Contents

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From the Editor 5

Articles

Marek Okoński
Spatial Mobility from the Perspective of the Incomplete Migration Concept 11

Joanna Nestorowicz
Immigrant Self-employment: Definitions, Concepts and Methods 37

Marta Anacka, Agnieszka Fihel
Selektywność emigracji i migracji powrotnych Polaków – o procesie „wypłukiwania” 57

Research Reports

Agnieszka Fihel, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Renata Stefańska
Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland. 69

Book Reviews

Maria Piechowska
Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, Migracje we współczesnym świecie 91

Cezary Żołędowski
Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska, Migrantów ścieżki zawodowe „bez granic” 93
Dear Reader,

We are delighted to introduce to you Central and Eastern European Migration Review (CEEMR) – the first online, multidisciplinary journal devoted specifically to the lively migratory processes of Central and Eastern Europe. In our view, the need for such a journal has been materialising for some time. The growing research output regarding international mobility from and to this region as well as integration patterns of CEE countries’ citizens in destination countries, in particular in the European Union, has created a need for an academic forum on this topic. We believe that CEEMR can effectively respond to this need.

The mission of CEEMR is to foster an academic discussion on scholarly works and research pertaining to migration within, into and out of the CEE region. From a comparative perspective, the CEEMR will address a broad range of topics related to international migration including determinants, mechanisms and consequences of international migration, as well as migration policies, migrants’ integration and ethnic relations. CEEMR will publish original, scholarly case-studies of CEE countries as well as works taking broader, international and transnational perspectives to examine migratory processes relevant to CEE countries and their citizens, ethnic minorities, institutions, territories, and policies.

The origins of the term Central and Eastern Europe can be traced to the Enlightenment era, when the term ‘Eastern Europe’ was used to denote the part of Europe that differed from ‘civilized’ Western Europe. In the migration context, the East-West divide in Europe has been addressed in a number of scholarly works, especially in the period preceding eastward enlargement of the European Union (cf. Górný, Ruspini 2004). In this context, the ‘East’ usually denotes all post-communist countries forming a region of Central and Eastern Europe, but some authors tend to make a distinction between Eastern Europe – the Commonwealth of Independent States – and Central Europe, comprising the Baltic States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the former Yugoslav countries. It can be, however, argued that, at least in the context of migration studies, the broader concept of Central and Eastern Europe has been more frequently used (cf. Okólski 2004). This conceptualisation of the CEE region is shared by the Central and Eastern European Migration Review.

Published papers on the unique role of Central and Eastern Europe in the European migration system date back to the early 1990s. It was then when terms like ‘buffer zone’ or ‘migration space’ were conceived to address migratory processes taking place in the CEE region. Economic and political transitions then underway in most post-communist countries set up a novel context of international mobility from, to and within the region. Different speeds and characters of transition of centralised communist economies into market economies resulted in the formation of several magnets within the region - particularly the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - which attracted the most immigrants from other CEE countries, especially from the ex-USSR.
In fact, in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, an overwhelming proportion of the migration of CEE countries’ citizens was contained within the CEE region itself. According to Marek Okólski (2004; 2010), factors responsible for emergence of a specific migration space in Central and Eastern Europe include:

- anticipatory controls put in place in member countries of the Schengen agreement area accompanied by the very existence of CEE’s magnets, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (and a few other, smaller countries);
- cost-benefit calculations of individual migrants, which often suggested that the potentially higher economic benefits associated with travelling to the West vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe were insufficient to offset the related expenses, inconveniences and risks;
- the rapid development of migration networks in Central and Eastern Europe and migrants’ familiarity with a common post-communist reality.

Political and economic transition in CEE countries was accompanied by the integrating of this part of Europe with the European Union. For some CEE countries, preparations for the Union’s eastward enlargement started as early as the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, contrary to common predictions of that time, a mass exodus from the CEE region to Western Europe did not materialise until the eastward European Union enlargements finally took place in 2004 and 2007. Only then, upon acquisition of the freedom of movement and work in (initially some) member states, citizens of the new Union members from the CEE region – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - started to migrate in large numbers to Western Europe. However, the intensity of these movements differed across accession countries, with Poland and Romania sending the highest numbers of migrants.

It is clear that Central and Eastern Europe’s overall geopolitical role and the place in the European migration system have changed as a consequence of the accession of 10 countries from its Central part to the European Union. As Corrado Bonifazi formulated it, (2008: 125) ‘The entry of most of the previously ‘planned economies’ into the EU has effectively expanded a migration system previously centred on Western European countries [as destinations], making it more sufficient than in the past. The borders of the system moved eastwards so that the countries of the former CIS now form a buffer zone’.

The political context of intra-CEE movements was also changed by the eastward EU enlargements. Some of these movements (e.g. migration of Slovaks to the Czech Republic) became an internal mobility within the European Union, whereas others, like the migration of Ukrainians to Poland, started to represent migration of third-country nationals into the European Union. Consequently, intensification of intra-Union mobility and immigration of third-country nationals to the Union – citizens of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine – have been observed, with both types of movements involving CEE citizens.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that, notwithstanding dynamic political changes that took place during the most recent decades in Central and Eastern Europe, the region remains a distinct area with respect to migration realities, when confronted with the Western and Southern models of European migration (cf. Arango, 2012). In part, this stems from historically-grounded economic, political and cultural links among CEE countries – including those currently within and outside the European Union. The role of migration-related factors observed first in the 1990s should be acknowledged as well. These factors encompass dense intra-CEE migrant networks and relatively high costs of migration to the more distant Western Europe compared to migration to another, closer CEE country.

From a migration perspective, Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a unique and fascinating object of research due to the variety of novel forms of international mobility occurring for the first time in CEE countries. Though the paradigm of transmigration is no longer novel, it can be argued that the recent mobility of Central and Eastern Europeans contributed to its extensions and diversifications. Terms like ‘false tourism’,

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‘incomplete migration’, ‘migrancy’, ‘settled in mobility’, ‘suspended emigration’, ‘fluid mobility’ and others were designed to capture nuances of the temporariness of CEE migrants and migrations. In this respect, migrations of Poles, Romanians and Ukrainians, due to their intensity and concentration in time and space, constitute unique natural experiments that deserve in-depth examination now and in the future.

The character of the CEE experience with immigration constitutes another aspect that distinguishes the region from the rest of Europe despite some important differences existing among CEE receiving states (cf. Grabowska-Lusińska, Drbohlav, Hars 2011). Systematic inflow of foreigners to CEE countries is a relatively recent phenomenon with a prevalence of temporary (circular) mobility constituting its distinctive feature. At the same time, the volume of migrants living in CEE countries is much lower than numbers of foreigners residing in the South and West of Europe. Some authors even call some CEE countries ‘future’ immigration countries at an ‘embryonic’ phase of transition from countries of emigration to ones of immigration, in contrast to the ‘new’ immigration countries in Southern Europe and the ‘old’ immigration countries in Western Europe (cf. Okólski 2012). Consequently, issues of concern and interest that relate to immigration in CEE countries encompass: managing and regulating flows, designing an adequate immigration policy as well as forming an integration policy and its monitoring. With few exceptions, the CEE countries also face a need to re-design their national registries and statistics to encapsulate foreign immigrants. In contrast, immigration-related problems being discussed in the context of other parts of Europe, like the co-existence of migrant minorities and native majorities, interethnic relations and the integration of second- and third-generation immigrants, are still exotic and marginal issues in the CEE countries.

Moreover, unlike Western Europe, the CEE region is primarily a sending area for migrants heading to the West – be it further afield in Europe or overseas. The sending-country perspective is thus an important approach in examining the international mobility underway in the CEE region. Meanwhile, as a consequence of eastward enlargements of the European Union, sending countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitute an important element of intra-European mobility processes. Paving the way for research bearing a sending-country perspective constitutes an important challenge for researchers working on migratory processes pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe.

Another CEE-related element of increasing significance in the European migration system is the visibility of Polish, Romanian, Ukrainian and other migrant minorities, mainly as a consequence of their post-accession mobility. These groups have grown in size for almost a decade and have become newly present in a number of places of Western and Southern Europe. This phenomenon, and its rapidity, has reshaped interethnic relations and attitudes towards foreigners and migration in general in European destination countries.

It can be thus argued that the CEE region, as a region comprising both countries that accessed the European Union in the first decade of the 21st century and non-member states to the Union’s South and East, constitutes an important migrant-sending area. At the same time, the CEE does represent a destination for certain categories of migrants, who typically follow one of the novel forms of temporary mobility observed in migration from and to the region. However, while claiming that Central and Eastern Europe deserves to be perceived as a distinct migration space with some specific migratory issues and phenomena, it should be also acknowledged that migratory links between CEE and other European and non-European countries are numerous and multifaceted. Countries of the region are parts of various migration systems that cross the borders of the European Union, sometimes reaching the Far East.

In light of the above, the role of newly launched Central and Eastern European Migration Review is two-fold. On the one hand, it is meant to deepen understanding of the specificity of migratory processes in Central and Eastern Europe by addressing problems that are of pivotal importance for the region. Among them, three broad themes can be distinguished: 1) developing a sending-country perspective in migration studies in the European context; 2) examination of phenomena relating to immigration that have just recently begun
growing in CEE countries but differently than how analogous processes took place in ‘old’ countries of immigration and 3) uncovering mechanisms governing temporary and fluid forms of mobility observed in migration to and from the CEE region.

On the other hand, the goal of CEEMR is to broaden the audience for migration studies on movements of CEE nationals or migratory processes in Central and Eastern Europe, under the conviction that their conclusions should be included in the wider academic discussion on European and global migration. It is of particular importance in the light of the fact that citizenry of a number of CEE countries have become an intrinsic element of the European Union migration reality and have formed sizeable migrant communities virtually throughout the Union. Meanwhile, we are aware that the visibility of scholarly research devoted to migratory processes to and from CEE as well as to the integration of CEE migrants in destination countries is not satisfactory. This lack applies especially to works conducted in the important sending area of the former Soviet Union, but also in other CEE countries. We believe that Central and Eastern European Migration Review can be a journal where such works will become accessible to a wider academic audience.

Central and Eastern European Migration Review will be published by the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw as an online, open-access journal. It will appear twice a year, but we intend to increase its frequency in the future. Materials presented in the journal will include scientific articles, reviews and research notes. Priority will be given to works addressing the CEE region perspective and comparative analyses. However, studies based on original empirical data devoted only to some country-cases also befit the scope of the journal. The language of the contributions will preferably be English but, in the ‘running-in’ period of the journal, works submitted in Polish may also be accepted. Before publication, each submitted paper will be subject to a double-blind peer review by two independent experts. We invite economists, sociologists, demographers, political scientists, psychologists, historians and anthropologists to submit their works.

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References


Spatial Mobility from the Perspective of the Incomplete Migration Concept

Marek Okólski

The article is devoted to the analysis of factors that influenced internal migration in Poland after the Second World War and revealing the links of internal migration with incomplete migration, a new form of international mobility of people that was characteristic of the declining stage of communist reign in Poland. It also systematises the existing knowledge about migration within and beyond Poland.

Keywords: internal and international migration in post-war Poland, workers' commuting, mobility transition, incomplete migration, under-urbanisation

Introduction

This article includes basic analytical considerations which led the author to systematisation of the existing knowledge about migration from Poland in the transition period, in a conceptual form of the incomplete migration. The theory itself has already been presented in earlier author's works (Okólski 2001a; 2001c). More important, the theory of incomplete migration had earlier become the fundamental conceptual premise of the research programme pursued by the Centre of Migration Research of the University of Warsaw (CMR) that began in the mid-1990s. It was first thoroughly examined and empirically tested in the late 1990s when the CMR experimented with the ethnosurvey approach to migration study (Jaźwińska, Okólski 1996; 2001; Frejka, Okólski, Sword 1998), and later substantially modified and used as a theoretical background in further CMR projects (e.g. Kaczmarszyk 2008; 2011).

The migration phenomena observed during the transition period in Poland have their roots in the rather distant past – the circumstances following the Second World War or even earlier. The same can be said of the primary type of international mobility of Polish citizens at the beginning of the 21st century, a phenomenon I call incomplete migration.¹

The concept of incomplete migration is defined more precisely later in this article. As a working definition, it can be considered a form of international labour mobility of a certain category of people who did not join the initial mass outflow from rural to urban areas in the industrialisation period.² As a result, and because of specific historical and regional circumstances, they were more or less trapped in their original places of residence, despite the structural unemployment which typified local labour markets. The surplus rural and small-town labour force first engaged in mass circular migration to nearby industrial centres. With time, however, many of

¹ Original version of this paper was published in Polish in 2001 (Okólski 2001b). The author would like to extend his thanks to Anne White for her invaluable linguistic help in finalising the present version.
² University of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS), Warsaw.
these people – increasingly followed by others from different social backgrounds – started to earn money from trips abroad. These trips largely supplanted commuting and performed some of the same functions.

To consider ‘industrialisation’ as one of the circumstances leading to incomplete migration is to risk over-generalisation. By industrialisation I mean a fundamental and abrupt change in the economic structure – a transition from a predominantly agricultural economy to one where most of national product is generated by industry. Such a meaning is undoubtedly Eurocentric and somewhat misleading even with reference to Europe, as it overlooks (for example) regional differences between and within national economies. However, it seems applicable to Poland.

Industrialisation in Poland was completed only after the Second World War, under the communist regime. Previously there had existed only isolated localities with an ‘industrial’ economic structure. Creating industrialised areas was – it must be emphasised – a difficult task.3

The impact of industrialisation on the mass outflow of people from rural to urban areas had been at the very least significant, if not decisive, in many West European countries. This has led scholars to suggest the existence of a number of universally observable features of spatial mobility. Generally, these have been considered part of the modernisation process (although other terms are sometimes used). Many researchers of human mobility during the period of European industrialisation have assumed the existence of a specific paradigm, according to which traditional society was characterised by very limited mobility, including spatial mobility,4 and it was modernisation which stimulated mobility in all its aspects – social, occupational and spatial.5

Accepting such a point of view is a short step from formulating the general ‘law’ that a highly immobile traditional society inevitably transforms into a highly mobile modern one. This is particularly evident if we take into account the once popular but now somewhat forgotten theory of convergence (Bell; Rostow), or newer ideas of universalisation (Fukuyama) or globalisation (Robertson). The approach has been adopted by many contemporary researchers of social change, including migration scholars.6 What is more, some have asserted that these laws describe permanent and irreversible trends (Goldscheider 1971; Zelinsky 1971), even unidirectional ones (Ipsen 1959; Davis 1974).7 This in turn led one critic of the approach to refer to such laws (not unsympathetically) as ‘beliefs’ (Hochstadt 1999).

This specific modernisation paradigm applied to contemporary population flows has met with growing disapproval among many researchers. Such scholars typically question the universal and generalisable nature of migration trends by supplying examples – from various social and cultural environments, and from different epochs and geographical locations – which suggest that spatial mobility is relatively strongly influenced by specific factors, whose impact is more important than that of universal ones.

Over the last few years, since this controversy has led to a deep rift among migration scholars, it has been difficult not only to find common ground, but even to discuss the arguments on both sides. Therefore, it seems reasonable to engage in a short digression.

On the one hand, contemporary anthropological and historical scholarship allows us to state that migration should be considered to be a normal, structural and ever-present element of societies throughout history (Lucassen, Lucassen 1997). In particular, migration is not a sign of modernity, but an inherent part of social and economic human organisation.8

On the other hand, in the period directly preceding industrialisation, societies of Western Europe were undeniably predominantly agrarian – the majority of their populations lived in rural areas, were employed and made a living in agriculture. By contrast, 100-150 years after industrialisation began, rural populations were a clear minority in every country. This conclusion is not invalidated by the differences persisting between these countries or indeed inside them, even by the continuing existence of agrarian enclaves in some countries. Nor is the conclusion invalidated by the phenomenon of increased urban-rural migration in this period, because such migrants did not usually seek employment in agriculture, and certainly did not make
a living out of it. Moreover, they maintained close ties with urban cultural and economic life. This change could not be brought about by a radical decline (to negative value) in natural increase rate of the rural population, or a much lower growth rate than the urban one. On the contrary, it was the result of a massive, frequently abrupt outflow, indeed an ‘exodus’ of the rural population into towns and cities.

This migration was a symptom as well as an effect of modernisation, and at the same time a means of achieving social mobility. It was due to several important factors.

First, migration became possible and widespread because of political and socioeconomic changes brought about by modernisation. Some early regulations (rugii, the historical practice consisting of evicting peasants and taking possession of their farmland, common in Poland in the 19th century; or the process of enclosure) all but forced the population into urban areas.

Second, fundamental changes in the economy, extraordinary technical progress and an increase in labour productivity gradually pushed out the labour force from sectors with fading or insufficient labour demand, i.e. usually away from rural areas and the small towns servicing them, and towards sectors with increased or unsatisfied labour demand, i.e. predominantly big cities. One example of this process is the collapse of small-scale production in rural areas, which was unable to compete with urban factories.

Third, the modern development of the social division of labour called for a quick turnover of a flexible and adaptable labour force from different occupations and with different skills, whose inflows were governed by impulses coming from the labour market, which covered ever-growing areas or indeed became partially internationalised.

Finally, demographic transition not only led to a massive increase in population, but also contributed to significant territorial disproportions in population, and resulted in relocation of demographic resources, to places with better livelihood opportunities.

Also of importance for the phenomenon is the already-mentioned settlement structure at the onset of the modernisation period, which was characterised by an overwhelming majority of rural population in the overall population. This is why an initially large, although not predominant, part of the population growth due to demographic transition was concentrated in rural areas. And even though – as a consequence of outflows to urban areas – the proportion of rural population in the overall population gradually decreased, the absolute surplus of rural over urban frequently increased, despite the fact that usually the symptoms of demographic transition manifest first in urban contexts and are more intensive there.

The exodus of the rural population due to modernisation in western European societies was aptly described by the hypothesis of the mobility transition (Zelinsky 1971). Initially, the outflow from rural to urban areas, which, according to the hypothesis, is one of the five types of spatial mobility (some authors claim that the list is incomplete), was steadily increasing and, with the development of migrant networks and ensuing chain migration, assumed a mass scale. At certain point, however, the momentum of the outflow was reached and the stock of potential migrants started to shrink. The number of new migrants gradually decreased, and when it became close to zero, the level of saturation was reached. Major determinants of that process were the ‘pull’ forces of industrialisation, on the one hand, and the push forces related to large demographic resources of rural areas and growing labour productivity in agriculture, on the other.

As has already been suggested, in Poland, the nature of the changes in the post-war economic structure seems to invite comparisons with the West European model of industrialisation. Given that at the onset of those changes, around two-thirds of Poles lived in rural areas and found employment in agriculture, it seems reasonable to assume that the population outflow could have been similar to the one in Western Europe. Because of that, we can assume that we are justified in applying the model of mobility transition, particularly the part that describes migration from rural to urban areas, to interpret the phenomenon in Poland. This approach will be adopted in the following analysis.
'Socialist industrialisation' and migration from rural to urban areas

The aim of post-war industrialisation in Poland, until recently often labelled ‘socialist’, was to make up relatively quickly for Poland’s having fallen behind. Hence the rapid industrial growth and high levels of capital accumulation. This strategy was initially realised through investment in branches such as mining, steel production, metallurgy, machine-building and transport. The scale and concentration of the investments were usually large, and moreover localised in a few industrial centres and urban areas.

At the time, labour demand in cities was growing, and by far exceeded supply. At first, many migrants who settled in industrial centres came from other urban areas, often destroyed during the war or annexed by the USSR, or from overpopulated small towns. The sizeable, though relatively decreasing, mobility of the urban population during the period of socialist industrialisation is evidenced by the fact that only in the first half of the 1950s did more people move between different urban areas than from countryside to city. Over time, the flow from rural areas to industrial centres gained in significance.

At that time, rural areas suffered from a surplus of workforce usually rather low skilled, and this was precisely that kind of labour which was in high demand in cities. This imbalance on the labour market proved to be an extremely influential factor in the increased mobility of human resources, and contributed to the mass outflow of people from rural to urban areas, which accelerated urbanisation in Poland.

Immediately after the Second World War, attempts to stimulate orderly and comprehensive urbanisation translated into official plans to create industrial centres and recruit the labour force from other regions, as well as to build housing estates and service infrastructure. However, the plans were nowhere brought to completion and were never widespread. Despite the lack of consistency in this area, from the mid-1940s and for two decades afterwards, the population flow into urban areas was exceptionally dynamic.

During the period of socialist industrialisation, several million people moved from rural to urban areas; in the years 1951-1970, their gross number was over 6 000 000 and the net number, over 2 000 000. In a relatively short time, the share of rural population decreased dramatically, from ca 66 per cent in 1946 to ca 48 per cent in 1970. It would seem that Poland, like Western Europe before, experienced the modernization-related migration cycle described in the hypothesis of the mobility transition.

