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Ukrainian Migration to Europe: Policies, Practices and Perspectives

This issue of Central and Eastern Europe Migration Review (CEEMR) is dedicated to migratory flows from one of the largest source countries for the European Union (EU). Almost a decade ago, Düvell (2006) even referred to Ukraine as Europe’s Mexico. Ukraine indeed seems to have the second-largest migration corridor in the world, the US–Mexico corridor being the largest (Migration Policy Centre 2013). This comparison, however, refers more to the migration corridor between Ukraine and Russia. Estimates of the migration flows between these two countries are really impressive, though they vary greatly between fewer than 100,000 and more than 3.5 million (Migration Policy Centre 2013). One of the explanations for the great disparity between these estimates is the lack of migration regulations (it is a visa-free regime for Ukrainians in Russia) and significant undocumented migration. When it comes to migration from Ukraine to the EU, the general pattern and the numbers seem to be different. There is no doubt that estimates of Ukrainian migrants in Europe might also be somewhat imprecise, due to the lack of a fully standardised definition and to the specifics of migrant statistics in member-states. Notwithstanding significant undocumented migratory movements, due to its visa policies, the EU obviously has more instruments for regulating and registering the inflow of Ukrainian migrants. Here the estimates from different sources vary at around 1 million. According to Eurostat (2011, 2014) Ukrainian nationals currently represent the fifth-largest migrant group in the EU (after Turks, Moroccans, Chinese and Indians). Eurostat (2014) puts the total number of Ukrainian residents currently living in the EU as high as 634,851 persons. Given the high numbers of Ukrainian nationals (and the Ukrainian-born) living in Europe, the dearth of academic books and mono thematic issues of scientific journals focused on Ukrainian migration is striking.

Since the 1980s there has been a growth of both popular and academic interest in a writing genre called ‘migrant literature,’ where authors with direct experience of leaving their home country describe their lives in new and often strange socio-cultural settings. Novels, short stories and plays in this literary genre often highlight the same themes as academic studies of migration. To date, there are few Ukrainian authors who have reflected their migration experiences in their writing. However, apart from the successful Ukrainian-origin British novelist Marina Lewycka, it is hard to name a single Ukrainian author who has articulated migration experience to international acclaim. This point, perhaps, helps to explain why the theme of Ukrainian migration has been somewhat neglected, both within Ukraine and elsewhere, despite its social, cultural and political importance. Fortunately, academic researchers have been busy mapping out the story of Ukrainian migration to Europe over the last three decades, using both ‘hard data’ and migrants’ own stories. In this special monothematic issue of the CEEMR, the fruits of this empirical scholarly research are presented together to provide the journal’s readers with an overview of Ukrainians’ experiences of migration in a variety of national contexts and from a range of perspectives.
The current situation in Ukraine

It is important to mention from the outset that preparation of this monothematic issue started before the Ukraine’s Maidan protests of late 2013. Therefore, the articles presented here pay only limited attention to the changing current economic, political and social situation, factors that are likely to influence Ukrainian migration patterns both domestically and internationally. On the one hand, more than three months of large civic protests violently suppressed by the incumbent Ukrainian regime eventually resulted in a change of president and government and gave Ukrainians a promise of smoother European integration, linked with freedom of movement within the EU. On the other hand, the involvement of the Russian Federation in domestic Ukrainian politics destabilised the situation even further, leading to military conflict in the eastern part of the country. The Russian annexation of the Crimea and the military aggression of pro-Russian (in fact Russia-backed) separatists, especially in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of the Donbas region, resulted in military and civilian casualties and the exodus of civilians from the conflict zones.

Many Ukrainian and international experts have already expressed their concern about the exodus of civilians fleeing the various war zones. According to estimations by the UNHCR published on 23 July 2014, the number of internally displaced people in Ukraine is over 100,000. Approximately 90 per cent of people who moved to safer locations within the country are from Eastern Ukraine, and the rest left Crimea following its annexation by Russia. The number of cross-border movements is also very high. The Russian Federal Migration Service reported that around 142,000 Ukrainian citizens were sheltering in Russia and about 42,000 had requested political asylum. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) also reported that the number of applications from Ukrainian asylum-seekers in the EU reached 1039 in June 2014.

The conflict in Ukraine is not over yet and it is hard to make any definite prognosis. One thing that is clear is that many Ukrainian refugees from Donbas and Crimea will a) not be able to return home due to the destruction of property and infrastructure and b) may not be willing to do so because of security concerns and the lack of job opportunities. Experts have already forecast a second exodus from the Eastern regions when the current conflict ends. In short, notwithstanding the immediate humanitarian crisis, the displacement of Ukrainian citizens because of conflict in 2014 will have a substantial impact on the national economy and will constrain government reform plans. The attitudes of Ukrainians towards their internally displaced compatriots represent an important avenue of future research because there is a risk of growing intolerance and social conflicts.

The research articles presented in this special issue provide a snapshot of Ukrainian migration to various parts of Europe prior to the events of late 2013 and 2014; they represent the experience of Ukrainian migrants over a longer period. While the political landscape has changed, the impact of previous patterns of migration from Ukraine will undoubtedly shape future patterns and behaviour in critical ways. For this reason, the seven articles in this issue are important: they help to set the scene for Ukrainian migration in the post-Maidan era.

Overview of the studies in this special issue

The opening article, by Marta Jaroszewicz and Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, examines the current state of Ukraine’s emigration policy. The authors’ main aim is to find an answer to the key question posed in the title of the article: Does Ukraine Have a Policy on Emigration? After a systematic and critical analysis, their final verdict is negative. The authors claim that, in spite of the substantial outflow of Ukrainian population and a growing awareness of the fact that this outflow might affect the future development of the country, Ukrainian policy-makers’ response to emigration is insufficient. Acknowledging the positive examples of bilateral
agreements and some successful legislative measures in the area of labour migration (e.g. measures to avoid double taxation, the recognition of qualifications and the transfer of remittances), the authors believe that the preparation of a comprehensive government programme regulating emigration and a focus on assisting returning Ukrainian migrants are hindered by the country having no dedicated state agency for migrant affairs and insufficient political interest. This article is enhanced by a fascinating study of interest groups – including the diaspora and non-governmental and religious organisations – and their impact on migration policy and practice.

The second article, by Ignacy Jóźwiak, presents the results of ethnographic research conducted in the small town of Solotvyno in the Transcarpathian region of Western Ukraine. This case study has two goals: 1) to present, acknowledge and understand the daily life practices of people living in a Ukrainian border region characterised by social and economic hardship – i.e. the disintegration of industry, a lack of infrastructure, unemployment, significant emigration, etc., and 2) to discuss important border-related social phenomena. The article explores the role of the state border in changing political circumstances and how this impacts on cross-border contacts and daily life practices. There is also discussion of the ethnic identity of the inhabitants of this Ukrainian–Romanian borderland.

The third article in this special issue examines the role of neighbourhood ties and social networks among Ukrainian circular migrants in Poland. The author, Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruíz, who based her analysis on the data from the respondent-driven sampling in the Polish capital city of Warsaw and its suburbs, showed that the social relations of Ukrainian migrants in a given area are formed by kinship and ethnic ties not related to this area. The author argues that Ukrainians do not tend towards spatial concentration. This finding is explained by the fact that being constantly on the move, circular migrants generally have poor contacts with native Poles (not only in the neighbourhood) and most of their ethnic social ties (often formed before migrating to Poland) are related to job opportunities rather than to place of residence (which is often changing). According to the author, the existence of the small ethnic clusters could be explained more by structural factors than by the personal preferences of Ukrainian migrants. The author sums up her analysis by noting that the dependency of circular migrants on dispersed transnational networks and the lack of interest in the local community could have important policy implications – it might hamper the integration of circular migrants on the local level.

The fourth article authored by the editor of this issue, analyses education–employment mismatch among Ukrainian labour migrants in the Czech Republic. Using data from two national migrant surveys, I challenge the stereotype of the typical Ukrainian migrant: university professors laying bricks or digging roadside trenches. This study suggests that the Czech Republic attracts Ukrainians with widely differing levels of education. Many of the migrants surveyed did not complete secondary education. At the same time, an analysis of the educational and occupational structure of migrants in comparison to the majority Czech population provides evidence of a significant waste of Ukrainian human capital. According to this research, every fifth Ukrainian migrant faces the risk of having a job where most of his or her fellow employees have a lower level of education. This waste of human capital tends to be persistent. Even if relatively well-educated, Ukrainians have the highest odds for occupying unskilled jobs in the Czech Republic and they tend to get stuck in these jobs. This education–employment mismatch cannot be explained by migrants’ personal characteristics, language skills, problematic legal status or low formal education.

The fifth article, by Francesca Alice Vianello, also studies the problem of the waste of human capital among Ukrainian migrants. This study is based on in-depth interviews conducted in both source and destination countries and explores the experiences of migrant women from the L`viv, Ivano Frankivsk and Chernivtsi regions of Ukraine working in the domestic and care sectors in the Veneto region of Italy. The main focus here is these Ukrainian women’s subjective perceptions of their own downward mobility. In her
article, Vianello analyses life trajectories of migrant women with a special emphasis on responses to their declining social status. One of the interesting findings is the claim that Ukrainian women employed in the Italian domestic and care sectors often experience a double process of downward mobility: prior to migration and in the destination country. As the author’s analysis of the personal stories of well-educated Ukrainian migrant women suggests, the second devaluation of skills in the country of destination is mitigated by two main strategies: a) social skidding, when migrants working in the domestic sector avoid working for poorly educated and working-class families and b) weakening the hierarchy within the labour setting, when migrants seek an informal and respectful relationship with their employers.

The penultimate contribution to this special issue, by Renáta Hosnedlová and Mikolaj Stanek, discusses the transnational behaviour of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. Using data from Spain’s national immigrant survey, this study examines how different factors affect three main areas of transnational activity: 1) making visits home to Ukraine, 2) pursuing indirect contacts with compatriots, and 3) sending remittances home. The evidence presented reveals the importance of gender roles on Ukrainian migrants’ transnational activities. Ukrainian women are more intimately and emotionally involved with other family members through indirect contacts. In contrast, men tend to focus on their role as breadwinner by providing financial support more frequently. This article highlights the crucial role of the family location (separation from spouses or partners and children) in defining the intensity of contacts with the country of origin. The authors also show that the legal status of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain has a significant impact on patterns of transnational behaviour where undocumented migrants, who cannot travel home to Ukraine, tend to compensate for this constraint by a) having more frequent indirect contacts and b) sending remittances home more often.

The final article looks at Ukrainian migration to Portugal. Here Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Sónia Pereira and Alina Esteves discuss the facilitating role of migrant networks. The authors examine the dynamics of this relatively recent trend in Ukrainian migration; in spite of the rather insignificant historical linkage between the countries, Ukrainians have today become the second-largest migrant group in Portugal. Based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, the article describes the basic features of this migration and its future prospects and provides an insight into the functioning of the so-called ‘migration industry’. Examination of the role of networks in promoting Portugal as a destination for Ukrainian migration involves the study of different actors, including lawyers, travel agents, recruiters, intermediaries, organisers, brokers, and even semi-legal and criminal organisations. This research highlights some interesting dynamics in Ukrainian migrants’ social networks: developing from somewhat instrumental ‘travel agencies’ primarily facilitating migration to Portugal in the early stages to the quite active social networks which play such a crucial role in assisting and maintaining migration and providing positive feedback to others in later years. In their concluding remarks, the authors acknowledge that, after a period of very rapid expansion followed by decline, Ukrainian migration to Portugal seems to have stabilised and exhibits an overall tendency towards permanence.

Concluding remarks

The articles included in this special issue examine both the situation in Ukraine as a sending country and migrants’ experiences in the different destination countries. The country-specific contributions combine research methods and use various data sources to describe different aspects of migration and migrants’ integration, focusing particularly on emigration policies, migration-related practices in the border region, neighbourhood ties and the spatial concentration of migrants in the destination country, over-education through migration and migrants’ perceptions of their downward mobility, the role of migrant networks and the transnational practices of migrants. A common theme in all of the articles of this special issue is that
Ukrainian migration to the EU deserves more attention. Ukraine’s destiny is very important to the EU not only because of common borders, the country’s potential accession to the EU, and concern about growing numbers of asylum-seekers from Ukraine stemming from the recent conflict. Ukraine was, is, and undoubtedly will always be part of the European cultural region, connected geographically, historically, economically and politically, and through processes such as international migration.

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This issue is dedicated to the brave people of Ukraine, who have not been afraid to risk their lives in the struggle for a better future for their children and grandchildren.

Glory to Ukraine and its heroes, alive and fallen!

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Notes

1 The great variation in the estimates could also be partly explained by the fact that the number depends on the defining criterion (i.e. country of birth or citizenship), the method and timing of data collection (register versus census data) and the overall quality of Russian national statistics on migration.

2 The preparation of this issue was initiated by researchers in the large interdisciplinary International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe (IMISCOE) network who specialise in Ukrainian migration (http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/projekt/2130/). Earlier drafts of some country-specific articles in this special issue will appear in a forthcoming book entitled: Beyond Circulation? Ukrainian Migration to the European Union.

3 A map with the statistics and a detailed overview of the population displacement by region, as of 23 July 2014, is available online at: http://unhcr.org.ua/attachments/article/1244/ukrdisplacementunhcrocha20140723.pdf. Data collected from local authorities and NGOs are likely to be incomplete and the statistics for the Luhansk oblast are missing.

4 The data are from the same source as in Note 3. In view of Russia’s geopolitical interest and its involvement in Ukraine’s current crisis, the data reported by the Russian Federal Migration Service should be interpreted with caution.

6 Oleh Pokalchuk, a social psychologist, highlighted these issues in an interview on Radio Era in Ukraine: see http://eramedia.com.ua/article/204588-voseni_ukran_sld_chekati_drugu_hvilyu_pereselellya/). In predicting the second wave of displacement, he emphasised that there are differences in both culture and political attitudes between the inhabitants of the Eastern regions and the rest of Ukraine.

References


Does Ukraine Have a Policy on Emigration? Transcending the State-Centered Approach

Marta Jaroszewicz*, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz**

This article examines the current state of Ukraine’s policy towards emigration. The authors seek to transcend the state-oriented approach, highlighting the role that diaspora and non-governmental organisations played in accelerating the process of policy formulation in this area. Explanations are provided for the Ukrainian state’s failure to actively implement a consistent policy on emigration. A historical overview of the legal and institutional developments shows that the issue did not have much priority during the first two decades of the country’s independence. It emerges that external pressure from the EU and non-state actors was needed to elaborate a set of guarantees for Ukrainian emigrants. Since 2011 a series of legislative initiatives have been launched, whose effectiveness is in doubt as long as the country does not overcome the larger challenges of territorial integrity and financial stability. The authors argue that for the Ukrainian policy towards emigration to be effective, opportunities need to be created for the permanent consultation and involvement of diaspora and non-governmental organisations.

Keywords: Ukraine, diaspora, emigration policy, Europeanisation

Introduction

The continuing emigration of Ukrainians is an issue that needs to be dealt with by the Ukrainian government. Fuelled by several waves of emigration over the past 150 years, a large Ukrainian diaspora can be found in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Russia, and other post-Soviet states. The emigration has accelerated since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to official statistics, around 2.5 million Ukrainian citizens left the country in the years 1991-2004, mostly permanently (National Statistical Service of Ukraine). According to the most conservative estimates, the current stock of Ukrainian labour migrants abroad totals around 2 million people (Jaroszewicz, Strielkowski, Duchac 2014).

Numerous academic studies and empirical data show that the sending countries have very limited instruments to influence the position of their citizens abroad. However, some opportunities for elaborating an effective emigration policy appear if the neopluralist approach is adopted, which considers not only the activities of the government but also investigates the influence of different non-governmental interest groups including diaspora communities. Besides instruments aiming to stimulate the inflow of remittances or return
migration, other innovative approaches to emigration include: the institutionalisation of the relationship between the state and diaspora communities and extending some economic and political rights to the emigrants.

This article examines the emigration policy of Ukraine, broadly understood. This includes the policies as pursued by the state government as well as by different interest groups, including diaspora, non-governmental and religious organisations. The article states that while Ukraine has not yet fully formulated its policy on emigration, it has developed some instruments (e.g. the status of ‘foreign Ukrainians,’ a national programme to safeguard the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad, and consultative centres where migrants may receive advice). The current absence of a comprehensive emigration policy can be attributed to: the early stage of developing migration policy as such, a long-standing institutional crisis in the country, a lack of interest for migration issues among the political elites, the ideological and political differences between the ruling elite on the one hand and representatives of Ukrainian diaspora and new emigration on the other, as well as financial constraints. However, civil society may manage to persuade the national authorities to speed up the process of formulating a state policy on emigration. A recent discussion in Ukraine on a draft law regarding external labour migration was in fact initiated by non-state actors.

The paper reviews the Ukrainian emigration policy from several angles. Firstly, it considers the theoretical foundations of policies with regard to own nationals abroad and examines two case studies (Poland, Mexico) of countries with high emigration dynamics and different emigration policies, which Ukraine could draw on. Secondly, the evolution of Ukraine’s emigration is examined against the background of the country’s overall migration policy, with a particular focus on the Europeanisation and modernisation of laws and institutions. Then, the article reviews relevant policy documents and presents the main actors and their positions and interests. Finally, conclusions are drawn as to the further development of Ukrainian emigration policy.

It is too early to tell how the recent political crisis in Ukraine, which ushered in a change of government in the wake of mass social protests and saw the Russian military intervention in Crimea, will affect the country’s migration policy and the policy on emigration in particular. However, we may safely assume that these events will further compound the ethnic and political challenges facing the Ukrainian state (i.e., the rise of inter-ethnic alienation, new attitudes towards the diaspora and emigrants, the relationship with Russia and the impact of Russia’s policy towards Ukrainian citizens on Ukrainian territorial integrity and its emigration policy). If the current political crisis continues and the new government fails to overcome the economic problems, then the Ukrainian policy-makers may find themselves facing a new surge in emigration, alongside the complex issues of maintaining working relations with the Russian Federation, seeking to protect the Ukrainian citizens in Russia and Russian citizens in Ukraine, and preserving national unity inside the country. This research also attempts to analyse possible consequences of the ongoing political crisis in Ukraine for the country’s migration policy.

### Review of emigration policies

#### Definitions and theoretical background

An emigration policy is a set of principles and actions that a sending country applies to its citizens who emigrate to another country. Unlike immigration policy, in case of emigration policy the migrants are out of reach of the sending state’s jurisdiction, which significantly reduces the state’s ability to influence the emigrants’ behaviour. In theory, for a state the most efficient method to conduct emigration policy is to apply exit controls of its own citizens and to decide which categories of citizens may leave the country and which may not. Obviously such an emigration policy would violate the internationally accepted human right to
leave one’s own country. Most Western European states abolished restrictions on emigration in the ninet

teenth century, hand in hand with the development of capitalism and liberalism (Zolberg 1999). However,
a ban on emigration served as one of the means to prop up the Soviet regime in the twentieth century (Light
2012), and some authoritarian states like Turkmenistan and Belarus still applied the practice of limiting emi

giration as recently as several years ago. In fact, some restrictions on leaving the country (for instance for
debtors) are still used to control political dissidents there (Jaroszewicz, Szerepka 2007).

Nowadays states rely on much more sophisticated instruments of emigration policy. They include, inter
alia: maintaining contacts with emigrants abroad through consulates and cultural and educational institu
tions; devising a system of social benefits for emigrants; enabling emigrants to actively influence the social
and political situation in a sending country; implementing a policy aimed at stimulating return migration and
supporting the reintegration of returned citizens. The traditional, but particularly important role for develop
ing states, is the sending state’s role in protecting its citizens rights’ abroad, including fundamental human
rights but also rights related to labour market and social policy. This aim can be achieved through compre
hensive consular and diplomatic protection, but also by entering into bilateral agreements on labour migra
tion and social protection between sending and receiving states. However, a sending state must be very
careful in defining how it understands the protection of its citizens’ rights aboard, so as not to interfere with
the right of the receiving country to protect and maintain the equality of all the population groups within its
borders.

There is currently much attention for the development and migration nexus, e.g., how the state may influ
ence that remittances sent by emigrants are spent in the most effective way with a view to sustaining the
development of local communities; how to promote an effective utilisation of skills and new ideas brought
by migrant returnees; and how to link emigrants’ economic activities abroad with the development of the
sending state (Cariño 1987; de Haas 2007). Moreover, one should also mention the state’s policy on diaspora,
by which we mean a sending state’s policy regarding a group originating from that state and/or in the long
run oriented towards the ‘homeland’ in different ways (Gamlen 2008; Vertovec 2005). In general, research
ers agree that essential features of diaspora are: dispersion to two or more locations, an unceasing orientation
on the ‘homeland’, and maintaining a group identity over the course of time (Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001).
A diaspora may also be at different stages of formation. It can include temporary immigrants who retain the
citizenship of a country of origin and plan to return there, as well as distant descendants of immigrants who
may actually have never visited their ‘homeland’.

High emigration dynamics in a particular state does not automatically entail the need to pursue an active
emigration policy. Particularly at the beginning of an emigration wave, sending countries may perceive pop
ulation departures as beneficial and decide not to react since emigration means getting rid of demographic
surplus, easing unemployment and social tensions in the labour market, and it creates an inflow of remittanc
to boost the national economy (Lesińska 2010; de Haas 2007). However, at some point of continuous emi
gration, it becomes necessary to establish efficient channels enabling migrants to transfer remittances and to
put in place conditions for labour migrants’ regularisation in the destination states. It is either the government
itself, an interest group (employees, NGOs, etc.), migrant communities or the public opinion that pushes the
state authorities to formulate a policy response to those challenges. Finally, when labour emigration becomes
unprofitable from a demographic point of view and becomes an important topic in political debate, a state
usually starts to pursue an active policy towards returning migrants.

In our research we aim to omit a realistic state-oriented approach towards emigration policy. The state
-oriented perspective presumes that a state is the main actor in international relations and that it competes
with other states for power and influence to achieve its national interests, also in relation to human capital
including migrants (Fitzgerald 2005). Applying only the realist approach would not be appropriate to inves-
tigating contemporary emigration policies in which the sending state has very limited possibilities to actually influence emigration. To be able to study emigration policy more broadly requires a neo-liberal, pluralist approach. A pluralist approach assumes that non-state actors, including local authorities, emigrant organisations, churches, international organisations and even local communities may influence and develop emigration policy. They can do so both by affecting state policy and at times also directly, as when local authorities seek to create efficient incentives for returnees (de Haas 2010). Moreover, a sending country’s emigration policy may actually be significantly influenced by the immigration policy of a destination state as it either seeks to stimulate or prevent immigration. It is also important whether a destination state tolerates irregular migration or attempts to receive only documented migrants, as well as whether it opts for temporary or settlement migration. The decision-making process in emigration policy that comprises so many actors may be complicated and contradictory, so that in the final stage it may result in policy outcomes that are different from those that were planned at the beginning.

This study is furthermore based on the findings of the so-called transnationalism, which investigates the movement of people across different state borders through the prism of groups of immigrants (Vertovec 2005). Transnationalism has been defined as the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and country of settlement (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994). These social ties may concern not only people but also institutions that can influence the policy of both the sending and receiving states. In the current era of globalism and transnationalism there are large groups of people whose everyday life depends on international connections and the policies of different states. An inevitable aspect of transnationalism, and a consequence of emigration policy, is the issue of multiple citizenship. In the past, a plural nationality was perceived as an irritant in international relations which complicated the issue of citizens’ loyalty and diplomatic protection (Aleinikoff 2002). However, in the last twenty years states have shown a greater willingness to tolerate multiple nationalities, recognising that a person may maintain links to more than one state and can benefit the development of those states.

Examples of emigration policy

In the following sub-section we discuss two examples of emigration policy of states representing different geographical locations but with a high relevance for Ukraine as a state which faces the dilemma of whether to build a genuine emigration policy. Firstly, we discuss the emigration policy of Poland, as a country that not only neighbours Ukraine but is similar to Ukraine in that it has been characterised by a high level of emigration throughout most of its history. Secondly, the geographically distant case of Mexico is presented. Ukraine is surrounded by two poles of attraction to migrants (the EU and Russia), and lacking adequate capacity to effectively stimulate return migration it might be able to build on the experience of Mexico, which for centuries has lived in an asymmetric relation with the United States and at the same time is the main ‘supplier’ of work force to the US.

Poland, a country with a long emigration tradition and now facing a depopulation challenge, has focused its emigration policy on two aspects: repatriation based on an ethnic criterion and policy towards return migration. Poland’s repatriation schemes directed towards persons of Polish origin (mostly in non-European parts of post-Soviet area) have been state-organised and state-financed, but due to financial constraints have never achieved significant volumes. The Polish policy towards return migration has become an issue of particular concern taking into consideration the massive outflow of Poles that took place after 2004 when Poland entered the European Union (EU) (Fihel 2011). However, it is also more difficult to assess the efficiency of Polish emigration policy since the government in Warsaw has decided to apply a reactive rather than an active policy on return, i.e. not stimulating return migration but creating a general framework for
migrants’ return and integration, if it happens (Szczepański 2012 Lesińska 2013). We may assume that the rationale behind that decision was that the income gap between Poland and the main destination countries for Polish emigrants was so significant that even the best tailored emigration policy would not induce migrants to return. Therefore Poland has addressed return migration in several ways: by providing migrants with an easier access to Polish consulates; by introducing special tax regulations to avoid double taxation conflicts for returning migrants; by arranging special services for those who wish to return; by conducting information campaigns on job opportunities in Poland; by recognising diplomas and qualifications acquired abroad; and by facilitating the school integration of returned pupils and others. At the regional and local levels, a few local governments have launched information campaigns encouraging return migration (Szczepański 2012).

Mexico may be considered the country with the longest emigration policy in modern history. Over the last century the overwhelming majority of Mexican emigrants have headed towards the United States, creating a so-called asymmetric interdependence in the relationship between the two countries (Keohane, Nye 1977) that favours the United States. Under these unfavourable conditions, Mexico had been pursuing an active, even if ineffective, policy on emigration, stimulating some social groups to leave and attempting to keep other groups inside (Fitzgerald 2005). Over time, the emigration policy of Mexico became more liberal with the central government staying ‘neutral’ towards emigration and focusing on the inflow of remittances, while local governments became actively involved in the organisation of emigration schemes to the United States. However, in the last two decades the Mexican authorities have attempted to implement a more sophisticated and multidimensional emigration policy. This change has included: attempting to actively influence US immigration policy by encouraging Washington to put an end to the undocumented labour of Mexican workers; the creation of a special police force to improve human rights conditions along the US border; the expansion of a consular presence in the US; and attempts to shape the American public opinion (Gonzalez 2001; Rosenblum 2004). These changes were to a great extent stimulated by both Mexican civil society and its diaspora in the United States (Delano 2012).

**Ukrainian state policy on emigration**

Despite high emigration dynamics in the last twenty years, Ukraine has neither formulated nor implemented an active policy on emigration. Several reasons may explain this. First of all, in the first years of independence Ukrainian state institutions as well as non-state actors were too feeble to propose any policy solutions in response to spontaneous mass migration, particularly at such a sophisticated level as a policy directed towards non-present co-citizens. Secondly, at that time Ukrainian society had only just regained the right to move freely outside the country and had eagerly begun to make use of that privilege (Jaroszewicz, Szerepka 2007). Thus, any attempt to enforce emigration policy could have triggered adverse effects.

However, even after the political and economic situation in the country stabilised, and unlike neighbouring Moldova, Ukraine failed to design a long-term migration policy. Due to an institutional weakness, internal conflicts within the political class and the little interest that had been paid to migration issues, Ukrainian migration policy has remained in a stalemate for the last seven to ten years (with short interruptions when political conditions enabled some developments). Thus, the Ukrainian state’s migration policy has remained limited to some basic priorities, among others: the protection of asylum seekers and other persons in need of international protection to meet Ukraine’s international obligations, and the fight against irregular migration as a result of the EU pressure and Ukrainian security concerns (Malynovska 2010).
National instruments

The following section illustrates the long and uneven impact of civil society organisations and international pressure that resulted in the creation of a basic but rudimentary framework to regulate emigration. Among the achievements, we may note the evolving scope for state involvement in establishing safe conditions for migrants’ labour and social security and the increasing awareness among the decision-makers that the state needs to adequately respond to the emigration phenomenon. Among the most significant failures are the disbanding of the State Migration Service and the failure to adopt the Act on External Labour Migration. Unfortunately, the most serious crisis to face the Ukrainian state since independence, which has been ongoing since May 2014, does not offer grounds for hope that these issues are going to be addressed any time soon.

Even prior to the official declaration of independence, Ukraine affirmed the right of its nationals to take up employment while staying abroad, which represented a break with the Soviet Union’s tight exit controls. Article 10 of the Act on Employment of 1 March 1991 provided for the right to pursue occupational activities when temporarily staying abroad as long as the employment did not contravene the laws of Ukraine or of the destination country. Article 11 stipulated that the interests of citizens of Ukraine temporarily employed abroad shall be protected by bilateral agreements with the destination countries (Act on Employment 1991).

However, over the next few years the Ukrainian state did not attempt to address any problem facing its citizens residing abroad. Rudimentary objectives of Ukrainian emigration policy were elaborated only in the presidential decree, On Main Directions of the Social Policy for 1997-2000, of 18 October 1997 (Decree of the President of Ukraine 1997). This document addressed two aspects of emigration policy: the return of nationals deported during the Soviet period and the repatriation of ethnic Ukrainians. However, the issue of labour emigration was not considered.

The first decade of the 21st century brought about a flurry of legislative acts in the area of immigration and asylum; a process that was brought about by Ukraine’s protracted and complicated process of aligning its legislation with European and international standards. This also reflected the change in the character of migratory flows: while in the 1990s emigration was the dominant phenomenon, the following decade witnessed an increasing popularity of Ukraine as a transit destination for migrants from post-Soviet area, Asia and Africa bound for the EU. At the same time, the continued emigration of Ukrainians and the emergence of sizeable diaspora groups in several European states started to become an issue in the public debate. The need to regulate labour emigration received more attention in the subsequent strategic document, the presidential decree Main Directions of Social Policy until 2004, issued on 24 May 2000. This document reiterated the state’s obligation to protect the social and economic interests of Ukrainian workers while acknowledging the need to counter the brain drain and preserve the labour and intellectual potential of the country. For the first time, an official document recognised the urgency of establishing legal and socioeconomic grounds for regulating labour emigration (International Labour Organisation 2012: 12).

The objectives outlined in the 2000 presidential decree remained unfulfilled for the first few years as the issue of Ukrainian external migration continued to have a relatively low priority. The impetus for legislative action was the 2003 publication of a comprehensive report on the observance of rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman), Nina Karpachova. The report was followed by parliamentary hearings on the position of Ukrainian migrants, held in October 2004. Members of Parliament acknowledged the need to facilitate return migration and to create more favourable conditions for the investment of remittances in Ukraine. In effect, the Parliament turned to the government with a request to undertake a number of steps to improve the level of protection of Ukrainian migrants’ rights. In November 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the Programme on the Provision of Rights and Interests of
Citizens Going Abroad for Employment and Children Adopted by Foreigners. The document addressed several of the Ombudsman’s recommendations, declaring as priorities, *inter alia*, the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements on labour migration, introducing legal provisions to control intermediary agencies, and taking measures in the fight against human trafficking.

Some of the declared actions were made more specific in a sectoral strategy, responding to the looming problem of population decline. In 2006, the Ukrainian government adopted the *Strategy of Demographic Development until 2015*, implemented by Resolution N 382-p of 6 June 2007. With regard to external migration, the Strategy concluded that the scope of irregular migration could be reduced if incentives were created for legal employment both at home and abroad. The proposed measures included a stepping up of cooperation with the destination countries through the ratification of bilateral agreements on social security and labour migration as well as on work placement, arrangements for the recognition of certificates and qualifications, and seeking opportunities for larger national quotas for qualified Ukrainian workers. In parallel, the Strategy encouraged return migration through a combination of indirect and direct measures. Indirectly, return migrants would be drawn to Ukraine by the improved opportunities for setting up small businesses, the availability of new jobs, and incentives for internal migration. Direct assistance would consist of establishing a national database of job vacancies and a lowering of fees for the transfer of migrants’ remittances. Moreover, the government envisioned designing and implementing programmes for the reintegration of returning labour migrants into the Ukrainian labour market and society, jointly with international organisations (International Labour Organisation 2012: 13). However, these measures did not come into effect as no budget funds were allocated (Bogdan 2010: 22).

Already for many years, experts had signalled the problem of the absence of an overall migration policy concept that could define objectives of state activities, allocate responsibilities for dealing with the issue, and provide the basis for mid- and long-term planning (Chumak, Kazmierkiewicz 2009; Malynovska 2010). This position was affirmed by the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of 15 June 2007, which concluded that the national migration policy lacked a conceptual foundation and that its objectives, tasks and principles needed to be made explicit. As a consequence of this decision, a comprehensive Concept of State Migration Policy was to be worked out by the government. The first attempt was undertaken only in 2009 by a group of members of the Ukrainian Parliament. The document was kept at a general level and merely reiterated some of the declarations made earlier. With regard to external migration, it called on the government to develop programmes to facilitate the return of Ukrainian migrants and to create conditions conducive for the reduction of emigration and return of migrants. The proposal was deemed insufficiently elaborated, and was not considered by the Parliament (Malynovska 2010; Bogdan 2010).

The incentive to work out a document that would define the strategic objectives and allocate resources and responsibilities among competent government agencies was the dialogue with the European Union. In fulfilment of the obligations related to the dialogue on visa liberalisation, the President signed the Concept of State Migration Policy of Ukraine on 30 May 2011. Responding to the EU’s preoccupation with controlling irregular movement through Ukraine, the document focused on the area of immigration, border control and asylum, giving relatively little consideration to the reintegration and return of Ukrainian migrants. Among the Concept’s objectives in the area of emigration were *the creation of conditions for the reduction of emigration, return and reintegration of labour migrants, repatriation of Ukrainians and other people born in Ukraine as well as the strengthening of social and legal protection of Ukrainian citizens who stay and work abroad* (Coupe Vakhitova 2013: 63).

To fulfil the commitments laid down in the migration policy concept and to meet the terms of the first phase of visa liberalisation, in 2011-2013 work proceeded on a number of legislative acts in the field of migration management. The legislative and institutional changes to be adopted were enumerated in the *Opera-
Plan of Action for the Regulation of Migration Processes in Ukraine in 2011-2012 Years, issued as a government decree on 11 March 2011. With regard to the regulation of emigration of Ukrainians, the Plan mandated the following steps: amendment of the Act on Elections to make voting in Ukrainian elections possible abroad, simplification of consular registration, developing the strategy for the reintegration of returning Ukrainian migrants until 2015. In terms of institutional changes, the capacity of Ukrainian diplomatic establishments in key destinations of Ukrainian labour migrants was to be increased with dedicated labour and social security personnel.

Parallel with legislative reforms, institutional changes were introduced in 2010. They achieved varying degrees of success. The State Migration Service, established as a coordinating body for migration policy in 2009, initially remained ineffective due to unallocated budget and staff and was disbanded in 2010 with its responsibilities transferred to the Ministry of Social Policy, only to be re-established again in 2011. The renewed Service has been functioning successfully to date, performing all key functions in the area of migration policy implementation with the exception of regulating labour migration, which was the mandate of the Ministry of Social Policy. This function was in turn allocated to the State Employment Service in 2013 in accordance with the amended Act on Employment of Population.

On the other hand, the establishment of an advisory body with the power to initiate and implement state policy on the social protection of migrant workers has not met expectations. The Council for Labour Migration was established by a government decision of 12 October 2011 and its meetings were to bring together the key actors in migration management: the central government ministries, the Parliament, the Ombudsman, organisations of employers and migrant workers as well as trade unions. In line with the commitments undertaken as part of the visa liberalisation process, the Council was to be enlarged by including representatives of associations of Ukrainians abroad. However, its importance should not be overestimated as it has convened just three times so far.

The need for concerted efforts by the state and non-state actors to elaborate a framework for assistance to Ukrainians residing abroad was recognised during parliamentary hearings, conducted in November 2013. The Ministries of Social Policy and of Revenue and Duties were joined by representatives of diaspora organisations, deputies and experts at the event titled Ukrainian Labour Migration: Its State, Problems and Way to Solve Them. The occasion for the hearings was the submission of the draft Act on External Labour Migration, which in Article 5 defines the primary mechanisms of Ukrainian policy towards citizens undertaking temporary employment and their family members. Some declarations reaffirm earlier commitments, such as the creation of favourable conditions for voluntary return, social reintegration and the transfer of remittances, as well as for creating job opportunities on the domestic labour market. Attention is also paid to the necessity to improve the system of collecting and processing statistical information on migratory flows and to step up efforts devoted to researching the phenomenon. Another set of instruments (Article 7) covers international cooperation, involving foreign state and non-state actors in regulating migration and providing social protection to migrants, in particular envisaging the conclusion of agreements on the transferability of pension rights, avoidance of double taxation, and realisation of other migrants’ rights (e.g. education).

A novelty of the draft law is that it represents the first comprehensive attempt at enumerating and defining Ukrainian labour migrants’ rights, proposing that the Ukrainian state guarantee them. This way the Ukrainian authorities would undertake legally enforceable obligations with respect to their citizens abroad. An entire chapter, titled Rights and Social Guarantees, is devoted to state guarantees with respect to social security, family reunification, education and recognition of qualifications and protection of property. While the law does not offer additional protection, referring merely to the current constitutional and statutory norms, the explicit assertion that such legal guarantees extend to Ukrainian citizens residing abroad would be an im-
important cornerstone of a state policy towards its external migrants. However, for these guarantees to be truly effective will require enforcement mechanisms as well as stable funding for the responsible institutions.

Of even greater importance are several substantial commitments, which would meet some long-standing pleas of diaspora organisations as well as Ukrainian civil society organisations (notably, the charity organisation Caritas which is actively involved in migrants’ assistance). Firstly, Ukrainians abroad would be entitled to take part in national elections and referendums on equal terms with citizens residing in Ukraine (Article 11). Secondly, associations of labour migrants, established abroad, could operate in Ukraine and cooperate with state institutions and non-governmental and international organisations (Article 17). Thirdly, responsible state organs would be obliged by law to provide information to returning migrants on exercising their rights under national legislation and international agreements, as well as to recognise and certify their educational qualifications and professional experience (Article 20). Apart from these procedural guarantees, the Ukrainian state would offer certain financial benefits. Under Article 22, migrants’ personal property as well as certain items brought back from abroad would be exempt from customs duties. Ukrainian consulates would guarantee labour migrants and their families emergency support, while returning migrants who find themselves in difficult life circumstances would be entitled to social assistance, either from the state or from non-governmental organisations (Articles 16 and 15).