It is important to note, however, that with the exception of the initial period of industrialisation, i.e. until ca 1960, the inflow of labour force from rural areas did not keep pace with the increase in their employment in urban areas. For example, in the 1950s, the increase in rural population of working age was greater than the increase in employment outside agriculture (on average, by 37 000 a year), whereas in the 1960s it was smaller (by 16 000 a year, on average). On the other hand, in the 1950s, the labour force who settled in urban areas (including the newly arrived migrants) occupied up to 70 per cent of the newly created jobs outside agriculture, whereas in the 1960s the share was only 58 per cent (Fallenbuchl 1977).

Territorial mobility of young workers (i.e. the economically active population between 30 and 39 years of age) was usually rather limited. In 1972, 41 per cent of them had not moved since their 15th birthday. Low mobility was particularly visible among the inhabitants of big cities (with the population exceeding 200 000), where the proportion reached 76 per cent, while among inhabitants of villages and small towns (up to 5 000 inhabitants), those who did not move were relatively few in number (33 per cent). If we compare the first 20-25 years after the Second World War with the following 15-20, we can see that the young and naturally relatively mobile labour force became significantly less prone to migrate. If we define as mobile the people who have independently changed their place of residence at least once after their 15th birthday, then we can conclude that, in 1972, 59 per cent of Polish workers (i.e. economically active people) aged 30-39 were mobile, whereas in 1987 their share decreased to 44 per cent. The main factor responsible for the decrease was the declining mobility of the rural population. Survey evidence indicates that in 1972 the rural population
participated in 73 per cent of all internal migration, whereas in 1987, the figure was only 68 per cent. What is more, in 1972, 22.5 per cent of the surveyed population who had lived in rural areas at the age of 15 resided in urban areas; by 1987, the share had decreased to 15.5 per cent (Węgleński 1992). Therefore, the decrease in migration, which had never been exceptionally large to begin with and was accompanied by numerous cases of return migration, was caused mainly by the diminishing outflow from rural to urban areas.

**Under-urbanisation – its causes and effects**

It turns out that ‘mobility transition’ in Poland, at least as far as the above-mentioned population movements are concerned, was very different in character from the one observed in the western part of the continent and described in Zelinsky’s hypothesis. Socialist industrialisation may have triggered mass inflows of labour force into the growing industrial centres, but, unlike the Western precedent, it did not lead to a mass movement of surplus labour force from villages and small towns to urban areas. One of the main reasons for this difference was that pressure (not to mention, coercion) to migrate was not exerted upon the ‘free’ labour force in this part of Europe (Turski 1965). This effect of industrialisation is common to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and results in a level of urbanisation which is significantly lower here than in Western Europe, if we take into account the similar level of industrialisation in both regions (Ofer 1977).

In the literature, under-urbanisation is perceived as an inevitable, though largely unintended, effect of the rapid expansion of industrial production in a centralised totalitarian state (Konrad, Szelenyi 1974). At its source are the socialist central planners’ attempts at ‘economising on urbanisation’ (Ofer 1977). Such attempts resulted from two phenomena: the relative economic backwardness at the onset of socialist industrialisation; and the doctrinaire and ideology-biased approach towards the strategy of economic growth (Dziewoński Gawryszewski, Iwanicka-Lyrowa, Jelonek, Jerczyński, Węcławowicz 1977; Regulski 1980; Kukliński 1983).

The backwardness was evident e.g. in the fact that the economy was dominated by a great number of small, barely commodified peasant farms, and in the large surplus of labour concentrated in small towns and rural areas. Unlike in big cities, where employment opportunities were great, the development strategy used in rural areas consisted in attempts to keep most of the surplus labour force in agriculture. In towns, the adopted strategy required considerable capital expenditures in relation to labour resources (Ofer 1977). What is more, the urban infrastructure, under-financed, meagre, and ravaged by war-time destruction, made it impossible to suddenly accommodate large numbers of new inhabitants.

However, the socialist doctrine of economic development implied a competition with, and a quick victory over, the capitalist economy. This was only possible in the context of rapid and wide-ranging growth. In a situation of a self-imposed isolation from the world and relative autarky, the only source of growth could be internal accumulation, i.e. the country’s own extremely meagre capital.

Among the many dilemmas faced by socialist planners, a fundamental one concerned the allocation of the available funds: in industrial investments, i.e. directly into industrialisation, or into reconstruction and development of the urban infrastructure and services, i.e. urbanisation. On the one hand, doctrinal reasons suggested that the main aim of investments should be to boost production, and on the other, historical reasons, i.e. a strongly ‘agrarian’ economic structure, made it possible to keep a large part of the surplus small-town and rural labour force in its traditional place of residence. The temptation was, as it soon turned out, too great to resist (Turski 1965; Konrad, Szelenyi 1974; Węgleński 1992).

‘Economising on urbanisation’, or rather on keeping it in check, was therefore the result of a rational choice made by the authoritarian state, unhindered by the complexities of democratic mechanisms. The state, in its attempts to maximise the rate of industrial investment, perceived urbanisation-related social costs as a burden and strove to minimise them. The main victim of this choice was housing development.
However, the planners, in their illusion of rational reasoning, were unable to control or indeed predict one of the objectively immanent characteristics of a centrally planned economy – ‘the soft budget constraint’ (Kornai 1986). This was responsible e.g. for the fact that in the so-called production sphere of the economy (industry in particular), labour demand was practically unsaturated. State enterprises were known for maintaining a level of employment which greatly exceeded the production needs at any given time (Rutkowski 1990). As a result, the forces which pushed people out of small towns and rural areas to work in industrial centres were in a way artificially created. Such a mechanism, however, did not operate in the non-production sphere, e.g. municipal or household services sectors. One may therefore conclude that the actual insufficiency of the urban infrastructure was the result not only of a conscious and rational under-urbanisation strategy, but also of excessive employment in industry.

The huge labour force demand in big cities, given their insufficient infrastructure, and lack of housing in particular, made it necessary to import employees who accepted that they could not settle in close proximity to their workplace or, in some cases, were not inclined to move at all. There were three principal forms of this arrangement: a) regular employment coupled with daily commuting, b) regular employment coupled with temporary stays in makeshift conditions (living in lodgings or sharing a room in a workers’ hostel, etc.) close to the workplace, with weekly visits to the family, and c) irregular employment (e.g. seasonal or exclusively out of season), coupled with weekly commuting and living in makeshift conditions close to the workplace during the week (or with some other form of commuting or living arrangements).

Commuting was the most popular choice. It seems that the planners who decided to save on urbanisation were aware of the solution’s serious social costs. However, it appears that investments in transport infrastructure were considered overall to be cheaper than investments in urban infrastructure (Dąbrowski, Żekoński 1957). What is more, the former seemed less technically and organisationally complex, and took less time to build. It was therefore decided that the state was going to invest in roads and railways leading to big industrial centres. What is more, many factories in these centres were supplied with their own means of transportation for the use of their employees. Commuting was free or heavily subsidised (Turski 1965).

This macro-economic argument – which supports the idea of employing non-local or temporary workers in industrial centres rather than having them settle in urban areas – is not the only one. Others are more micro-economic in nature, and have a common denominator – the minimal wage required to support the employee and the members of his or her household (Herer 1962).

There are three factors which best explain the low living costs of worker families and which are the most relevant to the strategy under discussion (Chołaj 1961; Dziewicka 1961; Sokolowski 1960). First, workers who commute or who have a temporary place of residence pay relatively little for lodgings. Second, their other basic expenses (food in particular) are also significantly lower than for other employees. Third, non-local workers tend to accept harsher living conditions more easily: a general characteristic of people who are socially or geographically mobile. All this is conducive to keeping wages at a relatively low level, but it also helps limit labour costs on a macro-economic scale and to reduce aggregate demand, and therefore (in the conditions of chronic shortages of many products on the market), to decrease the pressure on consumer goods supply. What is more, it is a typical example of the logic of socialist industrialisation.

The above-described, gradually intensified strategy resulted in diminishing migration from rural to urban areas and an increase in the number of commuters and people who chose other, non-residential forms of mobility, and, therefore, a gradual change in the balance between the scale of migration to big cities and of short-term moves, especially circularity (Fuchs, Demko 1978).

What would make so many people who were economically redundant in their place of residence accept the offer of a life which was permanently divided geographically, and usually marked by temporariness? After all, in many cases, by doing this, they also gave up any opportunity of substantially improving their
quality of life. To use a category developed in one well-known migration theory: risk diversification as a household strategy seems to have been a strong motivating factor for commuters and casual workers.

Small town and, particularly, rural residents employed in big cities came from households whose members usually had other and frequently diversified means of support, often largely uninfluenced by state planning and regulations. For these employees, their earnings in industry were like social benefits, a valuable addition to the money earned in their own workshop, shop, garden, and above all, their family farm. In particular, self-provisioning in agricultural produce meant that workers were not at the mercy of changes in supply and prices on the market. Occasionally they took advantage of such changes to sell their produce on the black market, including in the city.

In industrial centres, non-local employees from farming families valued their ability to make free choices on the labour market, especially the ease with which they could give up their urban job when there was a lot of work on the farm, and then find employment again. It must have also been important for them that they could slack at their factory job without fear of sanctions (Turski 1961).

In light of these arguments we can assume that the factors which impeded migration from rural areas and villages to urban areas became stronger with time, and the reasons to find employment outside one’s permanent place of residence and living environment became more firmly grounded. This had a strong impact on actual spatial mobility.

We should also be aware that in Poland, the change in balance between the volume of migration to cities and the scale of circularity, posited by the hypothesis of the mobility transition, took place in different circumstances and had different causes than the similar phenomenon observed earlier in West European countries. In Western Europe, the shift to large-scale circulation only happened when agriculture became a marginal sector of the economic structure and when most of the population previously employed in agriculture had moved from rural to urban areas. People who circulated between urban and rural areas were usually those who, in search of more favourable living conditions, had earlier chosen to move from densely populated and polluted industrial centres to the environs of urban areas, but nevertheless continued to work in the city and maintained their urban cultural identity (Fuchs, Demko 1978; Wiles 1974).

In Poland, however, the abrupt increase in circularity between rural and urban areas was observed in a situation when more than half of the population still lived in the former. The process concerned mostly workers who were redundant in their places of residence, usually members of peasant households. Therefore, whereas in the West circularity appeared after the mass outflow of redundant rural population to urban areas had dwindled away and, to a certain extent, when migration stopped being a viable source of labour, in Poland the two processes coexisted and, what is more, circularity largely replaced migration.

The peak and decline of commuting

At a cautious estimate, by the beginning of the 1950s ca 500 000 people commuted to work, and the number kept rising until the beginning of the 1970s. The dynamics of the phenomenon is evidenced by the number of monthly train tickets, which rose from 93 000 to 501 000 in the years 1947-1956 (Turski 1965). Later, commuters were counted directly. In the years 1964-1973, their number rose from 1 500 000 to 2 800 000, which reflected an increase from 20 to 27 per cent in the number of commuters among all non-agricultural workers (Fallenbuchl 1977). In some voivodeships, already by the 1960s their number amounted to 35-40 per cent (Dobrowolska 1970). In order to fully convey the scale of, so to speak, unfulfilled migration from rural to urban areas, we would have to include all the members of the commuters’ families, the people staying in workers’ hostels or lodgings, and those occasionally employed in big cities, of whom at least some had rural
origins. In the 1950s, the number of people living in workers’ hostels was estimated at around 1,500,000 (Dyoniziak, Mikulowski-Pomorski, Pucek 1978).

Some estimates show clearly that a large majority of commuters came from rural areas, from 70 to 80 per cent depending on the region (Dobrowolska 1970). A particular sub-group of the commuters were people with two occupations, colloquially referred to as peasant-workers (chłoporobotnicy in Polish), i.e. part-time farmers, part-time factory workers. They were regularly employed outside agriculture, usually in big industrial centres. However, they lived in rural areas, on their own family farms, where they helped around as well – after their regular hours in the city, on their free days, and during holidays or leaves of absence, not always acquired legally. They would often e.g. abandon their factory job during periods of intensive field work, malingering or supply fake doctors’ notes.

An unprecedented increase in the number of these peasant-workers, from 500,000 to 1,400,000, was observed between 1950 and 1970. Their overall share in the workforce also increased, from 4.5 per cent in 1950 to 6.7 per cent in 1970 (Fallenbuchl 1977).

The first peasant-workers (80 per cent in 1950) overwhelmingly came from households with small farms (up to 2 ha), but later they were increasingly joined by those who owned more land (Bajan et al. 1974). This was undoubtedly largely because from the 1950s a significant proportion of surplus farm workers from small farms were already commuting to work outside agriculture.

Commuting, usually from rural to urban areas, was a mass phenomenon for a relatively long period of over 20 years. It made many farm workers and their household members very fluid and flexible in their choice of jobs, and the trait was then passed on from generation to generation (Czyżyk 1987).

As a result, by the early 1970s, two phenomena related to under-urbanisation had become well established and more or less permanent: the prevention of huge masses of the redundant rural (and small-town) population who regularly earned money in cities from moving there, and circulation as practically the only means (form of mobility) leading to the gainful employment of that population. This had a number of important consequences which were probably not factored into the costs of the industrialising strategy.

Many of those consequences can be summarised as follows: a whole category of people, torn between living and working in the village or small town, and living and working in the city, were permanently marginalised, both economically and socially. It has been already noted that such people were usually inclined to accept low pay and poor working conditions. What is more, we can assume that they had fewer opportunities than other workers to participate in the management and supervising of teams or organisational units. It was probably also true of careers in local politics, in state administration or in trade unions, all very important at the time. They also did not participate in vocational training and were not promoted as often as their co-workers living in cities. It must surely have made them feel deprived and alienated (Turski 1961).

The reasons for this state of affairs, both ‘technical’ and cultural, were obvious. Commuters were usually rooted in a different cultural environment, sometimes considered anachronistic in their workplace, and their behaviour and attitudes were typical of this environment. They were frequently stressed by the lack of stability in their private lives; they had much less free time, further reduced by their long journeys between home and workplace; and, finally, in case of many the hard physical labour on their farms contributed to their state of constant tiredness.

Since they usually came from environments with limited access to secondary and higher education, their level of education was often low, and their vocational qualifications were frequently minimal when they first took up employment in the city. All these factors resulted in the very low value of the commuters’ labour, doomed them to the ranks of the lowest-skilled manual workers, and impeded promotion and social mobility (Konrad, Szelenyi 1974).
On the other hand, with time, inhabitants of rural areas employed in big industrial centres learned to deal with the unfavourable conditions and to adapt (Czyżyk 1987). For example, they could permit themselves to make less effort, be less productive, less disciplined, and less loyal towards their employer than other employees. Many of them became used to their freedom on the labour market and were satisfied with frequent job changes interrupted by periods of voluntary unemployment or freelancing. This was only possible because of the huge labour demand in big cities which well exceeded the supply (Beskid 1989). What is more, until the 1990s, a low-skilled worker could ‘wait out’ unfavourable conditions in the labour market on his or her family farm (Socha, Sztanderska 2000).

Finally, as already suggested, the choice made by the people who did not manage to migrate to their primary place of employment reflected the combined strategies of their own households. Their goal – as is typical of periods of social transition, including mobility between a relatively traditional and a relatively modern environment – was to split risk and role attribution, and to diversify sources of income between household members, which often allowed them to cope better with harsh living conditions typical of an inefficient totalitarian state. Moreover, a strong identification and real bonds with their households, often made up of several generations or even several families, gave commuters and other unfulfilled migrants moral, psychological and material support (Turski 1961).

To sum up, the post-war period saw the emergence of a relatively numerous segment of society which had one permanent characteristic – the ability to live away from the workplace (or to travel a long distance to work), and to stay relatively isolated from the more socially and economically developed and more culturally attractive big-city environment. In addition, fundamental socio-political and economic mechanisms led to the perpetuation of the phenomenon until the beginning of the 1970s.

The initial development strategy imposed in Poland and other countries by the former USSR was later unintentionally modified in many respects (due to the weakness of the authorities as well as their pragmatic approach). The most important of these modifications, and key to the present analysis, was the partial abandonment of plans to socialise or nationalise all property. It contributed to the preservation of the semi-traditional peasant sector in agriculture and, as a consequence of industrial growth, to the emergence of peasant-workers on the labour market.

However, this was not the only significant modification. Already from the mid-1960s onwards, it became clear that further investment expansion favouring production over consumption would cause rising tension. One of the sources of such tension was huge and rising energy consumption and the rate of consumption of raw and other materials in the national economy. Within the geopolitical constraints of the time, the tension could only be relieved by further investments, leading to even more intensive acquisition of raw materials and energy generation, which not only resulted in an extremely wasteful economy but also created a vicious circle (Kondratowicz, Okoński 1993). In this situation, the informal economy flourished as a buffer of the formal economy, reducing individual imbalances and neutralising workers’ frustrations.

The worker protests of December 1970 made possible a change of the state (communist) leadership and an ensuing radical overhaul of the economic strategy. It marked the beginning of restructuring and reconstruction in industry. New technologies were introduced, and more was invested in the production of consumer goods, including those requiring a high degree of processing. The main investments were often in modernisation, e.g. the purchase of new equipment or assembly lines. Less was spent on building new plants, unlike in the previous period. This led to a reduction in the overall demand for labour, while an increase in wages led to higher labour costs. A major cause of this change was Poland’s greater openness to the West. At the same time, parallel but informal social structures and institutions flourished. The new situation was best described by Bartłomiej Kamiński, who coined the term ‘withdrawal syndrome’ to describe the weakened state’s failure to fulfil its constitutional obligations and its surrender of important prerogatives. At the same
time, increasingly empowered citizens cut ties with ‘official’ institutions and established new organisations, informal structures and forms of participation (Kamiński 1991).

Soon after the onset of the changes in industrial structure and the related investment strategy, the demand for low-skilled labour began to dwindle. The first victims were those with weak links to their workplace, seasonal workers and employees with poor discipline records. Peasant-workers were a group hit particularly hard by the changes.

In addition, the authorities’ decision to open up to the West, coupled with attempts to attract direct foreign investments and with running up a huge foreign debt, came at an unfortunate historical moment. In 1973, the economy of that whole part of the world entered a recession period and underwent restructuring. The Polish economy could not remain unaffected. The economic situation worsened first in 1976, then again in 1978, this time very dramatically and, one could say, definitively. As a result, despite the initial economic upturn, the 1970s were a period of diminishing demand for unskilled labour, especially construction workers or those who were a surplus or reserve labour force in nationalised enterprises. Many enterprises reduced recruitment and transport services or even gave them up entirely.

Commuting became visibly less popular, especially among peasant-workers. Probably from 1 000 000 to 1 500 000 people were at a risk of losing their job in cities, and many of them did indeed become unemployed. Many found themselves in a kind of limbo, not only because their migration to urban areas had not been fulfilled, but also because its completion was unlikely in the foreseeable future, and it was impossible for them to go back to productive work in agriculture or on the rural labour market in general. What is more, the earlier systematic marginalisation of commuters as well as the personal characteristics they had come to adopt were a serious burden. The traits that had allowed them to effectively function on the peripheries of the labour market in a wasteful and ideology-driven centrally planned economy turned out to be useless in the new economic situation.

Opening to the West and territorial mobility of the population

At the beginning of the 1970s, crossing the Polish border was simplified not only for (foreign) capital and goods, but also for people. Generally speaking, it was easier to obtain a passport, because the procedures became more liberal and applicant-friendly thanks to several new institutional changes. New national agencies were established to organise Polish citizens’ employment abroad. At the same time, bilateral agreements were signed with numerous countries concerning the export of Polish workers, and recruitment of suitable employees was carried out. From 1974, Polish citizens could obtain a passport without any special circumstances, and for travel to other socialist countries they did not need a passport at all, but could use an ID card, which was issued to all citizens (Matthews 1993). This meant that in practice one could travel abroad on one’s own with no additional formalities other than a proof of owning a foreign currency bank account or the required invitation from a foreigner. In 1970, ‘tens of thousands of people’ who identified as German were allowed to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany, followed by 120 000 - 150 000 in 1975 (Lempiński 1987). In the second half of the 1970s, travel agencies specialising in group tours to foreign countries were established. All this added up to the ending of formal travel restrictions for Polish citizens, although for its own reasons the police maintained the right to refuse a passport (and therefore, the right to travel abroad) in certain circumstances (never revealed to the public).

There were also some partially institutionalised factors which helped citizens afford financially to travel abroad despite their low wages, and even to benefit financially from their travels. First, rail, aeroplane and ferry tickets for Polish citizens travelling abroad were ‘cheap’, paradoxically so, given their similarity to international fares. This was due to the official exchange rate of the Polish zloty to Western currencies. The
latter were extremely underpriced, between 10 and 20 times cheaper (up to over 20 times in some periods) than their actual purchasing power. Second, Poles travelling abroad could buy in the National Bank of Poland a limited amount of very cheap foreign currency, and sometimes also very reasonably priced hotel, petrol and other vouchers. Third, the black currency market was tolerated by the authorities (to say the least!), which made it easy to buy and sell foreign currencies. Fourth, there were some newly-established national chains of shops where Poles could sell goods brought from abroad. Some of them had branches even in small towns whose population often travelled abroad. On the other hand, goods (including those made for export in Poland) unavailable in other retail shops were sold in specially designated chains of shops (Baltona, Pewex) for the foreign currencies transferred to Poland or personally brought home by Polish tourists. In time, they became a factor pushing people to seek employment abroad, since shopping in Baltona or Pewex became a sign of social status and prestige.