The draft law is certainly the most comprehensive and ambitious attempt to regulate the issue of state assistance to Ukrainian migrants abroad. However, as with earlier initiatives, it has not been effective and in fact the work on the law has ceased. The primary reasons for this are a disastrous public finance situation, which does not permit any additional state obligations, and the internal instability of the state, as well as uncertain prospects for international relations of the country.

International instruments
In light of the fact that the sending state has limited means of ensuring adequate protection of its citizens abroad, the application of international instruments, whether multilateral (conventions) or bilateral (agreements with host countries), takes on particular importance. This section provides an overview of agreements that Ukraine has concluded since independence to protect its migrants abroad.

In the 1990s a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements were concluded to deal with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers, concluded by the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, which includes Ukraine) on 15 April 1994, bound the parties to recognise the educational and professional qualifications of CIS migrants, to enable the transfer of remittances and avoid double taxation. Moreover, it introduced the general principle under which migrant workers would receive social security (including accident and sickness insurance) in line with the legislation of the host country. This principle was reiterated in the bilateral social security agreements that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet period (with Hungary, Mongolia and Romania) and those it signed in the first years since independence (with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Moldova). Simultaneously, Ukraine signed bilateral labour migration agreements with the main host and home countries of migrants within the CIS area: Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation. The agreements adopted the principle of the responsibility of the country of migrant’s residence with regard to the coverage of accidents and occupational sickness and provided for the automatic recognition of educational and professional certificates (International Labour Organisation 2012: 24).

As Ukrainian migrants increasingly explored new destinations – Central and Southern Europe – the need arose to regulate Ukrainian migrant workers’ labour and social security rights there. The first bilateral agreements to be concluded with the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia were quite
general and complex in application, but they did facilitate employment arrangements (quotas in the Czech Republic and seasonal employment in Poland). A case in point is the 1994 Polish-Ukrainian agreement on employment, which was never actually implemented in practice (Frelak, Kaźmierkiewicz 2005).

The second generation of bilateral agreements on labour migration and social security became a more effective labour migration regulation instrument. The primary incentives for their conclusion derived from Ukraine’s international commitments. The initial framework was laid down in the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Communities and their Member States, concluded in November 1994, which created a legal basis for the conclusion of social security agreements covering Ukrainian nationals legally employed in the EU. Furthermore, upon ratification on 16 March 2007 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers of 1977, Ukraine undertook the obligation of providing social security on equal terms for migrants and their family members and for local workers at home (International Labour Organisation 2012: 25). According to the Operational Plan of Action for the regulation of migration processes in Ukraine in 2011-2012, the conclusion of bilateral agreements on seasonal employment, social protection and pension security is a top priority for fulfilling the obligations under visa liberalisation processes with the EU.

According to an ILO study, while labour migration agreements concluded with Portugal (2003) and Spain (2009) do not effectively regulate labour migration or guarantee the rights of migrant workers as they merely represent a declaration of the partners’ intention to develop cooperation in the field of employment, social security agreements prove much more effective (ibidem). Such agreements were concluded first and foremost with the new EU Member States: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, but also significant are the respective agreements concluded with destinations in Southern Europe: Spain and Portugal and of negotiations with Germany.

Social security agreements provide for reciprocity of benefits, ensuring that the parties to the agreements make them equally accessible to migrants. Under the agreements, labour migrants are to be accorded the same rights and obligations as the host country’s nationals, and benefits acquired in one country may be transferred to another. The most tangible benefit to migrants is the working mechanism of transfer of pensions: in 2011, the volume of pensions transferred to Ukraine from abroad stood at USD 2.3 million and EUR 342,000 while Ukrainian pensioners residing abroad received USD 1.3 million and EUR 971,800 (International Organisation for Migration 2012: 26). This mechanism is of particular significance given the ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian pension system in which delays in payment are not uncommon, and the provision in the Ukrainian pension legislation (acknowledged as unconstitutional but long in force) that terminates the payment of pension to Ukrainians permanently departing from the country. Bilateral agreements with the countries of residence have been important instruments in addressing these domestic problems, and in the assessment of Ukrainian experts they encourage legal employment and provide incentives for migrant workers to return to Ukraine (International Labour Organisation 2012: 27).

On balance, the conclusion of these agreements can be termed a success on the part of Ukraine’s emigration policy, considering the unwillingness of many destination states for Ukrainian labour migrants to conclude such accords. As a rule, the transfer of social benefits is more costly for them than for Ukraine as social allowances in Ukraine remain at a rather low level. Thus, the transfer of social benefits from Ukraine to an EU member state has more symbolic than financial significance, enabling migrants to feel that their long-term working experience has been respected.
Policy on diaspora

The desperate economic situation in which Ukraine finds itself in early 2014 underscores the vital role that the diaspora could play in the reconstruction of the country. According to World Bank estimates, Ukrainians abroad transferred home USD 9.3 billion in 2013 alone, second to none in Europe (World Bank 2013). Remittances aside, the potential of the diaspora for closer engagement with the Ukrainian authorities was largely wasted as Victor Yanukovych’s government was at odds with the most powerful Ukrainian communities of North America and Western Europe, which strongly sided with the Orange Revolution (Schreiber 2010). Although opportunities to engage diaspora representatives in elaborating the country’s migration policy were gradually extended during the last years of the Yanukovych term, fundamental differences on strategic issues hampered progress in this area. The political upheaval of January 2014 could mark a new phase in the relations between the diaspora and the Ukrainian authorities, but it is too early to draw any firm conclusions yet.

The basic act regulating the relations between Ukraine and its diaspora is the Act on Legal Status of Ukrainians Abroad, adopted on 4 March 2004. The Law introduces in Article 1 the status of a ‘Ukrainian abroad’, granted to citizens of other states or stateless persons who are of Ukrainian ethnic origin, come from Ukraine or identify themselves as Ukrainians. Written certificates confirming the status are issued, authorising the holders to receive a multiple-entry visa to enter Ukraine, valid for five years and free of charge. Upon entry, they enjoy equal rights and responsibilities as Ukrainian citizens unless otherwise provided in the Constitutions, laws of Ukraine, or international treaties of Ukraine (Article 9 of the Law). Significantly, holders of the certificate may immigrate to Ukraine as a priority group without regard for immigration quotas, established every year by the government. The validity of the certificate, set in the Law at ten years, was extended, making it permanent, by the decision of the President of Ukraine of 3 March 2012. The amended law establishes annual quotas for the admission of Ukrainians abroad to state-funded schools of higher learning, and affirms the right to employment on equal terms with the citizens of Ukraine. Notwithstanding the benefits of the scheme, its appeal has been very limited. By 2012 only a little over 4 000 persons had received the status (Tolstokarova 2012: 9).

In October 2009 the Parliament of Ukraine organised for the first time in its modern history a series of hearings, dedicated to the issue of the Ukrainians living abroad, under the title Foreign Ukrainians: Current Situations and Perspectives for Cooperation. This event provided an opportunity to discuss the current situation of the Ukrainian diaspora, including the problems encountered as well as how Ukrainians abroad could be involved more in Ukrainian matters. A representative of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress remarked on this occasion that the hearing represented the first step on the way to providing a legislative guarantee of relations between Ukraine and the Diaspora (Ukrainian Canadian Congress 2009). Consequently, this major diaspora organisation submitted to the Parliament several recommendations aimed at developing the cooperation between Ukrainians abroad and their homeland, including: 1) to set up a permanent system of cooperation with diaspora leaders through regional offices of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) abroad and through a delegation of UWC representatives to the Ukrainian Parliament, government and other relevant state institutions; 2) to adopt effective legislation concerning Ukrainians abroad and broadening of their economic, social and political rights in Ukraine as well as the passing of an Act on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and Ways to Protect their Rights and Freedoms; 3) to launch state-funded programmes for the development and support of Ukrainian studies, schools in the diaspora, scientific and research centres and to develop programmes popularising world-wide Ukrainian cultural, historical and spiritual heritage, contemporary achievements (...) with the purpose of improving the image of Ukraine in the world (ibidem).
The postulates of the Ukrainian World Congress were yet not taken into account by Ukrainian governments as of March 2014. However, some were incorporated in the already mentioned draft Act on External Labour Migration. Moreover, Ukrainian authorities created councils of organisations of Ukrainians abroad in around 30 Ukrainian foreign diplomatic missions (Tolstokarova 2012). A few reasons can be given for the state’s failure to involve the diaspora in Ukraine’s political, economic and social life. First of all, as said, the Ukrainian diaspora (or at least its most active part) has consistently advanced the issue of the national recovery of Ukraine, promoting the use of the Ukrainian language and opposing closer political and cultural ties with Russia (Konik 2010). Secondly, the Ukrainian government lacks sufficient financial resources to pursue an active long-term policy towards the diaspora. Thirdly, the weak Ukrainian state is not yet institutionally capable of proposing practical measures towards actively involving members of the diaspora in the political and social life of the country. This applies all the more so, given the risk that such an engagement may fuel opposition to the main directions of its foreign policy. The most recent case of Russia’s de facto annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea, ostensibly to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population, serves as a warning here.

Finally, it should be remembered that the Ukrainian diaspora resides not only in Central and Western European states and North America, but also in the post-Soviet space, mainly in Russia where the last Soviet census of 1989 counted 4.3 million inhabitants of Ukrainian origin. According to most conservative estimates, around 2 million of Ukraine’s citizens left permanently for Russia after the Soviet Union’s collapse. However, the Union of Ukrainians in Russia that was established in 1993 was practically terminated by the Russian authorities in 2012 with very weak opposition from the Ukrainian state (Kluczkovska 2012). There are no Ukrainian schools financed by the Ukrainian government in Russia. In such conditions Ukrainians residing there tend to assimilate quickly.

Another missed opportunity is the regulation of dual citizenship. Multiple citizenship has been allowed by many states that are characterised by high emigration, as an incentive for the emigrants residing abroad to contribute to the homeland’s economic and social development. Such a legal institution was introduced by neighbouring Moldova in 2007. However, there had been lively debates within the Ukrainian political class and expert circles on the rationality of providing such an opportunity to Ukrainian emigrants, and it was never approved. At the same time, Ukraine in practice tolerated dual citizenship. This is likely to change with the exacerbation of the political crisis due to the Russian intervention in Crimea as a draft law prohibiting and penalising dual citizenship was registered in the Ukrainian Parliament in February 2014.

Ukraine’s emigration policy and non-state actors

Ukrainian emigration policy in practical terms fits well with the pluralist neo-liberal perspective as presented in the first section of this article. Apart from international obligations and a certain Europeanisation that gave an impetus to the development of Ukrainian emigration policy, the other indispensable factor favouring reform was the activity of civil society organisations, the Greek Catholic Church and migrants’ communities, which have all been calling for a more proactive emigration policy.

Over the past twenty years of Ukraine’s existence as an independent state, Kiev has failed to overcome the immobility of its state apparatus and the weakness of public institutions. Several reasons can be advanced, such as the post-Soviet legacy with its focus on informal politics, patronage and corruption; the permanent political conflict within the Ukrainian state; the poor quality of the ruling elites (Kuzio 2012; Ryabchuk 2012). Weak elites and the absence of national unity have made the adoption of any ambitious law (like an Act on Labour Migrants) that would comprehensively alter a state system almost impossible. In 2005-2010, the political deadlock after the Orange Revolution caused by the unprecedented conflict between
President Victor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko resulted in a freeze on any migration policy development, even though emigration was a high level priority for both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko voters. In 2010, after Victor Yanukovych regained power, an active emigration policy started to be perceived by the governing elite as a necessary but risky instrument, given the prevailing anti-Yanukovych sentiments in the Ukrainian diaspora abroad as well as among Ukrainian labour migrants as such (Tolstokarova 2012).

Moreover, one should take into account the deep regional divisions between Western and Eastern Ukraine, with the more developed national identity and pro-European orientation and high propensity to emigrate among inhabitants of Western Ukraine, versus the more post-Soviet Russia-oriented population in the eastern part with a lower propensity for migration (Ryabczuk 2012; Olszański 2014). As a rule, EU-bound Ukrainian labour migrants originate from Western or Central Ukraine. These people, together with their national identity, visions of state and modern world, form either migrants’ organisations or more loosely organised networks that attempt to influence state policy on emigration.

In modern Ukraine there are two main non-state actors that influence the Ukrainian state’s emigration policy. These are: the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and Caritas, the charity organisation that is closely linked with UGCC and the Ukrainian World Congress whose role has been analysed in the previous sub-chapter. These organisations’ influence stems from the fact that they represent the Ukrainian national identity and as a rule are not well received in migrant communities that associate themselves more closely with Russian and post-Soviet identity. Therefore, UGCC and Caritas are mainly present, apart from in the Ukraine, in the EU member states as well as in the United States and Canada. In countries like Poland or Italy with significant ‘new’ Ukrainian immigration, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has been viewed by the migrants as not so much a Christian or Catholic denomination but primarily as a centre of Ukrainian identity (Ivankova-Steciuk 2012). UGCC churches in those states are treated by Ukrainian migrants as the principal location to hold meetings and address problems, including job searching. UGCC is particularly active in Italy, providing migrants with advice on their legal and job opportunities as well as offering shelter and financial assistance (Ivankova-Steciuk 2012).

The church plays an extensive role in building a network linking migrant communities and organisations. Thus, it serves as a voice for the diaspora community. This extensive experience that the UGCC has gained through its close links with migrants has enabled it to become one of the main actors to attempt to influence state’s policy on labour migration. UGCC and Caritas are the leading institutions that initiated work on a draft Act on External Labour Migration. Their position in the policy-making process is reflected in the fact that the head of the UGCC Commission for Migrants simultaneously holds the position of a Deputy Head of State Commission on Labour Migration (interview with a Deputy Head of State Commission on Labour Migration Hryhoriy Seleshchuk 2013).

Conclusions

Although the outflow of a substantial proportion of the population has been recognised by experts and governmental officials to be a matter of concern for Ukraine’s long-term development prospects, the Ukrainian policy-makers have been slow to acknowledge the need for a state response. The lack of a state agency that could lead the policy process (the State Migration Service was short-lived) and insufficient political interest (evident in the failure of the original migration policy concept to be considered in Parliament) has delayed the work on planning a comprehensive government programme for regulating external migration and assisting returning migrants.

Over the past decade, however, legislative foundations have been laid in several areas relevant to Ukrainian migrants’ needs. Ukraine has signed bilateral agreements on labour migration, social and pension securi-
ty and has ratified appropriate conventions, enabling migrants to avoid double taxation as well as to have their qualifications recognised and remittances transferred. The effectiveness of these agreements is however limited by the extent of irregular employment and the unwillingness of migrants to formally register their change of country of residence. Although legal and procedural conditions are in place, the bilateral schemes that could promote circular migration remain seriously underutilised.

A positive recent phenomenon is that the Ukrainian policy-makers have begun to acknowledge that an effective policy towards its own citizens abroad is impossible without involving diaspora associations, Ukrainian non-governmental organisations and research institutes. These stakeholders have been behind the latest and most ambitious effort to institutionalise migrants’ rights in a way that would be legally enforceable, thereby entitling Ukrainians abroad to a wide array of services provided by Ukrainian state institutions. Unfortunately, the ongoing crisis is putting enormous pressure on the Ukrainian state, relegating the issue of proper assistance to the diaspora and effective incentives to return to Ukraine to an indefinite future. At the same time, the looming danger of continued instability if not open internal conflict in the country has made the issue ever more pressing.

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Ethnicity, Labour and Mobility in the Contemporary Borderland. A Case Study of a Transcarpathian Township

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The article explores the connections between social, political, economic and ethnic processes in the Ukrainian-Romanian borderland. The aim is to describe how borderlanders work out strategies to overcome the contradictions inherent in the state border. The study is based on ethnographical fieldwork (participant and non-participant observation) conducted in a small town, a former mining centre, in the region of Transcarpathia in Western Ukraine. I point to the political changes in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (the collapse of the Soviet bloc and Ukraine neighbours’ integration in the European Union) and their impact on local social life. The crucial aspect, linked to the town’s geographical setting, is the role of the state border, which changes in accordance with the political changes in the region and in Europe. First, the collapse of the communist dictatorships in Ukraine and Romania resulted in the opening of the border and an increase in cross-border contacts. However, in the first decade of the 21st century, Romania tightened its passport and visa regulations for Ukrainian citizens. Another factor is the complete disintegration of the mining industry and local labour market, resulting in significant changes in occupational patterns and a greater role of the border in respect of labour migration and shuttle trade. I also acknowledge local ethnic composition and argue that the use of ethno-national symbolism, languages, relations between ethnic minorities and their ‘external homelands’ constitute an inherent element of the strategies to overcome the lack of regular employment and poverty.

Keywords: borderland, mobility, Transcarpathia, ethnic minorities, strategically situated ethnography

This article explores the correlations between social, political, economic and ethnic processes in the Ukrainian-Romanian borderland in the context of the European Union (EU) proximity and regional historical legacies. Some of these phenomena – border infrastructure (and its imprint in the local landscape), visa policies, local cross-border links and cooperation – can be seen as part of the wider processes associated with the eastern frontiers of the European Union in general. Others are consequences of the catastrophic economic situation in Ukraine – unemployment, low wages, labour migration. Finally, aspects of ethnic composition and language usage are primarily embedded in the regional and local context.

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The study is based on ethnographical fieldwork conducted in a small town (or to be precise, an urban-type settlement) in the region of Transcarpathia in Western Ukraine. In this article I focus on how the locally encountered daily life practices are shaped by the above-mentioned processes and contexts. I pay particular attention to changes of and at the state borders, as well as the consequences of economic and political developments in the region. Thus, I present local specificity as set in history and in political processes related to the European integration (EU expansion), cross-border neighbourliness as well as border and visa policies. I then argue that observed local strategies to overcome the lack of regular employment and poverty, including migration and shuttle trade, should be understood as a manifestation of individual and group agency under the conditions of an uncertain political and economic situation. Moreover, I claim that the use of the ethno-national symbolism, languages, relations between ethnic minorities and their ‘external homelands’ including the possible acquisition of Romanian and Hungarian citizenships constitute an inherent element of those strategies.

Writing about Transcarpathia, Judith Batt states that: *No one writing about Transcarpathia can resist retelling the region’s favourite anecdote. A visitor, encountering one of the oldest local inhabitants, asks about his life. The reply: ‘I was born in Austria-Hungary, I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I did my army service in Horthy’s Hungary, followed by a spell in prison in the USSR. Now I’m ending my days in independent Ukraine’. The visitor expresses surprise and how much of the world the old man has seen. ‘But no!’ He responds, ‘I have never left this village’* (Batt 2002: 155). In my study, I acknowledge not only the changing borders and citizenships in the course of the 20th century, but also the fact of living by the state border: it’s impact on daily life practices as well as its changing role over time. I also point to the phenomena of not only, to rephrase the anecdote quoted by Batt, ‘leaving one’s own village’, but also of doing so on a regular basis.

A town at the changing border...

Transcarpathia (or Transcarpathian District; Ukr. Zakarpats’ka Oblast’) is an administrative unit in Western Ukraine with its centre in Uzhgorod. The region borders on Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, as well as the Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Districts (Lvivs’ka Oblast’, Ivano-Frankivs’ka Oblast’) of Ukraine. Unlike the two latter (which in the course of history were a part of Red Ruthenia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Habsburg Galicia and Poland), the territories comprising Transcarpathia belonged to Hungary, Austria and the Hungarian part of Austro-Hungary from the Middle Ages until the First World War (WWI). After WWI they were ceded to Czechoslovakia, and in 1938 were annexed by Hungary, and in 1944 by the Soviet Union. The region is characterised by a mixed ethnic composition: apart from Ukrainians (and a difficult to estimate number of people referred to as Rusyns or Ruthenians), Transcarpathia is inhabited by Hungarians, Romanians, Roma, Slovaks, Germans, Russians and other nations of the former USSR.

Solotvyno (Rom. Slatina, Hung. Aknaszlatina) is a town (an ‘urban-type settlement’ – Ukr. selyshche mis’koho typu) of 10 000 inhabitants, situated in Tyachiv raion (a smaller administrative unit within oblast) by the river Tisa, which separates it from the town of Sighetu Marmăției (Sighet) in Romania.1 In terms of ethnicity, the official sources state that 60 per cent are Romanians, 30 per cent are Hungarians, and 10 per cent are classified as ‘Others’ – mostly Ukrainians (Molnár, Molnár 2005: 84). However, I believe that the statistics should be seen merely as a rough indication, as there are a significant number of ethnically mixed families, unmeasured in terms of population statistics, whose ethnic identity is either unclear or different from the one declared in the census. There have also been recent social and demographic processes influencing the ethnic composition and social stratification like emigration or the settling of ethnic Romanians from the neighbouring, wealthier villages of Nyzhna Apsha (Dibrova) and Bila Tserkva.
The built-up area of Solotvyno ends only tens of metres from the river, which forms the state border. Until the 1990s, the access line was demarcated by the posts and the no longer existing (dismantled) fence, while the border ran along the middle of the river, as it still does now. Nowadays, some of the blue-yellow concrete border posts stand just a few metres from the inhabited buildings, but they no longer delimit the accessible space as the river bank is easily approachable. The border on Tisa not only separates the two towns and countries: it also forms the outer limit of the European Union and will delimit the future Schengen Zone, while in the past it was an internal border, though by no means less protected, within the ‘Eastern Bloc’ (the Comecon, Warsaw Pact). It was only in independent Ukraine that crossing this border became possible, first by train from the nearby village of Teresva and only since 2007 (that is, already after Romania introduced visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens) across the Solotvyno-Sighet bridge. The river can also be regarded as a boundary, separating territories of common history and similar ethnic and linguistic composition. Crossing the bridge to Sighet, Solotvynians are required to apply for visas that are issued by the Romanian Consulate in the city of Chernivtsy, at a distance of 250 kilometres. Obtaining a visa requires two visits, and the visa cost is 50 euros. Carrying it does not guarantee permission to cross the border. That is one of the reasons why some people go ‘to Romania’ every day (mostly to the market in Sighet), while others have not been ‘there’ for over a decade, if ever. The frequency of visits is weakly associated with ethnicity – some Solotvynian Romanians know Sighet only from radio, television and others’ stories, while among those who go there a few times a week are both local Ukrainians and Hungarians.

From the beginning of its existence – and the oldest mentions can be found in 14th century chronicles (Makara 1982; Maryna 2001) – until the first decade of the 21st century, Solotvyno was a salt-mining centre (extraction stopped in 2010). Mines served as a main employer for the town and neighbouring villages. Nowadays they not only do not operate but are either collapsed or dismantled. The local landscape, which used to be of an industrial character with facilities and means of transport operating twenty-four hours a day, has turned into apocalyptic-like scenery of deserted ruins, the remains of the industrial ‘radiant past’ (Burawoy, Lukacs 1992). Apartment blocks (built by the Soviets) lack central heating, and roads and pavements have not been repaired or renewed for years. Some ‘Soviet’ buildings are deserted, some of the ‘new’ ones remained unfinished.

Facing a lack of regular employment, Solotvynians search for work abroad (mostly in the Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary) or in Ukraine’s big cities (Kyiv, Donetsk, Mariupol). This kind of mobility can be described as circular (see: Triandafyllidou 2010; Vertovec 2007; Wallace 2002). In this case, it means that migrant workers spend a certain amount of time in the place of destination without giving up their residence in Solotvyno. The proportion of time spent ‘here’ relative to the time spent ‘there’ varies. ‘There’ has no constant character; depending on the circumstances, the same people travel to different places that offer employment. Others focus on small-scale shuttle trade (see: Wallace 2002: 613), household farming or do small, seasonal work (renovations, chopping wood, harvesting, farming), fixing cars and household equipment for their comparatively wealthier friends and neighbours. This type of small work is unregistered and untaxed, and can often be described as mutual help rather than employment (see: Williams 2007). Nonetheless, it plays a significant role in sustaining many households and their budgets.

... and its ethnography

The ethnography of the narrowly defined site can contribute to the study of broadly defined issues. In the manner of the extended case method (Burawoy 2009) and strategically situated ethnography (Marcus 1995), I link the locally observed processes with wider phenomena of international political and economic issues and the way they impact ‘the local’. As Ido Tavory and Stefan Timmermans put it, ECM ties the ethnograph-
ic observations to outside forces (Tavory, Timmermans 2009: 254). In the case under study, these ‘outside forces’ may refer to the following: political changes in the post-communist countries (or the changes and breakthrough moments in Central Europe dating back to 19th century); the progressive European integration (the expansion of the EU), the economic situation and labour market in Ukraine, and the destination countries of emigration. Here, I refer to Stephen Castels’ attempt to link migration and mobility with social transformations (Castels 2010). Although my study is geographically bound to one particular site, it still carries some characteristics of multi-location as, to quote Candea: In the spirit of multi-sited ethnography, I followed people, stories, metaphors and debates through multiple spaces both within the village and without, with a constant attention to the way such spaces were constituted (Candea 2007: 173).

The visible collapse of the local mining industry and infrastructure which dominates the local landscape turns our attention to the context of political and economic changes and the decline of industry and public investments in the post-communist countries. The other outcome of those changes can be observed in the accessibility and porosity of the Ukrainian-Romanian border, which is also set in the wider issue of political changes in Europe, such as: the opening of the borders after the collapse of the ‘Soviet Bloc’ and the development of neighbourly relations between the new countries on the one hand, and imposing more restrictions on cross-border mobility in the course of some of these countries’ integration with the EU, on the other. The processes of securitisation and tightening the surveillance at its external borders, as well as labour migration and cross-border mobility provide the context of the outside, international and global conditionings of that particular site and its links to other places (such as destinations of mobility, the European capital cities and decision centres). State borders and international politics as well as the changes faced by industry and the patterns of employment observed in Solotvyno appear as implicated in what goes on in another related locale, or other locales, even though the other locales may not be within the frame of the research design or resulting ethnography (Marcus 1995: 110). The history of the region, with its political and territorial shifts, furthermore helps to embed the case study in macro-structures and to relate the site to the world as a whole, and to make historical connections between places, which in turn help us to advance in both our understanding of particular people and the refinement of theory (Lapenga 2009: 12).

The fieldwork, which the following article is based on, was divided into two main visits (although both were interrupted), the first from November 2009 till February 2010 and the second between November 2010 and May 2011. ‘Hanging out’ with the people I chanced to meet offered the opportunity of following Solotvynians in their daily life activities. During that time I accompanied the employees of one of the communal institutions in their daily duties (which left them plenty of time to share with me and to respond to my questions), car mechanics in their workshop, traders at the local market, and shuttle-traders in their cross-border visits. I was a guest during festivals, and ‘intruder’ during daily chores in the households. I walked, cycled, travelled by cars and a horse-cart. I spent hundreds of hours talking, listening and observing, and additional hours taking notes. My goal was to study ‘others in their space and time’ (Burawoy 2009: 75), to acknowledge and understand local inhabitants’ everyday practices, and to contextualise them within wider macro-structures. As Karolina S. Follies puts it after Carol Greenhouse, ethnographic fieldwork is a relational practice linking knowledge production to the historical and local specificity of experience (Greenhouse 2006: 187, cited from: Follis 2012: 214).

Ethnic minorities and the state (part 1): symbolism, languages, and inter-ethnic relations

Ukrainian symbolism, such as flags, emblems and maps placed on the facilities as well as the uniforms and insignias, is visible mostly at the border checkpoint. Ukrainian flags also fly at the two of the mine towers and, next to Romanian and Hungarian ones, on the local municipality building and the schools. Some street
names, including those given in the Soviet period (Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Franko, Taras Shevchenko, Kyiv), refer to Ukrainian traditions. So does the monument to Bohdan Khmelnytsky – which stands in front of the Romanian school, facing Romania. Ukrainian script is seen mostly on the street signs and official information boards. It is comprehensible to the inhabitants but not many are fluent in it. In daily life it gives way to Russian, which serves as the local lingua franca. This is the case even for the youngest generation, born and brought up in independent Ukraine (including students and graduates of Ukrainian classes). It can also be seen as a legacy of the mining industry and Soviet ethnic and linguistic policy. Most people I had a chance to interact with were sceptical of or reluctant towards the state language. A common justification was the lack of contact and impossibility of learning it at a proficient level. Sometimes reluctance towards the language was accompanied by scepticism about the Ukrainian state as such. It is worth mentioning that the people declaring Russian ethnicity or mother tongue form a barely significant number of inhabitants. What is more, the place is hundreds of kilometres away from the Ukrainian (or Moldovan) territories densely populated by Russian speakers. It also makes the language neutral, neither favouring nor discriminating local ethnic groups.

Unlike some Transcarpathian towns and villages inhabited by Hungarians, in Solotvyno there are no monuments or memorial boards referring to the Hungarian tradition or bilingual street names. Admittedly though, street name signs in any language are quite rare. Hungarian language is visible on the posters of the Hungarian Cultural Federation in Transcarpathia (Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség – KMKSZ), and it can also be heard on the streets. References to Hungarian history and culture are made mostly in direct oral statements, as individuals and entire families cultivate the memory of Hungarian past of the place and willingly talk about it.

With regard to Romanian symbolism, a statue of the Moldovan prince Stephen the Great and Holy (whose ancestors are believed to originate from northern Maramuresh) was erected in the centre of Solotvyno in 2012 after almost three years of preparations. The Romanian writer Mihai Eminescu, after a similar period of time, has only been honoured with an empty pedestal in front of the Romanian school. However, Eminescu has been honoured with a street name, and so has George Coșbuc. Romanian tradition is also cultivated through cultural events on the Great Union Day (commemorating the Union of Romania with Transylvania) and the Unification Day (the unification of Moldavia and Valahia into the Kingdom of Romania). None of these commemorated historical events concerned Solotvyno in terms of its geographical location. Participation in these celebrations is not ‘mass’, most of my interlocutors could not explain the meaning of these festivals and the statements regarding the ‘unity’ and ‘Romanianess’ of the territories on both sides of the Tisa were sporadic. Still, Romanian TV (especially music and entertainment channels) as well as radio and music (commonly played on mobile phones and passed around through Bluetooth) are highly popular.

Local inter-ethnic relations can be traced in the numerous mixed families as well as everyday interactions in the workplaces or public spaces such as streets, market and shops. In such a diverse environment, the number of ethnically mixed marriages is difficult to assess (but is unquestionably high), as is the category of ethnic belonging. This makes the ethnic boundaries blurred and the ethno-national categories arbitrary. Even those who declare a particular ethnicity have people of other ethnicities (kinsmen and relatives) in their families. Ethnic affiliation appears to be strictly declarative, and the category of mother tongue does not always apply. Notwithstanding family ties, friendships and neighbourly relations cross the ‘ethnic boundaries’, however, this does not mean that ethnicity goes unnoticed or does not play any role in local daily interactions. References can occur in conversations in the form of occasional jokes (sometimes accompanied by vicious remarks) or mentions of the history and (multi)national legacies of the town and the regions of Transcarpathia and historical Maramuresh. This is accompanied by a widespread knowledge and frequent use of the different languages. Despite Russian being a common language of communication, most people
I. Jóźwiak

I. Jóźwiak speaks or at least understands other ‘local languages’, with some switching fluently between Romanian, Hungarian, Russian and Ukrainian (with some being fluent in Russian, Hungarian and Romanian but not speaking good Ukrainian). Sustaining a conversation in the language it was started is common practice.

In the past, having the same job played an important role in sustaining inter-ethnic relations. According to my interlocutors, when the mining industry still functioned the shifts were ethnically mixed and the workers (not only miners) would pick up their colleagues’ languages by listening and asking about the meaning of certain words and expressions. Another aspect of coexistence was swapping the shifts so that the co-workers of different confessional affiliation (followed by the ethnic one) could take part in their religious holidays. As I was told by one of my informants, Nationality [Rus. natsionalnost] did not matter – we were all just workers. What emerged from my fieldwork is that even under the conditions of less regular, less stable employment and less organised labour (no longer playing the same role in Solotvynians’ life as it used to), people speaking different mother tongues and declaring different ethnic affiliations still work together, providing an opportunity to learn languages and maintain relations, regardless of ethnicity. This attitude could also be observed in leisure time (hanging out together, switching between languages) or occasional conversations in public places.

Following Fredrik Barth’s (1969) classic study of ethnicity as a form of social organisation and the related question posed by Katherine Verdery (1994) about the significance of certain types of differences (i.e. related to ethnicity, class, gender) and the boundaries that constitute the groups, in my study I suggest that neither languages nor ethnic self-identification play a central role. Various stereotypes are applied much more frequently to the ethnically Romanian villagers from neighbouring Dibrova and, to the lesser extent, Bila Tserkva. However, even if they are sometimes referred to as ‘those Romanians’ or ‘Romanians from Dibrova’, the most common form is just ‘Dibrovans’ or ‘those Dibrovans’. These stereotypes, which are commonly shared by Solotvynians of different ethnic identification and are not necessarily negative, are associated with their wealth and other local specificities, like strong family networks and a strong attachment to the land and to their villages of origin. What I describe in this sub-section contributes to the processes of ethnic differentiation as observed in the borderlands, where both state and ethnic boundaries are subverted and negotiated (Donnan, Wilson 1999). The attitudes towards Romania and Hungary with their inhabitants as well as Ukraine and Ukrainian citizenship, which also contribute to local ethnicity and differentiation, are elaborated in the next sub-section of the article.

**Ethnic minorities and the state (part 2): other states, other citizenships**

The difficult economic situation has fuelled criticism of the Ukrainian state and its political elites. However, Romania and Hungary are not necessarily seen as an alternative. The distance and scepticism towards Ukraine as a state are not accompanied by positive sentiments towards Solotvynian Romanians’ and Hungarians’ ‘external national homelands’ (Brubaker 1996). The EU’s ‘new iron curtain’ can take a form not only in tough border-visa regulations but also in the attitude of Romanian border guards and customs officers towards Ukrainian citizens (regardless of their ethnicity and fluency in Romanian). That makes ‘local Romanians’ averse to their ‘external homeland’ and its inhabitants. People travelling to Hungary have a much longer way to go, as the nearest border crossing to Hungary is 100 kilometres distant from Solotvyno (and the visas are issued in the towns of Uzhgorod – 160 km, and Beregovo – 115 km), and the destinations are mostly Nyíregyháza, Debrecen and Budapest, not the border cities. However, we can speak of the similar exclusion with the ethno-national factor being even more visible, as almost all people travelling to Hungary identify themselves as Hungarians. According to Solotvynians, though speaking the same language, having the same names and similar surnames, ‘Ukrainians’ are often treated by their uniformed co-ethnics from the
external homeland with an aloofness that sometimes turns into superiority and contempt (whereas the civilians’ attitude is much more diverse).\(^{10}\) These kinds of attitudes do not stop some of the Solotvynians – those who not only can afford passports and visas but also have a reason for such visits – from travelling to their ‘external national homelands’ to work, shuttle trade or visit relatives.

Another notable issue concerns citizenship. Although it is forbidden to possess dual or multiple citizenship in Ukraine, the state lacks the means to control and prevent the process of obtaining foreign passports by its citizens, who are obligated by law to give up Ukrainian citizenship when granted another (Shevel 2010). This makes it difficult to estimate the number of Ukrainians who do possess other passports (Shevel 2010: 16-17; Popescu 2008: 433). The citizenship policies of neighbouring countries and their impact on Ukraine and its inhabitants are also remarkable. The Hungarian law on citizenship, in effect from January 2011 (Act XLIV 2010), entitles the inhabitants of the historical Hungarian territories, regardless of their ethnicity,\(^{11}\) to apply for citizenship of Hungary (Toth 2010; Kovacs, Toth 2013). At the time of my fieldwork, it was too early to estimate the scale of this phenomenon in Solotvyno (I talked to four people who were planning to apply and one who was still unsure). According to the Romanian law, those who have relatives in Romania and the former citizens of the Kingdom of Romania as well as their families can apply for a passport (Iordachi 2013). (I met two people who had acquired Romanian citizenship and one family of five who were interested in it, but they assured me that the phenomenon is much more widespread). Importantly, the perspective of obtaining Hungarian or Romanian passports, which not only makes it easier to cross the bridge to Sighet or visit Nyiregyhaza but also enables people to travel to and work in most of the EU countries, was not always accompanied by any plan to work or settle in the respective countries. The efforts to obtain Romanian and Hungarian passports should be seen as part of a strategy for migration and to escape from poverty, rather than ethno-national ideology or the outburst of nationalism.

**Borders and mobility in uncertain times**

The collapse of communism in the USSR and its satellite countries signified a transformation of the national economies from state-planned into free market economies. Various scholars point to the free market economy and its associated belief in entrepreneurship, competition and private property as well as in freedom and democracy, as forming the new ideology in the new countries’ politics and shaping the new patterns of everyday practices (see for example: Burawoy, Verdery 1999). Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe was not a unified process, as the communist systems were not either. In the context of economic changes in Ukraine and their impact on Solotvyno, we should note the withdrawal of the state from its active role in the economy and the lack of public investments. This has resulted in the closing and collapse of the mining industry and other workplaces. For the residents, this has meant a lack of employment and regular income. The condition of the local economy also has an impact on the social mood and adds to the easily observed indifference, sometimes turning into reluctance towards the Ukrainian state. According to the commonly shared view, the entire industry and all the public institutions were developed during Austro-Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Soviet times. Czechoslovakia built water supply facilities and apartment buildings. The Soviets developed the industry, erected concrete blocks of flats with running water and central heating. But in independent Ukraine the workplaces were closed and the infrastructure devastated.

As a starting point for the analysis of the diverse nature of state borders and their impact on groups and individuals, I refer to the studies by Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson who treat borders as *signs of the sovereignty and domain of the state and markers of the (...) relations between a state and its neighbors (...) they are* records of a state’s relations with other states and with its own people (Donnan, Wilson 1999: 15) and point to various behaviours and meanings negotiated in the frontiers. State borders can also be linked to
global inequalities preserved under the conditions of ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ societies (Balibar 2004), serving as selective gates (which according to each particular situation can be either open or closed) and barriers for information, commodities, capital and people. With their selectivity, borders seem more open for capital and commodities than for people, who are treated unequally on the basis of their citizenship and wealth (Donnan, Wilson 2010; Smart, Smart 2008).

I understand borderland as a region and a set of practices defined and determined by the border (Alvares 1995: 448), where the state is subjected to subversion (Donnan, Wilson 1999: 4). According to Donnan and Wilson, borders can also serve as an indicator (a ‘litmus test’) of the processes applicable to the entire country as well as its international relations (Donnan, Wilson 2010: 3). [B]orderlands (...) have shown themselves to be zones of a remarkably wide variety of legal and illegal transborder economy and society. Whether it is in the form of such things as agricultural production and cooperation, labour migration, marriage, smuggling or just pure friendship, borders are punctured in myriad ways which often subvert the state’s international relations, the state’s own design for its borders (Donnan, Wilson 2010: 6-7). What is more, the studies of state borders, borderlands and mobility challenge the notion of separated cultures (Alvares 1995).

The mutual influence of the values, ideas, customs and shared economic relations of the borderlanders on both sides of the state border can also be associated with transnationalism (Donnan, Wilson 1999: 5), a process linked to circular mobility (Triandafyllidou 2010: 12) in which migrants operate in social fields that transgress geographic, political, and cultural borders (Brettel 2007: 120). In the process of transnational migration they maintain social relations in both, sending and receiving, countries (Schiller, Barsch, Blanc 1995). Stephen Vertovec highlights the importance of cross-border networks and the possession of dual citizenship as assets that increase one’s chances to circulate (Vertovec 2007). Applied to the studied case, these concepts link local cross-border mobility with labour migration to further destinations. They served as a barrier in the Soviet period and as a ‘selective gate’ after the collapse of the dictatorial systems on both sides. This political collapse triggered further processes which have led to the increased role of borders and the regulations of international mobility. The selective gate between Ukraine and Romania and the phenomena observed around the Solotvyno-Sighet border can serve as an example of something that is likely to take place on a wider scale. Local cross-border mobility provides us with the context of the mobility of Ukrainian citizens and the selectivity performed at its neighbours’ checkpoints. Queues of Solotvynians at the Solotvyno-Sighet bridge, waiting to visit their relatives on the other river bank or carrying goods to Sighet’s market, and groups of circular migrants travelling on mini-buses or private cars to Prague or Moscow appear to be two sides of the same coin.

The street market in Sighet is always full of traders, both from Solotvyno and Sighet, selling Ukrainian products: sweets, sunflower seeds, sunflower oil, sugar, flour, spices, toilet paper and cigarettes. People from both sides of the border cooperate in this buying-selling and in storing the products unsold or to-be-sold. Some goods, like fruits, vegetables and meat, are cheaper in Romania and they are also carried across the border in the other direction but more for domestic use than for trading. The shops in the centre of Solotvyno and just by the border (some of them open till late or round the clock) are always full of customers from Romania, coming by cars and loading their trunks full. The border crossing, the market in Sighet as well as the shops in Solotvyno appear as spaces of social and cultural interaction where law and order are renegotiated, commodities exchanged and the languages (Romanian, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Russian) mixed.

Travelling further than just across the bridge, i.e. working in Russia and the Czech Republic (the most common destinations12), and the accompanying practices are also set in local specificities. Ethnicity, even if arbitrary, is helpful in obtaining Romanian and Hungarian citizenships (granted, let us remember, on historical backgrounds) which entitle one to work in most of the EU countries (including the Czech Republic). The majority of male Solotvynians (women also migrate but on a smaller scale) have experience working in the
Czech Republic. It is also popular to bring in cars from the Czech Republic and to drive them without exchanging the number plates for Ukrainian plates, as this enables the owner to bypass a special tax for registering a foreign car in Ukraine. The visa free regime between Russia and Ukraine and common fluency in Russian works in favour of migration in the opposite direction, and for many Solotvynians it is easier to travel to faraway Moscow than to nearby Sighet. With its dynamic labour market, relatively high salaries, Moscow was often mentioned in conversations, also by those who had never been there. Popularity of Russian music, TV and movies made Russia even more present in daily life.

In their ethnographic research on Transcarpathia and the border crossings with Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, Andre Simonyi and Jessica Pisano point to the role that the proximity of the state border plays in the daily life of the borderlanders. By describing different patterns of dealing with the frontier and making use of it (in the form of shuttle trade and cross-border shopping and entertainment), and the ethnic and linguistic factors for cross-border dynamics, they point to both inclusive and exclusive aspects of the state borders and the way they create ‘zones of engagement’, as the apparatus of state security itself contributes to the formation of local and transnational networks (Simonyi, Pisano 2011: 223-224). Additionally, in her study of Szelmenc (a predominantly ethnic Hungarian village divided by the Ukrainian-Slovakian border), Jessica Pisano elaborates on the social and linguistic changes faced by the small community after opening the border crossing in the village (particularly the increased use of Ukrainian and Slovak languages and the change in the structure of local properties due to development of trade) (Pisano 2009). Both studies acknowledge that living close to the checkpoint does not contribute to equal chances to cross it (Pisano 2009; Simonyi, Pisano 2011). Particularly striking in this respect is how historical legacy and ethnic (minority) issues appear as intertwined with current international policies and legal regulations in the field of cross-border mobility and the circulations of goods and capital. These studies convincingly portray the (Hungarian) national culture, consumer (commercial) culture, leisure and small economic activity in its specific borderland and peripheral shape. Although the role of trade in Solotvyno is not as significant as in Szelmenc, and the Hungarian ethnic component not as central as in their studies, Simonyi and Pisano’s evidence of inclusive and exclusive aspects of the state border nevertheless contributes to the findings of my study.

Concluding remarks

I have described how the local and the international (‘global’) phenomena shape the practices of the studied group. I see these phenomena as linked to the economic situation and state politics which shape the daily life of the borderlanders. In Transcarpathia, this background has been changing for the last century along with changing state jurisdictions. Borders and borderlands, no matter how ‘old’ or ‘new’, are not only the spaces where the relations and mutual connections between people, state(s) and capital are easily observed – they are also sites where territories, historical legacies, economies, identities and citizenships are negotiated. The state border’s impact on the life of the borderlanders changes with the economic situation in the countries on its both sides (labour market, supply and demand for certain goods or services that could be cheaper or easier to obtain in the neighbouring country) as well as bilateral and international regulations (visa regime, customs law or the limits of goods to be carried across the border). The latter also influences the level of cross-border contacts, family life and friendships for the inhabitants of both sides of the border, regardless of their ethnicity.

Complementing David Harvey’s concept of time-space compression, Alan Smart and Josephine Smart propose the idea of time-space punctuation which structures the world with borders acting as periods, full stops denying legal entry (…) semi-colons, requiring visas and work permits (…) commas slightly slowing movement at various checkpoints (Smart, Smart 2008:175). Surveillance applied at the checkpoints and the
passport system as such can be regarded as part of an ongoing process of control performed by the state and capital over the workers and the poor (the ‘dangerous classes’) against their self-determination (Balibar 2004: 113). Applying the metaphor to the bridge linking Solotvyno and Sighet would mean that it serves either as a ‘full stop’ or a ‘semi-colon’, and as a means of exercising control over the third country nationals (needed but also ‘dangerous’) in Romania and entire European Union. Regardless of their porosity, the ambivalent nature of the state borders – these absolutely nondemocratic, or ‘discretionary’ condition(s) of democratic institutions (Balibar 2004: 109) – can work in favour of different kinds of contact, inclusion and exclusion (Simonyi, Pisano 2011). Even if we assume that the state borders preserve and sustain international inequalities, groups and individuals work out different strategies to overcome these conditions and contradictions as well as to dealing with implied historical and ideological burdens.

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Notes

1 Almost all towns and villages in the neighbourhood have their twin-settlements on the other side of the border river; as is the case with for example Tyachiv (UA) – Teceu Mic (RO), Velikiy Bychkiv (UA) – Bocicoiu Mare (RO), Lug (UA) – Lunca la Tisa (RO). However, the Solotvyno-Sighet case is different as, unlike in the previous examples, the towns have never formed one settlement. What accounts for ethnic composition, with 79.7 per cent of Romanians, 15.8 per cent (according to the 2002 census available on the website of the Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center: http://www.edrc.ro/recensamant.jsp?regiune_id=2140&judet_id=2376&localitate_id=2378, accessed: 30 June 2014). With Hungarian, Romanian and Ukrainian villages around, we can speak of some similarity (excluding the size and regional economic and administrative significance) between the towns.

2 According to the available sources, surface mining in Solotvyno dates back to the ancient period and the underground mining to the Middle Ages, while the industrial methods started in 1778 (Dyakiv 2012: 69; Privalov, Panova 2008: 155).

3 According to Michael Burawoy, the extended case method consists of the four extensions: the extension of the observer into the lives of participants under study, the extension of observations over time and space; the extension from microprocesses to macroforces; the extension of theory (Burawoy 2009: xv and further). My application of the first three steps in the field is explained in the further paragraphs. The last point helped me challenge the notion of bounded ethnic (national) groups as they figure in the existing statistics and some of the literature about Transcarpathia and ethnic minorities in Ukraine. However, the most challenging was the application of concepts related to transformation and the imposition of neoliberal solutions on Central and Eastern Europe, which made me give up the use of the concept of neoliberalism in reference to Solotvyno.

4 However, I did not aspire to become a part of the studied group and to hide my ‘real’ goals in Solotvyno, which in case of an educated foreigner and a vegetarian (among the meat enthusiasts), not doing ‘real work’, asking strange questions, would have been quite impossible. What is more, not always was my observation fully participant; according to the particular situation it could be either participant or non-participant, but there was always a constant interaction between ethnographer and participant (Burawoy 2009: 124).
In the Soviet period it was Russian, not Ukrainian, that was taught as the state language in schools for national minorities. It was also the language of industry. The study on the role of Russian language in Solotvyno can be found in the work of Angela Palagyi (2011).

There are three schools in Solotvyno (not counting the music school and the ‘special’ school for the disabled): Ukrainian (commonly referred to as ‘Russian’) with separate Russian classes, Romanian and Hungarian.

Mines used to give employment not only to men, as women also worked there: in the offices, canteens and as cleaning personnel or lift operators.

I heard complaints about and insults aimed at Romanian officers from Solotvynians crossing the border regardless of ethnicity. However, the division between (Ukrainian) ‘us’ and (Romanian) ‘them’ seems most relevant when expressed by the people of Romanian ethnicity.

Both Hungarian and Romanian names have often been ‘translated’ into their Russian or Ukrainian equivalents, for example: ‘Istvan – Stepan’, ‘Sandor – Aleksandr’, ‘Ion – Ivan’. Surnames are distorted due to Cyrillic transliteration which is re-transliterated into Latin alphabet in Ukrainian passports with the use of the official Latin Transliteration based on English spelling (which, for example, turns the surname Nagy into Nod).

This can be illustrated by a conversation I had with two young men (25-30 years old), a Romanian and a Hungarian. Both were educated in schools in Hungary and Romania, respectively, and both were convincing me, referring to each other’s experiences (tell him, he also had the same problem) that Romanians and Hungarians from Ukraine are not always welcome in ‘their’ countries.

Migration to Russia is a common phenomenon in Transcarpathia and the entire Ukraine. In the Czech Republic, Ukrainians form a significant number of immigrants, the majority of whom come from Transcarpathia. According to Zdenek Uherek, the popularity of the Czech Republic among Transcarpathian job-seekers can be explained through the historical legacy: the Czechoslovakian past and the memories of opportunities offered by Bohemia passed down through generations (Uherek 2009). Nowadays, there is even a regular bus connection between Rakhiv and Prague via Solotvyno.

References


Neighbourhood Ties and Migrant Networks: The Case of Circular Ukrainian Migrants in Warsaw, Poland

Sabina Toruńczyk-Ruiz*

The paper deals with the importance of neighbourhood ties in the social networks of circular migrants. While existing research shows that social networks constitute a crucial element in the process of circular migration, not much is known about the extent to which these networks are territorialised. The paper discusses this issue by analysing the case of Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw and its suburbs, who are close to the receiving society in both cultural and geographic terms and thus make this group a unique case compared to immigrants travelling to Europe from more distant places. The analyses are based on data collected in a survey on Ukrainian migrants carried out in 2010 by the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, with the help of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS). The studied sample consists of 342 respondents with different duration of migration from Ukraine to Poland. The paper argues that neighbourhood ties do not play an important role in the social capital and mobility patterns of Ukrainian circular migrants. The social relations of migrants are formed through ethnic and kinship ties, which are not related to a specific local area. The analyses also confirm earlier findings which show that Ukrainian migrants do not tend to concentrate spatially in the Warsaw metropolitan area, but which do point to the existence of small ethnic clusters. However, these seem to be determined by structural factors such as the availability of flats rather than individual preferences to live close to co-ethnics, which altogether suggests that there is a limited potential for local community formation among Ukrainian migrants.

Keywords: circular migration, Ukrainian migrants, local ties, clustering, neighbourhood

Introduction

Circular migration, defined as the repeated movement of migrants between their home and destination countries (Constant, Zimmerman 2011; Hugo 2013), has recently gained importance due to easier travel and modern forms of communication. Since over a decade, circular migration has been occurring on an unprecedentedly large scale, involving a greater cross-section of groups and taking a wider variety of forms than ever before (Hugo 2003). It is often seen as advantageous for all three parties taking part in the migration
process: the sending country, the receiving country and migrants themselves (ibidem; Vertovec 2007; Hugo 2013).

While there is a growing interest in circular migration among policy makers and scholars in Europe (Triandafyllidou 2013), the bulk of theories and empirical research is still rooted in a permanent settlement migration paradigm, with little knowledge about temporary migrants regarding their motives for taking up migration, their social and local integration, mutual relations and social and cultural effects on the destination country (Hugo 2003). One of the topics that remains understudied concerns the role of local ties and spatial concentration at the destination in circular migration; that is, the extent to which social ties of circular migrants are restricted to a certain territory such as the neighbourhood in the receiving country, and the existence of immigrant enclaves.

To my knowledge, there is no literature dealing with residential patterns and the role of local ties among circular immigrants. In Europe, the biggest group engaged in circular mobility is formed by migrants from the former USSR (e.g. Okólski 2010; Grabowska-Lusińska, Drbohlav, Hars 2011), who are the most important category of migrants in the Central and Eastern European region (e.g. Iglicka 2010). However, given the general scarcity of studies on Eastern European migrants (Markova, Black 2007), studies on the role of local ties and spatial concentration among this migrant group are lacking. This also applies to migrants’ residential patterns within Central and Eastern European countries, where foreign immigration is lower and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods are rare, but immigration from non-EU Eastern European countries is on the rise and therefore deserves closer attention.

This paper discusses the case of a migrant group that is close to the receiving society in both cultural and geographic terms, namely Ukrainian migrants staying in Warsaw and its suburbs. Ukrainians are thought to constitute the fastest growing migrant group in Poland and in the European Union (EU) (Kindler 2011). Originating from a nearby country with a similar culture, often remaining in Poland only temporarily, Ukrainians largely remain an invisible category of immigrants, which is therefore hard to study. The circular character of the mobility among these migrants and their cultural proximity to the host society make this a very particular case, compared to immigrants travelling to Europe from more distant places.

Based on a survey conducted in Warsaw among 342 Ukrainian migrants using Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS), the study analyses the role of neighbourhood ties in the migrant networks and the extent to which circular Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw concentrate spatially. Two main research questions are addressed:

1) To what extent are the social networks of the Ukrainian migrants living in Warsaw locally based? What are the determinants of the formation of local ties by Ukrainian migrants?
2) To what extent do Ukrainian migrants tend to settle in neighbourhoods in which their co-ethnics are present, and what are the determinants of this?

In the following section, selected theories on circular migration, migrant networks and ethnic clustering are introduced. The subsequent section briefly describes the characteristics of recent Ukrainian migration to Poland. After that, the data and measures used are explained. Then, the main results regarding spatial concentration and the importance of local ties among the studied migrants are presented. The results of two logistic regression analyses are included: one predicting the formation of local ties in Warsaw, the other settling in an ethnic cluster in Warsaw. Finally, the obtained findings are discussed and further research implications are provided.
Circular migration, neighbourhood ties and immigrant enclaves: theoretical framework

In general, circular migration may be defined as the systematic and regular movement of migrants between their home and foreign countries, usually aimed at seeking work (Constant, Zimmerman 2011). It may be practised by both skilled and unskilled workers, in a seasonal and non-seasonal manner. Its characteristic feature is that the options are kept open in both the home and host country, which means that circular migrants are in fact often in a state of limbo between the two societies of reference (Triandafyllidou 2006). Moreover, migrants spend significant periods of time at the origin and at destination and often have location-specific capital in both (Hugo 2013).

A crucial element in the migration process are social networks (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, Taylor 1993; Arango 2004; Vertovec 2002). Not only do they help people migrate, but they also provide personal support and facilitate maintaining ties with co-ethnics in the destination and home countries. While migrant networks may include both migrants and non-migrants in the home country and at destination, one important type of network is based on ethnic ties. Ties with co-ethnics help find a job and lead to the development of an ethnic community, including ethnic institutions and places such as shops, restaurants or ethnic businesses, which not only serve as meeting places for migrants but also offer natives an opportunity to get to know the migrants and their culture (Anthias, Cederberg 2009; Wessendorf 2013).

While most scholars assume that a sense of community based on common origins will naturally emerge among the newcomers, some researchers argue that an ethnic community cannot be simply assumed (e.g. Brettell 2003). Brettell argues that the formation of a community depends on state policy as well as on structural, ideological and political factors. She also highlights the role of the character of migration: temporary migrants retain a ‘homeland orientation’, which is maintained by a long-distance social network, while long-term immigrants are oriented towards the receiving society. Many researchers have argued that a sense of community is not necessarily limited to a specific geographic location in which face-to-face contacts are paramount (e.g. Gupta, Ferguson 1992), and that contemporary migrants tend to live in transnational communities across national borders (e.g. Portes 1997; Brettell 2003; Castles 2003; Blunt 2007; Vertovec 2007). At the same time, Brickell and Datta (2011) argue the need to examine significant spaces and scales beyond the national, which means mapping places that are significant during the process of movement. They denote such spaces as ‘translocal geographies’, and attempt to identify scales at which the local is constructed and has relevance in everyday lives. Seen this way, traditional spaces such as the home, community and neighbourhood should regain attention as immediate sites of encounter that produce notions of belonging and attachment (Brickell, Datta 2011). The neighbourhood is viewed as a meeting place, in which residents can form and maintain social ties (e.g. Völker, Flap 2007). Neighbourhood researchers have shown that the neighbourhood is an important site especially for low-skilled, low-income and minority residents, since they often lack useful social resources elsewhere (Fisher 1982; Logan, Spitze 1994; Sampson, Morenoff, Gannon-Rowley 2002; Pinkster, Völker 2009). Consequently, the social networks of these groups – to which migrants tend to belong – are expected to be more locally oriented.

In the context of immigrants and ethnic groups, the topic of the neighbourhood is intrinsically linked to the emergence of immigrant enclaves and ethnic segregation. An immigrant enclave refers to a residential area with a high concentration of immigrants who cluster together as a means of protecting their economic, social, political or cultural position (Marcuse 2001). According to the ecological tradition of the Chicago School and classic works by Massey and Denton (1985, 1993), especially new immigrants concentrate in enclaves as survival strategies. Whether or not living in enclaves is beneficial for immigrants and social cohesion is subject to debate. Some researchers highlight that ethnic clustering, providing easier access to social networks, provides immigrants with opportunities to find jobs, offers practical, social and emotional
support in daily life, and facilitates the functioning of neighbourhood-based services (Portes, Sensenbrenner 1993; Agrawal 2010; for a review see: McGarrigle, Kearns 2009). By contrast, other scholars see immigrant enclaves as negatively affecting life chances and as inhibiting social mixing and participation in the mainstream culture (Massey, Denton 1993; Marcuse, van Kempen 2000). In this perspective, ethnic and social residential mix are seen as key elements of an inclusive and integrated society, which is held to enhance social capital and life opportunities (e.g. Musterd, Andersson 2006). The latter rationale is reflected by 'mixing policies’ pursued in many European cities, aimed at diversifying the neighbourhood population (but see Amin 2005 for a critique). It is important to stress, however, that spatial dispersal does not necessarily lead to social integration (e.g. Kohlbacher, Reeger 2005), and that the absence of spatial segregation and of immigrant enclaves does not necessarily facilitate the acculturation process in the host society (e.g. Grzymała-Kazłowska, Piekut 2007).

While existing research suggests that social networks constitute a crucial element in the process of migration in general, questions arise about the importance of neighbourhoods and local ties in the lives of circular migrants. Conclusions regarding residential patterns among immigrants were largely drawn from American research on ‘black ghettos’, which have different dynamics than immigrant enclaves in European cities (e.g. Malheiros 2002; Schönwälder 2007), and, importantly, are formed by permanent rather than temporary residents. In Europe, the bulk of research on ethnic clustering and immigrants’ residential patterns concentrates on minority groups from outside Europe – predominantly Middle and Near East, Africa or Latin America (e.g. Bowes, Dar, Sim 2002; Musterd 2005; Schönwälder 2007; McGarrigle, Kearns 2009) – who are distant in both geographic and cultural terms, and are permanent rather than short-term or circular migrants. This paper is an attempt to fill the gap in the migration literature on residential patterns and the role of the neighbourhood among circular migrants who, in social and legal terms, constitute an invisible population of foreigners.

Ukrainian migration to Poland: background information

Compared to other European countries, the scale of international immigration to Poland is rather low (e.g. Górny, Grabowska-Lusińska, Lesińska, Okólski 2010). In the aftermath of World War II, Poland became an almost entirely homogeneous society in ethnic terms, and there were hardly any significant immigration streams during the communist regime. However, since 1989 – after the collapse of the communist regime which meant, among other changes, a liberalisation of passport regulations – Poland has been experiencing an increasing inflow of foreigners, with immigrants becoming increasingly visible especially in large cities. Within Poland, the highest number of foreign immigrants is in Warsaw (e.g. Kępińska, Okólski 2004). In 2011, the foreign population in Warsaw accounted for nearly one-fourth of all foreigners living in Poland (Piekut 2012).

In terms of general characteristics of the migrant population in Warsaw, there is a prevalence of temporary migrants. The largest group of foreign migrants is formed by Ukrainians, whose mobility in most cases can be characterised as circular labour migration. While it is difficult to assess the number of Ukrainian migrants residing in Poland, it is estimated that each year at least 100 000 work legally in Poland, which implies that the actual number of Ukrainian migrants is much higher (Bieniecki, Pawlak 2009). It can furthermore be assumed that this number is growing steadily, as the number of declarations of intent by Polish employers to employ Ukrainian nationals – the main means of entry to Poland for the Ukrainian nationals in terms of numbers – increased from 180 133 in 2009 to 217 571 in 2013 (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2013).
As regards sectors of employment, the Ukrainian migrants are concentrated in agriculture, domestic services, and construction. They usually enter Poland legally, but often engage in unregistered forms of work (e.g. Lutz 2008). The relatively low economic attractiveness compared to the rest of the EU, and the short geographic distance to the home country, do not make Poland a settlement country for the majority of the Ukrainians. Instead, most migrants circulate between Poland and Ukraine, where they have their homes and families (see also: Iglicka, Gmaj, Borodzicz-Smolinski 2010). The aim of the majority of the Ukrainian migrants is to earn money and to go back home, which obviously hampers integration with the host society. At the same time, however, thanks to well-established connections with Polish society and both cultural and geographic proximity, compared to other migrant groups, Ukrainian migrants easily adjust to life in Poland and integrate into Polish society (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2008). Qualitative data have shown that an assimilation strategy – including a preference to form ties with Poles rather than sticking to one’s own ethnic group and the desire not to stand out from the Polish surroundings (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014) – prevails among Ukrainian migrants. Conversely, native Polish residents perceive Ukrainians as ‘invisible migrants’ in terms of physical appearance; but as they often work as domestic workers, they are encountered by local residents on a daily basis, in contrast to the highly skilled migrants who have fewer contacts with the locals (Piekut 2012).

While there is very little knowledge about the transnational dimension of Ukrainian migration, several authors have applied the notion of transnational migration to analyse Ukrainian mobility to the EU (Solari 2010; Stanek, Hosnedlova 2012; Vianello 2013). In the view of Lutz and Palenga-Möllerbeck (2011), repeated travel between Ukraine and the receiving country make the Ukrainian mobility transnational. Moreover, several studies suggest that Ukrainian migrants tend to maintain ties with family and friends in Ukraine, and send remittances and visit their home country regularly (Kindler, Fedyuk 2014). However, involvement in other transnational practices such as ethnic businesses, organisations or political activity seems to be less evident, although more information is needed to obtain a clearer picture of the forms and practices of the Ukrainian community in Central and Eastern Europe.

As regards residential patterns, Ukrainian long-term migrants do not display a strong tendency to concentrate spatially, but are instead dispersed throughout the whole city (Grzymała-Kazłowska, Piekut 2007). Importantly, the migrants’ place of residence in Poland is strongly related to the type of work they perform. For example, migrants who take care of the elderly or disabled usually live with their employers, whereas women working as cleaners frequently share flats with other Ukrainian women (Kindler 2011). In general, however, migrants must rely on themselves – and on their social networks – when searching for housing in Poland (see also: Grzymała-Kazłowska 2004). Similarly to other labour migrants in Poland, they usually rely on the private rented sector (ibidem; for an elaboration on the housing situation among Ukrainian migrants in other countries see also: Markova, Black 2007).

As for most of the migrants that originate from countries less developed than Poland – which include Ukraine – the amount of rent is the most important factor when renting a flat. Migrants often choose low-quality dwellings, in large blocks of flats or single-family detached houses, in which they live in bigger groups (Piekut 2012). Regarding city districts in which Ukrainian migrants are present, the 2002 national census data demonstrated that Ukrainian migrants are more numerous in central parts of the city (Śródmieście, Mokotów, Ochota, Wola), but also in Praga Południe, Praga Północ and Targówek – districts on the right side of the Vistula river, which are further from the centre but easily accessible by public transport (see Figure 1). For Ukrainian migrants with a permanent residence permit, Grzymała-Kazłowska and Piekut (2007) showed that Mokotów, Praga Południe and Śródmieście were the most popular Warsaw districts, but in general, Ukrainian migrants were dispersed across the metropolitan area.
However, not much is known about the residential patterns of circular migrants, which may be due to the fact that studying circular migration in Europe is in general challenging for methodological reasons, and is thus fragmentary in its thematic scope. It can be expected that temporary migrants and migrants with irregular status will show a stronger tendency to concentrate spatially than migrants with a permanent residence permit, which is related to the higher degree of integration in Polish society, the legal status and relatively good socio-economic position of the latter, and to a stronger need for support in the receiving country among circular migrants (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2004).

### Data and measures

#### Data

This paper is based on data collected in 2010 among Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian migrants who entered Poland for the first time after 1989 and at the moment of the study resided in Warsaw or its surroundings. The survey was questionnaire-based, and was carried out at the University of Warsaw’s Centre of Migration Research. The research sample consisted of 546 respondents representing different types of mobility and duration of migration from Ukraine to Poland. The analyses presented here rely on a sample of 342 Ukrainian labour migrants. The average number of stays in Poland in this sample was 9.57, which indicates that the respondents were mainly circular migrants.

The study was based on Respondent Driven Sampling (hereafter: RDS), which is an innovative variation of snowball sampling designed by Heckatorn (1997) to reach hidden populations, and is gaining popularity in migration research (e.g. Napierała, Trevena 2010). The sampling in RDS begins with selecting several
respondents (so-called seeds), who broadly represent the given population as regards the most important socio-demographic characteristics. Every seed is issued coupons with which they can recruit their peers, and is rewarded not only for own participation in the study but also for each person recruited (which means there is a double incentive system). The persons recruited are given coupons to recruit further waves of participants and so on. Eventually, all respondents are connected in several networks.

Seven seeds were selected so as to represent the sex, employment sector, and legal status diversity of the population of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian immigrants residing in Warsaw and surroundings. As a sampling method, the RDS enabled us to reach diverse categories of migrants in terms of migration patterns as well as a relatively large number of non-registered migrant workers, which would have been difficult to achieve with other sampling methods (see also Napierała, Górny 2011).

Measures and method of analysis

The analyses contain descriptive data and the results of two logistic regression models. For the descriptive statistics, data were weighted with the use of the Successive Sampling (SS) estimator (Gile 2011), which is based on network sizes reported by the respondents. The estimated size of the population was 130,000, which is a rough estimation of the number of Ukrainian migrants staying in the agglomeration of Warsaw in 2012 (Górny, Kaczmarchyk, Napierała, Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2013). Regression models were based on non-weighted data, as there is no agreement as to whether RDS data should be weighted in case of logistic regression analyses (see e.g. Johnston, O’Bra, Chopra, Mathews, Townsend, Sabin, Tomlinson, Kendall 2011).

In order to explore the two main research questions, data regarding the characteristics of social networks, including local ties, were analysed. In addition, the spatial distribution of the Ukrainian respondents was examined. The measures used are described below.

Importance of people from the neighbourhood. Respondents were asked to assess the importance of several values in their lives, such as family, friends, acquaintances, leisure time, work, persons living in the same neighbourhood in Poland, and people from the hometown. Answers were given on a scale from 1 to 4 (1 = very important, 4 = not at all important).

Social ties were defined as relations to persons from outside the household – regardless of their country of residence – who are important to the respondent. While describing their social ties, respondents were free to include as many persons as they found appropriate. Four contact fields were distinguished: spending free time, asking for or giving advice, receiving help or helping out, and other relationships (cf. Fischer 1982). Respondents were asked to indicate the number of close ties in each of these four fields of contact. In addition, they evaluated the extent to which their social network consists of various categories of persons, such as: 1) persons from their own native country (in this case from Ukraine), 2) persons from Poland, 3) relatives and 4) persons living in the same neighbourhood in Poland. The response scale consisted of seven options: all, almost all, more than half, about half, less than half, some, none, which were recoded into five categories: all, more than half, half, less than half and none. Since the composition of the social ties did not differ strongly as regards the four fields of social ties, the results for one of the spheres will be presented, namely mutual help. Among the Ukrainian labour migrants who strongly depend on practical help, this field of contact seems to be a good proxy of the close ties that they can count on when in need.

In this paper, the term ‘local ties’ is used interchangeably with ‘neighbourhood ties’ to refer to ties with persons living in the same neighbourhood in Poland. The neighbourhood was defined in the questionnaire as the physical and social home surroundings, which the respondents pass through on their way to work, to do shopping and other daily routines.
Characteristics of the person that recruited the respondent. Various characteristics of the person that recruited the respondent were collected. Among others, a question was asked whether or not the person was the respondent’s neighbour, as a means of verifying whether the chains of recruitment were related to place of residence.

In order to identify the factors that predict the formation of local ties in Warsaw and settling in an ethnic cluster in Warsaw, two logistic regression analyses were conducted. Both models tested the role of several groups of predictors.

In the first regression model, the dependent variable was a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent had mainly local ties, which was defined as having more than half of all indicated social ties in any of the four studied spheres of contact with persons from the same neighbourhood. This analysis was done on the whole sample studied in this paper, i.e. 342 individuals. The existing literature on neighbourhood ties indicates that the quantity and quality of these ties depend on individual socio-demographic characteristics such as sex, age, education level, family situation and length of residence in the neighbourhood, as well as the type of building in which one lives (e.g. Lewicka 2004). Accordingly, these factors were included as independent variables. Variables relating to the history of migration such as length of stay and number of trips to the receiving country affect the migrant’s social integration, and thus they may translate into the propensity to engage with the local community. Therefore, these variables were also included as predictors of the formation of local ties.

Socio-psychological factors included: the size of social networks, since the overall number of social ties may affect the extent to which one is able and willing to interact with others in his/her neighbourhood; the characteristics of the person recruiting the respondent; and the level of emotional attachment to Poland, as place attachment is known to be related to the propensity to engage in neighbourhood ties (Lewicka 2010).

Regarding the second regression model, the perception of living in a place in which other Ukrainian migrants live was treated as a proxy for living in an ethnic cluster. The sample in this analysis included 102 respondents, as this was the number of persons who were asked about the perception of their current residential neighbourhood (persons who at the moment of the survey had not lived in the current area for six months or longer or during subsequent stays for at least one year were not asked these questions).

The independent variables included the same set of variables as in the model predicting having local ties, with the exception of the type of building in which the respondent lived in Poland, and the characteristics of the person who recruited the respondent. These variables are known to affect social relations, but there is no reason to expect that they predict whether or not a migrant settles in an immigrant cluster. In addition, the model controlled for whether or not the respondent lived in one of the four Warsaw districts with the highest numbers of Ukrainians.

Table 1 summarises the list of the independent variables used in both regression models.
Table 1. List of independent variables used in Models 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Model 1 Dependent variable: close ties important in overall ties</th>
<th>Model 2 Dependent variable: living in an Ukrainian cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent had mainly local ties</td>
<td>dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent reported that his/her neighbourhood was an area in which at least several other Ukrainians lived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Independent variables

**Socio-demographic variables**

| Age | ✓ | ✓ |
| Gender (male as reference category) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Employment sector (domestic sector and construction – the two most popular) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Employment sectors among Ukrainian migrants | ✓ | ✓ |
| Level of education (secondary education was treated as the reference category, since this is the most common level of education among Ukrainian migrants) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Living with partner in Poland | ✓ | ✓ |
| Having children (no children as reference category) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Country of origin of partner (not having a partner was treated as the reference category) | ✓ | ✓ |

**Migration-related variables**

| Number of years since the first stay in Poland | ✓ | ✓ |
| Share of time spent in Poland since the first stay | ✓ | ✓ |
| Having at least one stay in Poland in the past which lasted six months or longer | ✓ | ✓ |
| Not having lived in the same neighbourhood for six months or longer | ✓ | - |
| Having relatives in Poland | ✓ | ✓ |

**Characteristics of place of residence**

| The type of building in which the respondent lives in Poland (block of flats, tenement house, detached house, other) | ✓ | - |
| Living in Mokotów, living in Targówek (two city districts with highest shares of Ukrainian migrants – see further) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Living with the employer in Poland | ✓ | ✓ |

**Socio-psychological variables**

| Number of social ties | ✓ | ✓ |
| Number of acquaintances from the former USSR living in Poland | ✓ | ✓ |
| Perceiving the household in Poland as ones’ ‘home’ (respondents were asked to indicate which of their households they would call their home. Considering the house in Poland as ‘home’ was treated as an indicator of relatively strong emotional attachment to Poland). | ✓ | ✓ |

**Sampling related variables**

| Being recruited to the study by a neighbour (collecting this information allowed to verify whether the chains of recruitment were related to place of residence). | ✓ | - |
| Being recruited to the study by a flatmate | ✓ | - |

**Sample size**

| N = 342 | N = 102 |

Source: own elaboration.
The importance of neighbourhood ties in close social ties

The main interest of this article is the importance of neighbourhood ties among the migrants, regardless of whether they are with other Ukrainians, with other immigrants or with Poles. The obtained data permit an analysis of the declarative measures and behavioural measures of this type of ties.

Regarding the declarative measure, around 49 per cent of the studied migrants reported that people in the neighbourhood in Poland were important to them (table not shown). However, compared to the reported importance of other groups of people – family, friends, acquaintances, people from the hometown – people from the neighbourhood in Poland were considered less important. Groups other than ‘people from the neighbourhood’ were considered important by over two-thirds of respondents, ranging from nearly 64 per cent in case of the importance of acquaintances to 99 per cent in case of family. Nearly 65 per cent of respondents reported that people from their hometown were important to them, which would suggest that circular migrants are oriented more towards the country of origin than towards the receiving country.

Behavioural measures of the importance of local ties included information on the size and composition of close ties. On average, the respondents reported to have nearly seven persons in the domain of free time, nearly three persons in the domain of giving/receiving advice, and nearly four in the domains of giving/receiving help and other types of contacts. These numbers are not high, but it is important to bear in mind that the question referred to ‘close persons’ in these four spheres of contact, which means that acquaintances with which the respondent has rather weak ties were not included here. It appears then that for Ukrainian labour migrants it is sufficient to have only a few close persons in order to set up a life in Poland (see Table 1 in the Appendix). This is consistent with Kindler’s (2011) finding that the Ukrainian domestic workers have numerous weak ties and few strong ties.

Answers to the questions regarding the characteristics of the close persons whom the respondent has helped or from whom he/she has received help are illustrated in Figure 2. While this paper focuses on the significance of local (neighbourhood) ties, the proportion of other categories of persons in respondents’ close social ties – relatives, people of the same origin, Poles – are presented as a point of reference.

Ethnic ties are clearly the most important type of ties for the Ukrainian migrants (see Figure 2). The close ties of Ukrainian migrants include mainly other Ukrainians: around 87 per cent of the respondents reported that their networks consisted entirely of persons of the same origin. This means that the Ukrainian migrants are much more likely to give and receive help from their co-ethnics than from other people. By contrast, a similar percentage (nearly 88 per cent) reported that their networks contained no Poles. Since the respondents were asked about close ties, and not just any kind of social ties, this finding can be treated as some evidence that the ties between Ukrainian migrants and Poles hardly ever take the form of close relations. This is consistent with Kindler’s observation (2011) that the existing ties between Ukrainians and Poles are mainly of a weak nature, and are often related to work. Interestingly, relatives do not dominate the close ties of the Ukrainian migrants.5 While 32 per cent of the studied migrants had an entirely family-centred network as regards mutual help, 36 per cent reported to spend their free time with no relatives.

If we compare the reported proportion of close ties with persons from the same neighbourhood to the proportion of ties to other categories of persons, we see that this share was bigger than that of Poles, but smaller than that of relatives and co-ethnics (Figure 2). For neighbourhood ties, we cannot determine whether they were formed in the neighbourhood or already existed before settling in Warsaw. However, we can see that the majority of persons – almost 69 per cent – reported to have no persons from the neighbourhood in their social networks. Therefore, the idea that migrants tend to form a big number of local ties cannot be derived from the given data: the social networks of the respondents tend to be dispersed across the city and do not concentrate in the same neighbourhood. At the same time, however, around 11 per cent had an exclusively
neighbourhood-based network of persons, which suggests that the neighbourhood, though not playing a major role in the lives of the circular migrants, is important to a small yet significant group of Ukrainians.