The common denominator of all those solutions which pushed Poles to seek sources of income abroad was the malfunctioning of the authoritarian and centrally planned economy, with its chronic inability to satisfy the population’s needs, its shortages and the low purchasing power of the zloty in relation to Western currencies. This malfunctioning made it very profitable to travel abroad, and the profit was always calculated in relation to the black market price of the US dollar.

The emergence of this set of circumstances or institutions could be perceived as the ultimate proof of the planners’ weakness, their inability to solve many of people’s minor but nonetheless annoying problems. However, it could also be taken as evidence of their pragmatism.

All these circumstances undoubtedly encouraged Poles to travel abroad, all the more so because they had long experienced acute isolation and now felt the need, hitherto artificially suppressed, to explore and ‘see the world’.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the 1970s were a time of increased international mobility, although, paradoxically, official emigration data of the time indicated a decrease in the number of foreign journeys. In addition to numerous tourists visiting family and friends or sight-seeing in organised groups, several tens of thousands of people found employment abroad, and a similar number emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany owing to a special family reunification programme. Equally numerous were those who failed to return to Poland before the expiry date on their passport, which made them ‘illegal emigrants’ in official jargon. Based on many personal accounts of participants in such mobility, we can conclude that tourist trips – the most common form of international mobility at the time – gradually transformed into business trips, or a mixture of business and tourism. On the other hand, the migration flow seemed largely to make use of connections and follow older routes which had been very popular before the Second World War and in the immediate post-war period.

At the time, most people travelling abroad came from Warsaw and other big cities. They were the nation’s elite, the rich, the more educated, those who had travelled and seen the world, and who were therefore more willing to take the risk of travelling to unknown parts. In cities it was also easier to get the information necessary to fulfil all the formal requirements and, importantly, to use personal contacts to help obtain a passport. However, from the very beginning, in the 1970s, big-city travellers were joined by provincial pioneers (Frejka, Okólski, Sword 1998).

Research conducted at the Centre of Migration Research of the University of Warsaw shows that the mid-1970s were the watershed in foreign travel. Before then, migration from such well-researched peripheral regions as Podhale, Podlasie and Silesia (and even, to a certain extent, Warsaw) were sporadic and demonstrated no clear tendencies. After 1975, migration steadily increased (Jaźwińska, Łukowski, Okólski 1997).

Nevertheless, the volume of international migration rose sharply only in the years 1980 and 1981, mostly due to the suddenly much tenser political situation in Poland. The state administration made the procedure of
obtaining a passport much simpler, and some Western countries dropped their visa requirements for Polish citizens. A range of countries introduced special protective clauses that ensured basic assistance and the right to a relatively long stay for Poles. With unprecedented speed and often bypassing official procedures, the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed tens of thousands of Polish tourists who declared German nationality.46

After the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981, foreign countries granted asylum and refugee status or long-term transit permits to many Polish citizens who found themselves on their territory at the time. However, the event resulted in more restrictions regarding travel aboard.

Not for long. By 1983 international mobility had begun to increase again, to reach its peak in 1989. As a result, in the years 1980-1989, Poles travelled abroad in unprecedented numbers, much more often than in any other period since the Second World War or possibly even ever during Poland’s peace-time history47 (Okólski 1994). Over one million people undertook long-term migration. Most of them settled abroad, particularly in Germany. In addition not quite a million emigrated for a period of a few months. Most of these migrations were ‘illegal’. The number of ‘legal’ migrant workers sent abroad by their Polish state enterprises increased as well. Towards the end of the period, there were almost 150 000 such workers. Finally, several hundred thousand people – if not more – undertook several million short trading trips abroad.

The increase in migration from Poland, especially long-term migration and migration for settlement, proved to be a transient phenomenon caused by the exceptional political circumstances. There is however plenty of evidence that the increase in short-term travel (or, as it was officially called, non-migration travel) was a long-term trend. Short trips abroad, which even in the late 1970s had still been hybrid in character48 evolved in time into two distinct types: tourist trips and circular labour migration.

Isolated studies of international mobility conducted in the late 1980s suggest that many households engaging in this circular migration already had migration experience and that the money earned abroad was an important part of their budgets. Those whose permanent residence was in Poland usually sold goods they had brought back with them from abroad; those who spent long periods abroad were usually employed there (Gumuła, Sowa 1990; Misiak 1988).

Many factors suggest that the increase in international mobility constituted another watershed in Poland’s modernisation story. At the beginning of the 1960s, migration from rural areas and small towns to cities, as a mass phenomenon, was finally replaced by circular movements from rural areas and small towns to cities and back; from the late 1970s onwards, the latter were in turn increasingly supplanted by growing international circularity.49 Therefore, when employment opportunities in Polish industrial centres diminished, many workers from peripheral areas might have decided to seek employment abroad or, more commonly, make some money from travelling abroad, usually without spending long time away from home.

Such a hypothesis seems justified for three reasons. First, in the migration flow from Poland which began in the 1970s, the balance between the inhabitants of highly urbanised and industrialised areas and those of peripheral regions gradually changed, as did the proportion of highly- to low-skilled workers and educated to less well-educated. Initially, migrants from cities and highly industrialised areas clearly prevailed (in absolute as well as relative terms), but their numbers gradually diminished. By the 1990s, the largest group, though not an absolute majority, came from rural regions, while unskilled migrants outnumbered skilled migrants (with at least secondary education).50

Second, the balance between those who left ‘for good’ (or at least ‘for a long time’) and those who chose a short or very short stay abroad was also reversed. At the same time, fewer people migrated as whole families (households) and more went abroad on their own, leaving their family members (or at least some of them) in Poland. In 1980-1989, at a time of mass movement abroad due to specific political circumstances, emigrants prevailed, especially those who emigrated with their whole family, even if its members did not all
leave at the same time.\textsuperscript{51} This type of migration dwindled sharply in the years 1990-1993, and after 1994 it was truly insignificant in scale, comparable to the levels of the restrictive 1960s. International circularity, on the other hand, which had been already commonplace in the 1980s, intensified after 1990 and exceeded emigration for settlement by far. Unlike emigrants, short-term migrants usually travelled alone (Okólski 1994).

Third, international circular migration abroad and the migrants themselves had much in common with earlier internal temporary movements or commuting to industrial centres, and internal migrants.\textsuperscript{52}

The volume of 1990s international circular labour mobility was very great. One factor contributing to its intensification at the time was the abolition of tourist visa regimes for Polish citizens in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{53} If we subtract the number of those who engaged in daily trans-border mobility, surveys conducted among travellers crossing the state border allow us to estimate the average annual size of the movements at around three million people (Institute of Tourism 1996). Furthermore, data gathered by the Centre of Migration Research in selected Polish peripheral regions suggest that approximately one in two households had some experience with migration during the period. Of these, around one-third profited from migration financially (Giza 1998).

The emergence of circular international labour migration as the most numerically significant form of mobility among Poles is undoubtedly a conspicuous demographic and sociological phenomenon. It is evidently the result of a complex set of circumstances which shaped migration in the post-war period, and in particular of the international mobility initiated in the 1970s. It is also important to note that circularity is a form of chain migration, and is fed by other international migration flows.

As stated above, the first travels abroad in search of household financial gain took place in the 1970s. The first to notice the financial potential of even a short-term trip abroad were the inhabitants of big cities, who could leave the country easily or who went abroad in connection with their jobs – state officials, scholarship holders, researchers, artists, sportspeople, employees of national commercial associations, etc. Specialists and blue-collar workers sent abroad to render ‘export services’ (especially in construction) were also able to find additional earnings. Soon, their experiences were common knowledge and people travelling with tourist groups followed in their footsteps.

The short trips, with their specialised character and their purely financial purpose, were only possible in the context of mass (and poorly regulated) trans-border movements which emerged in 1980. Afterwards, Poles travelled regularly and with increasing frequency to countries that were easily accessible to them. The basic, if not only goal of such trips, was commercial. Thus, a separate category of petty traders emerged, engaging in pendular migration. By trial and error, they found the most profitable geographical destinations, learned how to reduce transport and board and lodging costs, to overcome administrative and legal obstacles, etc. The petty traders’ methods evolved quickly: as their sales increased, they started specialising and cooperating, and instituted a division of labour; moreover, they created informal but permanent locations for their businesses, sometimes known abroad as ‘Polish markets’ (Misiak 1988; Morokvasic 1992).

At the same time, there were other categories of Polish migrant who went abroad in the 1980s. The most important of them were those who emigrated to West Germany and obtained the status of ‘expelled co-ethnic’ (Aussiedler), or those of German origin (or related to a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany) who lived in Poland but acquired citizenship or a work permit in Germany. They created a natural migrant network which became an important channel for circular petty traders coming from Poland to access the German informal labour market (Literscy 1991; Misiak 1995).

A similar role was played by clusters of emigrants, usually part of the ‘Solidarność exodus’, who, for political reasons, had been granted temporary (usually long-term) refuge in foreign countries (Cieślińska 1997; Romaniszyn 1994; Erdmans 1998; Morawska 1999; Kurcz, Podkański 1991). They were to be found in Austria, Greece, Germany and Italy, as well as, to a lesser extent, France, Spain, the UK and Scandinavian coun-
tries (and even Canada and the USA). Many of the emigrants (in some cases even a great majority of them) waited there in the hope of being allowed to move to non-European immigration countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, South Africa, the USA). Before the definite move overseas, they took many jobs (sometimes legally) in the transit countries, and often found their small niches overseas. At the same time, they quickly created social centres in the receiving countries: ‘Polish’ parishes, schools, newspapers, and various services (legal, medical, etc.), and rudimentary cultural organisations. This was one of the significant factors attracting pendular traders from Poland and facilitating their temporary adaptation abroad, including finding employment. With time, the social institutions created by political refugees were completely taken over (and modified accordingly) by economic migrants.

‘Polish’ niches on the informal labour market were also created in countries that did not experience a significant inflow of Polish migrants at the time. This was largely a matter of chance, though also the result of the demand for the type of job Polish pendular migrants were willing to undertake. One can thus explain the regular and relatively heavy migration flow from north-eastern Poland to Brussels or smaller flows to other countries (e.g. Iceland).

As a result, in the 1990s, petty trade related to international circular mobility, although substantially changed in character, still remained the main occupation of people from the border regions (especially the western and south-western part of Poland). The petty cross-border traders were called mrówki (Polish for ‘ants’) because of their multiple one-day-long trips to neighbouring countries with relatively small quantities of goods, no more than could be legally transported. The great majority of labour migrants from other regions went to work abroad. Former shuttle traders often engaged in circular labour migration or became illegal migrants (Morokvasic, de Tinguy 1993).

The unfulfilled exodus from rural to urban areas vs incomplete migration

At the present point, I would suggest that the circular movement of individual household members in search of work abroad, despite its internal diversification, can be distinguished as a specific category of international mobility and termed incomplete migration.

One could argue that incomplete migration does not differ at all from international circularity or pendular movements, as this type of mobility is typically defined. Indeed, if we take into account the fact that definitions of circular migration primarily emphasise ‘territorial separation of obligations, activities and goods’ of circular migrants, who ‘commonly lack any declared intention of a permanent change of [their usual] residence’ (Chapman, Prothero 1985b: 1), it is easy to note its clear similarity to the international mobility of Poles (described in the previous section), but also to the earlier internal pendular movements between rural and urban areas. One significant difference, however, is that the above definition implicitly assumes circularity to be internal, and treats all cross-border population flows of the same character as exceptional and specific.

What is more, it seems clear that such movements are not only typical for Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries. Moch (1997) lists many cases of international circularity of a similar nature in Western Europe at the turn of the 20th century. Inhabitants of overpopulated rural areas in less industrialised countries migrated in search of work to countries where the process of industrialisation was relatively more advanced, usually in order to find employment in construction (e.g. of roads, railways or factories). Additionally, in their two monographs, Chapman and Prothero (Chapman, Prothero 1985a; Prothero, Chapman 1985) present many contemporary examples of such migration flows in non-industrialised countries (Melanesia, Polynesia, parts of Africa and Latin America).
The trait which distinguishes incomplete migration, or the contemporary international circularity in Poland (and in other Central and Eastern European countries) is the social and economic situation of the people who participate in it, especially their exclusion, their mass and involuntary marooning at the margins of the modernisation process that the rest of their society is undergoing.

The above discussion is based on the premise that people who left Poland for a short time to earn money in the 1980s and 1990s, and those who circulated between rural and industrial areas in the 1950s, had many related or even identical characteristics. It also implies that international circularity replaced commuting as the catalyst in the process of absorption of large surpluses of labour force at the peripheries of the Polish economy. This argument, along with its tentative justification, has already been raised in the previous sections of the article.

It is well known that, in the last quarter of the 20th century, the population outflow from small towns and villages to big cities was smaller (considerably so) even than right after 1960, when it all but stopped. Therefore, the ‘migration surplus’ may have been almost impossible to eliminate. What could peasant-workers (and people in similar situations) do in the 1970s and later, when jobs that suited their situation and skills became less common? Obviously, some of them kept their jobs in the city, and some even settled there. Others, however, stayed partly idle, probably somewhat increasing their household-based self-employment.

For many reasons, the mass character of international shuttle trading after 1980 attracted such people to join in. However, they only did it because they had plenty of free time, were used to travelling and its related hardships, and not fussy about the type and conditions of the jobs they took. Study conducted by the Centre of Migration Research shows that members of these communities and households travelled abroad as petty traders or in search of temporary work as early as the 1970s (Frejka, Okólski, Sword 1998). At first, consistently with the household strategy of diversifying income, they explored the possibilities of new ways of making money. The demonstration effect, access to information and interpersonal contacts laid the foundations for future migration on a larger scale. And indeed, over the next years and decades, such migration became very popular in communities of former peasant-workers or other people in a similar situation.

Inquiry by the Centre of Migration Research of the University of Warsaw into the phenomenon of international pendular migration by inhabitants of peripheral regions or other economically and socially marginalised Poles allow me to suggest the following description of incomplete migration.

Because of its formal status, incomplete migration is a separate and specific type of international mobility. The migrants go abroad for a short time, usually from several weeks to several months, and as a rule their stays and employment remain undocumented, as does any other economic activity they undertake. From this point of view, it is an illegal form of international circular migration. On the other hand, in some socio-economic spaces that can broadly be described as ‘peripheral’, incomplete migration involves a large number of households, and can therefore be considered a mass phenomenon. Finally, the most important fact is that participants in this type of circularity share a number of specific traits which seem to be the result of social and economic change in the post-war Poland. The traits can be characterised as follows.

First, generally speaking, the social status of this category of migrants in Poland is rather flexible and fluid. They do not belong to any of the main strata of the emerging society; their occupational status is relatively very low; and they often do not have stable employment, are unemployed or indeed economically inactive. However, given the limited use they can make of their vocational qualifications, the value of their free time (as well as of their labour) is relatively low, which is typical in these situations. For these reasons, they are willing to travel abroad at any time it is needed or indeed possible, and to stay there for as long as they have a job or as long as their residence permit is valid. They have modest expectations concerning the conditions of employment abroad, their job and type of work, and wages, not even expecting to receive social benefits.
Second, their situation in the foreign country is rather insecure. They have no choice but to accept relatively unattractive job offers in the inferior sector of the labour market. What is more, they are employed informally, and therefore have no access to social services and – to a large extent – no legal protection in the broad sense. They often fall prey to dishonest agencies, employers and the police, and fall victim to extortion.

Third, incomplete migrants tend to fulfil the strategies of their households rather than their own individual ones. Polish households, frequently encompassing several families or generations, give moral support and financial help to the migrant, and remain the point of reference of all his or her actions and vital decisions. From the point of view of the household’s strategy, migration of one of its members is a shared investment and an enterprise similar to a joint venture whose aim is to diversify modes of income generation and to minimise risks in an unstable environment or in a situation where the social standing of the household itself is changing. This favours pendular movements between Poland and the destination country over settlement in the latter.

Fourth, the migrants exploit the fact that consumer goods in their home country are heavily subsidised by the state which gives money earned in foreign countries (after conversion to the Polish currency according to black market rate) enormously high purchasing power. It seems that sustainability of incomplete migration largely stems from the economic calculus adhered to by the migrants and based on the above-described principle.

Finally, typical of these migrants is the temporariness (usually intentional or at least conscious) of their situation and a disjointed, amorphous living pattern, in which their place of employment is situated mainly (or even completely) abroad, and their family life is centred almost exclusively in Poland (sometimes with a surrogate ‘second life’ in the foreign country), with migrants often residing in both localities. The pattern also implies a lack or a drastic atrophy of social ties and participation in public life in both places. All this contributes to the migrants’ social marginalisation in both countries and makes it permanent.

The structural characteristics of incomplete migration of Poles show its striking resemblance to the internal circularity which emerged as a result of socialist industrialisation and the related under-urbanisation. The latter, together with the transformation of internal circularity into international circularity, which we have described above, confirms the claim that incomplete migration is the result of the incomplete migration from small towns and villages to big cities.

**Final remarks: the future of incomplete migration**

To sum up, incomplete migration, whose emergence and evolution have a particularly complex background, became in the 1990s the dominant feature of the geographical mobility of the Polish population, replacing the earlier population flow to big cities and the subsequent pendular movements between peripheral localities and regional centres, or the temporary flow into such centres. The phenomenon can be defined as a trans-national circularity of people, on the one hand seeking employment and on the other enacting a household risk minimisation strategy. They move between the social peripheries of Poland and those of other, relatively more developed and richer countries. Incomplete migration is undertaken by people who are usually incapable of settling in modern economic centres of Poland (or who live at their margins) or of occupying a regular job in the mainstream economy; but also of those who know how to benefit from every occasion to make money in destination countries, even when they have to resign themselves to the situation of temporariness, undocumented status (illegality) and heightened risk. It is therefore a phenomenon which leads to increased social and economic marginalisation of the migrants in both places, in Poland and in the destination country.
Additionally, this migration is a type of spatial mobility inherited from the era of socialist under-urbanisation. It draws its strength from the conditions which are typical for a society in transition; from a deep and diverse socioeconomic imbalance within the source country and between the home country and the richer foreign destinations; from the imperfect legal regulations or inefficient application of the law in the destination country; and from the relatively unstable and amorphous social structures of the origin country.

Incomplete migration consists to a large extent in transformation of a part of local pendular movements into international circularity, and in directing the mobility away from regional centres and the national capital in the origin country towards foreign cities, and to their social and labour market peripheries in particular. The situation is apparently paradoxical, but this paradox is largely an illusion. In reality, since barriers to international spatial mobility have been largely removed, incomplete migration is oriented towards more familiar social environments with the relevant social capital and institutions, which are often more easily found in foreign rather than in Polish big cities.

On the other hand, to individual migrants this type of migration may be viewed as a survival strategy after their initial livelihoods have become unsustainable, as a transition from passivity to an active role on the labour market. With time, the poorly skilled labour force from the Polish peripheries, initially in high demand in the nearby industrial centres, developed entrepreneurial spirit and undertook more costly and risky activities away from the home region. The change seems to have had little to do with accessing a more sophisticated quality of life. In both situations the migrating worker, instead of adapting to the cultural environment of the metropolis which employ him or her, often remains in relative isolation, bringing with him or her elements of his or her peripheral community or enhancing the provincial quality of the enclaves he or she joins in the metropolis.

Seen from a broader perspective, incomplete migration is the obvious result of the dramatic disturbances of the transition of spatial mobility, and in particular of the outflow of the surplus potential of internal circularity abroad (instead of migrating internally). Therefore, it is no coincidence that rapidly diminishing internal mobility was replaced by equally rapidly increasing international mobility. Ultimately, incomplete migration can be seen as a logical consequence of the ‘failure’ or ‘separateness’ of the process of transition of spatial mobility in relation to internal migration, especially the outflow from rural to urban areas.

Indeed, it might be argued that in the long run, many incomplete migrants will not be able to meet the challenges of the increasingly modern society and that they will not be sufficiently protected by the welfare state in their home country. On the one hand, this is the result of e.g. their low level of education and vocational qualifications; their easy-going attitudes (or indeed their lack of labour discipline); their inability to react adequately to the signals of the labour market; and, in many cases, of a protective niche created by the family home and sometimes the family business (farm, craft, trade), as well as by the support of their very strong and extended family ties. On the other hand, those people will find it ever more difficult to meet the requirements of the socioeconomic environment of the transforming origin country.

Despite all these factors and despite the implication that incomplete migration is a relatively stable, structurally based phenomenon, it can be predicted that, given the accelerating transformation of Poland into a modern market economy, it will become obsolete in a not remote future.
Notes

1 Even though the analysis in the present article concerns the situation in Poland, the observations are equally applicable to other Central and Eastern European countries. The phenomena discussed here have been analysed in a region-wide context in my earlier work (Okólski 2001c), which presents a range of evidence to argue that the phenomena are more universal than indicated in this paper.

2 According to this approach, such people should be perceived as elements of a dynamic, self-reproducing community, and therefore as a well-defined conceptual category rather than a group of individuals existing in a specific time and place.

3 However, the process was radical, far-reaching and violent in tempo. It seemed to copy the English path of development described by Karl Marx, but without ‘private capital’ and ‘exploitation’. It was also semi-autarkic, completed in international isolation. At the same time, largely because of the circumstances described above, it did not take into account the paths taken by capitalist latecomers and ignored the emergence, after the 1870s, of a structurally different type of ‘ultra-modern’ economy (at least in the economic area towards which Poland was gravitating). This required different industrial foundations (Barraclough 1967).

4 Even such influential scholars as Laslett (1965).

5 See e.g. Lampard (1969); Brown, Neuberger (1977); Wegleński (1992).

6 A long list of authors sharing this opinion can be found in Hochstadt (1999).

7 Particularly in the case of rural-urban migration.

8 See e.g. an overview of the phenomena in Moch (1997); Brown, Wardwell (1980); Champion (1989); Boyle, Halfacree (1998). A full account of the most recent research on spatial mobility in traditional or ‘pre-industrial’ societies can be found in Lucassen and Lucassen (1997). See also: Chapman, Prothero (1985a) and Prothero, Chapman (1985).

9 The list comprises three types of migration (including international migration) and two types of circulation. The types can be identified with phases of the modernisation process, are mutually complementary and, to a certain extent, interchangeable (particularly in the case of the relationship between migration and circulation). The hypothesis also states that, at the onset of modernisation, circularity was replaced by ‘unfulfilled mobility’, i.e. one which did not take place because of progress in the domain of telecommunications and transport. See: Zelinsky (1971).

10 In a way, the saturation level represents the sum of people who had migrated from rural to urban areas during the exodus.

11 The statement implies that the strength of the pull force is unlimited, which is unrealistic, though justified in the context of the ‘over-urbanisation’ thesis, rather popular at the time the described model was created.

12 However, migrants from rural areas played a significant role in re-populating many urban areas which had been de-populated towards the end of the war. For example, by the end of the 1940s they made up around 40 per cent of the inhabitants in Wroclaw, 30 per cent in Łódź, and 25 per cent in Warsaw (Dyoniziak, Mikulowski-Pomorski, Pucek 1978).

13 What is more, among the mobile, the share of migrants who had only moved once increased significantly, from 43 to 70 per cent.

14 The data in this paragraph (concerning young economically active people) are taken from a survey conducted among a representative sample of the Polish population, and therefore are probably more accurate in depicting tendencies of population mobility than the data on internal migration (of the whole popula-
tion) supplied by the Polish Central Statistical Office (CSO), as the former reflect actual mobility, while
the latter only record residence registrations, which do not always reflect the actual scale of migration.

15 The phenomenon was probably discovered in 1967 by Stefan Golachowski, who called it semi-
urbanisation. The term ‘under-urbanisation’ was suggested in 1971 by Ivan Szelenyi. See Szelenyi 1988.

16 For historical sources of the phenomenon, see Turski 1965.

17 What is more, it was believed that the best way to achieve a permanently high level of growth was to
focus most investments in heavy industry, which offered opportunities for further investment expansion.
Investments in the production of goods satisfying the basic needs of the population were perceived rather
simplistically as a waste of the dynamic potential of the economy. The planners intended to change gradu-
ally the proportion of investments in heavy and light industry, but this was difficult to achieve in prac-
tice (partly because of a gradual militarisation of their economy and its high and growing energy
consumption). This intention, like many others, was never fulfilled. The economic history of the People’s
Republic of Poland (communist Poland) proves that changes to the initial strategy of economic develop-
ment, whose cornerstone was socialist industrialisation, were largely the result of social pressure, rather
than intentional adjustment of fundamental principles.

18 In the economic literature, the phenomenon is called, rather picturesquely, labour hoarding.

19 In many Western countries, at the peak of the industrialisation process, there were also many industrial
workers employed away from their place of residence. However, they were usually seasonal workers,
relatively redundant in their native rural areas, and they did not commute daily, but rather lodged in
makeshift conditions close to their workplace (e.g. Hochstadt 1999). Such a transitional status of rural
migrants in search of employment in cities was ephemeral in comparison with the mass phenomenon.

20 To prove that the non-local labour force was relatively cheap, we do not even have to demonstrate that
in reality the wages of non-local workers were lower than those of local employees, though, given e.g. the
jobs, the level of education and qualifications of the former, such a situation was relatively frequent. Even
if the planners (in the role of collective employer) had kept the average pay at the same level in both
groups, it would have satisfied only the basic needs of the non-local workers, and would not have been
sufficient for those living locally. To balance this disproportion, indirect subsidies were offered e.g. to
help rent and maintain a flat, buy food, pay energy bills, etc., which was more useful to locals. A similar
picture emerges from the results of empirical studies (Nasiłowski 1958).

21 The relatively lower aggregate demand of households makes it easier to choose the rate of accumu-
lation and the structure of investments, which in turn results in a more dynamic investment process and
helps accomplish projects which drive production forward.

22 Some also point out the following advantages of living outside industrial centres and working in them:
healthier natural environment, safety, bigger houses, closer family ties, especially in families with small
children, generally healthier living conditions, etc. (George 1968; Wiles 1974). Personally, I am not co-
vinced of the significance of these advantages.

23 Of course, what I mean is the circumstances following the post-war mass displacements of the popula-
tion and the settlement of the abandoned cities.

24 To make them more efficient (although also for other reasons), in the first half of the 1950s, newcomers
were not allowed to settle in some cities.

25 Andrzej Gawryszewski (1989), citing Teofil Lijewski, quotes a different number than the CSO estimate
given above. Gawryszewski’s estimate is probably more accurate. In his opinion, in 1964, there were
1 800 000 commuters.

26 In the years 1951-1970, 65 per cent of the increase in this category was constituted by people who had
more than 2 ha of land.
On average, 55 per cent from small farms versus 8 per cent from bigger farms.

In 1970, there was at least one commuter in over 40 per cent of private farms (Bajan et al. 1974).

At the time, the authorities in Poland were clearly already aware of the negative macro-social consequences of the phenomenon, especially the commuters’ low productivity and the high social costs of commuting. They justified the necessity of incurring them with e.g. savings in housing development. It was also generally expected that the commuting of peasant-workers was a transient trend which in time would lead them to migrate (Padowicz 1973; 1974).

With the exception of some extremely fragmentary musings (e.g. Turski 1961), I have not yet found in the Polish literature a systematic analysis of the phenomena. However, an excellent example of such an analysis can be found in Konrad and Szelenyi (1974).

This was a typical effect of structural transformation and did not even require reduction in employment in individual enterprises.

Based on the CSO estimates, we may assume that the decline started from the mid-1970s onwards; e.g. in 1978-1983, the number of commuters fell by ca 400 000, or 11 per cent (Gawryszewski 1989). Survey data quoted by Jan Węgleński (1992) do not confirm this conclusion (although the subject of the survey was not commuting).

Contrary to the expectations of the authors who studied the phenomenon at the time, commuting was not replaced by migration for settlement (Dziewoński et al. 1977).

An attempt to solve this problem was made in Hungary, where people who wanted to set up their own business in agriculture (and several other sectors) were given preferential treatment (Szelenyi 1988).

Some of the changes were introduced earlier (from 1956 onwards), but they were not frequently applied.

This was the limit of the number of emigrants to Germany set out in the confidential commentary to the ‘Announcement of the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland’ (Informacja rządu PRL) from 18 November 1970.

Many of them were already introduced earlier but only for privileged travellers who went abroad on a business trip, or to simplify accounts.

This allowed them to do illicit business deals, e.g. bring foreign currencies from abroad and sell them on the black market. At the beginning of the 1970s, the official price of 25 US dollars was 100 zlotys, but sold upon return to Poland, they fetched from 2 000 to 2 200 zlotys on the black market, which was the equivalent of an average 2-week wage at the time. Vouchers on the other hand were often sold to foreigners abroad, usually to hotel or camping site employees, restaurant and petrol station personnel.

At the time when to travel abroad one had to own a foreign currency account in a Polish bank (Bank Pekao), buying foreign currency on the black market was an easy way to get permission to travel abroad.

Interestingly, the tax rates on sales, even in bulk, were very low or non-existent, and most buyers (second hand shops called komisy, delicatessens or department stores) did not ask about the provenance of the goods.

For the same purpose, Polish citizens could buy, from designated national enterprises, Polish cars, flats, and even villas in exchange for foreign currency.

For example, selling to foreigners vouchers or products brought for personal use, cigarettes or other goods which were relatively cheap (subsidised) in Poland, saving on one’s per-diem allowances, working occasionally or selling bulk quantities of goods illegally smuggled from Poland, and of course legal employment or private import of goods.
The effect of the ‘pragmatism’ was a relative improvement of the market and payment situation. For example, there was a time when most of the imported consumer goods or even spare parts and raw materials used in the production of consumer goods were brought into Poland by individuals. On the other hand, shortages of foreign currencies, which were most severe because of the need to finance import of goods for enterprises, were partly mitigated by the fact that the Polish state sold, on its own territory, its own goods for foreign currencies (or for their equivalents issued by the Polish national banks).

Despite the liberalisation of passport regulations, it took a long time to obtain a passport (several months), and refusals were relatively frequent.

The procedures were also often conducted perfunctorily and the required documents were forged in mass numbers (Kurcz, Podkański 1991).

With the exception, obviously, of the period of mass expulsions of people up to 1948, due to the fact that the Polish borders were moved to the West after the Second World War.

In this period, whatever their primary objective (business trip, sporting event etc.) or official form (tourist trip), travels abroad usually involved attempts to benefit financially upon return to Poland.

A similar implication can be found in one of Piotr Korcelli’s works (1994).

I have drawn attention to this problem in successive issues of *Trends in International Migration – Poland / SOPEMI*, available at OECD.

Family migration was typically a two- or three-stage process. In many cases the first to emigrate (‘illegally’, usually under cover of a tourist trip) was the (male) head of the family, who was later joined – legally – by his wife and children. Sometimes the children arrived after their mother. See Okólski (1994).

The question is discussed in more detail in the two following chapters.

The factor also contributed to the change in the geographical direction of migration and the ultimate decline of the role of Central and Eastern European countries in the process.

To earn money and because of the migrants’ irregular status.

For a description of this phenomenon in Greece, see Romaniszyn (1994), in Italy – Cieślińska (1997).

Petty trade stopped being a side business for tourists who wanted to offset the costs of the trip or even ‘with luck’ make some profit. This seems to have been mainly because society was becoming wealthier.

The hypothesis has been presented in depth in several works, e.g. Okólski (1997; 1999; 2000; 2001a). Its most detailed theoretical presentation can be found in Okólski (2001c).

This is evidenced by the comments accompanying this definition as well as the many cases to which it has been applied (Chapman, Prothero 1985a; 1985b; and Prothero, Chapman 1985).

The phenomenon was noted by Ryszard Turski, who used the Polish term *migracja połowiczna* (partial migration), as early as 1961. I would like to take my hat off to him, and to thank Ewa Morawska for calling my attention to the fact that Polish sociologists were already analysing the problem in the 1960s. The information prompted me to a more careful study of works published at the time.

I mean not only the zig-zags of economic policy in the Polish People’s Republic, but also the reactions of the world to the internal situation in Poland and the dynamics of international mobility after 1970, especially the transformation of pseudo-tourist trading expeditions into more purposeful travels in search of work.
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Immigrant Self-employment: Definitions, Concepts and Methods

Joanna Nestorowicz

The paper presents a review of selected definitional issues and theoretical concepts related to the phenomenon of immigrant self-employment. A chronological analysis of the developments of the academic discourse on the topic allows detecting the interconnections between various approaches and understanding their growing complexity. The inquiry is complemented with a review of most recent empirical studies, what enables an assessment of the applicability and usefulness of long-established concepts for framing contemporary studies. Based on the appraisal of gathered material this paper also points to the limitations and possible areas of development of future research in the field.

Keywords: migration, self-employment, ethnic entrepreneurship, middleman minority, ethnic enclave

Introduction

As labour market strategies migration and self-employment have at least one thing in common. In his pioneering research on entrepreneurship Cantillon (1755) observed that a number of people in the economy perform arbitrage – buy cheap and sell expensive. They bear the risks and uncertainties of the operation in exchange for potentially high profits. Thereby, the specificity of self-employment as a labour market strategy has been embedded in its time-, effort- and risk-demanding character. Similarly, migration is a strategy associated with high costs and uncertainty of outcomes. Thus it should follow that immigrants, since they are risk-takers by nature, would on average have greater propensity to become self-employed, than natives. Observed patterns of immigrants’ labour market choices fail to substantiate this assertion, though.

The prevalence of risk-taking in both migration and entrepreneurship, in spite of being seemingly grounded in economic intuition behind migration and entrepreneurship, is not as obvious when it comes to empirical studies. Desiderio and Salt (2010) note that indeed, ceteris paribus, self-employment rates are slightly higher among immigrants, than among natives in most countries associated in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but at the same time they point out that this relationship varies greatly across states. Most recent data (OECD 2011, see Figure 1) place Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland or Portugal on one end of the spectrum, with shares of entrepreneurs in total employment on average 6 percentage points (pp) higher among the natives than among the immigrants. In Greece the difference reaches a high of 16 pp. On the other side of the spectrum we find Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Denmark, Belgium, France or the UK where the shares of entrepreneurs are relatively higher for immigrants, with the highest difference observed in Poland – 18 pp.

**Figure 1. Difference between native and immigrant shares of self-employed persons as percentage of all employed natives and immigrants respectively, 2007-2008, in percentage points**

![Figure 1](image)

Źródło: own elaboration based on data from the International Migration Outlook, OECD (2011), [http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932440698](http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932440698).

Given the disparities in self-employment rates between immigrants and natives in specific countries we can comfortably take it for granted that there must be more to the migration-entrepreneurship link, than anticipated. Given the patterns depicted in Figure 1 it is neither the low risk-aversion of immigrants, nor the market conditions in the destination country that can solitarily explain these differences. Under what set of circumstances do immigrants choose to become self-employed then? And under what personal, social and market conditions is that an optimal labour market choice?

The diversity of market structures and opportunities, as well as consumer demand and preferences in distinct economies, are hypothesized to be the notions based on which migrants are able to perform successful arbitrage across markets – an activity inaccessible for immobile persons. It seems that, despite the forces of globalization and market organisation, there is and, at least for some time, still will be ‘structural viability’ of small-businesses in general (Kloosterman, Rath 2001) and, thus, also potential for immigrant ownership of these small businesses. Demand exerted by consumers employed in large-scale enterprises for group-specific, nearly tailor-made products and services in which it is hard to achieve economies of scale (child care, house cleaning, etc.) is precisely where immigrant entrepreneurs can and do find their niche. As it will be recognized on the basis of specific theoretical concepts, self-employment may also disentangle immigrants from potential labour market rigidities and constraints on employment of foreign labour in the destination countries.

Due to the specificity of immigrant entrepreneurship, as outlined above, this paper will not be an overview of migration theories in general, nor will it summarize the theories of self-employment. It will focus only on those theoretical considerations, which were specifically designed for the analysis of immigrant en-
entrepreneurship. Based on a supportive review of most recent empirical findings, the contemporary applicability of the reviewed theoretical concepts will be assessed. The resulting gaps will be pointed out in the conclusions.

**Definitional issues**

Before we move to the core of this paper let us pinpoint one principal issue. A careful reader would have noticed, that in the introduction the terms ‘immigrant’, ‘self-employment’, ‘ethnic’, ‘entrepreneurship’ and all possible combinations thereof have been used interchangeably. This will be a style applied throughout the text, following the practice of seminal papers in the area (e.g. Light, Bonacich 1988; Waldinger, Aldrich, Ward 1990; Portes 1995; Rath 2000b; Kloosterman, Rath 2003). Nonetheless, when analyzing and interpreting some works on the subject it is sometimes crucial to understand the designates of each of the terms. As it will become apparent in the following section, some phases of the discourse on immigrant self-employment have actually been dominated by debates on how to define and operationalize critical concepts under study. Based on an analysis of official statistical and conceptual definitions, as well as research practices, the following summary of the definitional debate is proposed:

**Table 1. Summary of selected definitional considerations**

<table>
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<th>self-employment</th>
<th>entrepreneurship</th>
<th>business</th>
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<tr>
<td>immigrant</td>
<td>Most limited, yet most clear term. Allows straightforward identification of both immigrants and the self-employed, thus often used in quantitative empirical research.</td>
<td>Requires specification of entrepreneurship, yet may refer to an attitude rather than just a labour market state.</td>
<td>Used in analysis of intra- and inter-company relations and organisational structures, rather than for describing individual behaviour and decision-making processes of spatially mobile people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Enables extending the analysis of self-employment to people who do not necessarily have any migration history, but who nevertheless constitute a distinct sub-population, implicitly suggests a group context.</td>
<td>Can be used in order to shift the weight of explanatory value to differences in behavioural patterns between groups which feature specific cultural characteristics.</td>
<td>Allows for the analysis of business organisation and industrial and market structures in relation to how they are run and exploited by diverse sub-populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority</td>
<td>Broadens (thus also adds vagueness) the subject of inquiry to people who do not represent the majority population within the society (e.g. sub-populations, minority ethnic groups) or labour force (e.g. women).</td>
<td>Approaches the field from the perspective of differences in proactiveness and performance presented by sub-populations, which for given reasons have limited access to certain occupations or the labour market in general.</td>
<td>Focuses on the eventual placement and organisation of enterprises run by people representing groups excluded from the mainstream economy and/or labour market.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Despite the above attempt of structuring and identifying the diverse uses of various terms related to immigrant self-employment, it should be noted that for the purpose of specific research topics the denotations of these terms may not reflect what has been concluded in Table 1 above. As economies and migration patterns among them develop, and as countries change their industrial and social structures, there will be constant need to redefine the concepts of immigration, ethnicity and entrepreneurship. This need appears to be natural and, despite alerts referred to also in this section, should be satisfied by allowing scholars to assign meanings to these terms on a ‘research-by-research’ basis. Depending on the socioeconomic context of a given study and related sources of data similar concepts might be referred by means of different terms or the opposite may just as well be the case. Be that as it may, what should be kept in mind is the authors’ liberty in providing various conceptualizations, and the implied assumptions and interpretational limitations.

**Conceptual issues**

This section will elaborate on the postulates, theoretical frameworks and models developed within the domain of research on immigrant self-employment. The review will be carried out on a chronological basis, trying to follow the development of thought on immigrant entrepreneurship over time. The following paragraphs will cover descriptive concepts developed within the field of e.g. sociology, as well as formal theoretical models of immigrant self-employment dominant in economic approaches. For purpose of clarity and precision this section will not think back on theories of migration in general, though these should be considered highly relevant when looking into why and on what conditions people could have migrated in the first place.

*The middleman minority theory*

One of the first ideas about how and why immigrants become entrepreneurs was developed in the early 1970s – Bonacich (1973) introduced the concept of middleman minorities. The specificity of the immigrants’ role in the economic and social structures of receiving societies was explicit. Immigrant groups were considered as communities ‘in the middle’, necessary intermediaries between market actors (agents, money lenders, rent collectors, brokers, etc.), but also in between the extreme social classes of the elite and the masses.

The key characteristic of middleman minorities was said to be the fact that they are, at least initially, sojourners, who do not plan to settle permanently in the destination country. This was not a sufficient condition to constitute a middleman minority, yet it was considered to be a necessary one. The reason for putting so much emphasis on the temporariness of immigrants’ stay is that such a situation results in specific socio-economic behaviour which is characteristic for middleman minorities, and which enables achieving success in business despite potentially unfavourable social and legal environments.

One of the behavioural patterns arising from the nature of being a sojourner is strong orientation towards the future and, consequently, being willing to make significant sacrifices in terms of social status and individual well-being in exchange for greater expected returns. The temporariness also strongly affects the types of business activities undertaken by middleman minorities, as by the nature of their stay they aim at possibly highest return and possibility to go back to the country of origin at their earliest convenience. Thus involvement in occupations such as e.g. trade, where the trader does not have to formally possess property rights to the goods he trades. In most general sense the businesses specific for middleman minorities are those which do not tie up significant capital, are easily transferable and liquidable. These could also include independent professions such as barber, shoemaker, tailor, goldsmith, etc.

Due to the vision of more or less prompt return, middleman minorities maintain high intra-group solidarity and choose not to integrate with the host society. These close ethnic ties also enable the minority to gain
an edge in business operations by means of self-exploitation – based on mutual trust, within-group hiring and business partnerships. Middleman minority entrepreneurs may either ‘hire’ their family members or count on low-cost co-ethnic workforce, in exchange for possible upward mobility, training opportunities or support in setting up one’s own business in the future. The ethnic solidarity also serves the initial business set-up process by providing such resources as capital or information. Close ethnic ties help control internal competition by means of formal and informal guild-like institutions. Owing to solidarity, organisation, thrift and access to low-cost co-ethnic labour force middleman minorities are able to compete with native businesses successfully enough to generate heavy concentrations of ethnic enterprises in certain middleman-specific industries or occupations, what may further lead to ethnic domination of these markets.