**Figure 2. Share of four categories of persons within close ties whom the respondent has given or from whom has received help**

Unfortunately, the dataset does not reveal whether the local ties are maintained with Poles, Ukrainians or other immigrants. However, we may look more carefully at the level and kind of social capital of the group of respondents who mainly have local ties in Poland. This group consists of individuals who reported that more than half of their close ties are located within the neighbourhood in Poland in at least one of the four studied spheres of contact (spending free time, giving/receiving help, giving/receiving advice, other). Such persons comprised 21 per cent of the whole sample. If we compare this group of migrants to the rest of the sample as regards the composition of the social ties maintained by both groups, we may observe that Ukrainians whose close ties were mainly based in the neighbourhood had fewer ties with their co-ethnics and with their relatives than did the rest of the migrants (Figure 3). They also had more ties with Poles. This suggests that the Ukrainian migrants for whom neighbourhood ties are important are more integrated in Polish society, and that their social capital is oriented more towards the host society than it is among the rest of the migrants. This could mean that the local ties that are maintained by Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw are in fact ties with Poles, and not with co-ethnics.
Predictors of having local ties

Which factors determine whether or not a substantial part of the social ties maintained in the destination country are local? Table 2 demonstrates the results of the logistic regression model predicting whether or not the respondent had mainly local ties. Among the tested predictors, the variables that were statistically significant were: living with a partner in Poland, the proportion of time spent in Poland and education level. Individuals who lived with their partner in Poland – regardless of whether the partner was Ukrainian, Polish or of a different origin – were more likely to have mainly local ties. Local ties were also more likely as the proportion of time spent in Poland (not to be confused with the total amount of time spent in Poland since the first stay) increased at the expense of time spent in Ukraine. Compared to persons with secondary education, migrants with sub-secondary education were more likely to have local ties. This is consistent with the observation that people with lower socio-economic status tend to rely more on local ties (e.g. Fischer 1982).

Interestingly, the moment when repeated migration to Poland began was not related to having mainly neighbourhood-based ties. The reason for this may be that for the majority of Ukrainians, a longer duration of mobility rarely transforms into more settled forms of migration and is thus not related to the formation of local ties. What appears to matter more is the amount of time actually spent in Poland, at the expense of time spent in the home country. The results show therefore that the persons who mainly have ties within their neighbourhood in Poland are persons embedded in Polish society, who spend a large proportion of their time in Poland, and who have strong links with Poles.

Variables such as sex, age of the individual, and type of the building in which the individual lives, had no significant effect.
Table 2. Logistic regression model predicting having local ties; N = 342

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>95% CI for Odds Ratio (Exp(B))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.246 (.143)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years since first stay in Poland</td>
<td>.073 (.045)</td>
<td>.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of time spent in Poland since first stay in Poland</td>
<td>2.64 (.991)**</td>
<td>2.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a stay in Poland for six months or longer</td>
<td>.06 (.504)</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not lived in the same neighbourhood for six months or one year altogether</td>
<td>-.002 (.404)</td>
<td>.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.037 (.025)</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education below secondary</td>
<td>1.57 (.771)*</td>
<td>1.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0.177 (.515)</td>
<td>.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.45 (.808)</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works in domestic services</td>
<td>.65 (.569)</td>
<td>.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works in construction</td>
<td>-.25 (.848)</td>
<td>.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin of partner – Poland</td>
<td>-.87 (.817)</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin of partner – other</td>
<td>-.17 (.499)</td>
<td>.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in block of flats</td>
<td>.53 (.701)</td>
<td>.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in tenement house</td>
<td>.94 (.883)</td>
<td>.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in a detached house</td>
<td>-.07 (.760)</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of social network</td>
<td>.017 (.014)</td>
<td>.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of persons from former USSR known in Poland</td>
<td>-.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has home in Poland</td>
<td>.80 (.507)</td>
<td>.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has relatives in Poland</td>
<td>.04 (.700)</td>
<td>.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives with partner in Poland</td>
<td>1.13 (.509)*</td>
<td>1.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has children</td>
<td>.04 (.689)</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruited by neighbour</td>
<td>-.04 (.528)</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruited by household member</td>
<td>-.50 (.525)</td>
<td>.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Mokotów</td>
<td>-1.03 (.601)</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Targówek</td>
<td>.75 (.548)</td>
<td>.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives with employer</td>
<td>-.06 (.545)</td>
<td>.323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $R^2 = .23$, (Cox & Snell), 0.33 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (27) = 54.69, p < 0.01.

* p < .05, ** p < .01

Source: own elaboration based on RDS U Warsaw 2010, Centre of Migration Research.

Spatial concentration

An analysis of the spatial distribution of the migrants studied in the RDS survey largely confirmed the census data, showing a high presence of Ukrainian migrants in central, older parts of Warsaw: Mokotów, Targówek, Śródmieście, and Praga Południe. An above-average presence of Ukrainian migrants in these parts of the city can be attributed in part to the higher density of tall buildings (such as blocks of flats and tenement houses) in these districts. It is also apparent that there is no particular district in which Ukrainians are concentrated; hence we cannot speak of a ‘Ukrainian neighbourhood’ as such.

When we turn to the question of the length of residence in the current neighbourhood, it emerges that less than 7 per cent of the studied migrants have lived in the same neighbourhood for six months or longer during their current stay in Poland, and 18 per cent have lived in the same neighbourhood for at least one year altogether across different stays in Poland. This result demonstrates that a majority of Ukrainian migrants tend to
change their place of residence during successive stays in Poland, which obviously hampers the formation of strong social ties in the neighbourhood. The Ukrainians who successively rent a flat in the same neighbourhood therefore constitute a very unique group compared to the rest of the Ukrainian circular migrants. The specificity of this group is confirmed in descriptive statistics: the migrants who had lived in their current neighbourhood for a considerable amount of time (six months or longer during their current stay, or at least one year across different stays) were on average older than migrants, who changed neighbourhoods across their stays in Poland (mean 41.22 years versus 36.60, t(207) = 2.28, p < .05), and more often female (55.3 per cent versus 44.7 per cent, χ²(1) = 8.77, p < .01). When asked in which country they perceived to have their own home, the migrants who had lived in their current neighbourhood for a considerable amount of time replied, more often than the rest of migrants, that their home was in Poland (24.5 per cent versus 10.5 per cent among the rest of migrants, χ²(1) = 6.02, p < .05). This result suggests that migrants who change their place of residence in Poland are to a lesser extent settled and are less attached to Poland and Warsaw in particular, and less attached to their hometown than the rest of the studied migrants.

**Subjective ethnic clustering and its predictors**

From among the persons who lived in the same neighbourhood for at least six months continuously or one year altogether, nearly 45 per cent reported that their current neighbourhood was an area where only Poles lived, 30 per cent said they lived in an area in which several other immigrants lived, and 18 per cent said that they lived in an area in which many other immigrants lived. Of the two latter categories of respondents taken together – who said that several or many immigrants live in their neighbourhood – 57 per cent (24 persons) reported that the immigrants who lived in their home area were mainly Ukrainians. This suggests that Ukrainian migrants do cluster in certain Warsaw areas, but the clusters are very small and are therefore hardly visible in the census data. The people who report to have other Ukrainians in their neighbourhood live in various locations in Warsaw, which confirms that the existing Ukrainian clusters do not form distinct ethnic neighbourhoods but rather small groups of persons renting flats together.

A logistic regression model was run to examine what variables are related to living in an ethnic cluster. Since the sample included in the analysis is rather small, the analysis should be treated as exploratory. The dependent variable was a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent reported that his/her neighbourhood was an area in which at least several other Ukrainians live. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 3.

As regards predictors related to migration history, the proportion of time spent in Poland was significant – migrants who spent a large proportion of their time in Poland (and less time in Ukraine), were less likely to settle in an ethnic cluster. This can be explained by the fact that migrants who are more rooted in Poland are more integrated with the host society and thus represent residential patterns similar to these of the indigenous population. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the number of years spent in Poland (in absolute numbers) was not significantly related to settling in a Ukrainian cluster.

Interestingly, the sector of employment matters: specifically, persons employed in the construction sector were less likely to live in a neighbourhood with other Ukrainians. Working in the domestic service sector was not related to living in a Ukrainian cluster.

Furthermore, the size of the social network turned out to be a significant predictor. The bigger a person’s network, the more likely he or she was to settle in a place where other Ukrainian migrants are present. This seems reasonable since migrants with bigger networks are more likely to know other migrants who settle in certain places and are thus more likely to settle there as well. Persons who have smaller networks are to a greater extent left on their own and may have worse access to these places. They may also be less aware of
the presence of other Ukrainians in their home area. Preliminary results of the qualitative study conducted
within the same research project reveal that the majority of Ukrainian migrants show little interest in know-
ing whether any co-ethnics live in the neighbourhood.

Table 3. Logistic regression model predicting whether or not the respondent reported that his/her
neighbourhood is an area in which at least several other Ukrainians live, \( N = 102 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>95% CI for Odds Ratio (Exp(B))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-323.476 (172.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years since first stay in Poland</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of time spent in Poland since first stay in Poland</td>
<td>-3.695 (1.74)*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a stay in Poland for six months or longer</td>
<td>1.109 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.824 (1.24)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education below secondary</td>
<td>-1.046 (1.07)</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-0.522 (0.83)</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works in domestic services</td>
<td>0.32 (0.85)</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works in construction</td>
<td>-5.682 (1.70)***</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin of partner – Poland</td>
<td>-2.415 (1.58)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin of partner – other</td>
<td>0.807 (0.83)</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of social network</td>
<td>0.102 (0.03)**</td>
<td>1.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of persons from former USSR known in Poland</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has home in Poland</td>
<td>-4.952 (2.08)*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has relatives in Poland</td>
<td>-0.106 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives with partner in Poland</td>
<td>4.3 (1.29)***</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has children</td>
<td>-2.022 (1.16)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives with employer</td>
<td>-1.949 (0.94)*</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in a Warsaw district with high number of Ukrainians</td>
<td>-0.994 (0.66)</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( R^2 = 0.37 \) (Cox & Snell), 0.51 (Nagelkerke). Model chi\(^2\)(20) = 46.82, \( p < .001 \).

* \( p < .05 \), ** \( p < .01 \), *** \( p < .001 \)

Source: own elaboration based on RDS U Warsaw 2010, Centre of Migration Research.

A further variable that predicts settling in a Ukrainian cluster is whether the household in Poland is consid-
ered as ‘home’. Individuals who did were less likely to have other Ukrainians in their surroundings. This is
consistent with the observation that more integrated migrants are spread across the city rather than clustered
in certain locations.

As regards family situation, persons who lived with their partner in Poland were more likely to cluster
with other Ukrainian migrants. This may be because these persons are more likely to travel in bigger groups
and thus settle in locations in which other Ukrainian migrants are more likely to be present. Unsurprisingly,
living with the employer reduced the chances of settling in a Ukrainian cluster. This is understandable since
persons who live with their employer do not choose their place of residence, and the people who employ
Ukrainian migrants are scattered all over Warsaw.
Discussion

Previous research on residential patterns of migrants has focused on long-term migrants who originate from places that are distant in both cultural and geographic terms, and therefore are motivated to protect their position in the destination country. The presented study concentrates on circular migrants travelling from Ukraine to Poland and shows that these migrants maintain close ties mainly with co-ethnics, the majority of which live outside their neighbourhood. This suggests that the networks were probably formed already before coming to Poland, but also that the neighbourhood does not play a major role in the social capital of Ukrainian migrants and their mobility patterns. It then appears that spatial proximity is not necessary to maintain personal networks with other circular migrants, and also that the neighbourhood is not a meaningful site of interactions for circular Ukrainian migrants. Relations are formed through ethnic and kinship ties, which are not related to a specific area. Ties based on work relationships and those helpful in finding a job seem to be stronger and more important than social ties maintained in the place of residence in Poland, which Ukrainian migrants appear to change frequently.

Regarding the Ukrainian migrants’ tendency to concentrate spatially, the findings are somewhat ambivalent. The analyses confirm earlier findings suggesting Ukrainian migrants do not tend to concentrate spatially in the Warsaw metropolitan area, but nevertheless point to the existence of small ethnic clusters, most likely consisting only of several neighbouring apartments or houses. Such clusters can be found mainly in locations containing a high number of blocks of flats and tenement buildings. The conducted regression model predicting living in an area in which other Ukrainians are present demonstrated that migrants who are less rooted in Poland and less integrated with Polish society are more likely to settle in such places. The reported relatively low importance of people in the neighbourhood in the destination country, compared to other groups of people such as family and people from the hometown, suggests that the existing small clusters result from structural factors such as the availability of flats rather than individual preferences to live close to co-ethnics. A strategy to mix with Poles may give the Ukrainians a stronger sense of security than living next to co-ethnics. However, more in-depth and preferably qualitative studies are required to explore the issue of Ukrainian ethnic clusters in Warsaw and to identify the determinants of their formation.

Despite the fact that the new Ukrainian migrants may be characterised as low-income, circular migrants, strongly relying on social networks when migrating and having few strong ties with Poles, a local immigrant community does not emerge in this group. The analyses do reveal, however, that neighbourhood ties in Poland gain importance when migrants are more integrated into Polish society. The Ukrainian migrants who mainly have ties within their neighbourhood in Poland spend more time in Poland and in this sense, they resemble long-term migrants more than circular migrants. As such, they are oriented more towards the receiving society than towards their homeland. In light of the above, the finding that the neighbourhood relations formed by these migrants are ties with Poles rather than with other Ukrainians is not surprising.

When analysing migrant residential patterns in Polish cities, it is also necessary to bear in mind that they need to be interpreted within the given institutional context, namely a new destination country for immigrants, in which an immigration policy - including an integration policy - has not yet been developed (e.g. Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014). Consequently, no policies in relation to access to housing for ethnic minorities and immigrants have been developed. In addition, the character of the housing market in Poland – typical for the Central and Eastern European countries – needs to be taken into account. The urban policies of the former communist regimes, aimed at dispersing members of particular social groups, as well as a current lack of a clear housing policy (e.g. as regards social housing) have led to rather disorganised patterns of residence with limited spatial segregation. Compared to West European cities, the levels of social segregation in the largest Polish cities are still low (Marcińczak, Musterd, Stępnia 2012). Consequently, and also because of
the low level of immigration in Poland, foreigners – who like natives rely on the informal housing market – show lower levels of spatial segregation than in most European cities (compare: Malheiros 2002). Therefore, in the case of Polish cities, immigrant neighbourhoods as such cannot be observed, which makes the Polish context very different from old immigration countries such as the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, in which migrant neighbourhoods have been present for decades. The absence of distinct immigrant neighbourhoods calls into question whether the theories on the consequences of living in immigrant areas are applicable in the Polish context.

An important factor to take into consideration when analysing the formation of local ties among Ukrainian migrants is the overall lack of a visible institutional background for the Ukrainians in Poland. Apart from the Orthodox Churches and the Greek Catholic Church, Ukrainian migrants do not have meeting places such as shops, restaurants, schools, etc. (see also Piekut 2012). As temporary Ukrainian immigration to Poland is a relatively new phenomenon, with the existing Ukrainian minority having very few common characteristics and history with circular migrants, the new migrants are arriving in a ‘vacuum’ with hardly any institutional support and existing ethnic communities. They are to a limited extent dependent on their co-ethnics, and show a rather individualistic approach. This, among other things, distinguishes them for example from the Vietnamese immigrants living in Poland, who have established a well-organised, closely-knit community (e.g. Kindler, Szulecka 2013).

When seeking to answer the question why neighbourhood-based ties are of relatively low importance for Ukrainian circular migrants compared to other social ties, several characteristics of this migrant group need to be taken into account. One explanation may be that Ukrainian circular migrants who do not have close ties with Poles can be seen as migrants living in ‘transnational space’ – between Poland and Ukraine – and constantly being on the move. Being in a state of limbo between the country of residence and home country, the migrants may show a lack of interest in building a local community, but an inclination towards a dispersed, transnational network, which can also be helpful in arranging the stay in Poland. In addition, the widespread use of the Internet and new technologies allow migrants to easily maintain contact with friends and relatives in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainians are close to Poles in cultural and geographic terms, and rarely face a strong language barrier, as do e.g. Polish immigrants in the UK – a seemingly similar migrant group – which facilitates the formation of weak ties with the host members and consequently may reduce the need to stick to one’s own ethnic group. Migrants who have strong social ties with the host members, in turn, are more oriented towards Poland and thus have greater chances to form close relations in the neighbourhood during their stay abroad.

The discussed results correspond with the policy recommendations of Hugo (2013), who suggests that the concept of circular migration is usually applied to situations in which ‘the home’ is the country of origin, with little recognition of circular migrants whose home is in the destination country. If facilitating and encouraging circular mobility should be the goal of policy makers, as is often argued today (e.g. Hugo 2013; Global Commission on International Migration 2005), there is little chance that this will be accomplished through policies at a local level. Such programmes will rather reach migrants embedded in Polish society whose home is abroad.

Notes

1 Simplified procedure to employ a foreigner. It allows foreigners to work without a work permit for six months within one year at most.

2 The interviews lasted approximately for one hour and were conducted mainly by Ukrainian interviewers.
The network of 204 respondents originating from one seed was excluded from the analysis. This was because its members differed from the rest of the sample in that they were of various nationalities and many of them were students. Meanwhile, residential patterns of students are determined by the locations of student dorms and not by individual preferences.

In this study, each person was given two coupons, which means that he/she could recruit a maximum of two other peers.

In case of relatives, the proportions varied for the remaining three fields of contact (mutual advice, spending free time and other), which may be due to the fact that the relatives are often located in Ukraine and contacts are therefore not on a regular basis.

References


Appendix

Table 1. Number of close social ties in the four studied contact fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spending free time</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving/receiving advice</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving/receiving help</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration based on RDS U Warsaw 2010, Centre of Migration Research.
The Education–Employment Mismatch among Ukrainian Migrants in the Czech Republic

Yana Leontiyeva*

The aim of the article is to provide a brief overview of current labour migration from Ukraine to the Czech Republic and to explore the degree to which Ukrainian labour migrants utilise their skills on the Czech labour market. The analysis, using internal statistical data from the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and evidence from specific migrant surveys, is focused on the relationship between the formal education of economically active Ukrainian migrants and their position on the Czech labour market, and the extent to which there is an educational–occupational mismatch. The article analyses the factors that might influence the match between jobs and formal education and the position of Ukrainian migrants in the labour market. Analysis of the educational background of Ukrainian respondents does not seem to support the popular stereotype of the average Ukrainian as a university-educated construction-site worker or a cleaner, primarily due to the fact that the Czech Republic does not only attract well-educated Ukrainian migrants. Nevertheless, a comparison of the educational and occupational structures of Ukrainian migration does provide evidence of a significant waste of human capital.

Keywords: Ukrainian migration, Czech Republic, utilisation of skills, education–occupation mismatch, waste of human capital

Introduction

For many years, sociologists have acknowledged that education and skills are among the most important determinants of social class and upward mobility in modern societies. The importance of education and skills has also been studied in the context of international migration. Labour market incorporation is generally considered a precondition for the successful integration of migrants into the host society. In turn, matching the education and skills of migrants to jobs in the destination country is often used as an indicator of labour market integration (Eurostat 2010).

This article is focused on the mismatch between the formal education of economically active Ukrainian migrants and their employment level in the Czech Republic. Ukrainians represent the largest group of migrants in this country, of whom the vast majority are economically active. Although often regarded predominantly as guestworkers, over the last few years they have exhibited a significant tendency towards stabilisation and longer stays, if not actual settlement in the country. Utilisation of their skills in the Czech Republic...
Republic seems to be a prerequisite for successful labour market integration and incorporation into the wider society. Due to the nature of the available data, this article addresses only officially registered migrants,\(^2\) with specification, where necessary, of their type of economic activity and permit to stay. As the title of the article suggests, the main aim is to explore the extent to which there is a discrepancy between skills and jobs among this largest group of migrants. The analysis which follows allows us not only to estimate the risk which Ukrainian migrants face of being over-educated (in contrast to other more numerous third-country nationals, or TCNs) but also to analyse the factors that might influence this risk. But before we move to a detailed analysis of over-education among Ukrainian migrants, it is essential to have a brief overview of the literature explaining the high occurrence of education–occupation mismatch among migrants in general.

Why do migrants waste their human capital?

Although there is a relatively rich literature on ‘education–occupation mismatch’, there is no unique definition of this term. Some attention has been paid to the utilisation of education in a broader sense, where knowledge acquired through formal and informal learning is viewed as a form of ‘embodied cultural capital’. However, most studies focus on the formal qualifications of a person and treat them as an institutional form of cultural capital, or as ‘certified knowledge’ issued by recognised institutions such as schools or universities and accepted by society at large as formal educational credentials. In a more general sense, a person is considered to be over-educated for a job if he or she acquired an education that is higher than is strictly necessary to do the work. There is no consensus on how to define the required level of skills and educational achievements, since there are no fixed or unique requirements in all occupations evident across space or time.

The literature on education and occupation mismatch highlights two basic types of incongruity: 1) the ‘horizontal’ mismatch, which occurs when the level of education or skills matches the job requirements, but the field of study is inappropriate for that particular job (Robst 2007); and 2) the so-called ‘vertical’ mismatch, which refers to a discrepancy between the level of education and the employment position (Leuven, Oosterbeek 2011). This paper focuses on the second form of education–occupation mismatch, which is considered to have strong implications for a person’s social and economic status.

This mismatch between a formal education and/or skills and a person’s position in the labour market and type of job undertaken is observable not only among migrants, but also among vulnerable categories of a country’s native population, such as women with small children after maternity leave, or recent graduates. Therefore, a considerable volume of literature explaining the determinants of the skills–employment mismatch has focused on the effects of gender and the lack of work experience in the labour market. These determinants of the education–occupation mismatch could apply equally well to both natives and migrants.

One of the key factors explaining why migrants might be less successful in utilising their formal education in foreign labour markets is the lack of work experience in the destination country, insufficient information about the employment situation there and poor orientation in the host society. A lack of post-migration experience is often combined with poor language skills. Proficiency in the language of the host country plays a crucial role in shaping the labour market integration of migrants (Nee, Sanders 2001; Chiswick, Miller 2007). Conversely, important constraints on the use of education in the labour market include problems associated with migrants’ legal status and lack of social networks. The limited status of many newcomers is connected with their limited labour market mobility, and other issues such as minimum rights and no access to the social safety net where unemployment benefits and requalification courses are provided. An inadequate initial contact with the majority population is sometimes compensated for by a migrant’s inclusion in ethnic market niches. Damm (2009) has suggested that living in ethnic enclaves may have a posi-
tive effect on the employment of low-skilled workers; at the same time, it might lead to greater labour market segregation and may also increase the skills-job mismatch for better-educated migrants.

One important obstacle faced by migrants seeking a fair skills-job match is the lack of recognition of their formal foreign qualifications in the host country, both in terms of institutionalised recognition and the discounting of their home-country (or foreign) work experience by employers (Reitz 2001). Another very important factor increasing the risk of over-qualification is the limited transferability of some context-specific skills. Friedberg (2000) found that the origin of an individual’s human capital is a crucial determinant of its perceived value. Countries’ educational systems differ in quality (Mattoo, Neagu, Özden 2008). In some fields of study, both qualifications and knowledge itself might have limited transferability. Apart from the non-recognition of diplomas and licensing examination requirements, the transferability of foreign education and qualifications might be limited by differences in technology.

Ironically, over-education among migrants may stem from the selection effect in the country of origin. There is conflicting evidence regarding the effect of education on decisions to migrate. Some studies suggest that, under certain circumstances, migrants could be negatively self-selected in terms of skills and education (Quinn, Rubb 2005; Borjas 2007). However, other studies suggest that people with higher levels of education are more willing to migrate (Stark, Taylor 1991; Williams 2009). There is a widespread notion that migrants are often favourably selected not only in terms of their more-extended schooling but also because of personal traits enabling them to substitute schooling with other productivity-enhancing skills. Hence, migrants may also be formally under-educated but capable of using their other life skills and abilities to adapt and do well in the host country. They are often described as ambitious, entrepreneurial or otherwise positively selected compared to similar individuals who choose to remain in their home country.

Gender inequalities might explain the higher incidence of mismatch among both native and migrant women. An important issue related to the specifics of gender differences among migrants in terms of over-education is the concept of intersecting inequalities. Traditional gender divisions, which lead to a concentration of women in low-paid, low-status work, can be reinforced by new divisions affecting migrant workers of both sexes (Castles, Miller 2003). According to Morokvasic (1984), migrant women from the periphery represent the most vulnerable, the most flexible and the least demanding work force in advanced industrial societies.

After arrival, migrants tend to occupy the bottom rungs of the labour market in jobs that are traditionally held by low-skilled native workers. This allocation of migrants to unskilled jobs stems in part from the perception that a given job is temporary. Of course, this is only an assumption and may be discounted for a number of reasons. First, many migrants might need to stay abroad for a longer period of time than they initially planned. Second, deskilling on entry into a foreign labour market may prove to be persistent. Third, the long-term under-utilisation of skills often results in the loss of these skills, which leads in turn to a continuous waste of human capital (Brandi 2001).

There are a number of studies confirming that recent migrants are less likely to be able to utilise their formal skills shortly after arrival in a destination country, whereas migrants with a longer migration history manage to achieve a better match between their education and their occupation. This logical positive shift in migrants’ integration potential in the labour market has been observed recently in English-speaking countries that have long migration histories – the USA, Australia, Canada, Ireland and Great Britain (Nee, Sanders 2001; Rubb 2003; Barrett, Duffy 2008; Green, Kler, Leeves 2008; Wald, Fang 2008). On the contrary, as noted earlier, there are also concerns that, in some countries, over-education among migrants may be persistent in nature (Fernandez, Ortega 2008; Dell’Aringa, Pagani 2010).

The aim of this paper, then, is to study the phenomenon of over-education among the largest group of economic migrants in the Czech Republic. In order to have a better understanding of the factors which lie
behind these education–employment discrepancies it is important to give at least a brief insight into the context of Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic.

**Ukrainian migration into the Czech Republic**

Ukrainian migration to Czech lands has a long history. Already in the 16th century, labour migrants from Halych and Bukovyna used to move for seasonal work, mostly to Bohemia and Moravia (Zilinskyj 1995). At the turn of the 19th century, Ukrainian intellectuals, who abandoned their native country for political reasons, were attracted mainly to Prague and other big cities within the Austrian part of the Hapsburg Empire. During the first decades of the 20th century, the Ukrainian diaspora was organised into several associations with different aims and scopes and was particularly successful in educational and academic activities. Unfortunately the Nazi, and especially the Russian, occupation of Czechoslovakia forced the closure of these Ukrainian associations and the majority of Ukrainian migrants blended into the native population (Zilinskyj, Kočík 2001). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Czech lands have attracted a new wave of predominantly economic migrants from Ukraine.

The number of Ukrainians in the Czech Republic has grown rapidly over the past 20 years. Starting with fewer than 10 000 in the early 1990s, the official number of Ukrainian citizens residing in the Czech Republic has risen to over 100 000 people. Ukrainians represent the largest migrant community in the Republic: they constitute about 25 per cent of all migrants and about 40 per cent of migrants coming from countries outside the European Union (EU). The total number of Ukrainian citizens registered by the end of December 2013 was 105 239 (Ministry of the Interior 2013), which represents a slight drop-off from the end of 2008, when their number was about 132 000 (Czech Statistical Office 2013).

For more than two decades, Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic has been primarily economic in nature. Most of the Ukrainian migrants are traditionally occupied in the secondary labour market doing low-skilled manual jobs. By the end of 2011, official records reported 68 650 economically active citizens of Ukraine in the Republic. Approximately half of those migrants were self-employed (some peculiarities of migrant self-employment are described later in the paper) and the rest had regular employment contracts. However, the nature of Ukrainian migrants’ economic activities has changed significantly over the last five years. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic drop in the number of directly employed Ukrainians – i.e. those with the status of a regular employee; this group exhibited an almost 60 per cent decrease in 2011 when compared with 2008. This did not, however, coincide with the mass return of migrants, as the total number of Ukrainians officially registered in the country remained the same. In order to understand this development, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is important to note that nine out of ten directly employed Ukrainians did not have free access to the labour market in 2008. These almost 74 000 people had to apply for work permits, which were mostly issued for up to one year and were employer-, position- and region-specific. At the very initial phase of the economic recession, the Czech state adopted a rather restrictive approach not only towards newcomers but also towards migrants already in the country. Since the beginning of 2009, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) has sent out several memoranda addressed to labour offices (LOs), with the intention of facilitating the employment of Czech citizens through the strict regulation of the employment of TCNs. First, the MoLSA rather vaguely appealed for ‘greater consideration’ for the general decline in demand for foreign labour within the Czech economy. In spite of generally declining trend in the direct employment of TCNs, the MoLSA decided, in early 2012, to instruct LOs to discontinue issuing work permits for positions for which employers do not request the Maturita (General Certificate of Secondary Education, or GCSE). However, in June 2012, following strong criticism from NGOs and Czech companies employing migrants, the MoLSA modified the aforementioned regulations and instructed LOs to prolong and issue work
permits to unskilled workers for a shorter period of time: up to six months – for professions needing no GCSE qualifications, up to one year – for professions requiring a GCSE certificate, and up to two years – for highly qualified professions requiring a university education. However, the new memorandum insisted on official proof of qualification requirements for all applicants. In the middle of November 2013, the MoLSA again modified the regulations, this time prolonging up to 12 months the maximum validity of permits for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The regulations concerning those professions requiring applicants to have a university education remained the same; however the proof of qualification is now required only for new work permits and not for the prolongation of existing permits.

Figure 1. Registered economic activities of Ukrainian migrants before and during the economic downturn

Unfortunately Figure 1 – which indicates the drop in the total number of Ukrainian regular employees – does not illustrate the noteworthy fact that, according to official statistics, the economic recession did not have any negative impact on the economic activities of directly employed Ukrainians who had free access to the labour market (i.e. employed holders of permanent residence permits, working family members, working students and graduates of Czech universities, etc.). Quite the reverse, the aforementioned groups exhibited an increase in numbers (slightly more than 7 000 people in 2008 compared to almost 13 000 in 2011) but they failed to compensate for the significant drop in direct employment since their number is still smaller than that of work permit holders. It seems that the decline in the direct employment of TCNs cannot be explained purely by staff reductions and the bankruptcy of Czech companies. On the contrary, it is likely to be strongly associated with the changing approach towards work permit regulations (as described above).

Another important change illustrated in Figure 1 is the 60 per cent growth in the officially registered entrepreneurial activities of Ukrainian migrants since 2008 (from 21 200 self-employed in 2008 to 32 700 in 2011). Here it is important to reflect on the nature of migrant self-employment in the Czech Republic. There are different forms of irregular economic activity involving migrants (Drbohlav 2008). Besides the employ-
ment of migrants without a valid residence permit and/or valid work permit, there is also the quite widespread phenomenon of employment hidden behind self-employment. In practice this means hiring the holder of a trade licence (a person who works freelance) without a working contract, not only for occasional jobs but also for regular dependent working activities. Although these ‘bogus employment’ practices (in the Czech context often called the ‘Švarc system’) are actually illegal under the Czech Labour Code, they are preferred (mostly for tax reasons) not only by employers and migrants, but also by natives. For migrants it is often a more flexible and convenient way to obtain formal employment while avoiding work permit regulations, especially when the work is in unqualified occupations such as cleaners, cashiers, welders, etc. There are no reliable data on how widespread the use of the ‘Švarc system’ is among Ukrainian migrants; however, several studies suggest that it might be an important strategy for them (Drbohlav 2008; Leontiyeva, Nečasová 2009; Hofrek, Nekorjak 2010; Drbohlav, Medová, Čermák, Janská, Čermáková, Dzúrová 2010; Čermáková, Schovánková, Fiedlerová 2011).

Over the past decade the share of female Ukrainian migrants has not changed much but has fluctuated between 40 and 45 per cent, with a slight increase since 2010. On the contrary, the stagnation of the migrant inflow, as a consequence of the Czech Republic’s changing approach to newcomers, has resulted in a significant increase when it comes to the share of permanent residence permit holders. The share of Ukrainians with a permanent residence permit in 2000 was less than a fifth, whereas it was almost a third in 2008 (Czech Statistical Office 2013) and almost two-thirds (65 per cent) by the end of December 2013 (Ministry of the Interior 2013). Ukrainian female migration is more settled, and the share of permanent residence permit holders is significantly higher (70 per cent compared to 61 per cent among men).

The strict regulations implemented by the MoLSA have targeted low-skilled migrants occupied in jobs not requiring a complete secondary education. In 2011 the vast majority (58 per cent) of Ukrainians were employed in unskilled auxiliary work, 20 per cent – in craft and related trades, and only 5 per cent – in managerial or skilled positions. Ukrainians are employed mostly in construction (44 per cent), manufacturing (21 per cent), the wholesale and retail trades, motor vehicle repair and personal and household goods (8 per cent) and transport storage and communication (6 per cent) (Czech Statistical Office 2013). The educational level of Ukrainian migrants is often a matter of speculation, as only limited data are available. Traditionally Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are portrayed as well educated but over-skilled and under-paid (Drbohlav, Janská, Šelepová 2001; Uherek, Plochová 2003; Drbohlav, Dzúrová 2007; Drbohlav et al. 2010; Ezzeddine 2012).

Data and methods of measurement

The literature on over-education offers several ways of measuring this phenomenon. This article uses a method often referred to as the ‘statistical approach’ or ‘realised-matched procedure’ (RM). This approach is based on the observation of a ‘normal’ correspondence between employment and education based on years of schooling (Verdugo, Verdugo 1989; Quinn, Rubb 2005). The distribution of education is calculated for each particular occupation and then organised into detailed categories. Consequently, employees who depart from the ‘norm’ or mean value are classified as mismatched: above the ‘norm’ indicates over-education while below denotes under-education. This type of measurement contains observations on the equilibrium realised by the interplay of supply and demand and may be inadequate when it comes to measurement on the demand side, i.e. it measures the allocation or actual job market practices determined by hiring standards and labour market conditions (Hartog 2000).

The following analysis is based on data from two research projects conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. The first dataset (also referred to below as Employed
Foreigners) comes from a national survey of non-EU work permit holders (N = 1,011) conducted in 2006. This survey targeted members of the population having three key characteristics: a) employed foreigners from non-EU countries, who b) had resided in the Czech Republic for at least a year, and who c) held a valid work permit. With respect to the target population’s distribution, the main nationality groups included in the survey were Ukrainians (70 per cent), Russians (8 per cent), and other less numerous nationalities such as Belarusians, Moldovans, Vietnamese, Chinese, Americans and Mongolians. The second survey (later referred to as Economically Active Foreigners) had a somewhat different target group and was conducted four years later. The survey of economically active foreigners (N = 1,004) realised in 2010 targeted five groups of economically active (including self-employed) non-EU migrants based on their citizenship: Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Russians, Moldovans and citizens from the former Yugoslavia – excluding Slovenia, which has been an EU member state since 2004.

The data collection for both surveys was carried out using quota sampling with quota characteristics (nationality, sex, age and region) based on the anonymous official database of registered migrants. Taking into account the limitations of the sampling method, both surveys produced comparable results when it came to characteristics not controlled by quotas, like the family status of migrants, their educational level, length of stay, and type of work in the Czech Republic (Bernard, Leontiyeva 2013).

Although neither of the surveys was primarily focused on the study of education–occupation mismatch, they both provided unique and valuable information on the educational levels of non-EU work permit holders and economically active migrants from selected countries and their position in the Czech labour market. Though Ukrainians represented the largest group in both surveys, the analysis presented here does not exclude other nationalities (coded in larger groups). This comparative analysis will help us to understand Ukrainian migration in the broader context of non-EU labour migration to the Czech Republic.

Are Ukrainian labour migrants over-educated and why?

In order to study the factors influencing the risk of migrants being over-educated for their jobs in the Czech Republic, multinomial logistic regression was used on data collected from work permit holders in 2006. First, it was necessary to define the dependent variable as an indicator of education–occupation mismatch. In order to do so, the realised-matched method described earlier was used. In spite of certain limitations, in the case of migrants this measurement is very useful because it respects country context and reflects the disadvantages faced by migrants relative to natives. For example, if at a given moment in time there is a higher incidence of native university graduates working in specific professions ‘traditionally’ defined as not requiring a university education (such as sales persons or office clerks) then migrants with a university education working in these professions should not be thought of as being discriminated against (even if they as well as locals might waste their skills at given job).

Following the logic of the RM method of measurement, the ‘usual’ educational attainment for the domestic population in a given profession had to be measured as a first step of the analysis. For this purpose, Czech data from the European Social Survey (ESS) were used to compute the mean for years of completed full-time education for migrants with work permits employed in different sections of the labour market. Czech data from the ESS round IV were collected in June 2009 with a total sample of 2,018 respondents. For the purpose of comparison, the data on occupation were coded using the ISCO sub-major groups. Critical judgement of the measure of educational attainment used (expressed by number of years spent at school) involves the comparison of this parameter for both majority and migrant populations. The results revealed that the differences were not substantial and that the usage of upper and lower bands for further classification (the measure of 1 standard deviation below and above the mean rounded up to complete years) helped to make
any further amendments necessary. Therefore, in the second analytical step, migrant respondents were classified into three groups according to their educational attainment compared to Czechs. At the top end were over-educated migrants with years of education one measure above the mean for a given profession. At the bottom end were under-qualified migrants one measure below the mean for a given profession. The remaining migrants were classified as being ‘relatively well matched’.

As a result, 16 per cent of migrants in the sample were identified as being under-educated, 21 per cent as over-educated and 60 per cent as reasonably matched (3 per cent of respondents did not specify the number of years spent at school and therefore could not be classified). This finding was compared with incidences of mismatch in the domestic population, where the share of both over- and under-education was lower (8 and 6 per cent respectively). These outcomes are consistent with two concepts discussed earlier: the poor human capital transferability among better-educated migrants and the positive selection among lesser-educated ones.

According to our measurements, every fifth Ukrainian respondent (22 per cent) was classified as over-educated. Comparison of the incidences of education–occupation mismatch among migrant groups of different origins brings to light a rather interesting finding. Ukrainian migrants who, in Czechia, became the symbol of unqualified foreign labour, do not seem to face a higher risk of being over-educated than Russians (the second largest group in the survey). The results of the measurements, however, show that the share of the over-educated among Russian respondents (although they occupy more qualified jobs and are relatively better educated) is even higher (28 per cent). Other nationalities included into the survey (coded as one group due to the small number of cases) had a lower share of over-educated respondents (18 per cent).

As mentioned, the effect of country of origin might be spurious and explained, for example, by the different structure of the migrant population. Therefore, in order to make any assumptions about the possible effect of country of origin, further analysis was carried out taking into account the influence of other important factors. Apart from controlling for the influence of other predictors of the risk of a migrant being over-educated, the analysis tested a limited number of working hypotheses. First, the data were expected to reveal the intersection of inequalities associated with gender and migrant status. Female migrants were expected to be more at risk of being over-educated than their male compatriots. Secondly, the influence of the family situation was also tested. It was assumed that separation from a partner and/or children, rather than family status as such, would have a significant impact on migrants’ success in the Czech labour market. Bearing in mind that the relation between the family situation of migrants and their incorporation into the labour market can be bi-directional, it was presupposed that the presence of the migrants’ closest family members in the Czech Republic would be associated with a greater probability of their skills being fully utilised. On the one hand, the presence of family members in the country can play a supportive role, whereas separation from them (a very typical situation for Ukrainian migrants) might result in their determination to take any job available in order to support the family back home. On the other hand, the absence or presence of family could be the result of the migrant’s economic situation (relative to the type of job), especially for families with only one income. The third and major expectation was that we would find some evidence of the positive influence of length of stay in the country on the matching of the formal education of migrants with their jobs in the Czech Republic.

The effect of factors influencing the utilisation of migrants’ educational potential was analysed by means of multinomial logistic regression with the dependent variable described above and indicating the association between migrants’ educational level and the educational level typical for a given profession. The dependent variable takes the following values: 1 = ‘over-educated’, 2 = ‘relatively well matched’ and 3 = ‘under-educated’; the middle category is assigned to be the reference category in the multinomial regression model. The independent variables

11 were introduced into the regression models in three steps. Comparison of the nested model parameters and associated fit statistics shows that the inclusion of additional explanatory varia-
bles in each step of the modelling process improves the overall fit of the model. For the sake of brevity, the results of the most extensive estimated model are illustrated and interpreted in what follows. Table 1 presents the results (along with the fit statistics) for the regression, taking into account the national origin of the respondents, their gender, age, family situation, length of stay in the Czech Republic and type of job, both in the destination country and back home.

Table 1. The determinants of educational mismatch for immigrants with a work permit (N = 844)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under-educated</th>
<th>Over-educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (other reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.460***</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.356**</td>
<td>1.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>1.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family in the Czech Republic (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family members not in the Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1.570</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay in the Czech Republic (months)</td>
<td>1.010***</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled job in the Czech Republic (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled job in the Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.714*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled job in the Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled job in home country (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled job in home country</td>
<td>0.290***</td>
<td>1.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled job in home country</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>9.227***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never worked in the home country</td>
<td>0.440**</td>
<td>3.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-683.7498</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1542.692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1419.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The coefficients express the relative risk ratios for the multinomial logit regression, with the dependent variable measuring the match between the job and the level of education. The values are: 1 = under-educated, 2 = relatively matched (used as a reference category), 3 = over-educated. The symbols (***) and (*) represent statistical significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.


The results of the regression analysis reveal that the national origin of respondents has no significant influence on the probability of being over-educated. However, one interesting finding is that, compared to the other work permit holders, migrants from Ukraine and Russia have fewer chances of being under-educated (i.e., 11.5 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively when compared to 21.5 per cent for the rest of the sample). These two nationality effects are significant even when control is made for other factors.
When it comes to these other factors, the analysis reveals some systematic features. Age significantly increases the risk of over-education, whereas it has no significant effect on the probability of being under-educated. According to the preferred model estimations, an average migrant at the age of 50 faces a 25 per cent risk of under-utilising his or her formal education, while the risk for a younger migrant, half that age and with the same characteristics, is only 15 per cent. The results of the model testing do not support our initial assumption about migrant women being more at risk of a mismatch than men. Another interesting finding is the role played by the family situation in migrants’ integration into the labour market. An initial expectation was that migrants whose families were in the Czech Republic would be better-off and more successful in utilising their formal education. At the same time, those migrants who left their families back home would be more likely to take any job, even if they were over-educated for the position. This might be relevant for Ukrainian migrants with transnational families, who might feel more pressure to support their families back home by sending remittances (Leontiyeva, Tollarová 2011; Ezzeddine 2012; Strielkowski, Weyskrabova 2014). However, our analysis suggests that there is no significant difference between these two categories of migrant – at least, not among work permit holders.

The level of success in matching education and occupation varies for the different skills. The finding that the type of job in the Czech Republic has a smaller impact on mismatch than the last type of employment in the home country is interesting. The probability of being over-educated is highest among migrants employed in unskilled jobs (ISCO Major group 9) in the Czech Republic when compared to those migrants employed in semi-skilled (ISCO Major groups 4–8) and skilled (ISCO Major groups 1–3) jobs. At the same time, migrants employed as managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals have the greatest likelihood of being employed in positions with comparable educational attainment to that of the natives. According to the results of our estimations, the probability of being reasonably matched for these migrants employed in a skilled job is 82 per cent. The chances of their being under-educated do not vary significantly across the professions in the Czech Republic when control is made for the last type of work performed in the home country.

Work experience prior to migration seems to have an important influence on success in matching education with the appropriate job in the Czech Republic. This may be explained by the fact that the education of migrants is more correlated with their last job before migration than with the work they do on arrival in the Czech Republic. This is especially true for those migrants who reported that their last job in the home country was skilled, as they then had a significantly higher risk of mismatch. The probability that these migrants will be over-educated for their job in the Czech Republic is 52 per cent (regardless of age, gender, family situation and length of stay in the country). Most of the well-educated migrants were employed in the country of origin as teachers.

A lack of work experience back home also influences the utilisation of formal education in the Czech labour market. Migrants who had never worked in their home country were less likely to be under-educated when compared to those who did unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the home country (even if controlled by age, which can be correlated with the lack of work experience). At the same time, those migrants with no work experience were more likely to be over-educated. The situation of these migrants is, in some respects, very similar to the difficulties faced by recent graduates in the Czech Republic.

Finally, the last predictor to be discussed in this part of the analysis is the length of stay in the destination country. The analysis revealed one important concern about the persistent nature of over-education. On the one hand, post-migration experience helps to compensate for insufficient formal education: the probability of being under-educated is less than 10 per cent for newcomers and those who stay in the host country for less than a year while, after eight years there, the probability of mismatch doubles. On the other hand, the length of stay in the Czech Republic does not significantly decrease the probability of being over-educated.
fore migrants who stay for a longer period of time in the country do not seem to ‘catch up’ in terms of matching their higher educational attainment to more appropriate occupations. To understand the real influence of post-migration experience, one should keep in mind that, after five years of residence in the Czech Republic, migrants are entitled to apply for a more secure status (permanent residence), with its free access to the labour market. Therefore, it is very likely that successful migrants who stayed longer in the country were not in our sample. On the contrary, migrants who remain in the Czech Republic for a long time on the basis of a work permit are either not motivated to be more integrated in terms of acquiring a more stable status (i.e. a permanent residence permit), which poses no institutional obstacles to labour market mobility, or are less successful in matching their formal education to their job and have very specific non-transferable job skills.

Worth noting also is the fact that the effects of other control factors included in the analysis did not differ between nationalities (the interaction effects with the country of origin were not significant). Therefore the individual characteristics of migrants and their work experience back home have a universal effect on the likelihood of skills utilisation for all three groups of respondents, regardless of their origin.

Is education a ticket to a better job?

This part of the analysis, based on data from the survey of economically active migrants conducted in 2010, has a slightly different focus. As mentioned earlier, the second survey was conducted during an economic recession and included not only migrants working for an employer, but also those who were self-employed. Therefore interpreting the rate of over-education in a similar way to that described in the previous section of this article could be quite problematic. Besides, it is not possible here to apply the same measurement since the data on years spent in school are missing in the 2010 survey. By using similar multinomial logistic regression, the intention was to explore how formal education and the individual-level characteristics of migrants determine the type of jobs undertaken in the Czech Republic. Following the same logic as before, the dependent variable of multinomial logistic regression describing the current job of migrants is here categorised into three groups: skilled jobs (ISCO-88 Major groups 1–3), semi-skilled jobs (ISCO-88 Major groups 4–8, used as a reference category) and unskilled jobs (ISCO-88 Major group 9). According to this categorisation, most Ukrainian respondents ended up in unskilled (43 per cent) and semi-skilled (44 per cent) sub-groups, with only 13 per cent of them occupying skilled jobs. When it comes to the other nationalities in the survey, Moldovans exhibited a very similar occupational structure (41, 44 and 13 per cent respectively), the Vietnamese dominated in semi-skilled jobs (5, 69 and 27 per cent respectively), the Russians were distributed almost equally between three groups (27, 37 and 37 per cent respectively) and citizens of ex-Yugoslavia – with the exception of those from Slovenia – were predominantly in skilled jobs (16, 39 and 45 per cent respectively).

Significant attention is paid here to the relation between the formal education of migrants and the type of job they perform in the Czech Republic. Here, again, the main focus of our research was on the effect of the country of origin on migrants’ success in the labour market. In other words, the analysis explored whether Ukrainians have a higher risk of ending up on the bottom rungs of the labour market comparing to other non-EU migrants with similar characteristics. Following the logic outlined in the hypotheses concerning the risk of mismatch, we expected to find some proof of gender inequality when it comes to the type of job performed by migrants. Similar expectations also concern the presence of migrants’ closest family members and the effect of their length of stay in the Czech Republic. The analysis also studied the effect of language skills, legal status and employment status of migrants.
As noted earlier, the permanent residence permit allows free access to the labour market. It implies that non-EU holders of permanent residence permits are expected to have more opportunities on the labour market and are, therefore, more likely to occupy ‘better jobs’. If this expectation is not fulfilled, then we may speak of a risk of persistent discrimination against migrants (on the basis of culture, ethnicity, language, etc.). Likewise, migrant self-employment is also expected to contribute to mobility in the labour market. Here it is important to remember that some migrant groups, such as the Vietnamese, Russians and migrants from the former Yugoslavia, are, in general, ‘more entrepreneurial’ than other groups such as Ukrainians or Moldovans. The disadvantage of aggregation based on ISCO coding is that it does not always distinguish between self-employment, business ownership and supervisory positions. Foreigners who own small businesses such as retail shops, restaurants, etc., were coded in one group with those who have skilled jobs (for example, managers and professionals). However, self-employed migrants are not merely business owners but also do semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Many of them are officially freelance cleaners, bricklayers or drivers but are, in reality, working for a single employer as dependent workers. Notwithstanding the negative aspects of this ‘bogus employment’ strategy, I believe that, especially when combined with the temporary residence permit, the self-employment status may have a positive effect on labour market success. This is because self-employment gives migrants more independence from employers and reduces the risk connected with the loss of a current job and, by implication, the residence permit.

Table 2 presents the results for the regression analysis (along with the fit statistics), taking into account the national origin of the respondents, their gender, age, family situation, language skills, legal status, type of economic activity and length of stay in the Czech Republic.

Analysis of the 2010 data in many respects revealed similar findings. Contrary to expectations, the results did not provide strong support for the theory of intersecting inequalities, as male respondents had only a slightly greater chance of finding a skilled job; at the same time, the two genders were at equal risk of ending up in unskilled jobs, regardless of other characteristics. According to these new data, the age of a migrant does not have an equal effect on labour market success. While older migrants have a significantly higher chance of finding a skilled job in the Czech Republic than their younger compatriots, age does not significantly reduce the risk of ending up on the bottom rungs of the labour market. Similarly, the presence of family seems to have a significant positive effect only on one type of transition within the labour market: while the probability of occupying skilled work is relatively higher, the risk of ending up in unskilled work is comparable with that for semi-skilled jobs.17

Language skills turned out to be fairly important determinants of labour market success. In spite of the fact that the effect of language skills weakens when one controls for the influence of other factors, migrants with an advanced knowledge of the Czech language were, on average, less likely to hold elementary jobs than all other migrants with lesser linguistic skills.

The 2010 survey reveals another important finding that institutional barriers in the labour market have a negative impact on the job status of migrants. Respondents with permanent residence permits turned out to be twice as likely to have skilled jobs compared to those with temporary residence permits and were half as likely to end up on the bottom rungs of the labour market.

The employment status of migrants has a significant effect only on having a skilled job. Regardless of age, education, origin, etc., self-employed migrants were much more likely to be in skilled jobs than waged, employed migrants (26 compared to 9 per cent). In contrast, both self-employed and waged employees appear to have an equal propensity toward being employed in unskilled jobs: one in five were employed in elementary occupations. The survey data show that self-employment does not help migrants to move up from the bottom echelons of the labour market because many of them held low-status, low-paid jobs and had no protection under the Czech Labour Code. Being self-employed at the very bottom of the labour market is not
always a rational strategy for migrants who wish to reduce the risk of losing a residence permit. Some employers tend to push migrants into adopting this strategy in order to cut labour costs and avoid quite strict work permit regulations.

Table 2. The determinants of the labour market success of economically active immigrants (N = 872)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Skilled job</th>
<th>Unskilled job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality – Ukraine (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.991***</td>
<td>0.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1.870*</td>
<td>0.517**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>1.028**</td>
<td>1.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family not in the Czech Republic (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family members in the Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.972**</td>
<td>0.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>1.698</td>
<td>1.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language skills – Poor skills (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable language skills</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.567*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good language skills</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level – basic (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education without diploma</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.566**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education with diploma</td>
<td>2.883**</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>24.41***</td>
<td>0.398**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent residence permit</td>
<td>2.164***</td>
<td>0.545**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>0.264***</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay in the Czech Republic (months)</td>
<td>1.045**</td>
<td>0.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-647.775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1525.756</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1363.549</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models comparison Likelihood-ratio (Assumption: nested models) test probe &gt; chi²</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The coefficients express the relative risk ratios for multinomial logit regression with the dependent variable indicating the type of job in the Czech Republic. The values are: 1 = skilled job (ISCO 1–3), 2 = semi-skilled job (ISCO 4–8, used as a reference category), 3 = unskilled job (ISCO 9). The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent statistical significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively.

Source: Economically Active Foreigners Survey 2010.

In line with the analysis described earlier, post-migration experience had a mixed effect on migrants’ position on the labour market. On the one hand, it had a positive effect on the probability of the migrant getting
a skilled job. On the other hand, it did not have much impact on the probability of working in an unskilled job. On arrival in the Czech Republic, a large proportion of Ukrainian migrants ended up in unskilled jobs and, even after significant time spent in the country, the risk of being on the bottom rungs of the labour market remained high. It seems that, in the Czech context, having an unskilled job as an entry point onto the labour market due to limited experience, poor language skills and limited legal rights can, in some cases, become a permanent state of affairs. However, this is true not only for Ukrainian migrants.

The formal education of economically active migrants is still an important determinant of labour market success; even when one controls for the influence of other important factors (like nationality, age, language skills, length of stay in the country, type of residence permit, etc.) the impact of education remains very significant. On the one hand, foreigners who had graduated from universities had a significantly higher chance of securing skilled jobs than their compatriots with lower levels of education. The estimated probability for the university-educated migrant group is 64 per cent, compared to 18 per cent for migrants with a secondary education with GCSEs, and 5 per cent for migrants with no school-leaving exam and those with only an elementary level of education. On the other hand, a university education significantly reduces the risk of ending up at the bottom of the labour market. Migrants with tertiary education face a 7 per cent risk of ending up there (compared to 17 per cent for migrants with secondary education with GCSE, 26 per cent for secondary-educated migrants without the school-leaving exam, and a 38 per cent risk for migrants with basic education).

There is a significant positive relationship between migrants’ labour market success and their educational achievements, meaning that university-educated migrants are much more likely to get skilled jobs. However, education is not always a ticket to the most prestigious (better paid) jobs. The results of the estimations indicate that even migrants who are university graduates still have a significant risk of being unable to find a skilled job. More than a third of migrants with tertiary education end up in jobs other than skilled ones (ISCO 4–9), including elementary jobs not requiring any specific skills. Keeping in mind the results of the previous analysis, which estimated the risk of over-education, and also the fact that there is a very low, if not zero, share of native Czech university graduates in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, concerns about wasting the human capital of non-EU migrants seem justified.

Last but not least, one of the important conclusions of the analysis of the 2010 data is the fact that, even when the influences of other factors are controlled for statistically, a migrant’s origin continues to have a significant impact on his or her labour market success. Analysis of the survey data showed that, out of the five migrant groups studied, Ukrainian citizens faced the highest risk of ending up in elementary low-status occupations. According to the survey estimates, four in ten Ukrainians are occupied in unskilled jobs regardless of their level of education and, at the same time, have one of the lowest chances of securing skilled employment (about 10 per cent). Predictions based on regression modelling suggest that a Ukrainian migrant with a university degree, who has stayed in the Czech Republic for two years and does not have a permanent residence permit, has a 31 per cent chance of ending up in an unskilled job. This risk is almost three times higher than that estimated for a Vietnamese migrant with a basic level of education who has resided in the country for the same period on the same type of residence permit (this person has only a 12 per cent chance of being at the very bottom of the labour market).

As already mentioned, the institutional obstacles connected with the limited rights of migrants who do not hold a permanent residence permit are significant and might influence their labour market integration as well as the successful utilisation of their skills. In fact, Ukrainian migrants often occupy jobs at the very bottom of the labour market even after a considerable number of years spent in the country. Imagine a Ukrainian university graduate who, say, spent ten years in the Czech Republic but still did not apply for a permanent residence permit. Based on the results of the preferred model, such a migrant with a long-term residence permit
and, for example, an advanced knowledge of the Czech language, still has a non-negligible (12 per cent) risk of being employed in an elementary occupation. However, if after ten years in the country he or she applies for a permanent residence permit, then the risk of ending up in the lowest echelons of the labour market is close to zero (3 per cent).

Concluding remarks

The disparity between the skills of migrants and their occupation in the destination country is currently a fairly well-researched topic in many Western countries. However, it is still an under-researched topic in the Czech context. This is true not only for Ukrainians, who are the focus of this article, but also for other migrant groups. Taking into account the dearth of data on the educational level of migrants in the Czech Republic, in many respects the explorative analysis presented in this paper draws on unique evidence. Although the surveys were targeting slightly different facets of Ukrainian migration and because the timing of the fieldwork might be context-sensitive (one period during the economic boom and the other during the recession), they shed light on some important and previously unresearched aspects of Ukrainian migration.

Analysis of the educational structure of Ukrainian respondents provided in this article does not seem to support the popular stereotype of an average Ukrainian as a university-educated construction-site worker or cleaner. This is primarily due to the fact that the Czech Republic does not only attract well-educated Ukrainian migrants. According to both surveys, a large proportion of Ukrainian migrants have less than secondary education and most of those with reasonably high levels of schooling tend to have skilled jobs. Nevertheless, a comparison of the educational and occupational structures of Ukrainian migration provides evidence of a significant waste of human capital and suggests that well-educated migrants are not always successful on the labour market. The risk of over-education among migrants in the Czech Republic is generally relatively high and post-migration experience might not help them to ‘catch up’ in terms of matching their higher educational attainment to more appropriate occupations. This is especially true for Ukrainians, who not only face a substantial risk of over-education (22 per cent) but who also often start their work in the Czech Republic on the bottom rungs of the labour market. According to the analysis provided in this article, Ukrainians belong to a migrant group with one of the highest shares of those occupied in unskilled jobs. This cannot be explained by the individual characteristics of the migrants, their mostly unstable legal status or their lower educational level. Institutional obstacles to labour mobility through the use of work permits as a form of regulation may lower the expectations of migrants and slow down their integration in the Czech Republic.

It is clear that the regression analyses and estimations of probabilities presented in the analytical part of this paper are statistical predictions based on the parameters reported in the preferred model and available in the survey data. Although such models cannot take into account all factors that influence the real labour market success of migrants, they shed light on certain rather interesting relations. On the one hand, the results appear to challenge the perception that migrants with higher formal education from culturally close source countries like Ukraine will always be more successful than migrants with lower levels of formal education from culturally distant countries like Vietnam. On the other hand, the results of the analysis suggest that Ukrainians might face a similar risk of over-education to that of the second largest and considerably ‘better-off’ group of work permit holders – the Russian migrants. Apparently it is the degree of over-education that matters here. Put simply, imagine an average over-educated Ukrainian migrant, who finished secondary school (with GSCEs), doing an unskilled job at the very bottom of the labour market. At the same time, an average over-educated Russian migrant would be portrayed as a university graduate doing a semi-skilled job, for example, in sales and services. Institutional barriers, ethnic market niches, the positive self-selection of migrants, and the transferability of skills might play very important roles when it comes to the
success of migrants on the Czech labour market. Taking into account the sharp decline in the registered employment of Ukrainian migrants since 2008, research on the different aspects of the labour market integration of this largest migrant group would appear to have considerable importance.

Notes

1 This article is based on the working paper commissioned by The Centre of Migration Research in the framework of the CARIM-East project, co-financed by the EU (http://www.carim-east.eu/about-us/).
2 I do not intend to stress the temporality of Ukrainian migration to the Czech Republic. However, I prefer the more neutral term ‘migrant’ (rather than ‘immigrant’), regardless of whether or not the person proposes to settle in the host country.
3 In addition to the official numbers already mentioned, some estimates suggest that the number of unregistered migrants could be as high as that of migrants recorded in the official statistics (Nekorjak 2007; Drbohlav et al. 2010).
4 The occupational structure of employed Ukrainians is described later in the paper.
5 Later data on the employment of migrants in the Czech Republic are not available.
6 The results of the estimations depend upon selected thresholds. In most cases, the value of one standard deviation above and below the mean is used. However, in some cases it may be based on the modal value and ad-hoc measure for upper and lower bands.
7 At the time of the survey, immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania were non-EU citizens; however, for the purposes of this article, these respondents were excluded from the analysis.
8 The European Social Survey (ESS) seems appropriate for this purpose since the survey is large enough and (unlike, for example, the Labour Force Survey) collects information about the number of years spent at school (self-reported by respondents).
9 ESS data were used only to calculate the means for the native population (the coverage of foreigners in the ESS is very poor). Professions were coded in larger groups (2-digit ISCO codes) in order to calculate the means.
10 Keeping in mind the differences between national educational systems, I compared the average number of years spent at school for four educational groups of migrants (based on the survey data available) and natives (based on the ESS). The highest mean difference between natives and immigrants was among those who had a primary or less educational level. More-educated immigrants and natives declared relatively similar numbers of years spent at school, since the difference in mean statistics was not more than six months. The average length of schooling was generally slightly higher for Czechs than for immigrants.
11 Apart from the age of the respondent and the length of stay in the country, all other independent variables (including country of origin) were dummy coded. A short description of the variables follows in the appendix.
12 The probabilities for the dependant variable with the specified values of a given predictor (while all other independent variables were set to mean values) were calculated in STATA for the final model, with the coefficients presented in Table 1. The same method of calculation was used for all probability estimations mentioned in the article.
13 The significance of work experience prior to migration, particularly for Ukrainian labour migrants, was also studied by Strielkowski and Raussner (2013), who used the assumption of so-called ‘structural channelling’. Using data from a case study realised in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine, the authors claim
that work experience in the Ukrainian construction sector increases the likelihood of being occupied in the same sector in the Czech Republic.

14 This finding is also supported by Kupets (2013), who studied the international mobility of Ukrainian teaching and research professionals and who explains why Ukrainian teachers tend to occupy low-skilled jobs abroad.

15 It would be difficult to define the required level of education for some types of entrepreneurial activity.

16 One disadvantage of this categorisation – when it is combined with a self-employed status – is covered in the next section.

17 As Table 2 shows, the coefficients expressing the relative risk ratios for being in unskilled jobs (as compared to being in semi-skilled) are not significant, therefore the probability of occupying these jobs is the same regardless of the family’s location.

18 For this same Ukrainian migrant the probability of having a skilled job is similar (34 percent).

19 Here the probability for the dependant variable was calculated (based on the coefficients in the preferred model) using specified values for the sets of named predictors (Ukrainian nationality, tertiary education, length of stay in Czechia equal to 10 years, no permanent residence permit and very good language skills), while all other independent variables were set to mean values.

20 The estimations are the same as those explained in Footnote 18, but the value of one dummy predictor for permanent residence permit is changed to 1.

References


Appendix. Variables used in regression analysis

Employed Foreigners 2006

Mismatch – Dependent variable expressing the (mis)match between an immigrant’s occupation and level of formal education, taking values of 1 if over-educated, 2 if relatively well matched and 3 if under-educated. This variable was coded from years of education the immigrant spent at school related to the average years of education of the Czech population in the same professions (ISCO 2 digit codes). Respondents with years of schooling one standard deviation above the mean for natives were coded as over-educated, whereas respondents with years of schooling one standard deviation below the average for natives were coded as under-educated.

Male – Dummy variable taking values of 1 if a male respondent and 0 if a female respondent.

Ukraine, Russia – Two dummy variables recoded from data on the citizenship (reference group Other) of the respondent, taking values of 1 if possessing Ukrainian/Russian citizenship and 0 if otherwise. Other nationalities were not coded into separate categories due to the limited number of cases.

Age – Age of the respondent expressed in complete years; based on the question What is your age?

Single, Nuclear family members not in the Czech Republic (CR) – Two dummy variables described the family situation of the respondent (reference group Nuclear family in the Czech Republic). The nuclear family was operationalised as partner/spouse and children. A set of questions was used to code respondents into three groups: What is your marital status?, Do you have a steady partner?, Does your partner/spouse live in the Czech Republic?, Do you have children?, How many children do you have? and How many of your children live with you in the Czech Republic? The variable Single takes a value of 1 if respondent has neither spouse/partner, nor children and 0 if otherwise. The variable Nuclear family members not in the Czech Republic takes a value of 1 if at least one of the children or the partner is elsewhere than in the Czech Republic and 0 if otherwise (i.e. if single or have all nuclear family members in the Czech Republic).

Length of stay in the Czech Republic – Variable expressing the length of a migrant’s current/continuous stay in months. The questions were: How long have you been currently living in the Czech Republic? In other words, how long have you been staying in the country without interruption, on the same permit, including all prolongations on the territory?

Skilled job in the Czech Republic, Semi-skilled job in the Czech Republic – Two dummy variables were used to describe the current work of the respondent in the Czech Republic (reference group Unskilled job in the Czech Republic). An open question was used to gather the data on the current occupation of immigrants: Please describe in detail what kind of job you have in the Czech Republic? Where do you work? What do you do? Interviewers were instructed to record an answer in as much detail as possible, including job title, job description and, if applicable, the kind of machine the migrants work with. If a respondent stated several jobs, the information about the main activity was recorded. Initially answers were coded into 2-digit KZAM codes (Czech classification based on ISCO-88). For the purpose of our regression analysis the data were coded into three categories: Skilled job (ISCO Major groups 1–3), Semi-skilled job (ISCO Major groups 4–8) and Unskilled job (ISCO 9).

Skilled job in home country, Semi-skilled job in home country, Never worked in the home country – Three dummy variables describing the last work of the respondent in the country of origin. (The reference group is Unskilled job in home country). The wording of the question was: What was your last job in your home
country? Where did you work? What did you do? The interviewer’s instruction was the same as in the question about current job. On the same principle, data were coded into three categories based on 2-digit KZAM codes. Some of the respondents had never worked in the home country (mostly due to their young age), therefore an additional dummy variable was used to describe the lack of economic activities of the respondent prior to migration to the Czech Republic.

Economically Active Foreigners 2010

*Job in the Czech Republic* – Dependent variable expressing the type of job immigrants currently occupy and taking values of $1 = \text{Skilled job}$, $2 = \text{Semi-skilled job}$ (used as a reference group) and $3 = \text{Unskilled job}$. The wording of the question was: Please describe in detail what kind of job you have in the Czech Republic. Where do you work? What kind of business activity do you pursue? What do you do? Interviewers were instructed to record an answer in as much detail as possible, including job title, job description and, if applicable, the kind of machine the migrants work with. If a respondent stated several jobs, information about the main activity was recorded. Initially answers were coded into 2-digit KZAM codes (Czech classification based on ISCO-88). For the purpose of our regression analysis, the data were coded into the categories: Skilled job (ISCO Major groups 1–3), Semi-skilled job (ISCO Major groups 4–8) and Unskilled job (ISCO 9).

*Male* – Dummy variable taking value of 1 if male respondent, 0 if female.

*Vietnam, Russia, Moldova, Ex-Yugoslavia* – Four dummy variables recoded from data on the citizenship (reference group Ukraine) of the respondent; taking values of 1 if respondent is of given nationality (citizenship) and 0 if otherwise.

*Age* – Age of the respondent expressed in complete years; based on the question What is your age?

*Single, Nuclear family members in the Czech Republic* – Two dummy variables describing the family situation of the respondent (reference group Nuclear family not in the Czech Republic). The nuclear family was operationalised as partner/spouse and children. A set of questions was used to code respondents into three groups: What is your marital status? Do you have a steady partner? Does your partner/spouse live in the Czech Republic? Do you have children? and Do all your children live in the Czech Republic? The variable Single takes a value of 1 if respondent has neither spouse/partner, nor children and 0 if otherwise. The variable Nuclear family members in the Czech Republic is taking the value of 1 if all members of the nuclear family are in Czechia and 0 if otherwise (i.e. if single or have at least one of the family members elsewhere).

*Reasonable language skills, Very good language skills* – Two dummy variables describing knowledge of the Czech language (reference group Poor skills). The variables are based on reports from the interviewers, who evaluated the language skills of respondents by answering the question: How would you rate the respondent’s command of Czech?, using proposed answer categories: $1 = \text{Very good}$, $2 = \text{Quite good}$, $3 = \text{Quite bad}$, and $4 = \text{Very bad}$. Due to the low number of respondents with a very bad command of Czech, categories 3 and 4 were coded together and used as a reference group. The variable Very good language skills takes a value of 1 if skills were reported as very good, 0 otherwise.

*Secondary education without diploma, Secondary education with diploma, Tertiary education* – Four dummy variables expressing the highest educational achievement of the respondent (reference group Basic education). The question was worded as follows: What is your highest attained education?, and answer categories were as follows: $1 = \text{Primary}$, $2 = \text{Secondary without state examination or GCSE (incomplete second-
ary), 3 = Secondary with state examination or GCSE (complete secondary) and 4 = Tertiary, including colleges and post-secondary schools. The variable Secondary with diploma takes values of 1 if the respondent completed secondary school with GCSE exam, 0 if otherwise.

**Permanent residence permit** – Dummy variable taking values of 1 if respondent has a permanent residence permit and 0 if possessing another type of residence permit, including a long-term visa or long-term residence permit. The wording was as follows: *What is your current residence status in the Czech Republic?*, and answer categories were: 1 = Short-term visa for up to 90 days, 2 = Long-term visa or long-term residence, and 3 = Permanent residence or asylum granted. Due to the low number of respondents on a short-term visa up to 90 days, the first two categories were combined.

**Employee** – Dummy variable expressing the employment status of the respondent and taking values of 1 if the respondent is working as a waged employee and 0 if otherwise. The wording was as follows: *What is your status in that job? Are you...?*, and answer categories: 1 = Employee of a business, 2 = Employee of an intermediary/personnel agency, 3 = Shareholder or executive of a limited liability company, member of a cooperative, 4 = Self-employed person working in a business based on a business licence, 5 = Self-employed person with employees, 6 = Self-employed person without employees, 7 = Co-working family member and 8 = Others. For the purpose of our regression analyses (due to the lower number of respondents in some groups), detailed categories were merged in two groups: Employees (1 and 2) and Others.

**Length of stay in the Czech Republic** – Variable expressing the length of current/continuous stay in months. The questions were: *How long have you been living in the Czech Republic?* Respondents were asked to provide information about the length of stay in years and, if possible, months. Duration was calculated in months depending on the respondent’s answer.
Ukrainian Migrant Workers in Italy: Coping with and Reacting to Downward Mobility

Francesca Alice Vianello*

This article investigates the phenomenon of Ukrainian migrant women employed in the domestic and care sector in Italy. The analysis is based on a broad doctoral research carried out both in Ukraine and in Italy between 2005 and 2007. In particular, I investigate the subjective perception of downward mobility and how migrant women face this process of social devaluation and respond to it, taking into account that, in the case of Ukrainian female migration, the social skidding produced by migration goes hand in hand with the erosion of social and professional identity as experienced in their origin country during the 1990s. Thus, in order to comprehend the complexity of migration experiences it is necessary to analyse the migrants' whole life trajectories. The main results of the article are that Ukrainian migrant women give meaning to the process of devaluation by viewing it as an interlude in their life and as a sacrifice that serves to improve their families' upward social mobility. Furthermore, in order to mitigate the social skidding and the asymmetrical relationships that characterise domestic work, they prefer to personalise the relationship with their employers and to avoid working for low educated and working class people. Finally, Ukrainian domestic workers react to the homogenisation engendered by migration by differentiating themselves both from other foreign nationals employed in the same sector, and from the 'rough mass' of their fellow countrywomen.

Keywords: migration, domestic and care work, devaluation, Italy, Ukraine

Introduction

The migratory experience is a process in which ambivalent and complex forms of social devaluation and valorisation of the individual coexist. This study explores the first of the two dimensions, based on an extensive ethnographic research on Ukrainian female migration to Italy, conducted in the countries of origin and destination between 2005 and 2007.

Work is one of the public spaces in which subjects negotiate their identity and weave their social relationships. This social field is particularly important for migrants, because work legitimates their absence vis-à-vis the society of origin, and their presence vis-à-vis the host society (Sayad 1999). In Italy, the majority of Ukrainian migrants are employed as domestic and care workers, so at the bottom of the labour market, even if the majority of them are well educated and many of them were skilled workers before emigrating.

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Thus, what are the migrant women’s feelings when faced with such a process of devaluation? How do these women experience and interpret their work experience characterised by seclusion, subordination, high labour intensity and emotional stress? And finally, how do they give meaning and react to such experiences? These are some of the questions that this article seeks to answer.

Qualitative sociological research on downward social mobility is scarce, especially in relation to migrant people; exceptions worth mentioning are studies by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (2001), Ho (2006) and Liver-sage (2009). The concept of ‘contradictory class mobility’ as elaborated by Parreñas is particularly useful, since it shows the simultaneous yet contradictory experience of upward mobility, caused by the increase in financial status in the country of emigration, and by downward mobility in relation to the decline in social status in the country of immigration, undergone by migrant Filipino domestic workers living in Italy and United States (Parreñas 2001: 150). However, in order to understand the impact of social devaluation engendered by migration on Ukrainian migrant women, it is necessary to go beyond the recognition of this contradiction, and to analyse how they cope with and react to such experiences during their stay in Italy, taking into consideration such aspects as their social class before departure, profession, educational level, age and migratory project.

In this article I focus only on the most prevalent category of Ukrainian migrant women, consisting of adult women in their 40s and 50s, who usually are the main breadwinner of their families and are employed as live-in caregivers. Generally these migrants leave Ukraine as a short-term project in the hope that they can earn sufficient money in a short time, e.g. one or two years. However, their migratory experience often turns out to continue for year after year, keeping migrants abroad in a transitory condition for a prolonged period. While remaining firmly focused on returning, they continue to postpone it. For this reason I refer to them as ‘migrants in transition’. Thus, I exclude from the analysis other categories of Ukrainian migrant women – for instance young women, single women, women married with Italian men – whose way of coping with downward mobility could be different.

After a brief section dealing with methodology, the second section of this article describes the main social and economic implications of transition for Ukrainian women. The third section gives a short overview of labour immigration in Italy, with particular attention for migrant domestic workers and care assistants. After that I analyse three groups of strategies adopted by migrants to cope with downward mobility, which can be summed up as follows: 1) thinking that it is only a short interlude in their life; 2) making the debasement and the subordination milder; 3) adopting practices and discourses of social differentiation.

Methodology

This article is based on the analysis of 41 in-depth interviews with Ukrainian migrant women, collected by the author between 2005 and 2007. The study was characterised by a multi-sited approach (Marcus 1995; Fitzgerald 2006), prompted by the awareness that, in order to achieve a full understanding of the different aspects and dynamics of migration, it is necessary to analyse the social contexts of both origin and destination country. Following this approach, interviews were collected in Italy, in particular in the region of Veneto, and in Ukraine, in the regions of L’viv, Ivano Frankivsk and Chernivtz. In Italy only migrant workers were interviewed, while in Ukraine the interviewees were both migrant workers who had returned for only a short period of vacation and permanently returned migrants. Interviews conducted in Ukraine were particularly rich in stories, opinions and reflections. This is probably due to the physical and psychological distance from Italy, which allowed women to be more self-reflective and also freer to express their opinion on Italy and Italians. Furthermore, the power relations shaping the interview were less asymmetrical than in Italy, where the researcher, being an Italian citizen, was a representative of the hegemonic group and potentially
damaging for a migrant that could be, for instance, without documents. By contrast, during the field work in Ukraine the interviewer was first of all an inoffensive foreigner and secondly a guest. Thus, migrants interviewed in Ukraine probably felt more confident and secure.

The majority of the women interviewed were between thirty and fifty-nine years old, single mothers – divorcees or widows – and holding a high school diploma or a university degree. In their country of origin the majority of them were employed as teachers, nurses, factory technicians, shop assistants and office clerks, whereas in Italy they had found employment mainly as care or domestic workers. Some of them were employed as concierge, intercultural mediator, blue collar or sales assistants.

An upset life

To understand the complexity of Ukrainian migrants’ life trajectories and hence the process and experience of devaluation, it is necessary to outline the entire span of the transnational migratory experience, starting from what happened to them in Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR and then analysing their entrance into the Italian labour market, where they often end up in the field of domestic and care work.

During the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the destruction of its integrated and interdependent economic system, Ukraine experienced a deep economic crisis. The prices of oil and gas increased, the manufacturing output fell, and the national income shrank, while the national deficit and inflation rates increased dramatically. The main economic impacts on common people were a sharp decline in wages, the devaluation of savings, high unemployment, under-employment and inactivity rates, and prolonged delays in wages payment (D’Anieri, Kravczuk, Kuzio 1999; Aslund 2009). In 1996, 30 per cent of the Ukrainian population lived below the poverty line (Dudwick, Wanner 2003). This overall impoverishment destabilised both the social organisation and the cultural reference system, causing radical changes in lifestyles, in daily practices and in the construction of people’s identities.

The political and economic transformations affected men and women differently. Women experienced a swift deterioration in their living conditions and social status, primarily due to the increased risk of losing their jobs, the erosion of family support services and the rapid spread of neo-conservative thinking, calling for a return to the traditional sexual division of labour (Buckley 1997). They suddenly found themselves alone in having to simultaneously cope with productive and reproductive responsibilities, as a double salary income was at that time essential for household survival.