When it comes to the perception of middleman minorities by the host society Bonacich (1973) recognizes hostility as the predominant reaction. From the perspective of the host society, the temporariness of stay of middleman minorities results in unassimilability. The two main accusations towards middleman minorities are that: 1) middleman minorities are disloyal to the countries in which they reside (unwillingness to naturalize, sending home remittances, etc.) and that 2) middleman minorities drain the host economies from resources (here again – by means of limiting within-country spending and sending home remittances, collaborating with other ethnic business rather than with domestic companies, etc.). As Bonacich (1973) points out, the hostility toward middleman minorities may just be the fact, which further reinforces the initially policy-driven, segregation, ethnic solidarity, love of homeland, increase of occupation and industrial concentration.

That said, middleman minorities may not necessarily want to eventually go back home. On the one hand this may be due to relative lack of opportunities in the home country. On the other hand, success in business may become an ‘addiction’ one will not easily give up, even for the possibility of return. If middleman entrepreneurs do decide to stay in the host country they may either 1) decide to integrate with the host society and economy or 2) remain a permanent temporary immigrant, wishing to go home, maintaining ties with the home country, but actually never returning home. The latter strategy may be classified as that of ‘potential wanderers’, who leave their options of settling and returning constantly open. Summarizing Bonacich (1973: 593) writes: ‘Middleman minorities are strangers. They keep themselves apart from the societies in which they dwell engage in liquidable occupations, are thrifty and organized economically. Hence, they come into conflict with the surrounding society yet are bound to it by economic success’.

Wong (1985) is among one of those who criticize the middleman minority theory and its enthusiasts. He makes his case by pointing out lack of explanation of what happens in case a society makes a transition from a triadic to a dyadic configuration (such as in the Southeast Asian countries after decolonization) or in case of multiethnic societies (such as in the United States), where the function of a middleman minority can be attributed to various groups depending on the circumstances. He neglects the idea of ‘once a middleman minority, always a middleman minority’, which according to him stems from the original concept (Bonacich 1973). He makes his case referring to second or third generation Chinese or Japanese living in the USA, who are said to be still classified as middleman minorities, despite the fact that they do not fulfil the socio-economic function of a middleman minority, nor do they represent its preliminary feature of being a sojourning community. He also accuses researchers who use the middleman minority concept of ecological fallacies resulting from looking at specific ethnic groups and eventually classifying all of them into one category of minority populations. The critique leads to pointing that the linkage between the temporariness of stay and occupational preferences is not necessarily the link that is in place in case of the Japanese and Chinese communities in the USA. In his discussion Wong rather suggests that explanatory frameworks be sought in the discrimination hypothesis. The discrimination hypothesis will be discussed in one of the following subsections of this paper.
The enclave economy hypothesis

Short after Bonacich’s (1973) theoretical contribution to the debate on immigrant self-employment a new stream of thought has developed, which put more emphasis on the internal economic structures and modes of operation of minority communities, rather than on the relations of ethnic minority entrepreneurs with the receiving society. On this arena such notions as the ethnic economy or the ethnic enclave economy have been developed. A large part of the debate concerning these concepts dealt with definitional and issues. The idea of ethnic enclaves and economies has been significantly affecting the debate on immigrant self-employment since the 1980s nonetheless.

The enclave economy hypothesis was developed by Wilson and Portes (1980) based on a claim that there exists a third alternative to the postulated primary and secondary labour markets (see: Doeringer, Piore 1971; Piore 1979). By analyzing the incorporation of Cuban immigrants into the American labour market they found a significant difference between migrants who worked in the peripheral economy (companies in sectors with relatively low average wages, relatively small average employment and without internal promotional ladders) and those who worked for Cuban entrepreneurs. Cubans working for Cuban employers (what was the identification of functioning within an enclave economy) were found to experience significant returns to their human capital, similarly to workers within the primary labour market. In the open, secondary labour market such returns were said to have been absent because immigrants did not have an opportunity (or need) to take advantage of their culture-specific human capital. From the immigrant entrepreneurs’ point of view, Wilson’s and Portes’s (1980) concept converges with the ideas presented by Bonacich (1973). They claim that hiring labour from within the same immigrant community resulted in opportunities for expansion due to privileged access to markets and labour or immigrant solidarity and obligation of reciprocity. The two conditions which were said to have been necessary for the development of immigrant enclaves were: 1) access to sufficient start-up capital (either through immigrant linkages or by connections with the home country) and presence of entrepreneurial skills among some people belonging to the immigrant population and 2) the renewal of the labour force within the enclave through immigration. In a subsequent study Wilson and Martin (1982) approached the notion of enclave economies from a comparative perspective and defined enclave economies as ‘self-enclosed inner-city minority communities’ (Wilson, Martin 1982: 135). They further specified that what contributes to the success of enclave economies is their collective vertical and horizontal integration, what possibly leads to significant additional spending within the economy once an initial demand is injected.

Not long after the original work of Wilson and Portes is published Auster and Aldrich (1984) develop the concept of an ethnic enterprise and use the concept of ethnic enclaves to define it. They concur that the structures of immigrant communities and the way how they can be utilized to mobilize resources needed for setting up a business are the principal features of immigrant entrepreneurship. In this context Auster and Aldrich refine the understanding of enclaves. They consider them as spatial entities on the one hand (where the entrepreneurs can, better than mainstream businessmen, respond to the local customers’ ethnic tastes), and, on the other hand, as ‘networks of communal solidarity’ (Auster, Aldrich 1984: 53) which can be spread across distant areas.

Subsequently Sanders and Nee (1987) challenge the enclave economy hypothesis as proposed by Wilson and Portes (1980). They claim that, indeed, functioning within an enclave economy may be beneficial for immigrant entrepreneurs, but that it is not necessarily the case for their co-ethnic employees. They reject the idea that there may be no cost to segregation in an ethnic enclave. After adapting Wilson’s and Portes’s methodology Sanders and Nee (1987) re-examine the Cuban population of Miami and Hialeah and the Chinese enclave in San Francisco and note that: 1) immigrants’ socioeconomic achievement is negatively related

The enclave economy hypothesis
to their spatial concentration in ethnic enclaves and that 2) immigrants’ socioeconomic achievement is positively related to their level of assimilation.

Jiobu (1988) takes the idea of ethnic enclaves an extra mile and defines an ethnic hegemony, which is a situation in which an ethnic group gains economic control over an important economic arena, on which interaction with the majority also takes place (Jiobu 1988). The conditions which have to be met in order for an ethnic hegemony to develop are: 1) the existence of an internal, sheltered labour market, 2) the role of a middleman minority has to be exploited, 3) the market must face ethnic saturation (there must be an occupation or labour market in which the minority is represented in disproportionately large numbers), 4) there must exist the possibility of exerting ethnic economic control, and 5) the minority must provide a product or service which is demanded by the majority in order to enforce contact, i.e. form an ‘economic interface’. Jiobu shows how his model works using the example of the Japanese ethnic group in California. When contrasting his concept with the idea of enclave economies, Jiobu finds three main differences: 1) the postulate of the existence of an enclave as such (the Japanese ethnic hegemony heavily relied on widely spread farmers), 2) the feature that an enclave allows returns to acquired human capital (as many of the Japanese were overeducated and even acquired additional human capital despite the fact they knew they would not take advantage of their education in their jobs) and 3) the necessity of renewing the ethnic labour force by means of immigration (what was not possible due to restrictive immigration policies at that time). According to Jiobu these three postulates of the enclave economy hypothesis do not hold in case of the Japanese in California. Yet given the information on the Japanese minority as presented by Jiobu, some of the already-existing extensions of the enclave economy hypothesis would possibly manage to explain the phenomenon of Japanese success without the need for constructing a new theoretical framework (see: Auster, Aldrich 1984). Furthermore, in light of the precondition that an ethnic hegemony relies on the middleman minority position of a given ethnic group and Wong’s (1985) conclusion that the Japanese community in the USA fails to meet the criteria of a middleman minority as defined by Bonacich (1973), Jiobu’s reasoning leaves space for doubt.

Zhou and Logan (1989) conduct further studies on the enclave economy per se by exploring the case of the Chinese in New York City. In order to provide robust results, irrespective of what we consider to be enclave, they approach three possible meanings: 1) that of a place of living, 2) that of a place of work and 3) that of an industry. In the latter conceptualization (not considered in the previous literature) they identify enclave industries as those, where the Chinese immigrants are over-represented. They manage to reconcile the findings of Wilson and Portes (1980) with those of Sanders and Nee (1987). On the one hand they find support for the positive view of the enclaves’ role, specifically in relation to the possibility of upward mobility of immigrants via enhanced opportunities for self-employment. On the other hand, they do not find advantages in terms of workers’ earnings or the entrepreneurs’ returns to self-employment when individuals within and outside of the enclave economy were compared.

In a subsequent article Portes and Jensen (1989) identify three approaches to understanding the enclave economy which have developed so far: 1) considering ethnic enclaves as a vehicle for immigrants’ upward mobility by means of access to otherwise unattainable start-up resources, 2) recognizing the enclave economy as a way of how immigrant populations deal with discrimination or even blocked entry into the mainstream economy and in the most pessimistic scenario 3) viewing enclave economies as ‘disguised vehicles for capitalist exploitation’ (Portes, Jensen 1989: 930). This was meant as a reply to the critique of Sanders and Nee (1987) by noting drawback of their conceptualization of enclaves as places where immigrants live rather than where they work. Portes and Jensen (1989) conclude that living in an ethnic neighbourhood is not equivalent to working in the enclave economy. They also find support for a rather positive role of the ethnic enclave in providing opportunities of socioeconomic mobility for immigrant workers and providing access to
resources and capital for immigrant entrepreneurs. In two following articles Sanders and Nee (1992) and Portes and Jensen (1992) re-examine each other’s results, each time coming to opposite conclusions. Eventually Portes and Jensen do not find sufficient arguments in the analysis of Sanders and Nee that disprove the enclave economy hypothesis. Concluding they add precision to the story of how enclave economies function, though, by signalling that the enclave economy does offer employment comparable in its returns to the mainstream economy, but that this feature holds rather for recent immigrants and to those who have limited language proficiency.

Given the ongoing discussion on the role of ethnic enclaves, Model (1992) puts the enclave economy hypothesis to yet another test, trying to compare the processes observed among the Miami Cubans and Bay Area Chinese within the frameworks of the ethnic enclave hypothesis, the middleman minority theory (Bonacich 1973), and the ethnic hegemony model (Jiobu 1988). In her work Model concludes that an enclave economy does not remunerate human capital strictly as hypothesized (Model 1992: 74-75). All in all, though, considering the various conceptualizations and definitional criteria, she concludes that neither does the enclave boost nor hamper income from labour.

Waldinger (1993) once again revises the ongoing debate concerning ethnic enclaves. He proposes including ‘training systems’ (Waldinger 1993: 447) as a critical feature, which allows both ethnic employers and employees reduce the risks of investment in worker training via network hiring. After discussing the theoretical and empirical consequences of applying different semantic explanations Waldinger concludes that in order to add quality to the debate and push it forward the term ethnic enclave should be dropped and the ethnic economy should be considered instead. One reason he gives (referring also to a forthcoming publication of Light) is that it would enable us to include the self-employed (non-employers – one man businesses) into the considerations. This amendment would also, according to Waldinger, move the discussion away from the unproductive debate about what is an enclave sensu stricto and shift it to more relevant considerations about the structures and processes within ethnic economies.

In terms of definitional issues Light, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr and Der-Martirosian (1994) assert that interchangeable use of the terms ethnic economy and ethnic enclave economy is conceptually wrong. Their reasoning stresses that the ethnic economy is a concept derived from the middleman minority theory, while the notion of an enclave arise from the theory of labour market segmentation. Referring to the various approaches to the ethnic enclave economy hypothesis Light et al. (1994) come to a conclusion that what has developed in the literature so far is ‘conceptual anarchy’ (Light et al. 1994: 69). Aside from clarifying the semantics Light et al. (1994) emphasize that using relative (within enclave vs. open market) wages as a measure based on which the enclave economy hypothesis is tested is misleading, the related assumption being that the people who earn wages outnumber those whose activity is not regulated by any employment contract. In case of ethnic minorities the opposite is true – the employers outnumber their employees, as many people are actually self-employed and those who can afford to hire workers do that on a very small scale. Thus, as Light et al. (1994) conclude, the relative wages may be a very deceiving measure of the welfare of the participants of the ethnic economy. Yet, as the authors further state, even if the wages of employees in the ethnic economy were actually lower than what they could earn in the open economy, this does not indicate that an ethnic (enclave) economy creates a mobility trap, as it has been postulated by Portes’s and Wilson’s opponents. In fact three issues should be considered: 1) that some employees in the ethnic economy may not want or may not be able to work full time, thus earning lower wages, but also voluntarily working fewer hours, 2) the ethnic economy could also be considered as a school for entrepreneurs, bringing the minority long-term benefits rather than advantages instantly visible in income data and 3) comparing wages in the ethnic economy to those in the open market is fair only if the open market offers suitable jobs to everyone who is looking for them (in fact, in the open market one could be underemployed or even
unemployed and so compared to earning nothing even a low wage in the ethnic economy is supreme). Thus Light et al. conclude the relative wages debate by claiming that relative earnings in the ethnic economy determine only the extent to which it is beneficial to work there, not whether it is beneficial at all.

More recently Werbner (2001) has once again put the enclave economy hypothesis into the spotlight. She sets the relative wage, human capital and labour market issues aside and instead focuses on the organisational and industrial features of the enclave economy. Referring to theories of industrial clustering Werbner suggests defining the enclave economy as a networked cluster of ethnic-owned firms producing certain goods, together with other ethnic-owned firms which provide services to the cluster. Thus, as she claims, the firms need not to be spatially concentrated in the strict sense of space, but it is sufficient that they are in a common space of networks and flows of goods and services (ref.: Greve, Salaff 2005). Regard for the goods ethnic economies specialize in is therefore crucial to understand how they operate and might be the key to explaining the contradicting findings. Werbner also adds to the enclave economy hypothesis the idea that in the same way enclaves may support entrepreneurship and enhance opportunities for business development, they may also make the economy more vulnerable to market shocks.

The discrimination hypothesis

Wong (1985), in the context of the middleman minority theory, as well Light et al. (1994) in the context of the enclave economy hypothesis have pointed to the fact that immigrants’ labour market choices may not be opportunity, but rather necessity driven, i.e. resulting from lack of other opportunities, discrimination. Such an understanding of immigrant self-employment has been labelled the discrimination hypothesis, or the disadvantage theory.

Over the past three decades the discrimination hypothesis received a number of formal conceptualizations and empirical verifications, being disaggregated into three processes: 1) employer discrimination (e.g. Moore 1983; Clark, Drinkwater 2000), 2) capital market discrimination (e.g. Coate, Tennyson 1992) and 3) consumer discrimination (e.g. Borjas, Bronars 1989). The first of these explains under what conditions immigrants would choose self-employment over wage-employment. The second concept explores access to capital as the key ingredient of entrepreneurial activity and examines how borrowing constraints affect the incentives and potential for the development of immigrant entrepreneurial ventures. The last concept is useful for explaining how consumer preferences with respect to providers of goods and services may affect the returns and thus also the numbers of immigrant businessmen.

Employer discrimination may be visible in two forms (Parker 2006). Either by blocking minority’s access to the labour market in general, or by restricting their opportunities to low-paid jobs, what would result in choosing self-employment as an escape strategy. Given the theoretical assumptions of formal models of employer discrimination, e.g. identical distributions of entrepreneurial abilities in the migrant and non-migrant groups and that business profits are an increasing function of these abilities, the explanatory power of this concept is not enough to answer the question of why some immigrant groups have higher and others have lower rates of self-employment when compared to the natives, though. Light (2004) provides a typology of disadvantages immigrants may face in the context of labour market activity (see Table 2). It follows that if labour market discrimination is in place, but one does have access to some resources, self-employment may be the only feasible alternative.
Table 2. Immigrant disadvantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>resource disadvantage</th>
<th>labour market disadvantage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>immigrants have low productivity and for the productivity they demonstrate they are not adequately rewarded, possibility of relying solely on the informal economy or experiencing long-term unemployment</td>
<td>no due to low resources (human, social, cultural capital) immigrants have low productivity and therefore receive low wages; very limited possibilities of occupational mobility or pursuing self-employment in the informal economy where limited resources are sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>immigrants can not obtain a wage which reflects their productivity; self-employment may be a more rewarding or the only possible source of income, if resources are sufficient it may be pursued in the formal ethnic economy or even in the open market</td>
<td>no disadvantage</td>
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In the framework of the disadvantage theory and employer discrimination the concept of blocked mobility (also referred to as bleak mobility, Mata, Pendakur 1999) has been developed. The former appeared e.g. in the work of Waldinger, Ward and Aldrich (1985), Beaujot, Maxim and Zhao (1994), or more recently Raijman and Tienda (2000). This notion refers to a situation in which immigrants pursue self-employment due to ‘glass ceilings’ as far as occupational upward mobility is concerned. Because of unrecognized qualifications or discrimination based on ethnic prejudice they experience a mismatch between their skills and labour market opportunities made available to them. In their study Raijman and Tienda (2000: 701) find that ‘the blocked mobility hypothesis obtains for Koreans, who view self-employment as the ‘price’ of immigration to be paid by the first generation’. It is hypothesized, though, that as time passes immigrants (and with greater probability their children) may obtain recognition for their skills or acquire skills by the standards of the receiving society, become proficient in the local language and, as a consequence, be able to eventually break out of the affliction of blocked mobility.

The second type of discrimination, discrimination in capital markets, may have a direct effect not only on the choice between wage-employment and self-employment, but also on the survival rate of ethnic businesses. Not having access to bank loans or being able to borrow relatively small amounts of money and at high interest rates may heavily impede business set-up and development. It has been shown, though, that even here the discrimination performed by banks does not necessarily affect all immigrant groups equally (Parker 2006). One of the possible explanations of this fact arises form the specificity and clustering of immigrant businesses mostly around only a few industries which have above-average failure rates (ref.: the middleman minority theory and Werbner’s (2001) insights into the enclave economy hypothesis for discussion on immigrant sectoral specialization). When relatively lower collateral of immigrants, as compared to the native population, is added to the picture, it may look as if banks discriminate immigrants as such, while in fact they ‘discriminate’ certain types of (risky) businesses (which happen to be run mostly by immigrants), a process referred to as statistical discrimination (Arrow 1998). Coate and Tennyson (1992) develop a theoretical model based on which they postulate that credit market discrimination actually occurs due to initial labour market discrimination.
The idea of consumer discrimination and its applicability to immigrant self-employment has been analyzed by Borjas and Bronars (1989), among others. The authors propose a model in which incomes and rates of self-employment among minorities are explored based on the hypothesis that consumers dislike buying goods and services from minority businessmen (see: Becker 1971). The equilibrium outcomes of both the consumer and producer choices imply that: 1) the average income of self-employed black entrepreneurs is lower than the average income of white entrepreneurs and that 2) the gains from self-employment for able black entrepreneurs are smaller than the gains from self-employment for able white entrepreneurs. The two conclusions imply that minority entrepreneurs not only have lower incentives to become self-employed, but that they are also negatively selected into self-employment with a greater probability than the majority population.

The interactive model

In line with Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward’s previous inputs to the disadvantage theory of immigrant self-employment (Waldinger, Ward, Aldrich 1985), in 1990 the authors suggested a conceptual model in which they combine the idea of immigrants’ limited opportunities (e.g. due to discrimination) with their possibility of mobilizing ethnic resources (e.g. within ethnic enclaves). Due to the mutual influences of its various components, the model has been named interactive.

The opportunity structures the authors define include historically shaped circumstances which enable (and constrain) ethnic entrepreneurship – market conditions and access to ownership possibilities. The types of industries, where immigrants are most likely to be able to set up the enterprises constitute specific niches: 1) where mass production technology does not apply and where mass distribution is unnecessary, 2) where there are low economies of scale, 3) where there is instability and uncertainty, and 4) where ethnic goods are in demand.

Apart from the somewhat external factors creating opportunity structures Waldinger et al. (1990) suggest that the immigrant group’s own characteristics also affect the rates of entrepreneurship. These characteristics are divided into predisposing factors and possibilities of resource mobilization. Among the former the authors recognize blocked mobility, selective migration and migrants’ aspiration levels. The latter category encompasses ties with co-ethnics, extent of social networks and government policies.

Ways in which ethnic entrepreneurs take advantage of the opportunity structures, given their group characteristics Waldinger et al. (1990) label ethnic strategies. These strategies are aimed at tackling the seven most common problems: 1) obtaining information, 2) generating start-up or development capital, 3) acquiring necessary entrepreneurial skills, 4) labour recruitment, 5) establishing and developing relationships with customers and suppliers, 6) dealing with competition and 7) responding to political attacks. The possibilities and eventual ways of addressing these issues emerge from the constraints and enabling mechanisms embedded in the market structures and ownership possibilities as well as from the specificity of predisposing factors and the potential of resource mobilization.