Some scholars (Kiblitskaya 2000; Dudwick, Gomart, Kuehnast 2003) argue that coping strategies in post-Soviet countries diverged according to sex, and that men and women reacted differently to the loss of their jobs. Women adapted more easily to the loss of their previous professional identity, since they were already second-class workers. Being used to embodying multiple identities as workers, mothers and wives, they underwent this transformation of living conditions in a less traumatic way. The Italian concept of ‘double presence’ (Balbo 1978) is useful here in order to better understand the experience of women’s double burden. It is the experience of commuting between different universes of meaning and of combining different activities and codes within the same time-frame. Thus, for women there is no separation of the temporal orders typical of the male model, because they belong to a multiplicity of temporal spheres and social identities (Bimbi 1991). For men, on the other hand, unemployment resulted in the loss of the most important part of their identity, which in Soviet society was closely linked to one’s profession. Although the post-Stalinist emphasis on education and prosperity had produced a wide range of employment opportunities, Soviet iconography associated the male with the image of the industrial worker: strong and healthy, and committed to his job. The centre of male Soviet citizens’ life was work; their self-realisation and social recognition depended on it (Kukhterin 2000; Kay 2006). For this reason they had to invest all their energy in their work, and this was
made possible by delegating all tasks related to the reproductive sphere to their wives. Women, however, depicted as mothers-workers, had a more pragmatic relationship with employment, since they also had to deal with everyday family responsibilities (Hankivsky, Salnykova 2012).

Many of the Ukrainian immigrants interviewed belonged to the impoverished Soviet lower middle class. They were employed in the health and education public services and trade sector, as teachers, physicians, nurses, technicians and craftsmen. During the Soviet period such jobs guaranteed them a certain stability and comfort, which quickly disappeared after the dissolution of the USSR, because of low wages and widespread delays in payments (Boyarchuk, Maliar, Maliar 2005).

In conclusion, most of the migrants interviewed had seen their lives change dramatically during the 1990s. Once they lost their jobs, many women re-invented both their professional and social identities, even accepting a significant deterioration in social status. Many other women had to cope with long delays in the payment of wages and to find alternative strategies to maintain their households. Thus, migration became one of the most common solutions to cope with the tumultuous social and economic transformations occurring in Ukraine, but also one of the strategies adopted by Ukrainian people to pursue upward social mobility for their families. Men and women, pensioners, unemployed or underemployed chose to go abroad.

**Ukrainian immigration in Italy**

In September 2011, the Ukrainian Mission of the International Organisation for Migration reported that the total number of Ukrainian citizens living abroad was 6.5 million, which equals 14.4 per cent of the total population. Between 2005 and 2008 the Russian Federation had been the first destination, attracting 50 per cent of Ukrainian migrants. Italy in the same period drew roughly 15 per cent (International Organisation for Migration – Mission in Ukraine 2011). However, the current conflict (2014) could radically change this figure in the near future.

Contemporary Ukrainian migration to Italy started in the mid-1990s. However, the presence of Ukrainian migrants has only been registered by the Italian Statistics Institute (Istat) after the general immigration amnesty of 2002. In 2001, Istat estimated that there were just 6 567 Ukrainian citizens with a permit to stay, while in 2004 the permits issued to Ukrainian citizens had rapidly increased to 117 161 (Italian Institute of Statistics 2001, 2004). According to the most recent data, 218 099 Ukrainian citizens have a residency permit (Italian Institute of Statistics 2011). They now represent the fifth largest national group among foreign citizens in Italy, after Romanians, Albanians, Moroccans and Chinese. 81.14 per cent of residency permit holders are women. Men amount to 18.85 per cent, and minors to 6.95 per cent. Both for women and men the main purpose of presence is work, but women outnumber men (77.04 per cent and 57.3 per cent) (Italian Institute of Statistics 2010c).

Even if statistics on the place of origin are not available, during my ethnographic research I observed that the majority of Ukrainian migrants come from Western Ukraine, especially from the regions of L’viv, Ivano Frankivsk, Ternopil and Cernivtzy. The flow is characterised by a prevalence of adult women – in their 40s and 50s – who are either married, divorced or widows (Conti, Ribella, Strozza, Tuoto 2010; Marchetti, Venturini 2013). Ukrainian women arrive in Italy alone, leaving their relatives behind. The majority are quite well educated and the main reasons for emigration are low incomes, unemployment and high tuition fees (Caritas/Migrantes 2006).

Ukrainian migrants are primarily concentrated in five regions: 41 622 Ukrainians in Lombardy (Milan region, northern Italy), 37 391 live in Campania (Naples region, southern Italy), 27 501 in Emilia-Romagna (Bologna region, northern Italy), 18 922 in Lazio (Rome region, central Italy), and 15 179 in Veneto (Venice region, northern Italy) (Italian Institute of Statistics 2010a). Initially, the preferred destination for Ukrainians
in Italy was Naples, probably because its port has had long-lasting commercial relations with the port of Odessa (Mazzacurati 2005), and because the black market economy is quite widespread there. This made it easier for migrants without documents to live and find work there. Now, the preferred destination is Lombardy, probably because there are more work opportunities.

The first Report on Immigrants in Italy published by the Home Office (Ministero dell’Interno 2007) dedicated a chapter to Ukrainians. It shows that the rate of employment of Ukrainians is one of the highest (77.4 per cent) and that the period of integration in the labour market is amongst the shortest when compared with other nationalities. Furthermore, intermarriages between Italian men and Ukrainian women are quite common, so that many women obtain Italian citizenship and have children with Italian men. The demands for family reunification are presented mainly by women: usually they are rejoined by their children. Finally, the Report underlines that Ukrainian immigration is characterised by a high level of overstayers.

Men are employed mainly in the construction and agrarian sectors (Morrison, Sacchetto, Cretu 2013), while women are employed in the domestic and care work sector and in the sex industry, where undeclared labour is particularly common. According to the most recent data of the National Social Security Institute, in 2011 Eastern Europeans (Ukrainians, Romanians and Moldavians) represented 46.32 per cent (427 565) of those insured in this sector (923 014) (Italian Institute of Social Security 2011). Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between home helpers and live-in elderly carers, but throughout my field research I observed that Ukrainian women are mainly employed as care workers.

In Italy, the increase in female employment that began in the 1970s, combined with the ageing of society, have created a high demand for paid care and domestic work, since native women cannot manage both paid work on the job market and unpaid labour at home. The interplay between the endurance of an asymmetrical sexual division of reproductive work and the Italian familist welfare state, based on the male breadwinner model and characterised by cash transfers to households rather than the provision of services, caused Italian families to rely on private welfare, made affordable by the availability of a cheap migrant labour force (van Hooren 2008, 2010).

In the 1990s, the emergence of Eastern European migration flows towards Italy was matched with a specific demand for labour force. Eastern European women – Croatian, Slovenian, Polish, Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan – are the ideal migrants to meet Italian families’ domestic and care work needs, as they are white, Christian, educated, middle-aged and alone, hence without any family obligations. Indeed, they are among the nationalities with the highest female incidence and the highest concentration in the care and domestic sector. After Filipino women, who have the highest degree of concentration in this sector (72.5 per cent), there are Ukrainian women (64 per cent) (Direzione Generale dell’immigrazione e delle politiche di integrazione 2012).

Finally, the deep economic recession that is affecting Italy has a low impact on Ukrainian women employment, since the majority of them are employed in services to families. While other national groups like Albanians and Moroccans, which mainly consist of men employed in industry and construction, are the most affected by the downturn in jobs (Italian Institute of Statistics 2010b).

A short interlude

Ukrainian migrant women belonging to the social category I have labelled as ‘migrants in transition’ accept domestic and care sector jobs, because they see the migratory experience as just an interlude in their life. It is a short period of time spent far from their home country, during which it is easier to occupy the lowest rungs of the social ladder. According to this view, the downward mobility is more acceptable when it happens in a foreign country because it does not radically impact their social status. Indeed, the reticence, even after
several years, to consider migration as a long-term experience, can be seen as an unconscious strategy to cope with social devaluation.

Even though migrant women recount that they were aware of the job expected of them in Italy when they left Ukraine, once they actually started working they were shocked upon realising the radicalness of the social debasement. The women I interviewed were torn between a desire to rebel against the condition to which they were subjected and the family responsibilities that inhibited them from doing so, forcing them to carry out these tasks for a while in order to improve their family living conditions. Sometimes, migrants are so ashamed of their jobs that they do not talk about it to their relatives, almost as if to erase it from their own experience. At the same time, relatives often do not ask their mothers, daughters or wives anything (Fedyuk 2012). How they earn money does not matter, but just the value of remittances, which condones the denial of the migration experience. Indeed, Oleksandra, who during the Soviet period was a music teacher, is torn between a sense of humiliation and the pride based on the idea that every work is worthy of respect, in particular if it is necessary for the family’s well-being. As she says:

\[\text{I do not feel more powerful. Honestly, I must say that since I started working, I've never been so humiliated as I am now. I think that my father would die if he knew the work I am doing here. I'm not ashamed. I accept this work. For me it is a good opportunity. I'm not ashamed to clean bathrooms, to wash the windows. I came here to work, I was aware of it, I expected it (Oleksandra – migrant – Venice 2.06.2006).}\]

Thus, the first strategy adopted by Ukrainian migrant women working in Italy as caregivers to cope with the downward mobility is to think that this humiliating experience is only an interlude in their life, aimed at improving their family’s living conditions and to defend their family’s social status. Thank to this sacrifice their children can pursue their studies and find a good job. Furthermore, their expectation is that once they return to Ukraine they will regain their previous social position in Ukrainian society. For this reason they do not like to speak with their relatives about their ‘Italian work’.

**From teacher to servant: how to make the subordination and the debasement milder**

Given the decline in prestige and social status, migrants in transition try to reduce subordination within the relationship with their employers by demanding respect, which they call ‘humane treatment’, and by personalising the relationship with employers. Towards their employers, who undervalue them because they are foreigners and who show no appreciation for their work and their professional background, they request to be recognised as equals. For this reason, every small sign of equal treatment is greatly cherished by the respondents. The case of Olesia is emblematic, as she recounts how she was suddenly rescued by her employers when she suffered a haemorrhage, as a demonstration of humanity.

\[\text{I worked with a family composed of wife, husband and six children. A very simple family, all very good. Even when I was ill, when I had a haemorrhage. Within an hour they had brought me to the gynaecologist. They helped me, but I was not feeling very well, so I decided to return to Ukraine. This family always called me. They told me: ‘come back, because you're good, we're used to you’ (Olesia – migrant – Venice 2.06.2006).}\]

Similarly to the Filipino domestic workers studied by Parreñas (2001), the Ukrainian migrants mitigate the contradictory class mobility by seeking out a close relationship with employers. Often, affective relationships arise between the elderly person and the assistant, since both of them live in a condition of frailty and social
isolation. Both parties often describe the nature of such a relationship as typical of the family context, such as one between parent and child. Indeed, it is not rare for the migrants to speak about the person they assist with affection, defining them as grandparents or parents. For instance, Nadia says that she likes the woman she takes care of, who reminds her of her grandmother.

_I work with a lady who is 100 years old. Her head still works. I work 24 hours... day and night. [...] They are a normal family. The daughter is a teacher like me and the lady, Gemma, lives only on her pension, 1 200 euros a month. The Municipality provides a cash transfer, but the salary is enough only to pay me and bills... I take 700 euros. My friends take a little more: 800 euros. But to me that’s fine, because there is not that much work: the apartment is small, she visits toilet on her own, she walks... she goes to the window and looks at the weather and then we talk a lot. With older people it is important to have a lot of patience. I have been working for her for a year and a half and I feel good. [...] She reminds me of my grandmother_ (Nadia – migrant – Venice 13.06.2006).

Numerous studies (Andall 2000; Anderson 2000a; Scrinzi 2004) have highlighted the ambiguity of personalisation, typical of this employment relationship, given that total commitment is required of the worker – physical, emotional and relational. The involvement in the intimacy of family relations is a double-edged sword, used by employers to obtain the worker’s maximum availability, as well as to increase his/her authority. However, domestic and care workers consider being part of the family as a form of recognition of their work that dissolves the relationship of subordination and makes more acceptable the social devaluation. Indeed, some interviewees recount that they maintain friendship relations with their previous employers even after the death of their patients, and sometimes even after going back to Ukraine.

The social class and educational level of the family in which migrants are employed is an important element for the understanding and interpreting how migrants describe and perceive their employment relationship. Here it is important to remember that the Ukrainian migrants I interviewed were socialised in a society that was, in theory, classless, since all Soviet citizens were considered equal owners of the means of production. However, education was one of the main factors of social stratification, since the education level was tied to job opportunities. It was the alternative channel for upward mobility and the main way to obtain a non-manual job (Gerber, Hout 1995). For this reason Ukrainian migrants attach great value to education and have particular difficulties in dealing with subordination to poorly educated Italian women who have the power to give them orders. Anger, bitterness and humiliation are common feelings among respondents who consider the social position reserved for them in Italy to be punitive, where even working class people can afford to hire a graduated domestic/care worker, treating her like a servant. Larissa, for instance, recounts her working experience with an elderly couple of poor origins, underlining that she found it unjust that they could employ a domestic worker. According to Larissa this labour relation is problematic because it is an incongruity of the legitimate social stratification, and it demonstrates how low their social position in Italy is. In other words, in her opinion low educated people belonging to the working class should not employ a person with higher education. She stresses that this is only possible because of the international wage differences and the inequalities between rich and poor countries.

_It’s not physically hard to carry out the duties of the caregiver, but it is morally depressing. Not all people are good, not everyone understands the reason why we are here in Italy. Once, they didn’t have any servant... now even people who are not rich can afford a servant... when I was in the countryside I was in a not very rich family: when she was young she was a servant too, and he was a gardener... they didn’t have better jobs, high level jobs, though at home they had a woman of a different nationality with whom_
they could behave like masters. I must submit to them, my head must stay down. I always stayed at home, I was not sleeping well because twice, three times a night I had to change her nappy. At home there was little food. Luckily there was a supermarket nearby, so I could go shopping with their money. Well, he told me I was eating too much. I told him that if he wanted to die he was free to do so, but I actually wanted to live. I told him so! (Larissa – migrant – Padova 04.06.2006).

Thus, the reason why it is particularly frustrating for Ukrainian migrants to be employed by families of a lower class and often low education level is that it throws into sharp relief the process of debasement engendered by migration, as well as the injustice of international inequalities. They are more willing to work for cultured families belonging to the middle or upper class, since it confirms the social order: an affluent and educated family has the ‘right’ to hire a domestic worker. Furthermore, the relationship with well-educated people gives the worker some advantages, like for instance learning the Italian language and being well paid, as Maria explains.

In Bologna I work as domestic worker in a family of physicians. He is also a professor at the university. One child is a journalist and the other one is still at school. I like them because they pay me well, they respect me, they know that I was a teacher for deaf-mute people. Furthermore, I am happy because they taught me Italian. Before, I worked for an elderly woman in a little town near Salerno. I didn’t like such work, because she didn’t speak Italian and I couldn’t learn it, she spoke only in the local dialect (Maria – Sambir – 17.08.2006).

To sum up, my thesis is that the greater the employee’s educational superiority toward her employers, the more pronounced is the perception of degradation. By contrast, if the difference in educational level between employer and employee is not as wide or if the employee feels culturally inferior in comparison to the employer, then the debasement seems less drastic and more acceptable. In these cases, it is easier for Ukrainian migrant women to accept and manage the downward mobility. However, there is a difference between middle and upper class employers, since it is easier to establish an informal relationship (which as we have seen, the migrants prefer) with the former. Middle-class families, being less accustomed to managing staff, tend to relate to the employee on a more equal basis, while well-off families are more accustomed to such servitude, and are used to establishing a professional and cold relationship.

In conclusion, in this section I have shown two strategies adopted by migrants in transition to mitigate the subordination and the social debasement, and thus to cope with downward mobility. Firstly, seek to have a respectful and informal relationship with their employers, so as to reduce the hierarchical relationships in their labour setting. Secondly, migrant women try to avoid working for lower class and low educated people because even if they accept to do servile work, they cannot tolerate doing it for people they consider culturally and socially inferior to themselves.

**Tactics of differentiation**

Domestic workers react to the social devaluation through different practices of differentiation. First of all they try to set themselves apart from other foreign nationals. Indeed, many respondents say that they do not have any immigrant friends from other continents and that they feel uncomfortable when they are associated with them. They consider themselves to be culturally superior to people of African, Asian or South American origins and sometimes even other Europeans, like Romanian and Moldavian, because they define themselves as Central European. For this reason they can integrate more quickly than the other migrants. Oksana’s de-
scription of a Filipino woman is particularly emblematic of the Ukrainian migrants’ attitude toward other nationalities.

Filipinas, idiots, oh my god, what kind of people are they? I don’t understand why Italians like them so much. Sometimes I think that you [Italians] are idiots too. They are like monkeys. You are happy even if they don’t do anything, they don’t understand anything. I have worked with them. In a house in Milan, before me a Filipina had worked there. He [the employer] arranged her residence permit. When I arrived, she had to teach me the work, how to prepare the food, etc. Sometimes she came to ask him information about the contract and he was so happy when she came. She couldn’t speak Italian. By contrast, after these 18 months I began to understand everything, I didn’t speak perfectly, but I understood and could explain myself. Even though she had been in Italy for many years, she wasn’t able to cook well. She had learned how to prepare only a few things to eat. After that job, she went to work for a priest. She prepared food for the priest. They don’t take on heavy work... Then, once we were in the kitchen she asked me about my country of origin. I told her and she didn’t know where Ukraine was. I explained that it was in Central Europe, between Russia and Poland, close to Germany. She seemed to understand, but then she asked me, ‘Why are your countrymen so black while you are so white?’ She didn’t understand anything [laughs] (Oksana – returnee – L’viv 17.09.2006).

The claim of superiority is due to the stratification of the domestic service sector, where wages and working conditions are diversified primarily on grounds of nationality and, secondly, to the colour of one’s skin. In Italy, the Filipinas are typically at the apex of the hierarchy, followed by women from Latin America and Eastern Europe and, finally, by the African women (Nigeria, Morocco), who earn less and are often rejected by employers because of both skin colour and religious faith (Zanfrini 2005). On the other hand, African women coming from the former Italian colonies who immigrated during the 1960s and 1970s share the top of the hierarchy with the Filipino women (Marchetti 2010). Therefore, in Italy the hierarchy structuring domestic services is different from the United States and the United Kingdom, where the intersection between gender, ethnicity and class is particularly evident since black women often serve white women (Glenn 1992; Andersen 2000b). In Italy another type of stratification and labelling operates. Migrant women are classified on the basis of fictitious essentialist cultural differences and their bodily characteristics: there are national groups more suited to acting as servants, since they are petite, silent and discreet, namely the Filipino women, while other groups are more preferable for assisting the elderly, as they are skilled, physically strong, and show a spirit of sacrifice, namely women from Central and Eastern Europe (Scrini 2004). Furthermore, since Ukrainian migrant women are in their 40s and 50s, they are considered more patient and calm than young girls, and thus more apt to spend long hours within the domestic space. Ukrainian women try to affirm their domain within the care service niche in order to obtain better working conditions, using the Italian society’s stereotype of them to their advantage, and stigmatising the ‘others’, labelling them as inferior because they are ‘non-European’.

Ukrainian migrant women furthermore adopt distinction tactics with regard to their fellow nationals. The experience of international mobility produces a sort of social and generational levelling among migrants. They are emptied of their past and share a new common identity, i.e. being Ukrainian immigrants. Indeed, as one interviewee said: in Italy, Ukraine becomes unique [...] no matter what job you did in Ukraine, here we are all equal. However, some women resist the homogenisation that occurs in Italy and look for other ways to stand out. The active participation in religious communities and ethnic associations is one of the most common practices adopted by some ‘migrants in transition’ to seek fulfilment, valorise their skills and distinguish themselves from the others. During my research I met women who devoted their free time to being...
leaders of an ethnic association, ministers of music in their church, Ukrainian language teachers in the community school for second generation children, or journalists for small newspapers. For instance, Daria was member of the editorial staff of an Ukrainian newspaper for migrant people called *Do Svitla* and she had the idea of including a new column based on migrants’ letters.

*In Bologna I started collaborating with the editorial staff of Do Svitla. I thought it was necessary to improve the involvement of migrant people with the journal. We contacted our friends living in Italy asking them to write something for the newspaper. It started as a joke, but we received many, many letters. So many letters to write a book, not a newspaper. In Italy there are so many Ukrainian teachers, many educated and intelligent people. While we work we don’t need to use our head, but at night-time we like to use it and to write* (Daria – returnee – Ivano Frankivsk 14.08.2006).

Recapitulating, in this last section I analysed how migrants in transition react to the process of downward mobility and in particular to the social levelling they experience in Italy. I identified two differentiation strategies; the first one concerns attempts to distinguish themselves from migrants coming from other countries. They use ethnic stereotypes in their favour to improve their working conditions. The second strategy is to try to stand out and to recover their skills by doing voluntary intellectual work and participating in religious or ethnic associations.

**Conclusions**

As we have seen, Ukrainian migrants employed in the Italian domestic and care sector experience a double process of downward mobility. The first one occurred in Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The majority of migrant women I interviewed were originally employed in education, health and public services, but underwent a sudden process of impoverishment during the 1990s due to a loss of job and/or buying power, wage arrears and inflation. Migration was seen as a means of escaping the pauperisation and of maintaining their family’s social position and standard of life. However, in Italy they underwent a second devaluation, as their skills are not recognised and they can only find work as unskilled workers in a few sectors of the Italian labour market such as domestic/care work and prostitution.

In this article I have analysed how a particular category of Ukrainian migrant women, the ‘migrants in transition’, employed in the domestic/care sector, cope with downward mobility and how they react to it during their stay in Italy. First of all, I have argued that migrants give meaning to their experience and justify it by viewing it as a short interlude. The economic gains justify this process of devaluation and give meaning to the migratory experience. According to Parreñas (2001: 171-196) the money earned through wage differentials justifies the contradictory class mobility, which leads educated and qualified women to carry out work which is repetitive, poorly paid, servile and socially under-recognised in order to improve their respective family’s social mobility in their country of origin. For migrant women, remittances are therefore one of the means by which they reaffirm their self-esteem.

Furthermore, I have gone beyond Parreñas’s analysis by highlighting two different coping strategies that migrants adopt to mitigate the downward mobility. Firstly, they try to weaken the hierarchy within the labour setting, looking for an informal, cordial and respectful relationship with employers. Secondly, they try to avoid working for lower class and low educated people. In particular, concerning this last finding I have shown that ‘migrants in transition’ are more willing to work for well-educated families, since in that context they consider a hierarchical relation to be socially legitimate and because they appreciate cultured people like themselves. Conversely, they are unwilling to serve people they judge to be uneducated and belonging to the
lower class, since they consider themselves superior to them. Therefore, being employed for working class people underscores their proletarianisation and calls into question their logic of social stratification.

Finally, I have shown the Ukrainian migrants’ tactics of differentiation as a response to downward mobility. Just as emigration could be interpreted as a response to impoverishment, differentiation is the migrant’s response to the downward mobility engendered by migration. On the one hand, Ukrainian migrants adopt discursive strategies to differentiate themselves from migrant women from other countries whom they consider to be inferior, in order to improve their work conditions. On the other hand, they attempt to set themselves apart from their fellow nationals by seeking personal self-fulfilment and social recognition during their free time. By doing so they can recover, at least partially, their previous social position and self-esteem.

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Notes

1 This article draws from a Ph.D. research project completed in 2008 at the Department of Sociology of the University of Padua (Italy), which was published in Italy with the title Migrando sole. Legami transnazionali tra Ucraina e Italia (Migrating Alone. Transnational Bonds between the Ukraine and Italy) (Vianello 2009) and also in some English-language articles and chapters (Vianello 2011, 2013a, 2013b).

2 In Italy the professional figure of the intercultural mediator is an intercultural advisor and a linguistic go-between. Usually they work for public employment centres, migrants offices, social and health services and schools.

3 For further information about this topic see: Brück, Danzer, Muravyev, Weisshaar (2010); Round, Williams (2010); Brück, Lehmann (2012).

4 Comparing data on employment according to job types from 1989 to 2005 (Laborsta 1989-2005), I noted heterogeneous trends. For some professions the employment levels were constant or had increased, for instance for blue collar workers and store clerks, while for technicians, agrarian workers, clerical workers and artisans, the levels had significantly decreased.

5 No data are available on unregistered Ukrainian migrants in Italy.

6 The legal status of Ukrainian people in Italy is that of non-EU citizens. They can enter Italy only with a visa for tourism, family, work, business or study. Upon arrival in Italy, they must apply for a residence permit which, however, is not required if their stay in the country – for visits, business, tourism or study – is for periods not exceeding three months. They can stay in Italy only until the visa expiry date, unless they have the right to obtain a longer permission to stay. For more information see: http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/en/.

7 Newer data are not available.

8 In the case of elderly assistance, by employer I mean the elderly person’s children, although if the elderly person is self-sufficient or if he/she has no relatives, then this person incorporates the roles of beneficiary and of employer.

9 In Italy the use of dialects is quite widespread.
Western Ukraine, and in particular the ancient region of Galicia, belonged to the Polish Crown and later to the Austrian Empire.

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Analysing Selected Transnational Activities among Ukrainian Immigrants in Spain

Renáta Hosnedlová*, Mikołaj Stanek**

In recent years, the concept of transnationalism has become one of the main analytical tools used to assess the mobility patterns of Central and Eastern European populations. This work studies the transnational activities of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. It examines three areas of transnational behaviour: travelling to the country of origin, the frequency of non-direct contact with the communities of origin and remittances. Our objective is to examine how gender, legal status and type of family unit (multilocal/non-multilocal) affect the frequency and extent of transnational activities. Most of the statistical data presented in this article come from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI-2007) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (Spain). The study confirms that family ties play a crucial role in establishing and maintaining links between countries of origin and destination. It also reveals that the legal status of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain has a great impact on patterns of transnational behaviour. In this sense, it is evident that institutional factors must be included in analyses of migratory processes from a transnational perspective.

Keywords: Ukrainian migration, Spain, transnationalism, gender, irregular migrants, family

Introduction

Immediately after the collapse of the communist system, the international mobility of Central and Eastern European populations changed significantly. Along with the traditional patterns that used to predominate in these regions, such as long-term migration for economic or ethnic reasons, new forms of mobility have appeared, such as circulatory migration and the flow of temporary workers (Wallace 1999; Morokvasic 2006). These extraordinary cross-border flows have established links between receiving and sending countries and also provided material for a thorough rethinking of the traditional nation-state-centred immigration paradigm that saw East-West migration as a lineal and unidirectional process, with socio-economic and cultural assimilation as the final outcome (Favell 2008). In this context, the concept of transnationalism has become one of the main analytical tools used to assess the mobility patterns of Central and Eastern European populations (Morawska 2002; Rogers 2004; Moskal 2011).

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Surprisingly, contemporary studies of economic migration among Ukrainians have rarely focused on this transnational perspective. Yarova (2007) carried out one of the few studies that have taken this approach by analysing how doing domestic work in Italy impacted the family life of Ukrainian women in their country of origin. Along the same lines, Tolstokorova (2010) examined the implications that Ukrainian migration to European countries has for the transnational family field, emphasising issues surrounding gender, maternity and paternity, and in a recent study, Solari (2010) compared the migratory patterns of flows to California and Italy. Although the number of studies on Ukrainian immigration to Spain has increased over the years, the focus has not been on the transnational aspects of this phenomenon and, therefore, relatively little is known about them. For example, Sanchéz Urios (2007, 2010) examined the ways in which Ukrainian immigrants enter the labour market and the social necessities that arise in the course of this process and Hosnedlova and Stanek (2010) recently described the general socio-demographic aspects and mobility patterns of this group.

In this article we examine certain empirical indicators related to the transnational dimension of Ukrainian immigration to Spain. To be precise, we explore the phenomenon of transnational families and various transnational activities (travelling to the country of origin, frequency of contact with the community of origin and remittances). Specifically, we aim to answer the following research questions here:

1. Does gender affect the frequency and extent of the selected transnational activities?
2. Does legal status play a significant role in shaping the selected transnational activities?
3. How does the type of family unit (multilocal/non-multilocal) influence the intensity and scope of these transnational activities?

Regarding the data, we analyse the official statistics of the Spanish Municipal Register and the data from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI-2007) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (Spain). The first source will be used to develop the socio-demographic profile of the immigrant population in Spain; the second source will enable the analysis of transnational activities and their factors. Concerning the methods, we will implement the descriptive statistics and basic analysis using charts and cross tabulations.

The article is structured around four sections. The first part is theoretical, dealing with the concept of transnationalism. We justify our approach, present the transnational activities and other terms that will be examined in the empirical section. The second part deals with the data sources, their characteristics and limitations. The goal of the third part is to describe the group of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain in terms of basic social and demographic characteristics (e.g., intensity of flows and age-sex structure, geographic distribution, irregularity rates, type of family unit). The fourth part is analytical and addresses the issues surrounding selected transnational activities of the Ukrainian immigrants. Lastly, the conclusion summarises the main findings and evaluations. In the fifth part concluding remarks are presented.

**Conceptualising transnationalism**

Within the past twenty years, a period that several writers date from the seminal article on transnationalism published by Glick Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton (1992), several migration scholars have shown that migrants maintain multiple ties with their countries of origin while they adapt to the host society. Transnationalism involves multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states. Members of transnational communities move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require a simultaneous presence in both.

Transnationalism has become a key dimension in the analysis of migration, providing essential conceptual tools for explaining and understanding the current transformations of population mobility patterns. Nevertheless, the enormous popularity of this approach has led to a situation in which, according to Vertovec
transnationalism seems to be everywhere, at least in social science. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the definition of transnationalism is sometimes so broad that it cannot be used as a circumscribed and contrastable empirical reference. Portes (2001: 182) suggests that there are dangers inherent in seeking to broaden the definition of what constitutes transnationalism because in doing so one risks diluting the efficacy of the theory; in the end, every aspect of migratory praxis could be defined as a cause or consequence of transnational activity, thus encompassing everything yet explaining nothing new. In order to avoid these risks, our study borrows from the precise definition of transnationalism proposed by Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) who defined the concept as activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation. One of the advantages of this definition is that it allows us to establish a series of indicators of transnational activities which maintain and reinforce ties between countries of origin and destination.

Current academic literature suggests that transnational activities and practices may be developed in several areas of the social life. Goldring, Henders, Vandergeest, (2003: 5) for instance, list and describe the forms the transnational activities can take: 1) the social transnational activities can be represented by regular contact with relatives and friends in the home country, or by family and/or other type of visits to the home country; 2) the cultural transnational activities can be illustrated by celebrating ethnic, religious or national holidays associated with the home country; 3) the religious transnational activities can be maintaining religious identities and practices associated with specific leaders or institutions based in the home country or region, economic support for faith-based projects; 4) the economic transnational activities are known mainly as family remittances, collective remittances or investment; and 5) the political transnational activities comprise voting, raising funds for parties or social movements, lobbying the host government regarding homeland issues. In our study we deal with some of the transnational activities suggested by Goldring et al. (2003), namely: travelling to the country of origin and sending of remittances. The selection of these has been influenced by the characteristics of data sources and at the same time inspired by the theoretical considerations that are discussed as follows.

Numerous studies have indicated that one of the key elements of transnational activities is direct contact with social networks and communities in the country of origin through cross-border movement (Menjivar 2002; Walton-Roberts 2003). At the same time, travelling to the country of origin and face to face contact with family members or friends should not only be considered in terms of reinforcing sentimental relationships but also as an important method of transmitting information about migratory destinations, economic exchange and technological modernisation. In this sense, more or less regular visits or circulatory mobility are factors that allow direct and intense interaction between migratory communities and origin communities on various levels (homes, broad social networks, associations, political groups or churches).

Communication is another crucial dimension of transnational activities, as the vitality of transnational links relies on the strength and intensity of social contacts across national borders. A number of scholars stress the role of new communication technologies as a fundamental feature of contemporary transnational activities (Hiebert, Ley 2006). The simultaneity and immediacy allowed by modern technologies significantly intensify and expand transnational connexions (Portes, Guarnizo, Haller 2002). The telephone, internet and other ICTs open up space for transnationalism as this form of communication can cross national boundaries ‘without actual bodily movement’ (Guarnizo, Smith 1998: 14).

Remittances are another manifestation of transnationalism. Among transnational activities the importance of ‘sending money home’ has grown enormously over the past few years. This practice plays a fundamental part in improving the short-term economic situation of families, although its contribution to economic development at the local and national level is still being debated (Guarnizo 2003). What is most important in the
context of our study is that remittances cause members of a family network living in countries of origin to become economically dependent on resources coming from abroad, which reinforces ties across borders.

When studying the transnational behaviour of migrants our goal should be not only to determine the scope and extension of these activities but also to identify possible correlates. It has been suggested that a number of factors must be considered in order to understand what is involved in transnational activities (Portes, Escobar, Walton Radford 2007). For example, Portes, Guarnizo, Landolt (1999) points to factors such as access to technology, economic and human capital stocks and the distance to the homeland. Multilocal families can be regarded as another factor that determines the development of transnational activities. Due to geographic mobility, the family unit is separated into various cells that meet both in origin locations and in receiving countries. From a transnational perspective, migration involves the physical separation or dispersal of the family unit, but that does not mean that family members no longer have sentimental and economic ties with each other. Despite dispersal, family networks allow these different fragments to interact as a common entity. This new family structure links various local realities to an international setting and configures what has been called the multilocal transnational family (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). Geographic separation and the lack of daily contact convert the family into an imagined community which requires continual effort from its members to keep the links between them alive. The possible linking mechanisms imply maintaining, reducing, reinforcing or establishing links with family members (Bryceson, Vuorela 2002).

In addition, various studies reveal that men and women undertake transnational activities differently (Menjívar 2002; Itzigsohn, Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). In this sense, transnational activities reflect and simultaneously reproduce social and power relationships that determine the sexual division of labour roles within households. For example, Pessar (1999) revealed that Mexican men pursue a more transnational strategy in many cases with an eye on an eventual return, while women are more engaged in the social life of the receiving communities. Moreover, in some cases differentiated reproductive roles in the family might reinforce transnational behaviour. For example, in their study on transnational motherhood Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) showed how Latina immigrant domestic workers who leave their children behind are deeply involved in family life across borders and in constant movement between locations.

Another key factor that shapes the ways in which transnational connections develop is the institutional and legal framework established by national and supranational policies. National regulations on foreigners and immigrants, the relations between countries of origin and destination and finally, processes of economic and political integration at the regional level (such as the expansion of the European Union) can either facilitate or limit the establishment and development of transnational links in the context of migration (Waldinger, Fitzgerald 2004). Immigration laws and the rights of immigrants affect their ability to move across borders and limit other forms of transnational behaviour. Irregular status in a destination country can limit cross-border mobility and also lead to greater communication via new technologies.

The history of geographic mobility among Central and Eastern European populations clearly illustrates the importance of the legal framework for the development of transnational activities. Without a doubt, three processes, a) the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Bloc, b) European Union enlargements in 2004 and 2007 and c) the removal of transitional restrictions on the free movement of workers from the new member states, greatly advanced the creation of a new transnational or, more precisely, ‘trans-European’ area of geographical mobility (Gil 2011).

In this context, the issues surrounding the transnationalism of migratory groups whose members find it difficult to obtain legal status become particularly interesting. Ukrainians are currently the most numerous non-community European group in Spain. An analysis of the transnational strategies and behaviours maintaining their links to their country of origin could be a valuable contribution for future comparisons with European community immigrant groups.
Data sources

As mentioned above, most of the statistical data presented in this article come from the National Immigrant Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes, ENI-2007) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics at the beginning of 2007 with a sample of 15,465 people born outside Spain (16 years of age and older), including 223 Ukrainian immigrants. The sample method of the survey was based on a three-stage sampling strategy: 1) census sections – stratification of first stage units in accordance with the size of the municipality to which the section belongs; 2) second stage units – a sample of ten dwellings was selected in each sample section; 3) third stage unit – a person was selected with equal probability from among the list of those born abroad and who reside in each dwelling (Reher, Requena 2009). A goal pursued for the survey was to present representative and reliable data. According to Reher and Requena (2009) the results of the poll can be regarded as statistically representative for all of Spain, for the main autonomous regions of the country, and for the most numerous migrant groups. With regards to the Ukrainian population in Spain, there will be some biases, as it is not one of the most numerous migrant groups in Spain, but ENI-2007 can still be considered the most reliable source of information on Ukrainians in Spain.

The National Immigrant Survey provides a set of data that complement information from traditional sources about the phenomenon of immigration (censuses and municipal registers). The survey includes data on the experiences of individuals who have immigrated to Spain, such as their participation in the labour force, their housing conditions and other relevant aspects of their lives (Reher, Requena 2009). ENI-2007 also contains a useful set of variables, including geographical distribution of family and household, frequency of visits to the country of origin, remittances, frequency and methods of communication with family members and friends in the country of origin, all of which can be used to carry out an analysis from a transnational perspective.

Despite the richness of the data source, it is subject to some limitations, the most important being that our study relies on the data from a survey conducted in the host country. This offers only limited possibilities to reconstruct all the possible patterns of immigrant mobility, since we have no access to the people who have already returned to their location of origin after a temporary stay in Spain. In addition, the ENI 2007 sample includes only immigrants who at the time of the survey had either been in Spain for at least a year or had the intention of staying in the country for at least a year. Taking into account these limitations, in order to approach the issue of the geographic mobility patterns of Ukrainian immigrants we have decided to try to examine the movements between places of origin and destination from the host country’s perspective. To this end, we focus on the frequency and duration of movement not from Ukraine to the host country, but rather from Spain to the countries of origin. We distinguish two types of movements: first, ‘long-term temporary migration’, when immigrants return to their country of origin for a period of more than three months; and second, ‘short-term temporary migration’ where stays in the countries of origin never exceed three months.