Within this framework Waldinger et al. (1990) look for explanations of why self-employment rates may differ across ethnic groups. They define three categories by which the immigrant communities differ, and which affect their functioning in the destination countries: 1) pre-migration characteristics (mainly level of human capital), 2) the circumstances of migration and the ways they evolve (e.g. into temporary vs. permanent migration) and 3) post-migration characteristics (especially the position of the ethnic group in the host economy).

Bonacich (1993) questioned the approach of Waldinger et al. (1990) blaming it for a pro-capitalist perspective, i.e. that the described social processes are nothing but a product of the forces of supply (group characteristics) and demand (opportunity structures). Bonacich also points out that the emergence of ethnic entrepreneurship, as described, seems not to be a product of the desires of the groups in power. Among the
reasons for ‘nurturing’ ethnic entrepreneurs by the majority Bonacich mentions: 1) their role in legitimizing the ideas of capitalism (pursuit of profit, protection of private property rights, free competition, etc.), 2) their possibility of securing cheap subcontractors for big businesses, 3) their position as ‘buffer’ middleman minorities, and finally 4) their function of ‘ideological weapons’, which serves the majority to present certain ethnic groups as ‘model minorities’ (Bonacich 1993: 690-691). Eventually, she claims, the ruling majority designs such institutions, which rule out other possible forms of immigrant incorporation. Missing this larger politico-institutional picture in analysis of ethnic entrepreneurship may thus actually imply missing the significance of the whole phenomenon. It seems that Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward’s initial proposal could, and partially did, account for such logic.

In a rather recent work Putz (2003) re-examines the interactive model looking from the perspective of cultural characteristics of immigrant groups. He accuses the ‘opportunity approach’ of being structuralist in its nature and thus not being able to explain well enough why individuals react to the same opportunity structures in different ways. He suggests extending the existing analytical framework by including paradigms derived form the theories of action and decision-making. He insists on putting greater emphasis not only on the structural conditions, but also on the objectives and strategies of action-oriented agents. He also offers criticism of the ‘resource’ side of the proposed analytical approach. He recognises that it does make an attempt at incorporating culture-specific notions into the model, but that these notions are based on two fallacies, namely that: 1) immigrant communities are homogenous (so that the way in which resources are e.g. ‘ethnic’ applies to everyone in the same way), and 2) immigrant communities have a common ethnic foundation (their life strategies are determined by the culture of the place of origin, which – by means of cultural demarcation – would be distinct from the culture of the destination). Consequently he proposes that:

- no generalized and ultimate statements about culture be made, as even if individuals act in a similar way their reactions are interpretations of culture, rather than culture per se,
- culture should be conceptually treated as a process, rather than as symbols which have fixed meanings and interpretations,
- only statements on single, constantly changing ‘cultural phenomena’ be made, as treating culture as a whole or its components as static is in reality a conceptual impossibility,
- situational rather than general interpretations be in place,
- that not only social relations and integration into social networks be treated contextually, but that spaces themselves gain recognition as having symbolic significance for, and across, individuals.

Volery (2007) combines the original interactive model with the extensions proposed by Putz and comes up with an amended proposition of how opportunity structures and resources are translated into ‘ethnic strategies’ of dealing with the challenges they face as immigrant entrepreneurs. In Volery’s understanding there are two distinct, yet interconnected dimensions – the ethnic dimension and the entrepreneurship dimension. The advantage of Volery’s approach is that, on the one hand, his model does not separate entrepreneurial and ethnic aspects of immigrant entrepreneurship, and, on the other hand, it takes into consideration individual features which may be useful for explaining why individuals with the same ethnic background react differently to certain opportunities. The entrepreneurship dimension is responsible for explaining the entrepreneurial process as such, without regard for the ‘ethnic’ aspect of immigrant entrepreneurship. The ethnic dimension creates opportunities and threats specific to immigrants (or particular immigrant groups). How individuals recognize, evaluate and exploit these opportunities, though, is described by the entrepreneurial process, not the ethnic one.
The concept of mixed embeddedness

The interactive model (Waldinger et al. 1990) has become the foundation for Kloosterman and Rath’s (2001) proposal to incorporate into the immigrant self-employment debate the notion of country-specific institutional frameworks. The diverse institutional settings were hypothesized to add explanatory power to the various post-industrial self-employment trajectories by implying different opportunity structures for immigrant and local entrepreneurs (see also: Vinogradov, Elam 2010). The work had the ambition to combine the agency and structural perspectives found in the critique of the interactive model. In pursuit of their objective Kloosterman and Rath develop the concept of mixed embeddedness, which was also intended to be a solid theoretical framework suitable for international comparisons of immigrant self-employment. Mixed embeddedness implies that immigrants are not only embedded in immigrant networks and their ethnicity, but also in the ‘socioeconomic and politico-institutional environment of the country of settlement’ (Kloosterman, Rath 2001: 2). In their in-depth inquiry into what has so far been labelled generally as opportunity structures (see: Waldinger et al. 1990) Kloosterman and Rath firstly recognize, that immigrant communities not only differ from the majority in ‘cultural’ terms, but also as far as other, more tangible, forms of capital are concerned – financial, human, social. Thus, they are initially dependent on different segments of the opportunity structure than the native population. The second aspect of opportunity structures as understood heretofore, which Kloosterman and Rath (2001) question, is their static character. Migrants may by their mere presence change opportunity structures.

In their furthering of how opportunity structures should be viewed, Kloosterman and Rath (2001) recognize two crucial dimensions – the accessibility and growth potential of markets. In effect Kloosterman (2004) proposes a two-dimensional typology of their interrelations. The typology allows to systematize various markets in terms of their attractiveness and accessibility for immigrant businesses by classifying them as stagnant or expansive on the one hand, and low threshold or high threshold (as far as human capital requirements are concerned) on the other hand. Ethnic markets are according to Kloosterman (2004) able to emerge in all but one categories of this typology and thus should be treated as special cases of protected markets within (see also: Wilson, Portes 1980). The only case which Kloosterman (2004) finds unattractive for immigrant businesses is that of stagnant and human capital demanding markets.

Although the concept of mixed embeddedness advanced the understanding of the interactive model it did so without addressing the critique addressed towards the original idea of Waldinger et al. (1990). This suggests that Bonacich’s (1993) and Putz’s (2003) concerns remain valid.

The frameworks of modes of incorporation

The contexts and opportunity structures under which immigrant self-employment becomes a feasible labour market strategy have been further elaborated upon in concepts which can be classified as frameworks of modes of immigrant incorporation. A major contribution to this stream of thought was that by Portes and Rembaut (1996, first edition in 1990) who developed a typology of immigrant incorporation with ethnic entrepreneurship as one of its features. According to them what is crucial to recognize when trying to understand the variations in immigrants’ labour market performance are: 1) immigrants’ resource endowments in the form of educational attainment, skills, motivations, aspirations, professional experience, financial, social and cultural capital, etc., 2) their status of entry and residence (legal, irregular, etc.), 3) the conditions under which they left their countries of origin and 4) the contexts of reception. The latter have been decomposed into governmental, labour market and ethnic community aspects.
The above-mentioned aspects, just slightly differently phrased, have also been identified by Waldinger et al. (1990, see: Section The interactive model). It does not come as a surprise then that independently to the work of Portes and Rembaut (1996) Waldinger (1987, 1996) analyzes a specific case of immigrant incorporation, namely that which took place in the context of industrial change in the second half of the 20th century in New York City. Waldinger conceptualizes the process of how immigrants manage to undertake self-employment due to succession of entrepreneurial openings (Waldinger 1987, 1996) and labels it the game of ‘ethnic musical chairs’ (Waldinger 1996: 257). In Waldinger’s view the industrial transformations taking place in the 1970s in the New York City area lead to changes in the composition of local industrial and labour markets such that the numbers of whites declined ‘set[ing] in motion a vacancy chain, allowing non-whites to move up the job hierarchy as replacements for whites’ (Waldinger 1987: 370).

Waldinger observes that the small business segment of the market went trough a similar succession process (Waldinger 1996). In the above-mentioned circumstances self-employment became a predominantly immigrant activity, with rates exceeding those of African-Americans and, as duration of stay increased, also exceeding those of the white population. He finds three main reasons for such a state of things:

- increasing immigrant populations, creating their own ethnic demand which co-ethnics were best suited to serve (immigration being also a critical element of the development of ethnic enclaves, see: Section The enclave economy hypothesis),
- opportunities for succession in small business industries, which could not benefit from mass production and/or mass distribution practices and which in the new economic environment seemed mildly profitable for communities which use to occupy them (immigrant business specificity being stressed since Bonacich’s work in 1973),
- lack of other opportunities for immigrants whose skills did not match the labour demand or who could not have their skills recognized (a feature recognized in the enclave economy hypothesis, but mainly conceptualized within the disadvantage theory).

Though Waldinger’s ability to conciliate various analytical approaches within one framework, Rath (2000a) criticizes such a way of thinking when applying it to immigrant entrepreneurs in Amsterdam. He recognizes four aspects of Waldinger’s concept which do not fit into the stories of immigrant incorporation in the Dutch case. The first is the notion of a ‘labour queue’ (Waldinger 1996: 26). The idea implies that there is a fixed hierarchy of preferences towards specific categories of the labour force. As Rath points out, the Dutch society is not as race-conscious, though, as the American society. Moreover, he recognized the socio-political dynamics of how minority statuses might change over time, thus changing the ordering of the ‘queue’. Secondly, Rath comments on Waldinger’s assumption of long-term cohesion, solidarity and support within ethnic communities. Rath notices, that the social relationships within ethnic groups tend to change over time and, especially under the circumstances of harsh ethnic competition within ethnic niches (see also: Kloosterman 2004), this may not be true. Rath’s third argument relates to the importance of local institutional frameworks at the destination, which affect the opportunities for immigrant self-employment. He criticizes Waldinger for stressing the role of ethnic networks in the process of immigrant incorporation, while the notions of consumer demand, technological change and international division are put aside. Finally, Rath draws attention to the underexposed variety of the scopes and scales of institutional frameworks which affect immigrants’ opportunities, a notion which was later emphasized by Kloosterman and Rath in their 2001 paper. In a subsequent piece of critique Rath (2001) notices also the drawbacks of Waldinger’s definition of niches which is said to 1) too weakly point to the voluntary character of their formation and 2) too strongly emphasize the absolute size of the self-employed and wage-employed ethnic community (what in case of Amsterdam would lead to excluding economically and culturally significant and distinct ethnic groups). He also points to the lack of differentiation between occupations and branches of trade and industry,
which may be spread over different labour markets, making the distinction crucial to understand the immigrant modes of incorporation in these specific arenas of economic exchange.

**Empirical research methods**

The empirical studies on immigrant self-employment suffer from the same definitional ambiguities, as theoretical considerations. Who is considered to be self-employed and what is classified as migration is subject to the acuteness of relevant statistical categories. These imperfections have to be taken into consideration when interpreting and, especially, contrasting and comparing various empirical works. In general, empirical research in immigrant self-employment can be classified into two streams of literature relating to: 1) the probability of becoming self-employed (such as in: Borjas 1986; Phizacklea, Ram 1996; Sanders, Nee 1996; van Tubergen 2005; Akee, Jeager, Tatsiramos 2007), and 2) the returns to self-employment (such as in: Li 2000; Lofstrom 2002; Edin, Fredriksson, Aslund 2003; Portes, Shafer 2006). Due to data set construction, in most cases, studies which focus on immigrants’ returns to self-employment also explore the notion of its determinants (probability). Data used to conduct such analysis usually either come from dedicated (i.e. not representative) surveys or from countries with relatively large immigrant populations (as the self-employed are a small percentage of the immigrant minority anyway). These constraints limit a vast majority of studies to a few major recipient countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia or the UK. Due to the heterogeneity of immigrants in these major destinations, research on either probabilities of self-employment or returns to this form of labour market activity most often contains examinations related to e.g. racial differences or within- and across-immigrant group differences in access to various forms of capital.

The findings of empirical studies on immigrant self-employment remain inconclusive *en masse* as to the mechanism of the process of immigrants’ choice of self-employment (for a broad review including theoretical foundations, posed research questions and methods applied to answer them see Nestorowicz (2011)). Due to that, or maybe because of that, most recent research in the field of immigrant self-employment continually feeds on the theoretical concepts developed over the past decades. The most contemporary analyses are indicative of the changes which have been going on in terms of immigrant settlement processes and longer and longer histories of migration of individuals, as they may focus on second generation migrants or chronicle subsequent labour market choices of individuals.

As far as research methods are concerned both qualitative and quantitative approaches are applied in research on immigrant self-employment. Qualitative research seems most suitable especially when it comes to researching the individual psychological and personal motivations, preferences and other reasons for pursuing self-employment, but also the effects cultural factors have on the self-employment propensity of immigrants. Quantitative methods applied in the reviewed papers consist of: 1) statistical analysis and methods suitable for dealing with dichotomous variables, e.g. logistic regressions (for exploring the odds of immigrants becoming self-employed), 2) linear regressions applied in studies of returns to immigrant self-employment, and 3) decomposition methods (e.g. the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition) used in order to disaggregate the factors responsible for various outcomes of the complex phenomena under investigation, such as e.g. wage differences or diverse self-employment propensities.

**Summary and conclusions**

This paper aimed at reviewing and, when possible, pointing to interrelations between various theoretical frameworks formulated for the analysis of immigrant self-employment. It has appraised most frequently quoted concepts starting from the middleman minority theory developed by Bonacich in the 1970s, through
the probably most influential and controversial ethnic enclaves hypothesis, to most contemporary mixed embeddedness approach and all-encompassing frameworks of modes of incorporation.

Based on the analysis of theoretical and most recent empirical contributions to research on ethnic entrepreneurship we may see that, with changing socioeconomic environments, 40 years after the most influential concepts have been developed they are still subject to empirical verification. In large part the immigrant self-employment research frontier depends on data availability, though. It is also for this reason that most conceptual developments and corresponding empirical studies have been carried out in the North American, British, Canadian or Australian contexts. Determining, both theoretically and empirically, if and how the recalled understandings of ethnic entrepreneurship are applicable in other settings still calls for scientific attention. Especially, that existing theories provide quite a coherent, though not holistic, picture of how immigrant self-employment develops, while available empirical studies come to conflicting conclusions.

In the context of taking research on immigrant entrepreneurship beyond the dominant frames of reference, it could have not gone unnoticed that Central and Eastern European countries have the highest differences between immigrant and native self-employment rates, with the former exceeding the latter by 4.9 pp in Hungary, 5.2 pp in the Czech Republic, 10.5 pp in Slovakia, and 18.3 pp in Poland (Figure 1). At the same time research on ethnic entrepreneurship in this part of the world is scarce. The reasons behind these disparities remain unexplored. Could they lie in the reluctance or inability of the native populations to undertake self-employment? Or maybe they should be assigned to greater responsiveness of immigrants to the opportunities created by the economic transitions in the region? And how would the answers to these questions correspond to the conceptual frameworks presented in this article? It is yet to be determined.

References


Central and Eastern European Migration Review


Selektywność emigracji i migracji powrotnych Polaków – o procesie „wypłukiwania”
Marta Anacka₁, Agnieszka Fihel₁

The paper contains the analysis of selectivity of emigration and return migration to Poland in years 2004-2008. By using Migration Selectivity Index with comparable data (Labour Force Survey) we were able to confirm the hypothesis of ‘washing-out’ of selected categories of Polish population: men, people with post-secondary, secondary and vocational level of education, inhabitants of rural areas and those who live in agricultural households. We made an attempt to estimate the scale of the phenomenon and described its demographic consequences. Our analysis corresponds with the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis (Okólski 2011, 2012; cf. Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009; Anacka, Okólski 2010) stating that the post-accession emigration from Poland gave a chance to an economically ‘redundant’ labour force to move to regions and economic sectors with high demand for labour.

Keywords: return migration, selectivity of migration, washing-out of population

Wstęp

Tlo teoretyczne
Selektywność migracji, rozumiana jako zróżnicowana skłonność do podejmowania mobilności przez osoby o różnych charakterystykach, w centrum zainteresowania badaczy znajdowała się już u zarania studiów migracyjnych. Analizując dane spisowe z końca XIX wieku, E. G. Ravenstein – oprócz przywołanej już wcześniej prawidłowości – sformułował m.in. prawa mówiące o tym, iż mieszkańcy terenów wiejskich

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Ów znaczący odpływ sprawił, że analizy selektywności na dobre zagościły na kartach książek i artykułów badaczy migracji (m.in. Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2007; Mioduszewska 2008; Kaczmarczyk, Mioduszewska, Żylicz 2009). Gwałtowność zmian, których świadkami staliśmy się wówczas, wymagała narzędzi, dzięki którym możliwa byłaby stosunkowo szybka ocena, na ile mieliśmy do czynienia z kontynuacją trendów obserwowanych przed akcesją, być może w większej skali, na ile zaś przyszło nam obserwować odmienne jakościowo zjawisko. Dzięki dostępności nowego i wartościowego źródła danych na emigrację, jakim okazało się Badanie Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności (BAEL) i zastosowaniu przełomowego Współczynnika Selektowności Migracji, można było formułować wyjaśnienia dotyczące przyczyn różnic w strukturze ludności podejmującej mobilność i ludności osiadłej przed i po akcesji Polski do UE (Anacka, Okólski 2010) oraz trwałości zaobserwowanych zmian (Anacka 2010a).

Wydarzenia kolejnych lat skierowały uwagę badaczy zajmujących się selektywnością migracji na coraz bardziej intensywny strumień migracji powrotnej (Anacka, Fihel 2012). Pytanie o to, kto i dlaczego wraca do Polski (lub, odwracając perspektywę, kto i dlaczego do Polski nie wraca) przez pewien czas rozpałało publiczne debaty i znów – dzięki tym samym narzędziom, które posłużyły do scharakteryzowania odpływu ludności w drugiej połowie ubiegłej dekady – można było stwierdzić na temat przyczyn i ewentualnych konsekwencji napływu powrotnego Polaków. Wypłukiwanie populacji, jako metafora zjawiska polegającego na występowaniu dodatniej selektywności dla strumienia emigracji i niedodatniej dla strumienia migracji powrotnej w wypadku pewnych grup ludności (por. kolejny punkt niniejszego tekstu), pojawiło się już w pierwszych artykułach o poakcesyjnej migracji powrotnej (Anacka 2010b). Wyniki analiz sugerowały wówczas, iż w latach 2002-2008 owo wypłukiwanie mogło dotyczyć m.in. osób z wykształceniem polskim i wyższym, mężczyzn oraz mieszkańców północnych regionów Polski. Jednocześnie konkluzje nie zostały jednak wyciągnięte, jako że metoda badania była mocno niedoskonała – zastosowana definicja migrant powrotnej obejmowała osoby, które podejmowały ruchliwość typowo cyrkulacyjną, powszechną w okresie przedakcesyjnym (por. Jaźwińska 2001), a w analizie brakowało oceny statystycznej istotności otrzymanych wyników.

Podobna próba zestawienia selektywności emigracji i migracji powrotnej została poczyniona dwa lata później (Anacka, Fihel 2012) przy użyciu technik ekonometrycznych (statystyczna istotność otrzymanych wyników była zatem bezdy dysyjna), choć tym razem wyniki dla obu strumieni nie były w pełni porównywalne z uwagi na różne okresy analizy. Pewnym mamentem badania było wzięcie pod uwagę osób mi-
grujących – zarówno z, jak i do Polski – w okresie 1999-2009, a zatem niedokonanie rozróżnienia na migracje przedakcesyjne, często o charakterze cyrkulacyjnym, i poakcesyjne¹. Niemniej jednak w wypadku niektórych kategorii ludności – mężczyzn, osób młodych i osób z wyższym wykształceniem – dostrzegany wcześniej wzorzec wypłukiwania populacji potwierdził się.

Metoda analizy


\[
WSM_{V_i} = \frac{M_{V_i} - P_{V_i}}{P},
\]

gdzie: \(V\) – zmienna, ze względu na którą mierzona jest selektywność migracji (np. płeć, wykształcenie); \(i\) – kategoria zmiennej \(V\), dla której liczona jest wartość współczynnika (np. mężczyzna, wykształcenie wyższe); \(M_{V_i}\) – liczba emigrantów z danego obszaru należąca do kategorii \(i\) cechy \(V\); \(P\) – całkowita liczba emigrantów z danego obszaru; \(P_{V_i}\) – liczba ludności danego obszaru należąca do kategorii \(i\) cechy \(V\);

Formuła Współczynnika Selektynyści Migracji Powrotnych jest analogiczna do powyższej i ma postać:

\[
WSMP_{V_i} = \frac{R_{V_i} - E_{V_i}}{E},
\]

gdzie: \(V\) – zmienna, ze względu na którą mierzona jest selektywność migracji powrotnych (np. płeć, wykształcenie); \(i\) – kategoria zmiennej \(V\), dla której liczona jest wartość współczynnika (np. mężczyzna, wykształcenie wyższe); \(R_{V_i}\) – liczba migrantów powracających na dany obszar należąca do kategorii \(i\) cechy \(V\); \(R\) – całkowita liczba migrantów powracających na dany obszar; \(E_{V_i}\) – liczba ludności pochodzącej z danego obszaru i przebywającej za granicą należąca do kategorii \(i\) cechy \(V\); \(E\) – całkowita liczba ludności pochodzącej z danego obszaru i przebywającej za granicą.