We have also used the official statistics of the Municipal Register. This source of data is an administrative register of the residents of each municipality, regardless of their legal status, and it is currently one of the most widely used sources for the analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of the immigrant population in Spain. This register is more useful for the analysis of the core features of foreign populations than other sources available because it covers both documented and undocumented immigrants.
Ukrainian migrations to Spain – basic social and demographic characteristics

Intensity of flows and age-sex structure

The first Ukrainian economic immigrants arrived in Spain in the mid-1990s. There is no apparent relation between previous political migration (in 1940s and 1950s) and post-Soviet economic migration to Spain. Although we lack reliable statistical data for this period, it can be assumed that the influx was relatively large. After the regularisation processes in 2000 and 2001 Spanish statistics displayed a sharp increase in immigrants of this origin. Between 1996 and 2001 the number of Ukrainians with residence permits grew from 240 to approximately 9 500 (Ferrero Turrión 2005). In the same period approximately 25 500 Ukrainians were registered in Spanish municipalities. Over the following years the number of Ukrainians registered in the Municipal Register increased exponentially, reaching 81 243 by 2009. However, in recent years the inflow of Ukrainians to Spain (as well as migrants of other origins) has slowed down as a result of the economic downturn and the corresponding dramatic increase in unemployment and budget cuts. At the beginning of 2013, the total number of Ukraine-born migrants registered in Spain was approximately 86 697. However, this apparent stagnation in flows contrasts clearly with the significant decrease in the number of other major Eastern and Central-Eastern European migrant groups such as Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles.

Figure 1. Changes in the number of major immigrant groups from Central and Eastern Europe in Spain 2001-2013

According to Municipal Register statistics, in 2013 the sex ratio of Ukrainian migrants in Spain was 85 males per 100 females. The age structure reveals a clear prevalence of adult population. According to the data for 2013, most of the population falls within the age category spanning from 25 to 49 years. As shown

Source: Authors’ own composition based on data from the Municipal Register 2001-2013, National Institute of Statistics (Spain).
in Figure 2, a prominent feature is an asymmetric relation between gender categories, particularly in the case of adults where there is a clear predominance of women. At the same time, it must be highlighted that a comparative analysis of the data corresponding to the structure of the Ukrainian immigrant population by gender and age at the onset of the immigration process to Spain in 2003 and the data from 2013 reveals that the composition of the population had experienced a rapid and sharp transformation. In 2003 there was a clear concentration of immigrants in economically active age groups, with a prevalence of young adults between 25 and 29 years old, followed by the 30-34 and 35-39 cohorts. Furthermore, in 2003 a slight prevalence of young adult men can also be observed. The trends that have occurred in the structure by sex and age between 2001 and 2013 seem to indicate that during the period mentioned the migratory process was marked by the prominence of males in the initial stage, but was subsequently compensated by the arrival of women as part of the process of family reunification as well as a result of individual migratory decisions.

Figure 2. Age-gender chart of the Ukrainian immigrant population in Spain 2003 and 2013 (per cent)

Source: Authors’ own composition based on data from the Municipal Register (2001 and 2007), National Institute of Statistics (Spain).

Geographic distribution

According to data from the Municipal Register, in 2007 most Ukrainian immigrants were concentrated in three particular regions: the Autonomic Region of Madrid (23.0 per cent), the Autonomic Region of Valencia (19.3 per cent) and Catalonia (19.1 per cent). There are also relatively large contingents of Ukrainian immigrants who have settled in other regions of the Mediterranean coast, like Andalusia and Murcia (Hosnedlová, Stanek 2010; Sánchez Urios 2010). Ukrainian immigrants have been attracted to Madrid and Catalonia by the offer of employment in the industry sector (especially women), in construction (basically men) and in
hotel and food services. In addition, Madrid is an important gateway to the rest of Spain (with its busy international airport, and its bus lines between Madrid and different Ukrainian cities). Valencia, Andalusia and Murcia are distinguished by the wide range of temporary jobs (hotel and food services, agriculture, retail and wholesale trade). As to the places of origin of the Ukrainian immigrants, according to the results of the National Immigrant Survey, over half of the Ukrainian immigrant population comes from four provinces located in the western part of the country: Lviv (23.4 per cent), Ternopil (12.7 per cent), Ivano-Frankivsk (9.5 per cent) and Chernivtsi (7.8 per cent). Many immigrants also come from the province of Kiev (14.3 per cent).

Irregularity rates

Ukrainian immigrants usually enter Spain with a tourist visa and remain in the country after it expires, becoming undocumented irregular immigrants. Within this context, it should be noted that a high rate of irregularity has been considered one of the structural characteristics of migratory processes to Spain (Arango 2004). However, there is evidence that the overall situation has been clearly improving in the last few years, mostly thanks to advances in border control systems, greater flexibility in obtaining the necessary permits by immigrants working in Spain (through special regularisations, legalisations via ‘rooting’ and contracting in origin).\(^1\)

In order to have an approximate idea of the irregularity rate, we compared the number of immigrants in the Municipal Register with the number of immigrants who have a residence permit and are living in a legal situation. The difference between the two figures allows us to estimate the size of the irregular immigration phenomenon (Viruela 2006). As can be seen in Figure 3, at the end of 2012 approximately 13 per cent of the Ukrainians living in Spain lacked the documents required by the Spanish government for legal residence in the country. If we take into account the trends in irregularity rates among the Ukrainian population over the last few years, we can see that the total number of undocumented Ukrainian immigrants decreased drastically between 2005 and 2006, from 62 per cent to 29 per cent, mainly as a result of the regularisation process that was carried out in 2005.\(^2\) Another factor that has contributed to the significant reduction of the levels of irregularity (by half between 2007 and 2013) was a slowdown of immigration flows since the start of the economic crisis.

Figure 3. Regularity rates for Ukrainian immigrants in Spain 2001-2013

![Figure 3. Regularity rates for Ukrainian immigrants in Spain 2001-2013](image)

Source: Authors’ own composition based on the Municipal Register (National Institute of Statistics) and the Ministry of Employment and Immigration statistics (Spain).
Ukrainian transnational families

One of the major consequences of migration is the dispersal of the family unit both abroad and in the country of origin. This new family structure links several local situations to an international setting and shapes what has been termed by some authors the multi-local family (Mendoza 2005). The incidence of multi-local transnational families (those in which at least one member of the immediate family is outside Spain in the immigrant population indicates the existence of strong ties with the places of origin (Dustmann 2003). In overall terms, the total number of non multi-local families exceeds the number of multi-local ones. Of the Ukrainians interviewed, 44.5 per cent declared that all the members of their families are in Spain, whereas 35.4 per cent said that at least one family member was in their country of origin or elsewhere. Focusing on the sub-categories that make up these two types of geographical distribution of families, a third of the entire population (33.7 per cent) is comprised of families in which all of the children live in Spain. There is also a high proportion of people (15.7 per cent) whose spouses are in Spain, but at least one of their children is living in the country of origin, as well as single-parent families with at least one child living in Ukraine (9.8 per cent).

Table 1. Geographical distribution of family unit members (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Documented</th>
<th>Undocumented</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: non multi-local families</strong></td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner in Spain, no offspring</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner and all offspring in Spain</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No spouse/partner and all offspring in Spain</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: multi-local families</strong></td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in the country of origin, no offspring</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No spouse/partner and at least one of the offspring in Ukraine</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner in Spain and at least one of the offspring in Ukraine</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner and at least one of the offspring in Ukraine</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other situations</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persons without immediate family (no spouse/partner/offspring)</strong></td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1 illustrates the complex relationship between transnational families and the legal status of the immigrants. In general terms, irregular immigrants are more likely to form part of a multi-local family. Among immigrants who do not have a residence permit in Spain one out of every two belongs to families in which at least one of the members lives in Ukraine. In contrast, the proportion of documented immigrants in this situation is 33 per cent. This pattern indicates that obtaining a permit is a crucial factor in the process of family reunification. In this sense, the restrictions in obtaining legal status directly affect the creation of the transnational family model.

We can also observe significant differences in the location of family members of different genders, which in turn gives us some idea about the strategies pursued by the immigrants and the decisions made within their...
households. In the first place, the existence of multi-local family bonds is more frequent among male immigrants. The proportion of males whose spouses and offspring are all living in Spain is substantially less in comparison with females who form part of this category. Among the male population 23.2 per cent are in this situation, as opposed to 43.1 per cent of females. The proportion of males whose spouses or partners and at least one of their children is living in their places of origin is four times greater than the proportion of females in the same situation. A similar pattern is observed in the case of families with no offspring whose spouses or partners are living in their countries of origin. This data indicate that the male breadwinner migration model is still prominent when making decisions on migration within households. In this model the male assumes the role of primary provider for the family and also the risk related to the initial immigration move. Thus, the male head of the household is the first to travel to the country of destination and, once settled, the woman and children follow at a later date.

The existence of the family migration model, in which the males play the leading role in the initial stage, is related to cultural conditioning in the place of origin. However, as some authors reveal, the inequalities in economic opportunities for males and females can also be a factor (Pajares 2007). The wages of males employed in the construction sector are considerably higher than those of females working in domestic services. In addition, until the emergence of the economic crisis in Spain, women had more possibilities of finding themselves jobless. Accordingly, the economic cost of migration was, at least in the initial stage, higher and more difficult to confront in the case of females.

The data presented in Table 1 also reveal another typical migratory pattern of the Ukrainian population. Almost one third of the male population who have immigrated to Spain (30.0 per cent) have no family responsibilities, as opposed to 11.3 per cent in the case of the female population. This data might indicate that for many Ukrainian males, emigration is part of a survival strategy or an attempt to improve their individual economic situation. The proportion of women in this situation is lower, which confirms that for most females the migratory decision is conditioned by the mobility of their spouses or partners.

Within the context that we have just outlined, single-parent families (without a spouse but with children) represent a special case. Almost 22 per cent of the Ukrainian women in Spain find themselves in this situation, as opposed to 8.4 per cent of the male population. We must remember that this gender difference is principally due to the fact that when couples split up, the women usually take care of the children. On the other hand, the high proportion of single women with offspring is due to the high occurrence of divorce in Ukraine. In this regard, it is worth noting that most women without a partner form multi-local families.

Results – transnational activities

Visits to the country of origin

We will first analyse movements between places of origin and destination. Among Ukrainians surveyed, only 5 per cent had returned to their country of origin for a period of at least three months. In general, their stays in Ukraine are infrequent and for short periods of time. As can be seen in Table 2, if we only take into account stays shorter than three months, it emerges that approximately one third of the people surveyed travel to their country of origin less than once every two years, while a similar percentage has never gone back to Ukraine. The people who visit their country more frequently (at least once a year) represent only a small group within this population – a mere 7.6 per cent. Also, no significant differences between males and females are observed in this regard.
The frequency of travel to their country of origin is significantly conditioned by the legal situation of immigrants. The great majority of undocumented immigrants (91 per cent) declared that they had not visited their country of origin since they arrived in Spain. Among documented Ukrainian immigrants the percentage is far lower. The main factor that determines this behaviour is that Ukrainian citizens are required to have a visa to enter any of the countries that comprise the free circulation area established by the Schengen Agreement. It should be added that for irregular immigrants the requirements to obtain a residence permit are important factors when it comes to devising strategies of transnational mobility. One of the main requirements for the latest regularisation that took place in the spring of 2005 was to prove that the immigrant had been living in Spain prior to August 2004 and to be in possession of a work contract for a minimum period of six months (three months in the case of the agricultural sector) (Kostova 2005). In order for an immigrant to obtain legal status through ‘rooting’, which is independent of the processes of extraordinary regularisation, applicants must prove that they have lived continuously in Spain for a minimum period of two years and have worked at least for one year during that time (Aguilera 2006). Therefore, the possibility of obtaining a residence permit might reduce the transnational mobility of immigrants and transform temporary migration into long-term or even permanent migration.

Finally, there is a direct relationship between the type of family and the number of visits to Ukraine. Members of multi-local families visit their places of origin more frequently than immigrants whose entire immediate family resides in Spain. This reveals that family is one of the crucial links that tie immigrants to their origins. This phenomenon is also confirmed by data collected on the reasons why immigrants visit Ukraine. Among the reasons stated for visiting Ukraine, seeing family members and friends were the highest, followed by holidays, (91.5 per cent and 71.4 per cent, respectively). Work related reasons, periodic stays in the place of origin and dealing with bureaucratic affairs only represented a limited percentage of the interviewees’ replies.

Communication with the country of origin

In general, immigrants maintain relationships with their communities of origin even after settling in Spain. More than 97 per cent of the immigrants interviewed declared that they remained in contact with their relatives or friends. Compared to women, men are only slightly less prone to maintain contacts with their family and community of origin. Legal status does not affect the contacts with the community of origin. Similarly, family situation also does not have a significant impact on the frequency of transnational communication. Among immigrants with transnational families, 99 per cent communicated with their communities of origin, while 98 per cent of immigrants whose entire immediate families were in Spain did the same.

Table 2. Frequency of short stays (under three months’ duration) in the country of origin (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Documented</th>
<th>Undocumented</th>
<th>Multi-local family</th>
<th>Non multi-local family</th>
<th>No immediate family</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every two years</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than every two years or never</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.
As showed in Table 3, the most widely used means to communicate with people who live in Ukraine is the telephone. Other means of communication are less common, although a considerable proportion of people rely on emails for such purposes. Approximately 68 per cent of the Ukrainians interviewed declared that they stayed in contact with close acquaintances that live in their country of origin at least once a week and 21.8 per cent did so at least once a month. Irregular immigrants in Spain tend to maintain a slightly higher frequency of contact with people close to them who remain in the country of origin, which allows us to hypothesise that they compensate for their lack of opportunities to visit their places of origin with more frequent indirect contact. Finally, as can be expected, immigrants with multi-local families tend to communicate by telephone more frequently than other categories of immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Frequency of phone contact with family and friends at origin (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

Remittances

Two out of every three Ukrainian immigrants interviewed declared that they sent money to their country of origin. Table 4 shows that men are most likely to send money home. Among Ukrainian men interviewed, 65 per cent declared that they sent remittances compared to 54 per cent of women. Men also send remittances more frequently, which is directly related to the persistence of the male breadwinner migratory model among a large percentage of Ukrainian immigrant households. The geographic dispersion of the family is a very significant factor when determining strategies related to remittances. More than half of the immigrants who belong to multi-local families send money at least once a month. This number is clearly contrasted with that of immigrants whose entire immediate family live in Spain. The enormous differences in this transnational practice between these two groups suggest that the economic dependence which exists in transnational families plays a crucial role in the creation of transnational links between countries of destination and origin.

Among both irregular immigrants and regular immigrants there are no significant differences in the proportion of people who send money and those who do not. However, it is striking that irregular immigrants send money much more frequently to Ukraine. Almost half of undocumented Ukrainians send money at least once a month. This pattern could have two explanations. In the first place, visits to the place of origin (much more frequent among documented immigrants, as mentioned earlier) allow immigrants to make economic contributions directly. In addition, our analysis suggests that because irregular immigrants are less secure in their possibilities of prolonging their stay in Spain, they feel more closely tied to their places of origin and this motivates them to invest or accumulate the money earned in the country of destination back home. However, as the analysed data source does not include information on the motives to remit, we cannot go more in-depth in understanding the mechanisms governing this process.
Table 4. Frequency of monetary remittances (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Documented</th>
<th>Undocumented</th>
<th>Multi-local family</th>
<th>Non multi-local family</th>
<th>No immediate family</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least once a month</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once every</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months on average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year or less</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

Conclusions

The main objective of this article was to examine the issues around migratory flows from Ukraine to Spain from a transnational perspective. Using the definition of transnationalism proposed by Portes et al. (1999), we have established three empirical indicators of transnational activities: visits to the community of origin, indirect contact and remittances. In our analysis we try to establish how factors such as gender, legal status in Spain and the geographic dispersion of family units affect the intensity and scope of these transnational activities.

In the first place, slight differences have been observed between males and females regarding transnational activities. Ukrainian women in Spain maintain telephone contact with family and friends in their communities of origin with greater frequency and men, by contrast, tend to send money more frequently. Our findings resemble trends observed in studies carried out in other social and geographic contexts revealing that immigrant women are more intimately and emotionally involved with other family members and acquaintances as a part of their gender role. By contrast, men are more engaged in fulfilling their social role of the male breadwinner (Parreñas 2005). These confirm that transnational activities reflect social and power relationships determined the sexual division of social roles within households. Secondly, our study confirms that the physical separation of the family unit, both abroad and in the country of origin, plays a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of links between places of origin and destination. Geographic dispersal and the absence of daily contacts lead members of multi-local families to redouble their efforts to maintain links through visits and long distance communication. Finally, we observed that the legal status of immigrants has a profound impact on the patterns of transnational behaviour of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain. Irregular immigrants face greater obstacles to visit their countries of origin. These limitations are compensated to a certain degree by more frequent indirect communication (telephone, email). Irregular immigrants also tend to send money to their communities of origin more frequently. In this sense, for irregular immigrants indirect transnational relationships (communication, remittances) constitute a clear alternative to ‘face to face’ contact with members of their family networks and communities of origin.

We can conclude that transnational activities develop in a context in which various forces and tendencies intersect and collide. For instance, the development of global capitalism, increasingly rapid means of transportation, lower travel costs and the spread of new communication technologies allow people to travel, communicate and do business more quickly and with greater frequency. In addition, domestic immigration policies and international relations on the state level are important factors that determine the ways in which transnational links are established. With this in mind, it will be crucial to carry out analyses of transnational phenomena from an institutional perspective.
Notes

1 Mechanism based on the concept of ‘rooting’ (regularización por arraigo), which is aimed at regularising those immigrants who can prove to be sufficiently integrated into Spanish society.

2 It should be emphasised that the approximation we propose here is merely for the purpose of orientation since it does not include people who do not figure in either register and whose numbers are difficult to estimate.

3 Immediate family is understood as spouses or partners and offspring.

4 It should be noted that the recent economic crisis has changed this situation, exposing the male population to greater risks of unemployment than the female population.

5 Ukraine has one of the highest divorce rates in the world. In 2001 there were 4 divorces per 1 000 persons (Perelli-Harris 2008).

6 Beyond labour-based ‘rooting’, Spanish immigration law also considers the possibility of social and family ‘rooting’. To attain regularisation via social ‘rooting’, immigrants must prove that they have lived in the country for a period of at least three years, had a work contract for a minimum period of one year, have family ties with other foreigners who are residents or, alternatively, present a favourable report about their insertion in society issued by the city council. Regularisation by means of family rooting is aimed at the children of people who were originally in possession of Spanish nationality.

References


Migration of Ukrainian Nationals to Portugal: Changing Flows and the Critical Role of Social Networks

Maria Lucinda Fonseca*, Sónia Pereira**, Alina Esteves***

In a short period of time, Ukrainians became the second largest foreign community living in Portugal. Without historical ties linking the two countries, the ‘migration industry’ as well as positive feedback and assistance provided through pioneers’ social networks were decisive for the constitution and rapid expansion of the flow. However it slowed down in only few years and the economic crisis affecting Portugal since 2008 has introduced new limits to a possible future expansion. The goal of the paper is to provide insights with respect to the evolution of the flow, particularly looking at mechanisms of assistance and feedback provided and received within social networks, including the role of the ‘migration industry’. We explored quantitative and qualitative data collected through questionnaires applied to 306 Ukrainians and interviews conducted with 31 Ukrainians in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area in 2011 and 2012. The research confirms the importance of assistance received through social networks at different stages of the preparation of the move, upon arrival and throughout the settlement process in Portugal. We conclude that negative opinions on the present economic opportunities in Portugal have replaced initial positive perceptions about labour market opportunities and this information is being transmitted through social networks to Ukrainians back in Ukraine. We suggest that the significant decrease of the inflow can probably be explained by negative feedback and a more limited willingness to assist the migration of others. Future trends in the migratory flow of Ukrainian citizens to Portugal as well as the permanence of these immigrants in the country are uncertain. On the one hand, migrants are struggling to live through the crisis, while the recent social upheaval in Ukraine pushes them to leave.

Keywords: migration, social networks, feedback, Ukraine, Portugal
Introduction

While the presence of Ukrainian migrants in Portugal is very recent (from the end of the 1990s), in very few years it became the second-largest foreign community living in the country. However, from the mid-2000s the flow has been declining (with punctual growth episodes). The sudden and fast emergence of this immigration flow is quite unique, particularly given that previous immigration flows to Portugal were mostly from Lusophone countries, largely related to the country’s colonial past.

Analysing the composition of the migrant stock according to nationalities, one of the most striking features is the very low figure of Eastern Europeans in the country, including Ukrainians, up until the early 2000s. Indeed, on 31 December 2000 there were only 167 documented Ukrainians in the Aliens and Borders Office database, whereas the population census conducted on 12 March 2001 counted 10 793 Ukrainian nationals residing in Portugal for more than one year. The disparity between the two numbers reveals that a significant number of undocumented Ukrainian immigrants were living in the country at that time.

Aside from the geographical distance, Portugal and Ukraine do not share historical links, a common religion or language. The intense and recent inflows of Ukrainian citizens to Portugal resulted from a combination of specific economic and social conditions in both countries, but also from the important role played by social networks and organised groups (sometimes of a criminal nature) in feeding the flow, once it was started by pioneers in the late 1990s (Baganha, Marques, Góis 2004; Peixoto, Soares, Costa, Murteira, Pereira, Sabino 2005; Baganha, Marques, Góis 2010).

Indeed, the notable expansion of the Portuguese economy between the second half of the 1980s and part of the 1990s, due to foreign investment and European Union structural funds for public works and the construction sector, led to an increase in labour market needs that were solved with imported foreign labour (Fonseca, Malheiros, Esteves, Caldeira 2002; Fonseca, Malheiros 2003; Fonseca 2008; Pereira 2010). During this time, Ukraine was going through a complex process of independence from the Soviet Union, with a concomitant change in the prevailing economic model, growing wage differentials, rising unemployment and underemployment, delays in salary payments, declining living standards and social discontent. All these factors stimulated international labour migration (Malynovska 2004; International Organisation for Migration 2011). Moreover, the lack of investment and the disparity in wages between the Western and Northern oblasts (more agrarian) and the Eastern regions of Ukraine (more industrialised), including Kiev, led many people to leave the country (Coupé, Vakhitova 2013). At that time, there was massive emigration to Western Europe, among other destinations (Malynovska 2004). Initially, the flow to Portugal was by and large set in motion through the active engagement of ‘travel agencies’—including smugglers and organised criminal groups—in Ukraine and nearby countries that promoted this country as a migration destination, despite its peripheral position in Europe (Fonseca, Ormond, Malheiros, Patricio, Martins 2005; Baganha, Marques, Góis 2004; Peixoto et al. 2005; Fonseca 2008). Lyuba (40 years old, Ukrainian immigrant, arrived in Portugal in 1999) recalls how the ‘travel agency’ proposed that she migrate to Portugal, when initial plans of migrating to the Netherlands failed:

No, I never thought... Our destination was the Netherlands, but the firm that took care of the papers/visa, that is a great mafia... the proposal was the Netherlands, but it was obvious that there was nothing in the Netherlands, and they started saying, with the Visa already, they started saying that the person that was supposed to be there waiting for us had problems... so our departure to the Netherlands kept being postponed... I could not wait anymore. They asked us if we wanted to go to Italy, Spain or Portugal. And I don’t know why, I said Portugal.
Existing labour demand at that time, particularly in the construction sector but also in manufacturing and domestic service facilitated entry into the labour market and subsequent settlement. After the first immigrants settled in Portugal they began to mediate directly the migration of further family and friends, thereby reducing the need for the more expensive intermediation of ‘travel agencies’. In addition, due to the criminal character of these ‘services’ that included not only the preparation of the move in the origin country, the organisation of the move (transport through Europe, usually in minivans with a short-term Schengen visa) and finding a job and accommodation upon arrival, but also subsequent practices of extortion and violence (Fonseca, Rato, Mortágua 2005; Peixoto et al. 2005; Pereira, Vasconcelos 2008), there was strong police crackdown on these organisations leading to their arrest and halting their operations to a large extent (Peixoto et al. 2005).

Operating at the meso-level of communities and localities, the role of networks in feeding the flows became critical. In migration processes, it is through these networks that assistance is given and received both to prepare the move and after reaching the destination country. The support provided includes monetary help, information on job opportunities and the housing market, advice on legal issues or other practicalities of the daily life, or hosting a country fellow upon arrival. Additionally, the information sent to the country of origin in the form of positive feedback mechanisms plays an important role in how networks stimulate and enable further migration, thereby generating a process of cumulative causation (Massey 1990; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pelligrino, Taylor 2005). Conversely, negative feedback mechanisms contribute to dissuading further migration thereby leading to an inverse effect of cumulative causation that leads to shrinking migration flows (Massey 1990; de Haas 2010; Engbersen, Snel, van Meeteren 2013).

Based on this framework, the goals of this paper are twofold: on the one hand, to provide an overview of the evolution of the flow of Ukrainians to Portugal from early 2000s to the present moment. On the other, it relies on the results of recent research to explore the role of networks involving different actors over time, including the ‘migration industry’, in mediating the migration process and in providing feedback to the origin country as enhancers or gatekeepers of migratory flows. In this case, the ‘migration industry’ includes not only private lawyers, travel agents, recruiters, organisers, fixers and brokers who sustain links with origin and destination countries (Cohen 1997: 163) but also criminal organisations and their active role in promoting Portugal as a destination of Ukrainian migration.

In the following sections the paper presents: 1) a brief review of existing literature and research on Ukrainian migration to Portugal; 2) the methodological approach, explaining how empirical data was collected in recent research in the ambit of a NORFACE funded project – Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS) – and whose analysis will support the remaining sections of the paper; 3) the basic features of Ukrainian migration to Portugal – volume and dynamics of the Ukrainian flows over time, a short characterisation of the migrants’ settlement patterns and socio-demographic profiles and the spatial dynamics involved in terms of origin and settlement regions; 4) a discussion of the role of networks in migration from Ukraine to Portugal, with a specific focus on assistance and feedback mechanisms within these networks; 5) the present context and its impact on feedback mechanisms and potential effects on the flow from Ukraine to Portugal; 6) future prospects for Ukrainians residing in Portugal in terms of permanence, re-emigration and return. The paper concludes with final remarks stressing the effects of macro-economic conditions on assistance and the generation of negative versus positive feedback, and the potential impact of these mechanisms on the dynamics of Ukrainian migration to Portugal.
Literature and research overview

Studies and subsequent publications about Ukrainian migration to Portugal are as recent as the inflow to the country. As described above, this flow emerged unexpectedly around the end of the 1990s but increased very rapidly within only a few years, peaking in the early 2000s (2000 and 2001 in particular). The first studies began to be carried out shortly after. There were no historical records of any prior migration to the country.

Based on the first comprehensive and large scale study carried out in Portugal on Eastern European migration (mostly from Ukraine but also from other Eastern European countries), Baganha et al. (2004) offer a global overview of the main characteristics of the flow, the trajectories of the migrants, their demographic and socio-economic profile, and also the patterns of their settlement in the country. Also Fonseca, Alegria and Nunes (2004) explore the migrants’ geographical dispersal across the national territory, which is unlike previous migration flows that had mostly concentrated on the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. Particular emphasis is given to the conditions that enabled the constitution of such an unexpected and new influx, including the initial role played by the migration industry and organised groups (Baganha et al. 2004; Peixoto et al. 2005) as well as the subsequent emergence of autonomous migrant networks that began to link Portugal to Ukraine. Peixoto et al. (2005) focus specifically on the issue of trafficking as a relevant dimension to understand Eastern European (including Ukrainian) migration to Portugal, based on interviews and analyses of court cases related to trafficking for both labour and sexual exploitation as well assistance in illegal migration.

Subsequent studies have aimed to further understand the settlement patterns of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal, specifically in terms of work, housing, legal status, education, access to health care and religion, within the realm of a conceptual framework of ‘integration’. This ‘integration’ of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal was approached both globally, at the national level, and in specific local and socio-professional contexts (the healthcare sector in particular). In addition, some generalist studies undertaken in the mid-2000s shed further light on the particularities of the migration flow to Portugal: Wall, Nunes and Matias (2005) and Hellerman (2006) explored the specific trajectories of migrant women, which included Ukrainian immigrants among other nationalities; Fonseca et al. (2005) examined family reunification processes, and Carneiro (2006) described immigrants’ labour market trajectories in Portugal. More recently, Baganha, Marques and Góis (2010) published a thorough study dedicated to the Ukrainian community living in Portugal with quantitative data obtained in a survey conducted in 2004 covering a wide range of issues, such as incorporation in the labour market before and after migration, language fluency, civic participation and perception of discrimination, just to name a few.

The empirical observation of the sudden rise and expansion followed by quick stabilisation contradicts to some extent the proposal of ‘cumulative causation’ put forward by Massey and colleagues (Massey et al. 2005). In this case, no ad infinitum increasing migration took place leading to the formation of a ‘migration system’ as a result of expanding social networks linking origin and destination. In addition, at least initially, there was the important role played by ‘migration industry’ agents who actively sought to promote Portugal as a migration destination. It was only in subsequent stages that migrant networks began to facilitate further migration. For these reasons, this particular migration flow calls for a renewed analysis of the role of networks in migration processes, their transformative character over time, their interaction with changing contexts in both origin and destination countries, as well as their potential to contribute to inverse processes of cumulative causation leading to reduced flows (de Haas 2010; Engbersen et al. 2013). In the next sections we will describe how this flow and consequent settlement processes evolved and how the networks contributed to this evolution.
Data and information sources

This article draws on registered data from the annual statistics of the Portuguese Aliens and Borders Office (SEF) and data from fieldwork conducted in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area in 2012 and 2013, in the ambit of the Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS). As part of this project, 31 semi-structured interviews were conducted with and 306 questionnaires administered to immigrants from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian citizens interviewed were selected through a snowball sampling strategy. In the case of the survey, a sample was selected using the respondent-driven sampling method (RDS). According to the theoretical principles underpinning RDS, the initial selection of seeds, which initiates the recruitment of other respondents through the creation of waves, does not have significant implications in the final balance of the sample, because this depends mostly on the generated number of waves and on the degree of homophily of the sample (Heckathorn 1997; Gile, Handcock 2010). The selection of the seeds was based on the attempt to achieve a final sample that reflects the diversity within this group of immigrants, both at the social and demographic levels (e.g. sex, age, socio-economic status, level of education), and at the level of the immigrants’ migratory and integration processes (e.g. year of immigration, legal status, region of origin, main motivation).

The recruitment chains of our sample are long enough to claim that there is no correlation of characteristics of the seeds with the outcome (homophily), in terms of sex, age, decade of arrival, educational level, activity status and legal status. Indeed, the ratios of men and women among the interviewed population (52.9 per cent and 47.1 per cent, respectively) are very similar to those of the Ukrainian citizens, aged 20 or more, residing in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area at the time of the 2011 census (men: 52.5 per cent, women: 47.5 per cent).

Basic features of Ukrainian migration to Portugal

Volume and dynamics of the Ukrainian flows over time

Ukrainian immigrants first became visible in official statistics in 2001 due to the large regularisation programme carried out that year (it was in place up until 2003, but most ‘permanence permits’ were granted in 2001) (Figure 1). The Ukrainians were the largest beneficiaries of this regularisation, receiving 64 730 permits. After some years of decline the population showed signs of recovery in 2008 and 2009 due to the opportunities created by the new immigration law published in 2007. Between 2009 and 2012 the number of documented Ukrainian migrants registered a drop of nearly 16 per cent (from 52 293 in 2009 to 44 074 in 2012). Besides the break in the statistical series, the reduction in the number of documented Ukrainians living in Portugal between 2005 and 2007 can also be explained by the growing numbers of those leaving the country, both to return to the country of origin and to migrate further to other European countries. Many took advantage of labour market opportunities in Spain, for example, where the construction sector was booming at the time. The registered unemployment rate among Ukrainians in Portugal increased markedly between 2004 and 2006 (18.5 per cent), showing how serious the labour market situation had become (Malheiros 2007). According to data from Aliens and Borders Office (SEF), Ukrainians have ranked among the largest foreign-national groups in Portugal since 2001, and since 2008 they have maintained a stable second position in the ranking of foreign nationals residing legally in Portugal. The reduction in the stock of Ukrainian nationals can also be explained by the acquisition of Portuguese citizenship, a procedure made easier by the law enacted in 2006 which reduced the required length of legal residence in Portugal and reinforced the principle of ‘jus soli’. According to Eurostat, the number of concessions of Portuguese citizenship to Ukrainians grew from 4 in 2003 (representing 0.2 per cent of the total number of deferred requests) to 484 in 2008 (2.2 per cent) and to 3 322 in 2012 (15.2 per cent).
This immigration flow was by and large labour market-oriented and initially dominated by male adults (Baganha et al. 2004; Fonseca et al. 2005; Pereira 2010; Malheiros, Esteves 2013), even though independent migrant women have also been present from the start (Wall et al. 2005; Hellerman 2006). Indeed, in a survey conducted in Lisbon in 2012, around 60 per cent of earlier migrants (arrived between 1998 and 2003) were male (Table 1) and 77 per cent of them indicated that their main motivation to migrate to Portugal was: ‘opportunities for work’ (Table 2). The percentage substantially decreases in subsequent years, as women become more present in the flows and the motivation of ‘being with family members or other people you care about’ gains importance as a consequence of processes of family reunification and family formation. Since 2007, and according to data from SEF, the annual inflow of Ukrainian migrants to Portugal consists mainly of women. In more recent years (arrival between 2009 and 2011), ‘opportunities for studying’ has gained importance as a motivation to move to Portugal, which is probably related to processes of family reunification with parents that had migrated earlier (Table 2).

### Table 1. Respondents by gender, according to the year of arrival in Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of arrival</th>
<th>Male (per cent)</th>
<th>Female (per cent)</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: THEMIS data.
Initially, Ukrainian migrants showed intentions of staying in Portugal only for a limited period of time. Overall, migration to Portugal was conceived by Ukrainians as a temporary migratory project (Baganha et al. 2004; Fonseca et al. 2004; Fonseca et al. 2005; Pereira, Fonseca 2012). According to a national survey conducted in December 2004 and January 2005 (Fonseca et al. 2005) and another one conducted in the Alentejo region in April 2003 (Fonseca et al. 2004), more than 70 per cent of Ukrainian migrants claimed that they intended to stay in Portugal for less than six years and approximately 20 per cent showed the intention of re-emigrating to another European country or the USA. Only approximately 12 per cent said they intended to stay permanently in Portugal. However, with time, other time-frames seem to have gained importance. Recent research for the THEMIS project has shown that a number of Ukrainians have remained in Portugal for ten years or more (71 per cent of the respondents were in this situation). However, further research is required to provide more conclusive data. Certainly, life cycle transformations, including the formation of families and reunification processes, may have played a role in more permanent settlement. In the THEMIS survey, 29.9 per cent of those claiming to have migrated to Portugal to join family members said that, in the first place, they migrated to join their mother or father. For example, Andriy (37, arrived in Portugal in 2000), interviewed in Lisbon says: And another thing, now we have our son, and if he will know Russian, Portuguese, English, French, I think that here in Portugal he will have a better education, and near his parents, because already we were three years without him, and my wife cried… Nevertheless, overall, the future of this flow and the stability of Ukrainian presence in Portugal are uncertain, particularly in face of the current low demand in the labour market in Portugal, which is in fact generating large Portuguese emigration (we shall come back to this in a later section).

### Settlement patterns and socio-demographic profile

Ukrainians first entered mostly with tourist Schengen visas and remained irregularly in the country until obtaining their first permit to stay legally. A considerable number of these migrants benefited from the regularisation process carried out in 2001, through the change in immigration law that took place that year, as mentioned above (Marques, Góis 2007). Following the implementation of this legislation, irregular immigrants were able to obtain a ‘permanence permit’ by presenting a working contract validated by labour inspection authorities. This permanence permit needed to be renewed every year during a period of five years, as long as the immigrant could present a valid labour contract, after which the immigrants became eligible for a residence permit. In SEF’s statistics for 2012, nearly all Ukrainians already had residence permits. Despite successive regularisation campaigns, there are still a number of Ukrainian immigrants who are undocumented or in process of regularisation. According to the results of the THEMIS project, 4.5 per cent did not

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**Table 2. Motivations to move to Portugal, by time of arrival (per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of arrival</th>
<th>Experiencing the culture and life of another country</th>
<th>Opportunities for work</th>
<th>Opportunities for studying</th>
<th>Learning a language</th>
<th>Being with family members or other people you care about</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: THEMIS data.
have any permit to stay in Portugal and 1.9 per cent had applied for a permit but had not received an answer at the time of the interview.

Concerning age, Baganha et al. (2004) indicate that the average age of the sample surveyed in 2002 was 36 years old and indeed, data from SEF for 2006 reveals that around 69 per cent of legal residents of Ukrainian origin were 30 years or older with the highest concentration in the interval of 30-34 (18 per cent) followed by 35-39 (15 per cent). The average education level of these migrants is high in comparison with both the Portuguese population and other third country nationals. In the sample surveyed by Baganha and her team (Baganha, Marques, Góis 2005: 38), 69 per cent had completed secondary education or equivalent vocational training and 31 per cent had tertiary education. The THEMIS survey of 2012 indicates similarly high educational levels: 43 per cent with postsecondary vocational training, 24 per cent with undergraduate tertiary education and also a high percentage (12 per cent) with postgraduate training.

Ukrainians found jobs mostly in construction, manufacturing and agriculture (Baganha et al. 2004; Santana, Serranito 2005). These immigrants showed a higher level of occupational diversity in comparison to immigrants from other origins, particularly as a result of their entry into agriculture and manufacturing, where the presence of immigrants had been scarce up to that point. Despite their qualifications, a large proportion of them performed low-skilled jobs. In a survey conducted in 2002 it was found that 62 per cent had found work in unskilled jobs, (Baganha et al. 2004: 34). The THEMIS survey in 2012 also indicates that the most important entry occupations (corresponding to the first job in Portugal) were unskilled and skilled construction work, cleaning and domestic work. In addition, upon arrival some Ukrainian migrants faced abusive and exploitative conditions in the labour market (Pereira, Vasconcelos 2008). With time, a number of them were able to obtain jobs more in line with their qualifications and with better working conditions. One such example was the programme for the recognition of competencies for medical doctors in 2002 (109 Eastern European doctors completed the course successfully) and again in 2008, sponsored by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

In recent years, Ukrainians seem to have been affected by the rising unemployment in Portugal, as a consequence of the post-2008 economic crisis. In 2012, the majority of Ukrainian respondents (72 per cent) in the THEMIS survey did not hold their entry occupation, and for the majority this was due to loss of employment (20 per cent). Also, only 4 per cent were employed as skilled construction workers (down from 16 per cent in the first occupation). Despite a decline, domestic work and cleaning remained important occupations.