Oba te współczynniki przyjmują wartości z zakresu \([-1, +\infty)\), przy czym dodatni WSM_{V_i} oznacza, że kategoria i pewnej cechy \(V\) jest nadreprezentowana w odpływie ludności z danego obszaru (jej skłonność do emigracji jest wyższa), ujemny zaś – że jest ona niedoreprezentowana, co oznacza niższą skłonność do emigracji osób o tej właśnie cesze. Kluczową rolę odgrywa wartość zerowa tego współczynnika, oznaczająca brak selektywności, zwłaszcza gdy jest on liczony na podstawie danych pochodzących z badania reprezentacyjnego (nie zaś pełnego, jakimi są np. powszechne spis ludności czy rejestry ludności). Formalnie rzecz biorąc należałoby, wyliczyszy wartość WSM, przeprowadzić test statystyczny, który pozwoliłby ocenić, czy ów WSM jest istotnie różny od zera. Jednak rozkład statystyki testowej jest w tym wypadku problematyczny (nie jest to żaden z popularnie wykorzystywanych rozkładów). Na użytek niniejszego badania istot-
ność statystyczna średnią wartości WSM w okresie 2004-2008 została zastąpiona oceną stabilności wartości WSM dla poszczególnych 19 kwartałów. Jeśli we wszystkich kwartałach był on jednakowego znaku (stale dodatni bądź stale ujemny), jego wartość uznawana była jako stosunkowo stabilna i za wiarygodne przyjmowano było stwierdzenie, iż w analizowanym okresie był on różny od zera. Ponadto przy interpretacji wyników brany był pod uwagę przypadek, gdy WSM był odmiennego znaku w dokładnie jednym spośród 19 kwartałów. Wyjątek ten wynikał z faktu, iż w ocenie statystycznej istotności wartości parametrów również przyjmuje się pewne prawdopodobieństwo popełnienia błędu (zwyczajowo jest 1 proc., 5 proc. lub 10 proc.), na co pozostawione zostało miejsce i w naszej analizie. Do oceny selektywności wykorzystane zostały jedynie opisane powyżej stosunkowo stabilne wartości WSM.

W niniejszym artykule wykorzystane zostały dane pochodzące z prowadzonego regularnie co kwartał Badania Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności z lat 2004-2008. Ankieta BAEL dotycząca gospodarstwa domowego zawiera pytanie o ewentualny czasowy pobyt zagraniczny jego członków i o to, czy pobyt ten jest krótszy, czy też dłuższy niż 1 rok. Ponadto w analizie wzięto pod uwagę przypadek, gdy WSM był odmiennego znaku w dokładnie jednym spośród 19 kwartałów. Wyjątek ten wynikał z faktu, iż w ocenie statystycznej istotności wartości parametrów również przyjmuje się pewne prawdopodobieństwo popełnienia błędu (zwyczajowo jest 1 proc., 5 proc. lub 10 proc.), na co pozostawione zostało miejsce i w naszej analizie. Do oceny selektywności wykorzystane zostały jedynie opisane powyżej stosunkowo stabilne wartości WSM.

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- migranci powrotni – osoby przebywające w Polsce w II kwartale 2008 roku (moment przeprowadzania badania modułowego BAEL), które w latach 2004-2008 powróciły z zagranicy;
- niemigrujący – osoby obecne w Polsce w momencie ankietowania w ramach regularnie przeprowadzanego sondażu BAEL.

Wyszczególnione subpopulacje odpowiadają tym, których struktury wykorzystywane są do wyliczenia wartości WSM i WSMP (liczbę migrantów, emigrantów, migrantów powrotnych i niemigrujących oznaczanych w przywołanych wyżej formułach odpowiednio przez M, E, R, P). Liczebność prób odpowiadających po wyższym kategoriom była zróżnicowana – od 300 do blisko 600 w każdym z 19 kwartałów dla subpopulacji wyjeżdżających za granicę, ponad 50 tys. dla subpopulacji niemigrujących i ponad 1 000 dla subpopulacji osób powracających.

Proces wypłukiwania populacji Polski

 Wyniki dotyczące selektywności emigracji w latach 2004-2008 wskazują na większą skłonność do wyjazdów mężczyzn (niż kobiet), osób z wykształceniem policealnym, średnim i zawodowym (niż wyższym), mieszkańców wsi, członków gospodarstw domowych z przynajmniej jednym użytkownikiem działki rolnej, a także mieszkańców Podkarpacia i Małopolski (Tabela 1, Mapa 1). WSM okazał się dodatni też dla wszystkich kategoriach wieku poniżej 40 roku życia (wyjątkowo zaś wysoki dla osób w wieku 25-30 lat). Niższą skłonnością do emigracji cechowały się osoby z wykształceniem co najwyżej podstawowym, mieszkańcy małej vewojewództwa lubuskiego, łódzkiego, mazowieckiego i wielkopolskiego, czterdzieściolatkowie i starsi mieszkańcy Polski. Z kolei selektywność migracji powrotnych w latach 2004-2008 polegała na wyższej skłonności do powrotu osób z wykształceniem wyższym lub co najwyżej podstawowym (w porównaniu z osobami o innych poziomach wykształcenia), mieszkańców Mazowsza i Wielkopolski oraz co najmniej czterdzieściolatkowi.
nich emigrantów. Niższą skłonnością do migracji powrotnej cechowały się osoby o wykształceniu poliecealnym i średnim, mieszkańcy wsi, osoby wywodzące się z gospodarstw domowych, w których przynajmniej jeden z członków był użytkownikiem działki rolnej, mieszkańcy Ziemi Lubuskiej, Małopolski, Podkarpacia i Podlasia oraz najmłodzi emigranci (do 24 roku życia)\(^5\).

Tabela 1. Współczynniki Selektowności Emigracji (WSM) i Współczynniki Selektowności Migracji Powrotnej (WSMP)\(^a\) dla wybranych kategorii ludności\(^b\), lata 2004-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kategoria</th>
<th>WSM</th>
<th>WSMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Płeć: mężczyzna</td>
<td>0,31**</td>
<td>-0,09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiek: do 24 roku życia</td>
<td>0,57**</td>
<td>-0,27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiek: 25-29 lat</td>
<td>2,33**</td>
<td>-0,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiek: 30-39 lat</td>
<td>0,40*</td>
<td>-0,03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiek: 40+</td>
<td>-0,62**</td>
<td>0,41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wykształcenie: wyższe</td>
<td>0,15</td>
<td>0,37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wykształcenie: poliecealne i średnie zawodowe</td>
<td>0,30**</td>
<td>-0,13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wykształcenie: średnie ogólnokształcące</td>
<td>0,44**</td>
<td>-0,17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wykształcenie: zawodowe</td>
<td>0,31**</td>
<td>-0,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wykształcenie: co najwyżej podstawowe</td>
<td>-0,74**</td>
<td>0,35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klasa miejscowości zamieszkania: wieś</td>
<td>0,17**</td>
<td>-0,19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Użytkowanie działki rolnej</td>
<td>0,24**</td>
<td>-0,21**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) W tabeli gwiazdkami oznaczono wartości uznane za stabilne na tyle, by uznać je za różne od zera na podstawie analizy wartości współczynników selektowności w 19 kwartałach: ** - we wszystkich 19 kwartałach wartość WSM lub WSMP była tego samego znaku; * - w jednym kwartale wartość WSM lub WSMP była odmiennego znaku niż w pozostałych 18 kwartałach.

\(^b\) Wartości WSM i WSMP dotyczą populacji osób w wieku co najmniej 15 lat.

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie BAEL.

O procesie wypłukiwania ludności Polski możemy mówić w odniesieniu do grup społeczno-demograficznych o wysokiej skłonności do emigracji (dodatni WSM) i jednoczesnej niskiej skłonności do powrotu (ujemny WSMP). W analizie dotyczyło to osób w wieku do 24 roku życia, z wykształceniem poliecealnym i średnim (w tym średnim zawodowym), czyli o kwalifikacjach bądź zbędnych, bądź relatywnie nisko wynagradzanych w Polsce w porównaniu z rynkami pracy innych krajów europejskich. Wypłukiwanie dotyczyło też mieszkańców wsi i członków gospodarstw domowych z przynajmniej jednym użytkownikiem działki rolnej, a także osób wywodzących się z Małopolski i Podkarpacia. Regiony te cechują się bogatą historią mobilności zagranicznej mieszkańców, jednak w kontekście selekcji mieszkańców wsi niezwykle istotne jest, iż te dwa regiony cechują się wysokim odsetkiem gospodarstw quasi-chłopskich wśród gospodarstw rolnych. Są to gospodarstwa drobne, samozaopatrzeniowe, niezaangażowane w wymianę rynkową produktów rolnych. Według Halamskiej (2010) odsetek takich gospodarstw w latach 2006-2007 na Podkarpaciu wynosił 66 proc., zaś w Małopolsce – 60 proc., i były to najwyższe wartości dla całej Polski, dla której wartość średnia nie przekraczała 41 proc. Wysoki udział gospodarstw samozaopatrzeniowych może świadczyć o ekonomicznej „zbędności” mieszkańców wybranych regionów wiejskich, polegającej na braku zatrudnienia w miejscu zamieszkania i konieczności szukania go poza lokalnym rynkiem pracy. Także za granicą.
Trudno nie zauważyć, iż oprócz wypłukiwania ludności Polski z pewnych kategorii społeczno-demograficznych zachodzi proces odwrotny, polegający na niskiej skłonności do emigracji i wysokiej skłonności do powrotu innych kategorii ludności. Osoby z wykształceniem co najwyżej podstawowym są niedoreprezentowane w odpływie, za to nadreprezentowane w napływie powrotnym. Podobny efekt dotyczył mieszkańców Mazowsza i Wielkopolski, czyli regionów o dość chłonnych rynkach pracy skupionych wokół Warszawy i Poznania. W wypadku tych regionów użycie sformułowania będącego kwintesencją koncepcji E. Lee (1966) wydaje się naturalne – są to regiony przyciągające migrantów (pull), w przeciwieństwie do wypychających (push) regionów południa i wschodnich Polski. Wśród czynników przyciągających znajdują się więc i takie, które sprawiają, że wyższą skłonność do powrotu obserwuje się wśród osób z wyższym wykształceniem (wyższą metryką – wypłukiwanie w największym stopniu dotyczy osób do 30 roku życia).

Jedynie selektywność ze względu na wiek nie musi być symptomem dostrzeżonych procesów wypłukiwania. Ponieważ wyższą skłonność do emigracji i niższą skłonnością do powrotów cechują się ludzie młodzi, odwrotny wzorzec zaś występuje w wypadku osób starszych (powyżej 40 roku życia), można uznać, że odpowiedzialny za to jest fakt traktowania przez pewną część populacji wyjazdu zagranicznego (jak pokazu-
ją dane – najczęściej zarobkowego) jako pewnego planu, który ma się zakończyć powrotem do Polski. Wśród 5 najczęściej wskazywanych motywów składających emigrantów do powrotu w 2008 roku 4 wiązały się właśnie z taką strategią (GUS 2008: 15). Na podstawie przedstawionej powyżej analizy selektywności nie można jednak stwierdzić, jak dużej części migrantów i migrantów powołanych wzorcow ten dotyczy.


Jednak najistotniejszym efektem selektywności emigracji poakcesyjnej jest jej wpływ na strukturę wieku ludności Polski. Ponieważ około połowa mężczyzn, którzy wyjechali w okresie 2004-2008, była w wieku 20-29 lat, a stałe zameldowanych w Polsce dwudziestolatków w 2004 roku było 3 234 tys., za granicą pozostał średnio co ósmy z nich (12,7 proc.). Tak duży ubytek ludności młodej, a przede wszystkim w wieku najwyższej płodności, będzie przyspieszać proces starzenia się ludności Polski i będzie miał niebagatelną konsekwencję dla reprodukcji ludności. Jeśli bowiem ubytek ten okaza się trwały, powstanie swego rodzaju luka pokoleniowa dotycząca nie tylko najliczniejszych roczników zaangażowanych w emigrację poakcesyjną (to jest urodzonych w okresie 1975-1988), ale również ich dzieci, które przyjdą na świat za granicą⁵. Pogłębi to proces starzenia się ludności Polski, który wynika nie tylko z wydłużania się przeciętnego trwania życia, ale również (a może nawet przede wszystkim) ze spadku liczby urodzeń i zmniejszania się roczników dzieci i młodzieży.

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Wykres 1. Liczba emigrantów* (w tym: liczba mężczyzn), lata 2004-2011 (w tys.)


Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie BAEL oraz GUS (2012a).


Podsumowanie

Analiza zawarta w niniejszym artykule uzupełnia opublikowane dotychczas analizy dotyczące selektywności procesów migracyjnych, w które angażują się Polacy. Po raz kolejny potwierdziła się teza, iż we wczesnym okresie poakcesyjnym (lata 2004-2008) zarówno wyjazdy, jak i powroty były selektywne ze względu na pewne cechy społeczno-demograficzne. W wypadku emigracji selektywność dotyczyła osób młodych, z niższym bądź średnim poziomem wykształcenia, mieszkańców wsi i osób związanych z rolnictwem. W wypadku migracji powrotnej selektywność odnosiła się przede wszystkim do osób z wykształceniem wyższym lub co najmniej podstawowym. Analiza udowodniła też istnienie mechanizmu wypłukiwania ludności Polski z pewnych grup społeczno-demograficznych, cechujących się stosunkowo wysoką skłonnością do emigracji i stosunkowo niską skłonnością do powrotów. Dotyczyło to osób bardzo młodych (do 24 roku życia), z wykształceniem politycznym i średnim (w tym średnim zawodowym), mieszkańców wsi, osób związanych z rolnictwem, mieszkańców Małopolski i Podkarpaccia. Może to oznaczać, że emigracja jest szczególnie opłacalna, lub raczej, że pozostanie w Polsce jest stosunkowo najmniej opłacalne, dla osób
o wykształceniu średnim i/lub zamieszkujących tereny wiejskie, na których trudno znaleźć zatrudnienie. Wyniki te korespondują z hipotezą M. Okólskiego (2011, 2012; por. również Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009; Anacka, Okólski 2010) mówiącą o rozgéuszającej roli polskiej emigracji poakcesyjnej, to znaczy realokacji ekonomicznie „zbędnej” siły roboczej z sektorów pozarynkowych (takich jak gospodarstwa quasi-chłopskie) ku sektorom i regionom zgłaszającym popyt na ową siłę. W okresie transformacji ustrojowej polskie miasta zgłaszały ograniczony popyt na siłę roboczą z terenów wiejskich i z zagranicy, a dodatkowo migracje hamowały wysokie koszty osiedlania się na terenach miejskich i podmiejskich. Za wcześnie na jednoznaczne wnioski o trwałości emigracji poakcesyjnej i roli procesu wypłukiwania dla populacji Polski, lokalnych społeczności wysyłających i samych migrantów, jednak przedstawione wstępne wyniki mogą przemawiać na korzyść hipotezy o rozgéuszeniu.

Przypisy

1 Wynikało to z liczebności zbioru danych – zbyt małej, by wnioskować o charakterze napływu powrot- nego do Polski w krótszym okresie.

2 W latach 2004-2005 osoby uznawane były za czasowo nieobecne, jeśli przebywały za granicą co najmniej 2 miesiące; począwszy od roku 2006 dolną cezurą jest okres trzymiesięczny.

3 Pomimo tego, że BAEL można uznać za jedno z najbardziej wartościowych źródeł informacji o statystycznych cechach populacji współcześnie migrujących Polaków, nie jest ono pozbawione wad. Do najważniejszych należy fakt, iż dane te zbierane są podczas bezpośrednich wywiadów ankietowych, a informacje o migrujących członkach gospodarstwa domowego pozyskiwane są od innych jego członków. W ten sposób wszelkim statystykom wymyka się zapewne istotna grupa emigrantów, którzy tworzyli w Polsce jednoosobowe gospodarstwa domowe lub którzy wyjechali za granicę z całymi rodzinami, nie pozostawiając w Polsce nikogo, kto mógłby udzielić ankieterom informacji na ich temat. Dane BAEL dotyczące przyczyn niezrealizowania wywiadów nie pozwalają na analizę oszacowania obciążenia wyliczonych współczynników (por. Anacka, Fihel 2012), co należy mieć na uwadze, zapoznając się z dalszą treścią artykułu.

4 Do wszystkich wyliczeń zostały zastosowane wagi przypisywane gospodarstwom domowym, z których pochodzili ankieterowie reprezentujący poszczególne subpopulacje.

5 Czytelnikowi należy się słowo komentarza na temat różnic pomiędzy wynikami zamieszczonymi w niniejszym artykule a wynikami zawartymi w niedawno wydanej publikacji, w której rozwija się podobne zagadnienia (Anacka, Fihel 2012). Na podstawie danych pochodzących z regularnie przeprowadzanego sondażu BAEL (nie zaś z badania modułowego, z którego dane wykorzystywane są w tym artykule) stwierdzono m.in., że w latach 1999-2009 dodatnią selektywność dla strumienia migracji powrotnej można było zaobserwować w wypadku osób pochodzących z obszarów wiejskich, a także osób z wykształceniem zasadniczym zawodowym (co zarysowuje odmienny obraz migranta powrotnego niż przedstawiony w niniejszym tekście). Należy wymienić go najmniej dwa powody występowania tej po- zornej rozbętności. Po pierwsze, w obu przypadkach znacząco różni się okres badania – lata 1999-2009 w dużej mierze obejmuje okres przedakcesyjny, odmienny pod względem charakterystyki migrantów niż lata późniejsze. Po drugie zaś, można przypuszczać, że w próbce, która poświęciła się wyczerpaniu współczynników selektywności dla owego dłuższego okresu, znalazło się więcej osób zaznaczających w stosunkowo krótkotrwającą, ale powtarzalną (sezonową) mobilność zarobkową. Służące za podstawę przedstawianej tu analizy badanie modułowe BAEL zostało przeprowadzone w drugim kwartale roku, czyli w okresie, kiedy część migrantów sezonyowych jest nieobecna w kraju.
Proces ten już się zapewne rozpoczął – począwszy od 2009 roku w Wielkiej Brytanii notuje się rekordową liczbę urodzeń wśród imigrantów z Polski. W 2011 roku Polki urodziły tam 23 tys. dzieci a trend liczby urodzeń był wzrostowy (por. ONS 2012); w tym samym czasie w Polsce liczba urodzeń wyniosła 388 tys. i była niższa niż w poprzednich latach (GUS 2012b).

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Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland

Agnieszka Fihel, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Renata Stefańska

The article presents the main recent developments in migration policy and migration trends to and from Poland. Polish migration policy has been becoming more open to immigrants in the years 2009-2011, especially immigrants needed by the Polish economy. At the same time, according to the new migration strategy, it is going to devote more attention to the issue of immigrants’ integration. As for trends in international migration, the trans-border mobility remained elevated and intensified, among others due to agreements on the Local Border Traffic with the Eastern neighbours. Since 2006 the emigration for a permanent stay has been decreasing and immigration for a permanent stay has been increasing, mostly due to return migration of Polish citizens, but still, in 2010 a negative net migration was registered. The number of long-term Polish emigrants stabilized, while the number of short-term emigrants declined abruptly, which suggests that Poland is already in a ‘late’ or ‘mature’ phase of post-accession emigration, characterized by stabilization of the outflow of settlement type and intensification of return migration. The latter is to some extent reflected by the statistics referring to immigration for a permanent stay and to mixed marriages. Labour immigration and foreign employment in Poland have been increasing constantly over recent years.

Keywords: international migration, emigration, immigration, migration policy, Poland, SOPEMI report

1. Introduction

The acronym SOPEMI stands for the French name of Système d’observation permanente des migrations (in English: Continuous Reporting System on Migration), established in 1973 by the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As its long-standing chairman Jean-Pierre Garson said, the system was ‘to provide the OECD member countries with a mechanism for the timely sharing of information on international migration’ (OECD 2011: 5). In practice, the SOPEMI network consists of national experts reporting on international migration flows and policies incorporated in their respective states, and the OECD Secretariat experts carrying out analytical and synthetic studies published as annual International Migration Outlook. Statistical data provided by national

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1 We would like to express our gratitude to Marta Anacka who laboriously collected the data on international migration for Poland for this study.

ii Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw.
experts were recently made available at the OECD Secretariat webpage as the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (extended to many non-OECD countries) and International Migration Database.