Spatial dynamics: regions of origin and destination

The regions of origin in Ukraine have been researched less, but information collected through interviews and in the survey conducted for the THEMIS project in 2012 has shown that there is a remarkable dispersion of sending regions, although there is a large predominance of immigrants from Western Ukraine, particularly from Lviv, Ternopil, Ivanofrankivsk and Chernovitskaja, but also from Donetsk (in Eastern Ukraine) and Cherkasy (Central Ukraine). The geographical dispersion has also been noted in a survey conducted in 2003/2004 with 100 Ukrainian migrants settled in the metropolitan area of Oporto (Caldeira 2011), although the regions of Kiev and Odessa together represented more than half of the total number of respondents.

Regarding patterns of geographical settlement in Portugal, SEF’s data reveals that Ukrainian immigrants settled throughout the country but with higher concentration levels in the districts of Faro (around 20 per cent in 2005), Lisbon (around 20 per cent in 2005), Santarém (around 12 per cent in 2005) and Leiria (around 10 per cent in 2005). It is possible to observe an increasing concentration in Lisbon over the course of time (in 2012, data from SEF recorded around 28 per cent in this district), and a decrease in Santarém (7 per cent in
2012), although patterns of internal mobility in Portugal have not been examined. Results from the THEMIS project seem to confirm the tendency towards increasing concentration in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, given that approximately 15 per cent of the respondents had resided first in other Portuguese regions.

Migration processes: the role of social networks in migration from Ukraine to Portugal

The important role of social networks in migration processes has been well documented in migration theory. Social networks are fundamental to explaining the development and perpetuation of migration flows between particular origins and destinations. Indeed, informal social relations link potential migrants in origin countries to previous migrants residing in different destination countries. Through these relationships, information is provided on the host society and vehicles for assistance are created with respect to obtaining legal documents, finding a job and accommodation, financial help, and so on (e.g. Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pelligrino, Taylor 1993; Arango 2004; Massey et al. 2005; van Meeteren, Pereira 2013). Besides assisting migrants with the settlement process, family and personal networks provide emotional support to migrants, helping them to maintain a sense of identity and community, often through transnational social practices (Boyd, Nowak 2012). Social networks convey relevant information on job opportunities, wages and working conditions, and facilitate access to the labour market. However, their benefits to workers can also be negative. Several authors stress the unfavourable consequences of exploitative hiring by unscrupulous employers, especially in the informal sector of the economy, and the diversion of migrants from jobs better suited to their qualifications (Boyd, Nowak 2012). In addition, a ‘migration industry’, understood as specialised social actors and profit-making commercial institutions, also developed to assist and benefit from the mobility and adaptation of the migrants to the new country (Salt 2001; Garapich 2008: 736).

The rapid development of new information technologies and the widespread access to the internet are also facilitating migratory movements by offering easy access to relevant information on the place of destination, through websites, social media and online-based virtual communities (Satzewich 2002; Ros 2009; Oiarzabal, Reips 2012; Dekker, Engbersen 2013; van Meeteren, Pereira 2013).

Among the population surveyed in the THEMIS project, it is evident that most migrants already knew someone in Portugal before they arrived (79 per cent of respondents). As expected, the proportion increases over the course of time (reaching 100 per cent for those who arrived in 2010 and 2011), and is also higher for women (85 per cent). Family or neighbourhood networks, activated from the origin, allowed the first migrants to be followed by close family members, neighbours and friends in a network of geometric progression in a short period of time (Baganha et al. 2010: 17). Being a recent migratory flow, for almost all of the respondents the contacts they had in Portugal were exclusively with co-nationals. The frequency of contacts with previous migrants in Portugal before migration is relatively high, with 33 per cent communicating every week and 21 per cent every month. Phone or Skype were the preferred means of communication (60 per cent). In addition, 52 per cent had met Ukrainians that resided in Portugal while the latter were on holiday in Ukraine. For example, Vladyslav mentions the advice passed on while on holiday back in Ukraine: I advised people while I was there on holidays. Many asked: ah can I come [to Portugal]? But back then I had work; we could find work more easily. The majority (60 per cent) acknowledged that such contacts with migrants in Portugal made them more interested in moving there (39 per cent said those contacts had the opposite effect).

For the migration to Portugal, the THEMIS survey confirms the importance of assistance received through social networks at different stages of the preparation of the move and upon arrival, and also of institutions such as ‘travel agencies’ in mediating the formation of these flows. To fund the trip, 33 per cent borrowed money from an individual or institution and 19 per cent received money. In this domain the majority of respondents received assistance from family members (parents and husband) followed by friends. Assis-
tance was received from persons based in Ukraine or already residing in Portugal. The relevance of assistance received from previous migrants already in Portugal increases with time of arrival. Indeed, it is not uncommon for previous migrants to help fund the migration of subsequent family members or friends. For example, Bohdan, a Ukrainian immigrant in Portugal says: My older brother arrived after, maybe after three months. I earned some money and sent that to him so that he could make it.

Furthermore, an important proportion also paid someone to obtain documents to move to Portugal (53 per cent) and 41 per cent relied on ‘travel agencies’ to obtain the necessary documents, usually Schengen visas as we saw before. The role of ‘travel agencies’ was particularly important in the early stages of the migration flow from Ukraine to Portugal, as already shown by previous studies on this community (Marques, Góis 2010; Malheiro, Esteves 2013). In the case of THEMIS, 60 per cent of the migrants that arrived in the late 1990s refer to their role, while only 42 per cent of those arrived in the 2000s mention their assistance, and none of the most recent arrivals in 2010 or 2011. In addition, a further 5 per cent mentioned the intervention of human smugglers or criminal organisations. Vasyl mentions the important role played by ‘travel agencies’ in the constitution of the migration flow to Portugal: I talked to the travel agency, at that time in my village. There were many agencies that did these trips, but only for money. Of course we had to pay. And so we came here.

Assistance was further granted throughout the settlement process in Portugal, particularly to obtain documents, find a place to stay and a first job. Once in Portugal, immigrants were allowed to apply and obtain other documents that entitled them to a longer stay in the country, namely through the ‘permanence permits’ mentioned before, which were linked to employment. The majority of respondents obtained a permit based on employment (44 per cent) but a significant share did not obtain any other permit immediately after arrival (37 per cent). At the time of the survey, the vast majority had a permit based on employment (76 per cent) and only a small proportion held documents based on family ties (7 per cent).

The majority of immigrants also relied on help by others to find the first job (65 per cent) and an important number paid someone for that (14 per cent). Friends, colleagues and neighbours have been the most important sources of assistance when it comes to finding the first job (53 per cent relied on them). Indeed, similar results have been found elsewhere (van Meeteren, Pereira 2013: 16). Symon’s experience illustrates this:

Then I had a friend here who was my neighbour there [in Ukraine] and he found work here for me and my friends... We called. His father gave us his phone number and we called him ‘is it possible or not?’ and he said ‘it is possible, come... I will help you’. He had a car and he went around looking for work for us... He would go to the construction sites and ask ‘do you need workers? And they would say ‘yes’, two, three people.

Upon arrival the majority either stayed with someone who already had a house (52 per cent) or received assistance to find a place to stay (34 per cent). For example, Veronika mentions how she used to let people stay at her house upon arrival:

I used to help with work, house, they came to my house, I would not mind that they came to live for a while because I understand that people do not have anything there [in Ukraine] and want to have something.
In addition to receiving information from other migrants and assistance throughout their migratory project, a large share of immigrants also passed on information to Ukrainians back in Ukraine and enabled the migration of others.

The majority gave information on how Ukrainians are treated in Portugal (85 per cent), how to find a job in Portugal (67 per cent), on visas and immigration procedures (65 per cent) and how to find housing (60 per cent). This information was mostly given to relatives. Many of them were also specifically asked for assistance (35 per cent) and in most cases they always helped others: to fund the trip (78 per cent always helped when asked), to find a job (74 per cent), to stay at their own house (71 per cent), to find a house (67 per cent), or to obtain documents (54 per cent). Assistance was mostly given to friends.

Nevertheless, the majority says that they did not encourage others to follow in their footsteps to Portugal (57 per cent). Katya, for example, recounts how she looked for help when she wanted to move to Portugal but that she never, of her own initiative, encouraged others: I, when I wanted to go to Portugal I called and asked a family member to help me, and they did; but no one has asked me and I myself never say ‘come, come’.

Under certain circumstances, migrant networks can also be selective or exclusionary, acting as ‘gatekeepers’ (enabling selective chain migration) or ‘gateclosers’, discouraging migration among potential migrants and thus leading to the decline of migratory flows (Engbersen et al. 2013). Therefore, in the next section we will analyse 1) how the economic and financial crisis affects changing perceptions and motivations of Ukrainian migrants in Portugal to provide assistance for potential migrants in their home country; and 2) the development of negative feedback mechanisms transmitted through migrant networks to prospective migrants.

The present: macro-economic crisis and the role of feedback mechanisms

The end of the cycle of economic expansion and the impact of the financial collapse have taken its toll on the Portuguese economy and society at large (Reis, Pereira, Tolda, Serra. 2010; Fonseca, McGarrigle 2014). The country’s bailout by the so-called Troika of the IMF, European Commission and Central European Bank, with the subsequent introduction of an austerity plan, that has included wage cuts, increasing taxes and cut down on public services, has been accompanied by rising unemployment which has affected both national and foreign workers. The perception of the country’s poor economic performance is transmitted by immigrants to friends and relatives in the home country through negative feedback that may dissuade potential migrants, leading to declining emigration to a specific destination (Engbersen et al. 2013).

Today, the majority of Ukrainian immigrants would not recommend moving to Portugal to other Ukrainians (63 per cent), according to data gathered by the THEMIS survey. This is due more to the lack of economic opportunities found in the country – 49 per cent considers economic opportunities in Portugal to be poor – than to a strict immigration policy – 77 per cent feels that the immigration regime in Portugal is not very restrictive. Indeed, in migrants’ discourses the difficulties and reluctance to assist others or to encourage the move to Portugal are largely related to current constraints in the Portuguese labour market, as the quotes below clearly illustrate.

Now many people want to come here. But they get here and there is not much work. My father can give my number, then someone from my home village calls me. I have to explain that I don’t have work, I can’t, he can’t even speak the language, doesn’t have a visa or anything. What is there for him to do here now? (Vladyslav).
In the same way, Andriy talks of the same difficulties:

Now it’s not worth coming to Portugal, because if he comes [he is referring to an acquaintance], he can’t speak [Portuguese], he may stay with me, ok, but concerning work, how much is he going to earn? Five hundred, six hundred euros ... it’s not enough. There won’t be any money left in the bank account (...), it’s not worth it. It’s better to stay there.

Olga specifically mentions the lack of work for men, mostly as result of the decline in construction work:

Now, it’s not interesting to come to Portugal because our Ukrainians say they don’t have work, it’s difficult to find work. Many Ukrainian men are here in Portugal either without work, or registered at the Employment Centre, or they work for one month, then they stop for two weekends. It’s like this.

When contacting their friends, relatives and acquaintances in Portugal, potential Ukrainian migrants are informed of the difficult labour market situation. As Mykhaila says, Many Ukrainians ask if there are jobs here and people tell them there aren’t. (...) They do not want to take risks now because there is less work. They do not want to come and remain jobless.

In addition, 20.6 per cent of the 306 interviewees admitted that they had already discouraged people from Ukraine to move to Portugal and approximately one third (33 per cent) would advise people to move elsewhere. In the words of Liliya:

No, nowadays no, things changed a lot, a lot, a lot. It’s not like when I arrived, now everything is more difficult, with the crisis there is less work, things are more expensive. Thus I’m not going to advise people to come, not even the family because one doesn’t know how things will go on... Presently, I would advise people to go to Germany, England, but not to come to Portugal.

Despite this overall negative opinion regarding current prospects in Portugal, it is also evident that the feedback sent home concerning migration to Portugal also involves some selectiveness in perception and/or in the people to whom the advice is given, suggesting that the advice provided, and eventual assistance, can be different in specific conditions and for particular persons. Indeed, 18 per cent of the interviewees stated that in some cases but not in others they would recommend people to move to Portugal. In addition, if asked for assistance, the majority revealed a willingness to assist in most cases, particularly to find a house (66 per cent would always try to help), a job (53 per cent) and obtain documents (42 per cent). They are however less inclined to fund the migrant’s trip (23 per cent would always try to help) or let them stay in their own house (39 per cent would always try to help).

The continuing poor performance of the Portuguese economy with persistently high unemployment rates, especially among foreign workers, precarious contractual relationships and lower salaries has stimulated the re-emigration of foreign workers as well as the emigration of nationals. The scope of the outflow is difficult to determine due to a lack of statistics, but more than 84 per cent of the Ukrainian citizens surveyed in the Lisbon region knew fellow countrymen who previously lived in Portugal but now had left the country. Almost half of the 306 respondents (48 per cent) knew five or fewer people who left, whereas 27 per cent knew more than 10 people, and the remaining 25 per cent knew between 6 and 10 individuals who no longer reside in Portugal.

In summary, we can conclude that the THEMIS survey, together with the testimonies of settled Ukrainian migrants in Lisbon, show that the initial positive perception of labour market opportunities has now been
replaced by largely negative views on current economic opportunities in Portugal. At the same time the flow has stopped, which can probably be attributed to negative feedback and a more limited willingness to assist the migration of others.

**Future prospects for the migratory project of Ukrainians in Portugal**

Future trends in the migratory flow of Ukrainian citizens to Portugal as well as the permanence of these immigrants in the country are uncertain. The results of the research conducted as part of the THEMIS project show that remaining in Portugal is still an option for 29 per cent of Ukrainians, as mentioned earlier. Despite all the drawbacks and daily challenges, remaining in Portugal is still regarded as a plausible possibility by many interviewees and confirmed by a member of a Ukrainian association. In his words:

*As a member of the association, there are approximately 60 thousand Ukrainians here [in Portugal], and two thirds will stay, I believe. They have their families here. I know people who own their home, opened businesses, obtained equivalences to their diplomas, work in garages, or in hospitals as medical doctors. Thus, two thirds will stay [in Portugal] (Viktor).*

Combining the best of both worlds through circular migration between Portugal and the origin country appeals to 29 per cent of Ukrainian migrants. This flexibility of movement pleases individuals who feel comfortable with transnational practices and view adaptability to circumstances as a way of life (Vertovec 2004; Levitt, Glick-Schiller 2010). Immigrants live in the host country when it is more convenient to do so, and return to the origin country if better perspectives can be found there. According to Lyudmyla:

*I know people [Ukrainians] who left and came back [to Portugal] who were not able to live there [in Ukraine]. Even our friend who bought a van and went back to Ukraine and said that he would never come back. He stayed there for half a year and came back [to Portugal]. The same happened with my husband. After being in Portugal for two years, he went back to Ukraine and said «ok, I won’t go back to Portugal». He stayed home for four months and spent all the money he had earned. He [dealt with the paperwork] and obtained the visa again and came to Portugal. He thought [his first experience] was enough and would not come here again. But he did.*

However, returning to the home country (22 per cent) or continuing the migratory project in another country (17 per cent) are also seen as viable options. According to Anatoliy:

*I believe that half of the people returned to Ukraine. They worked here for a while, saved some money and went back home. (...) Some people started to go back to Ukraine because they were tired of being here [in Portugal] and far away from the family, since 2006 (...) And now, with this crisis, many more people are returning to the origin country.*

The economic and social situation in Ukraine is also a motive for re-emigrating. Despite all the challenges and constant hurdles, after an experience abroad, migrants might feel the need to leave again. The remittances sent to the home country, personal fulfilment, social mobility, labour experience and contact with different cultural environments combined with little hope of better days in the home country, may function as stimuli to re-emigrate (Pereira 2012). In the opinion of Vasyl:
And there are others who try to go to other countries, to Spain, to France, where they can obtain the documents and move there. Because a friend of mine has already obtained his documents and has received the authorisation. He went back to Ukraine to reunite with his family, his children are grown up now and they are studying. He then wanted to come back here [to Portugal] but he didn’t have the documentation. He’s now working in Moscow. He worked in Kiev, in our capital city, but now he’s working in Moscow.

The recent faint ‘recovery’ of the Portuguese economy, visible in the slow decline of the unemployment rate and positive growth of the GDP on the one hand, and growing social unrest in Ukraine on the other, involving violent clashes in Kiev and elsewhere in February 2014, will certainly play a role in the future trends of migration to Portugal. The Revolution of Dignity, which brought together protesters against president Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Agreement of Association with the European Union and citizens wanting to initiate criminal proceedings against those involved in government corruption, has played and will continue to play a major role in shaping migratory flows is of major importance to define the evolution of the outflows from Ukraine.

Conclusion

The literature review and research presented here portray the quick evolution in the Ukrainian migration flow to Portugal, going from a very rapid expansion to decline and stabilisation in just a few years. Framed by an unfavourable macro-economic and social context in Ukraine combined with economic expansion in Portugal, largely due to a booming construction sector, this flow was largely supported by the active role of the ‘migration industry’ and of migrants’ social networks. The emergence of ‘travel agencies’ (ranging from profit-making businesses to criminal organisations) that facilitated the migration to Portugal was instrumental at the early stages of the flow, but were slowly replaced by the active role of social networks in providing assistance and positive feedback to others in subsequent years. This development testifies to the transformative character and dynamism in the networks that constitute and facilitate migration.

More recently, the post-2008 economic crisis in Portugal is being transmitted through the same social networks back to Ukraine and current advice is not as favourable, mostly due to decreasing job opportunities in the Portuguese labour market. In addition there is more reluctance to assist further migration, which is likely to create a more selective process. Nevertheless, there seems to be a certain overall trend towards the permanence of current Ukrainian migrants in Portugal. Recent social upheaval in Ukraine (early 2014) may boost further emigration, but it is uncertain whether Portugal will continue to offer a viable destination for new potential migrants, given the ambiguity in migrants’ views. On the one hand, advice given is negative, while on the other, there is still evidence of a willingness to assist others if asked. This is clearly a matter worthy of further research at both ends of the migration flow.

Notes

1 Financial support for THEMIS from the NORFACE research programme on Migration in Europe – Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics is acknowledged.
2 A wave corresponds to the stage of evolution of each chain of recruitment that statistically expresses the level of differentiation reached in relation to the individuals surveyed at the beginning of the recruitment. The seeds are wave number ‘00’, the individuals recruited by them are wave number ‘01’, and the next recruited people are wave number ‘02’, and so forth.
Homophily assesses how far respondents prefer to recruit others within their own group in detriment of a random recruitment. This measure varies between -1 and 1. Zero corresponds to a totally random selection, whereas 1 corresponds to a selection only within one’s own group and -1 to an exclusively extrinsic recruitment (Heckathorn 1997).

Lisbon Metropolitan Area, within research Project THEMIS – Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems.

In February 2013 the unemployment rate in Portugal reached a peak of 17.6 per cent. For 2012, the unemployment rate among foreign workers was 26.5 per cent (Source: Pordata).

For ten consecutive months, since February 2013, the unemployment rate in Portugal has decreased. The Portuguese GDP showed a 1.6 per cent growth rate in the fourth trimester of 2013, compared to the same trimester of 2012.

References


While denouncing the ‘toxic context of high emotion and little knowledge’ surrounding the area of migration policy, Paul Collier urges his audience, including policy-makers, migration scholars and experts, to learn the real effects about migration as a social fact, rather than being led by value-based judgements. The long list of his publications culminates with his most recent book in a new research field, marking for the first time the territory of migration scholars and policy-makers. *Exodus. Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century* is an extension of his previous work, *The Bottom Billion*, the title of which refers to the number of people ‘trapped’ in extremely poor countries, the poorest in those countries and in the world. The bottom billion of the world’s poorest people are not the migrants we see among us in Western societies, because the poverty afflicting these poorest people is so extreme as to decouple their hopes of better lives ‘abroad’ from realistic opportunities to actually flee elsewhere. Collier, however, emphasises that the emigration of those poor who do make it to better societies, usually referring to Europe and the USA, has a number of effects on the poorest left behind; it is indeed of primary moral as well as social and economic concern whether these effects are good or bad. It is this empirical observation which triggers Collier’s engagement in his latest book, which presents a wider analysis of the social phenomenon of international migration from poor, underdeveloped and developing countries to Western affluent democracies. The question of whether migration is good or bad is not the right question to ask, he argues. We need to ask to what extent migration is ideal and how fast the international movement of people should be taking place. When it comes to the issue of international migration, he argues, immigration policies set by host states ought to weigh the interests, in terms of the social and economic costs and benefits to the indigenous population primarily, against the interests of migrants and those left behind as well.

In Collier’s view, any migration is more desirable than no migration at all. The question is more how much migration and how we establish it. Collier’s central argument is that contemporary migration is economically generally beneficial, with some exceptions, for host countries and those left behind, but socially less so. However, were migration to accelerate, the effects would firstly be socially disastrous, as this would corrode social trust and affect attitudes of cooperation not only between the indigenous people themselves but also between the indigenous population and the migrants. And secondly, even if cooperation and trust were not undermined, rapid immigration would come at the expense of cultural loss. Collier invites us to imagine England becoming Bangladeshi, or Africa becoming Chinese. Migration, therefore, would not be desirable even if the gains in economic terms were so big as to increase the wealth of the poorest left behind, of the migrants and of the indigenous population. Against global utilitarian and libertarian views which advocate cherishing the freedom of movement of individuals and which posit that open borders would lead to an enormous increase of global wealth, Collier speaks of the risk of loss of national cultures, leading to a loss of social trust and cooperation. Protecting culture in the face of diversity is, therefore, an overarching criterion in establishing migration policies.

In the five constitutive parts of the book, rich in philosophical, sociological, economic, moral, and
While diversity enriches economies by bringing fresh perspectives to problem-solving, in principle it threatens culture, which is why diversity should be down-sized so that it is absorbed, and thus migration policies should limit the fast international movements of people.

While there is a clear moral obligation to help the poor who live in other countries, there is no such obligation to permit the free movement of people across borders. Furthermore, Collier argues, While nationalism does not necessarily imply restrictions on immigration, it is clearly the case that without a sense of nationalism there would be no basis for restrictions. This assertion might be problematic in regard to other accounts in the literature – according to which there is a strong basis for restriction unrelated to national identity – which are not taken into consideration. One such legitimate claim could advocate migration restriction based on the claim that democracy needs borders in order to function properly, positioning by default the will of the citizen (and not cultural identity) as bearing normative standing. The implication, consistent with Collier’s view, is that citizens forming the demos have the right to democratic decision-making (call it legitimacy claim), as in the following illustration: The citizens of Romania might well decide, via democratic decision-making, to invest in technology, and therefore to restrict the access of some immigrants working in agriculture while welcoming immigrants from other parts of the world to bolster the technological sector.

Importantly, Collier explains that, although migration is a response to extreme global inequalities, the reason why it increases is dependent on two main factors: first, the wider the gap in income between states, the stronger the pressure on the poor to migrate; second, the larger the size of the diaspora in the host country from the country of origin, the faster the immigration of newcomers, and the slower their integration into the host society. According to his model, migration policies, far from being arbitrary, are necessary for maintaining the important equilibrium between the cultural absorption rate of migrants within the host society and newcomers, the
effects of which are conceptualised by the author in terms of social loss.

In Part 2, Collier explains the social and economic effects of immigration on a host society. He predicts that, if left uncontrolled, migration will accelerate. Contrary to the utilitarian universalist principle operating on the basis of the greatest happiness for the greatest while disregarding what happens to the individuals in host countries, Collier claims that mutual regard matters. It matters insofar as it normally generates cooperative action and trust, and is based on the sympathy people have for each other, of which cultural affinity is a precondition. Furthermore, since every country has its own social model – rules, norms and narratives – poor countries admittedly have worse social models in terms of cooperation, trust among citizens and institutions. Migrants moving to other countries, Collier argues, bring worse cultures with them. Migrants integrating culturally into a new society – becoming insiders – is what enables the host social model to keep on functioning. As members of a (host) society, if immigrants reject this society’s national identity, Collier adds, they are indeed choosing to be outsiders. However, contrary to Collier’s assumption, considering oneself as German as well as American by citizenship, makes one a German-American, rather than an outsider, in which case citizenship in a country confers a strong guarantee of not being an outsider. Furthermore, for many citizens identifying with their ancestors’ culture, it might be problematic to think that this per se makes them outsiders, as a dual identity is accepted by most people as good enough for someone to be and feel an insider in a social model.

One such case, in which Collier refers to the less-desirable social model which migrants bring from their country of origin, is ‘Latinos in the USA’, who free-ride (as opposed to cooperate) more than the indigenous population. Evidence that migrants, in some cases, demand fewer welfare benefits to which they are perfectly entitled than the indigenous population (and the consequential assumption that the indigenous population free-rides more than migrants) is missed in Collier’s argument. Some speculate that migrants could be motivated to cooperate more, and more fairly, than the indigenous population, due to their more precarious status and fears for the termination of their work contracts and the non-renewal of their visas. This speculation, if correct, challenges Collier’s assumption in the sense that, although it might be correct that cultural diversity suppresses social trust, it can also increase attitudes of cooperation. In line with his account, if and when this is the case, should more migration be advocated, insofar as both the social and the economic effects are highly beneficial for the host country? If this speculation is correct, it urges a more detailed explanation of how we understand and analyse social cooperation and its intertwined relation with cultural identity and attitudes of trust.

In Parts 3 and 4, Collier analyses the economic and social effects of migration, focusing on migrants and those left behind. Migrants are both the big economic winners from migration, with their income sometimes increasing up to 400 per cent, and the big losers insofar as they suffer psychological costs outweighing the economic ones, and because their wages seem to be affected by the new incoming migrants. He also claims that those left behind are also better off not only due to the money migrants send back home as remittances, but also because their political and social attitudes, such as democratic attitudes. Contrary to the myth that migrants lower indigenous wages, Collier claims that the wages of migrants themselves are affected primarily and for the most part. Concerns arise with regards to the definition of the term migrant, loosely stated, leaving important implications of his arguments rather obscure. If the migrant is understood as a person of different origin and nationality moving to another country, it is empirically difficult to understand which migrants he analyses when he speaks about Haitian or Latinos, or any other migrant in Europe and the USA. Would there be any relevant difference for Collier between the migrant moving to Europe 80 years ago, becoming a citizen but never integrating in the relevant sense that Collier understands ideal cultural integration, and
a migrant who moved 20 years ago, integrated fully, but never became a citizen? Collier might be inclined to refer to the first citizen as a migrant – on the basis that he is not integrated culturally in the relevant sense, yet for some of us at least, he is an insider – and to the second non-citizen as a non-migrant on the basis that he is integrated culturally. Is cultural identity the main decisive feature describing who falls within which category and when one stops falling in the outsiders’ box? Political scientists struggle to find which considerations should be taken into account, such as schooling, birth, naturalisation, residence and family relations in order to define a migrant as an insider or an outsider. The cultural absorption metric, according to which one at some point becomes an insider, might be ontologically and morally arbitrary, too. For many philosophers, it might be problematic to consider that cultural claims override citizenship. For instance, deporting American citizens of Japanese origin from the USA in a moment of tension between the two states is problematic precisely because their deportation is justified on cultural, or broadly ethnic grounds. This indicates that the cultural absorption metric, as an insider/outsider metric, needs constraints that are not mentioned clearly in Collier’s book. If transitioning from being a migrant, understood as an outsider, to an insider status is left to the cultural integration metric only, internal fears and the disaffection of migrants towards an indigenous population, with whom they are not equal, despite them being at some point equally citizens, can lead, contrary to Collier’s view, to social haemorrhage in the social fabric.

In asserting that the migrants are like lottery winners when they achieve migration, Collier seemingly determines that the social and economic effects on host countries are also positive. Emigration has several effects on those left behind, but the clearest, and probably the most important, are on the resident stock of educated people and on remittances. Big countries like China and India normally gain enormously from emigration, while small countries could suffer when their skilled young generation migrates en masse. Haiti is one such country, having lost 85 per cent of its educated people. In such cases, Collier recommends restrictions. Assuming that restricting migration will benefit the poor small countries left behind, states are requested to enact migration policies based firstly on national interest, and secondly on the interest of migrants and those left behind. Acting in the interest of the latter, however, is a matter of compassion, he claims. It is doubtful that a state would undermine its own interests in welcoming or not welcoming migrants (or the type of migrants, such as skilled, if needed). The harm that a small nation can experience thanks to migration policies set by host countries is therefore contingent upon the interest of the host state and its charitable spirit in mitigating these policies. Although Collier introduces the idea of admitting migrants as a charitable gesture, the best reading of his argument is finally that opening the door or closing it (if necessary) to poor immigrants reflects the economic interest of the host state. The creaming of the crop in a poor country like Haiti is compatible with Collier’s view, at least in principle. This conclusion might be surprising, as his reflections inspiring the book are concern for those left behind.

In the final part, Collier’s policy recommendations should find such a compromise between the interests of states, migrants and those left behind. The policy package that Collier proposes contains four recommendations: ceilings, selection, integration and legalisation. The task of migration policies should be to prevent the acceleration of migration to levels that would endanger both indigenous populations in the host country and those left behind in the country of origin. In this sense, if migration were to accelerate, the walls of nations should be higher, in accordance with the criteria specified in the ceiling and selection policies. The ceiling specification should restrict immigration in cases such as Haiti, even if this goes against the principle of national interest. If we follow Collier in this direction, we should bear in mind previous cases of restriction in which a clear beneficial effect applied to the poor left behind. Rich countries select immigrants based on their skills and employability, both criteria that do not refrain from draining the poorest countries of
their young talent. According to the third criterion, migrants sharing more cultural affinity are preferred to those whose cultural background is more distant. Even if Collier indicates that policies should not be racist, to some of us, a selection of would-be migrants based on their cultural background might still be morally troubling; secondly, selection might be not charitable at all to most poor countries, which differ in culture from the Western world. The fourth criterion of vulnerability requires that states which receive asylum-seekers should demand their return to the home country when peace is restored; this responds to the principle of the duty to rescue, on which most migration scholars agree.

In line with integration policies, a range of strategies is adopted in order to facilitate and increase the absorption of a diaspora in the mainstream culture of their members’ particular host country. This could be understood as requiring the geographical dispersion of migrants, school policies aimed at the integration of pupils who are migrants, etc. Finally, Collier proposes the legalisation of illegal migrants by conferring on them a partial status: they pay taxes, but can only access public services as tourists.

Exodus comes across as a frank account written in a rather provoking manner. It is a book rich in reflections and suggestions that are worth exploring for migration scholars and policy-makers. The policy recommendations might accommodate the views of those cherishing culture as a value to be protected, and would produce uneasiness in those for whom such an inflation of culture is rather excessive or undesirable. The facts about international migration presented in the book prove sufficient to be sympathetic to those who share the same values as Collier, and somewhat lacking in proof of why migration would accelerate to such an extent as to resemble an exodus; furthermore, why would mass migration ever trigger such sentiments in current indigenous populations similar to Africans who, during colonisation, did not have settlers moving in simplisticiter, but ruling them, often by the use of force and violence.

Until the social losses due to immigration are proven to be such by empirically grounded research, and Collier himself signalled many gaps which scholars have not addressed, the phenomenon of immigration will take place on an individual basis, rather than as a mass invasion, given that currently 97 per cent of the world’s population is stable; current migration triggers economic and some social gains for indigenous populations, migrants and those left behind, as Collier agrees. Finally, we would be able to have sufficiently peaceful and affluent democracies like the United States, whose present indigenous population are almost all migrants.

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Recent scholarly debates in Europe have become preoccupied with the effects of increased ethnic diversity on social relations, trust and social participation. It has been widely investigated, if and how ethnic diversity impacts the quality of urban and neighbourhood contacts between people of different origins. Particularly, the question whether the increase in ethnic diversification leads to ‘hunkering down’ of social capital (Putnam 2007) or ‘erodes’ trust (Stolle, Soroka, Johnston 2008) could be regarded as a starting point of a dynamic academic discussion in many European countries on so called ‘diversity effects’ at the neighbourhood or local community levels. Here, Merlin Schaeffer’s book Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion. Immigration, Ethnic Fractionalization and Potentials for Civic Action arrives as a comprehensive review of to-date debates and methods, it also brings diverse, often contradictory arguments together, and points to new research directions.

Schaeffer starts his book by saying: Over the past six decades immigration has made Western societies more culturally, religiously and phenotypically diverse (p. 1). It is hard to disagree with this statement; however, I would like to bring it forward.
Indeed, Western European countries have faced in last decades an increase in immigration influx, resulting in ethnic diversification of these societies. A lot of attention has been paid to the effect of ethnic diversity on social relations in Western Europe, but there are other parts of the continent, which are less diverse, although they used to be more ethnically mixed more than six decades ago. Specifically, this is the case of most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Thus, let me use this opportunity of reviewing Merlin Schaeffer’s book to sneak a few reflections on a potential for developing similar studies on ‘diversity effects’ in the CEE region.

Schaeffer’s book is an effect of an extensive statistical analysis of the German subset of the Ethnic Diversity and Collective Action Survey (EDCAS); nonetheless, the work is very theoretically driven and based on an original theoretical framework. It is well situated in the exiting research and, interestingly, it does so by employing statistical modelling of to-date literature by discipline, region of analysis (regrettfully, Europe is included as one region), the type of ethnic diversity that was analysed, the level of data aggregation and the type of studied dependent variables etc., controlling for publication type [sic] (Chapter 2). This meta-analysis of the existing studies of diversity effects confirms inconclusiveness of the debate (p. 30), which is a result of differences in applied methodologies and it highlights the importance of moderating conditions in analyses of ethnic diversity’s relationship with indicators of social cohesion.

A strong part of the book is Chapter 4, which provides empirical analyses of different diversity indices. Here, theoretical approaches that were discussed in the previous chapter are linked with corresponding indices, e.g. in-group favouritism with the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, group threat theory with the index of ethnic polarisation, cultural preferences with the measure of cultural distances (‘culturally weighted ethnic diversity’) and ethnic group-based income inequality and, finally, linguistic and coordination concepts with the ‘mean of host-country language skills of persons of immigrant origin’. The comparison of ‘competing indices’ reveals, however, that they explain a similar amount of variance, and marginal differences in model fits were found. We read convincing reflections under what conditions the indices could be more informative and we learn that all of the most common diversity indices applied in studies are not sensitive enough when minority groups are relatively small in numbers, i.e. less than 30 per cent of total population (p. 68). Thinking about a wider implementation of diversity effect studies in Central and Eastern Europe, in countries where levels of immigration are lower and statistical diversity indices have little variability, it would be useful to further investigate what measures could be used to study diversity in countries with histories of ethnic diversification different from those of Western European countries.

Some solutions for low-diversity countries are presented in the next part of the book. Chapter 5 touches on a topic which has not yet been so broadly investigated as the effects of actual, statistical diversity on quality of inter-ethnic relations — namely subjective perceptions of ethnic diversity. Schaeffer argues that cognitive indicators regarding whether, and to what extent, ‘real’ diversity is recognised and acknowledged by a population could serve as a micro link between the contextual demographic situation and individuals’ tendencies to withdraw from public social life (p. 75). This chapter further exposes contrasting effects of statistical diversity on behavioural and cognitive aspects of social cohesion. Perceptions — as the provided analyses demonstrate — bridge the gap and offer alternative explanations of ethnic diversity effects.

Another attention-grabbing part of the book is the next chapter which critically engages with the idea whether these perceptions could be at all subjective, since they refer to local/national ‘genealogies’ of ethnic difference, which are anchored in social and political discourses and daily mediated by media and public discourse (Chapter 6). Specifically, the Author discusses the German vision of nationhood, citizenship, demarking ethnic ‘others’ and tests with data whether ethnic categories remain salient when people are asked about groups responsible for problems in neighbourhood with an open-ended question, avoiding specifying ethnic categories a priori.
Going back to my previous considerations, subjective measures of diversity could be more useful as diversity measurement tools in countries with lower levels of actual ethnic diversity. The comparison of subjective and objective indicators of diversity could provide insight into the role of familiarisation with diversity for inter-ethnic relations (cf. Hooghe, de Vroome 2013; Kuovo, Lockmer 2013) for societies with high levels of ethnic diversity. It is still under-investigated how ethnic or national diversity is perceived by residents of less diverse countries, such as countries in the CEE region. Of course, such studies were beyond the scope of Merlin Schaeffer’s book. However, what could enrich this part of the book would be a critical reflection on the causality between social cohesion and perceptions of diversity. As other literature argues, subjective perceptions of diversity could be ‘distorted’ by a lack of social interaction, prejudiced views and perceived threat (cf. Alba, Rumbaut, Marotz 2005; Schlueter, Davidov 2013; Strabac 2011). Thus, perception of diversity is not always a more precise indicator of actual diversity, a moderator or a mediator of statistical diversity effects, but it could be considered a more complex psycho-sociological variable, which is reversely impacted by social cohesion. Obviously, a follow-up EDCAS survey would allow to investigate the causality question.

The final empirical chapter of the book entitled The Dilemma of Inter-Ethnic Coexistence discusses residential segregation and spaces of encounter with people of different background. It extends existing analyses of the diversity effect and along with measures of diversity, segregation and contact, includes more specific sites of inter-ethnic interactions, namely parks and playgrounds (which facilitate interactions of people with children) and bars and restaurants (with their potential of forging cross-ethnic friendships). This analysis points to new directions in research of ethnic diversity and a need to design more nuanced measures of inter-group contact occurring in neighbourhoods and within urban space. I have only a minor comment here – the section omits the rich human geography literature on spaces of encounters, which could be further employed in conceptual frames of such studies. For example, there has been research on how people experience everyday encounters in public spaces, such as public transport (Wilson 2012), schools (Hemming 2011), or social organisations (Matejskova, Leitner 2011).

Overall, Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion... should be an essential read for social scientists studying social change in European societies brought about by international mobility and ethnic diversification. This book might also call the attention of anyone interested in conducting parallel quantitative, large-scale research in other European countries, since it provides rich ‘food for thought’ about how to contextualise and situate such research in particular national or regional contexts. Whether such studies will emerge in Central and Eastern Europe – hopefully, we will see soon.

Notes

1 EDCAS was a computer assisted telephone survey conducted in October 2009 – July 2010 in Germany, France and the Netherlands. The German sample of EDCAS comprises 7,500 observations in 55 selected regions with 24 per cent oversample of people of immigrant origin.

2 However, the formula Schaeffer actually refers to is the Simpson’s Index of Diversity, since the sum of squares is subtracted from unity (Simpson 1949).

References


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