Since 1990 Polish experts have been involved in the cooperation within the SOPEMI network. The activities have included preparing annual reports for Poland (in 1990, exceptionally, also for other post-communist countries) and participating in annual sessions of SOPEMI experts at the OECD Secretariat’s headquarters in Paris. In 1996 Poland became a full member state of the OECD. From the very beginning of cooperation national reports for Poland were prepared by members of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, that is – in chronological order – by Marek Okólski (1990-2002), Ewa Kępińska (2001-2007), and a team consisting of Marta Anacka, Agnieszka Fihel, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Renata Stefańska (from 2009 on) and very recently (2012), Paweł Dąbrowski. Annual SOPEMI reports for Poland have also been published on-line in the CMR Working Papers series. In line with the OECD standards, reports include sections concerned with economic developments in recent years, changes in migration policy, characteristics of trans-border mobility, inflow and outflow. Recent reports have been complemented with analytical parts each year devoted to a different important topic referring to international migration in Poland. The whole has been complemented with an extended statistical annex that cannot be presented here due to space limitations.

In this article we follow the standards developed for national SOPEMI reports. In Section 2 we discuss recent developments in migration policy, in Section 3 we present the most important statistical data on international migration for Poland. The data were collected from many sources: the Border Guard, Central Population Register, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Office for Foreigners, and, complementary, the Institute for Tourism and Labour Force Survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Poland. Finally, we present characteristics of recent trans-border mobility (Section 4), outflow from Poland (Section 5) and inflow to Poland (Section 6). Thanks to employment of various and comprehensive statistical data this study gives a complete picture of current trends in international migration in Poland. The scope of the study overwhelms developments in the migration policy up to 2011 (including 2011) and developments in the migration trends up to first months of 2011 for which the source data was already available.

2. Migration and integration policy

2.1. Migration policy developments

The 2009-2011 period could be characterized by relatively many legislative and political initiatives taken in the field of migration. One of the most important events concerning Poland’s migration policy was adoption of the first comprehensive strategic document regarding this topic entitled ‘The Polish migration policy: current state of play and further actions’. The document was adopted – after broad social consultations – on 20 July 2011 by the inter-ministerial Committee on Migration, the consultative and advisory body to the Prime Minister. General message of the document is that Poland should be more open for immigrants with skills needed on the Polish labour market and not causing integration problems. At the same time Poland should prevent abuse of immigration system. Currently, the document is awaiting approval by the Council of Ministers.

In addition to adoption of the strategic document that will have a crucial impact on the state’s migration policy in the future, in years 2009-2011 several amendments in the law relating to various aspects of migration policy were enacted. The most important legal developments concerning migration issues in the reported period are presented below.
2.2. Simplification of employment procedure for foreigners

As a rule, foreigners need work permits in order to be employed in Poland. In February 2009 important amendment to the Act on promotion of employment and labour market institutions entered into force, which greatly facilitated foreigners’ access to the Polish labour market. The most important change simplifying and shortening the procedure for issuing work permits was abolition of the obligation to apply for a work permit promise, before obtaining a work permit. Also, a fee for issuing a decision on granting a work permit was substantially reduced – to 50 zlotys for work permits issued for a period up to three months, 100 zlotys for work permits issued for a period exceeding three months, and 200 zlotys for work permits concerning pursuing export services. Previously, this fee was several times higher and it constituted an equivalent of a minimum wage. On the basis of the amended Act the list of foreigners automatically granted work permits (i.e. without labour market test) was extended with, among others, the following categories: foreigners employed in an occupation which is on the list of deficit occupations in a given region (each year determined by the region’s governor in consultation with social partners); foreigners who graduated high schools in Poland or in the other European Economic Area countries or in Switzerland in the period of three years preceding submitting application for a work permit; foreigners legally residing in Poland for three years preceding application for a work permit. The list of foreigners released from the obligation to possess a work permit was also expanded. The full access to the Polish labour market was granted to, among others, students and graduates of Polish full-time higher education studies and full-time doctorate studies in Polish universities.

Besides facilities, the amended Act on promotion of employment and labour market institutions introduced provisions aimed at preventing social dumping by specifying that foreigners’ salaries should not be lower than received by Polish citizens working on similar positions.

2.3. Simplified employment system for foreign workers from the East

Additional facilities concerning access to the Polish labour market were designed specifically for workers from the East. Poland has a simplified employment system for labour migrants from selected Eastern European countries since 2006. Initially, it was addressed only to foreigners from countries bordering Poland and it was limited to agriculture. Since 2009 the simplified procedure relates not only to nationals of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, but also to nationals of Moldova and Georgia and it embraces all sectors of economy. Residents of these countries can work in Poland without a work permit up to six months during twelve consecutive months (previously, only three months during six months) on the basis of a declaration of employer on the intention to employ a foreigner, registered at the local labour office.

On 28 July 2011 regulations imposing new information obligations for employers recruiting foreign workers from the East under the simplified procedure entered into force. Occupation, place of employment, date for start of work and period of work performance, amount of salary proposed, and even the type of contract to be concluded with a foreigner – all this detailed information employers are obliged to provide in declarations on the intention to employ a foreigner. The employers are also required to confirm that they had acquainted with provisions governing employment of foreigners and that they are aware that all information on immigrants they employ may be provided to the Border Guard, the National Labour Inspectorate or the Police. The aim of the amendments is to improve monitoring of simplified employment system for foreign workers from the East and to respond to exploitation of the system for purposes other than legal employment, such as e.g. ‘trade’ in declarations of Polish employers.
2.4. Amnesty for foreigners

On 28 July 2011 the Polish Parliament passed the Act on legalisation of stay of some foreigners in the territory of Poland.¹ On the basis of the new law from 1 January 2012 to 2 July 2012 foreigners living in Poland illegally will have an opportunity to legalize their stay. Amnesty (so called abolition) will be available to all foreigners whose continuous stay in Poland is illegal at least since 20 December 2007, or since 1 January 2010 in the case of foreigners who prior to that date were granted a final decision on refusal to award the refugee status along with the decision on expulsion. Moreover, an opportunity to legalize their stay in Poland will gain foreigners for whom on 1 January 2010 next proceedings for the award of the refugee status were carried out. It is worth to stress out that the new Act on abolition is very liberal – it does not envisage any economic requirements for amnesty applicants. Under the abolition Act foreigners will be granted a permit for a fixed period valid for two years. During this period they will be entitled to work in Poland without a work permit, but only on the basis of an employment contract (not civil law agreement such as e.g. commission contract or contract for a specific task), which is not easy to obtain even in the case of Polish nationals.

2.5. Local border traffic with Ukraine, Belarus and the Kaliningrad District

On 1 July 2009 the Polish-Ukrainian local border traffic (LBT) agreement came into force (signed in 2008). On the basis of this agreement Ukrainian nationals, residing in border zone – area that extends no more than 30 kilometers from the border – do not need visas, but only local border traffic permits in order to enter Poland and to stay in the border area of Poland (Polish nationals are entitled to visa-free travels to Ukraine, so provisions of the LBT agreement are not very important from their point of view). Such a permit entitles to a multiple border crossing under the local border traffic regime. A maximum duration of each uninterrupted stay on the basis of this document may not exceed 60 days. Persons entitled to obtain the LBT permit must have documented permanent residence for a period not shorter than three years in one of 1 545 towns and villages from the Volyn, Lvov (without Lvov) and Zakarpackie oblast (ca. 1.5 million residents) and possess medical insurance policy valid throughout the period of stay. Similar LBT agreement was signed by Poland and Belarus in 2010. So far, however, due to political reasons, the agreement has not been ratified by the Belarusian side. On 14 December 2011, agreement on the LBT encompassing the entire Kaliningrad District was signed by the Polish and Russian authorities. It will enter into force by mid-2012.

2.6. Relocation and resettlement of refugees to Poland

On 28 July 2011 the Polish Parliament adopted amendments to the Act on providing foreigners with protection within the territory of the Republic of Poland, which made possible relocation to Poland refugees from the other European Union member states and resettlement from third countries to Poland foreigners recognized as refugees by the UNHCR. A number of foreigners relocated or resettled to Poland in a given year, states from which foreigners would come and the amount of funds allocated to cover the costs of relocation or resettlement will be specified by the Polish government. Thus, participation of Poland in these solidarity programs will not contribute to uncontrolled influx of forced migrants to Poland.
2.7. Policy on admitting Chechen refugees

In 2010, the number of Russian nationals declaring Chechen nationality granted international protection in Poland dropped abruptly, as compared to the previous year. While in 2009 Chechens obtained 101 positive decisions granting refugee status and 2 338 positive decisions granting subsidiary protection, one year later – appropriately – only 43 (more than 2 times less) and 222 (more than 10 times less). Sharp decline started in April 2009. According to the Office for Foreigners large number of refusals to grant Chechens international protection stems from two main reasons: changed profile of asylum seekers (larger proportion of fugitives for economic reasons) and changed situation in the country of origin (safety of civilians in Chechnya – due to, among others, completion of military actions – improved considerably). The Office points out also the fact of completion of anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. However, according to some NGO activists change of the refugee policy towards Chechens is associated rather with the warming of political relations between Poland and Russia than with considerable improvement of situation in Chechnya.

2.8. Facilitated access to education for immigrant children

On 1 January 2010 the amended Act on education system facilitating access to education for foreign children came into force. It granted all foreign children – including children staying in Poland illegally – the right to free-of-charge education at general secondary, technical secondary and basic vocational public schools. Previously, children from non-EU countries could attend schools on the same rules as Polish nationals only at the level of primary and lower secondary schools (gymnasiums). Another important change was entitling foreign pupils who do not know Polish language well to a year-long help of the teacher’s assistant during lessons at school (a person speaking the language of immigrant children).

2.9. Draft bill on Polish citizenship

On 2 April 2009 the Polish Parliament passed a new Act on Polish citizenship. The Act has not entered into force yet because the President had referred it to the Constitutional Tribunal with a request for consideration of the constitutionality of a provision extending the possibility of acquiring Polish citizenship under administrative procedure, i.e. by the decision on acknowledgement as a Polish citizen, taken by the governor of the region. The most important amendment is granting all foreigners the right to apply for acknowledgement as a Polish citizen by the governor of the region. Hitherto, the acknowledgement procedure is accessible only to stateless persons and persons with undetermined citizenship. According to the draft bill the decision on acknowledgement will be taken by regional governors almost automatically provided that the applicant will fulfill several conditions: 3-year residence in Poland on the basis of a permanent residence permit (shorter in case of, among others, people of Polish origin and refugees), providing proof of ensured accommodation as well as maintenance means, complying with the Polish law and a completely new requirement – possessing knowledge of the Polish language confirmed by a state certificate. Currently, majority of foreigners have access only to the conferment procedure (citizenship granted by the President), which is very discretionary. Moreover, in the light of the new act possessing multiple citizenship will be allowed. Another great novelty is introduction of a possibility of restoration of Polish citizenship granted to persons, who lost it on the basis of previous acts on Polish citizenship, e.g. due to political reasons in the period of the Polish People’s Republic.
2.10. Future developments

During the reported period several new regulations concerning migration issues were elaborated, among which the most important are: the new Act on foreigners and the Act on sanctions against entities who employ third-country nationals in breach of legal provisions. The most important amendments set out in the draft assumptions for the new Act on foreigners include: introduction of a single permit covering both residence and work; extending from two to three years a maximal period for which a permit for a fixed period may be issued; imposing a requirement of a basic knowledge of Polish language (A2 level) to be granted permanent residence permit. The bill on sanctions against entities that employ third-country nationals in breach of legal provisions envisages severe penalties for employing foreigners illegally residing in Poland, even penalty of imprisonment.

As is clear from the above, the Polish migration policy has been becoming more open to immigrants in recent years, especially immigrants needed by the Polish economy. It facilitates the entry and access to the Polish labour market for desired categories of foreigners. At the same time, according to the new migration strategy it is planned to devote more attention to the issue of immigrants’ integration, what is reflected e.g. in the plans to introduce, on the one hand, voluntary integration courses for all categories of foreigners, and on the other hand, knowledge of Polish language requirement in order to obtain permanent residence permit and Polish citizenship.

3. Sources of statistical data on international migration

Measurement of migration (regarding both size of flows and stocks of migrants) is commonly acknowledged as one of the most critical areas in migration research. This point is particularly well taken in case of Poland and this is due to two reasons. Firstly, assessment of the scale of migration is complicated in case of those countries where majority of population movements constitute short-term of circular mobility (as it is in case of Central and Eastern European countries). Secondly, since 2004 enlargement and introduction of free migration regime the statistical control over migratory flows is far more complicated than before.

Still, the Central Population Register (so-called PESEL) carried out by the Central Statistical Office of Poland, is considered as the basic and official statistical source used to assess international migration from (and into) Poland. It includes all residents of the country and, consequently, records entries of immigrants and exits of emigrants. However, definitions applied are crucial here. Immigrants are defined as persons who have arrived from abroad and have been registered as permanent residents in any basic administrative unit of Poland. Emigrants are defined as persons who moved with an intention to settle abroad and delisted themselves from their permanent place of residence in Poland. The problem is that in Poland – similarly as in many other countries – the number of those who complete the act of de-registration even if they do migrate remains relatively low. As a consequence, there is a significant number of persons who are counted as permanent residents of Poland even if have de facto ceased to live in Poland (de iure residents and de facto migrants). This is the reason why official data on registered migration from Poland are treated as non reliable and this was also the main incentive to make an attempt to provide more reliable data on scale and structure of Polish mobility. The outcome of these efforts is regularly presented (since 2006, on annual basis) estimate of the stock of permanent residents of Poland staying temporarily abroad (i.e. de facto migrants) prepared and published by the Central Statistical Office (CSO 2011b). Contrary to the category of ‘officially registered emigrants’ a category of ‘temporary migrants’ is being used which concerns permanent residents who have stayed in a foreign country for longer than three months.
The second unique feature of the Polish statistics on migration is the reference to the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS), conducted by the Central Statistical Office of Poland, as one of potential sources of information. This data, based on relatively big samples (recently over 50 thousand households), refers to persons aged 15 years and more who are still treated as members of households residing in Poland. Despite a large range of this survey, it has at least three disadvantages as the source of information on international migration. First, the sample of migrants does not include migrants who moved abroad accompanied by whole households, neither those staying abroad for shorter than three months (till 2006 for shorter than two months). Secondly, LFS was created for the purposes of the labour market analysis and the sample design is subordinated to this particular task. Due to above presented reasons the Central Statistical Office holds a position that data on Poles staying temporarily abroad are not representative for the total population and should be analyzed and interpreted with caution. Third, the pollsters were not trained to interview foreigners so the presence of the latter may not be documented in all cases. Thus LFS data cannot provide information on real scale of migration, however – as proven by statistical tests – it may serve as a very good data source on migration dynamics and its structural features (see particularly 2009 SOPEMI Report for Poland, Kaczmarchzyk et al. 2011).

4. Trans-border mobility

The scale on trans-border mobility at Polish borders is estimated by the Institute for Tourism on the basis of the Border Guard reports and the CSO’s information on accommodation of foreigners in Polish hotels. After the communist period Poland experienced an outburst of trans-border mobility reaching its peak in 1995 with almost 90 million of arrivals of foreigners. This number dropped to about 51 million in 1998, mostly due to so-called Russian crisis and accompanying economic downturn in Poland, as well as due to coming into force of the new Act on foreigners, significantly tightening the entry conditions and border controls. However, since the Polish accession into the European Union in 2004 the number of arrivals has remained relatively stable at the level of 50-60 million annually (Figure 1). In 2009 a small drop was registered, followed by an increase in 2010 (54 and 58 million border crossings, respectively).

The arrivals to Poland have been in vast majority undertaken by the European Union citizens. In 2010, the most recent year for which detailed data is available, 81 per cent (47 385) of arrivals constituted those persecuted by the citizens of EU member states: 49 per cent citizens of the ‘old 15’, and 32 per cent of the new member states. It is self-evident that the biggest numbers of arrivals to Poland have been noted in case of citizens of neighboring countries in the Schengen area (88 per cent of total): in 2010 44 per cent of entries referred to German citizens, 16 per cent to Czech Republic citizens, 10 per cent to Slovak citizens, 5 per cent to Lithuanian citizens. As for the foreigners from outside of the Schengen area, the main groups arriving to Poland were constituted by the citizens of Ukraine (9 per cent of arrivals) and of Belarus (5 per cent).

In 2010 the Border Guard refused to let 23 758 foreigners (16 864 in 2008 and 26 941 in 2009), mostly due to lack of valid visa or other proper documents. This concerned mostly the citizens of Ukraine (11 802 persons), followed by citizens of Belarus (4 737), Russia (3 542) and Georgia (2 880). In 2010 2 349 persons have been apprehended while crossing or attempting to cross the border illegally (in 2009 – 3 581, a decline by 34 per cent). Most of apprehensions referred to the non-EU citizens (92 per cent) and a half of apprehensions involved the citizens of Ukraine (1 269 persons, 54 per cent). As a rule, apprehensions take place slightly more often at the external EU border (58 per cent in 2010), as compared to the internal border. It is worth mention that the number of apprehensions has been constantly diminishing over the last years.
Figure 1. Arrivals of foreigners to Poland, 1980-2010, in million

Source: own elaboration based on the Border Guard and the Institute for Tourism data.

The Polish accession to the Schengen area imposed on non-EU citizens the obligation of having a visa in order to enter Poland. In order to facilitate the trans-border mobility the governments of Poland and Ukraine signed the Local Border Traffic (LBT) Agreement (see Section 2.5), in force since 1st of July 2009, that concerns residents of a strip of land located up to 50 km from the border. The Agreement is of great importance for the Ukrainian citizens, as the Polish citizens are allowed to a non-visa stay in Ukraine lasting up incessantly to 60 days. Statistical data on trans-border mobility is available at the website of the Border Guard of Poland, whereas the CSO (2011a) provides additional information on expenses of Ukrainian citizens in Poland. The data is gathered only with regard to the Ukrainian citizens.

According to the Border Guard of Poland, in the period July-December 2009 Ukrainian citizens crossed the Polish border 345 thousand times (Figure 2) on the basis of the Agreement on the Local Border Traffic. In 2010 (January-December) this number increased to 3 596 thousand, whereas in the first quarter of 2011 it was already 1 218 thousand (as compared to 539 thousand in the first quarter of 2010). The majority of foreigners crossed the border a few times a week (71 per cent), 10 per cent crossed the border every day (CSO 2011a). The scale of expenses spent by the Ukrainian citizens in Poland increased and the number of new enterprises registered in the Polish border region rose as compared to the regions in Poland close to Russia and Belarus. Therefore, a similar agreement is to be concluded with Belarus; it was signed by the government of Poland on February 12th, 2010 and it has not been ratified yet by the Belarusian part. In December 2011 similar agreement concerning Kaliningrad District has been adopted and it is expected that it will come into force by mid-2012 (see Section 2.5).
5. Migration from Poland

5.1. Registered in- and outflows

According to the Central Population Register, in 2010 the declining trend in the number of Polish emigrants continued fourth year in a row. The number of emigrants was a high as 17.4 thousand, i.e. 6.5 per cent smaller than in previous year and almost three times smaller than in the peak 2006 year (Figure 3). In turn, the number of those persons who immigrate to Poland remains relatively stable over last few years. In 2010 it amounted to 15.2 thousand and it meant almost 13 per cent decrease as compared to 2009, but slightly higher than in 2007 and 2008. As a consequence, in 2010 officially registered net outflow was as high as 2.1 thousand, that is 30 times higher than in 2009 and over 17 times higher than in 2006. This was mostly due to the decrease in scale of the registered outflow and a slow increase of immigration.

As for structural features of the outflow, Polish registered emigration is feminized: in 2010 the share of women among all emigrants amounted to 54 per cent. Traditionally, young persons are those who dominate among all registered emigrants. In 2010 the share of persons aged 20-39 was as high as 48 per cent in case of males and close to 50 per cent in case of females. The share of persons aged 0-14, i.e. accompanying dependents remained relatively high, 14 per cent for men and 12 per cent for women. In terms of regions of origin of Polish emigrants, in 2010 a decline was noted in case of all Polish regions. However, the distribution of sending regions remained largely unchanged as compared to previous years: the highest share of migrants originated from Śląskie region (voivodship) (22.8 per cent of all permanent migrants), Dolnośląskie region (11.6 per cent) and Opolskie region (10.6 per cent). It is important to note that relative dominance of these three regions clearly shows that data on registered flows refers to particular types of mobility only, traditional migratory flows based mainly on ethnic or kinship linkages with abroad.
In 2010 EU-27 countries dominated among destinations of Polish permanent migrants and their share was as high as 81 per cent. The main destination remains Germany targeted by around 39 per cent of all registered emigrants (12 per cent decrease noted as compared to 2009). The next main destination include: the United Kingdom (20 per cent of all emigrants, less than 1 per cent decrease noted) and United States (10 per cent, negligible increase noted) and the Netherlands (4 per cent, 2 per cent decrease noted). Decline in number of emigrants was recorded in most destinations. The only exceptions include Belgium, Czech Republic, Iceland, Australia and the United States. In all cases, however, the scale of change was (very) low.
5.2. Stock of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad according to the CSO estimate

Since 2006 the estimates presented by the Central Statistical Office of Poland serve as the most reliable and accurate data on emigrants’ stocks. Table 1 presents the outcomes of the most recent estimate published in October 2011.

Table 1. Polish citizens staying abroad for longer than three months (two months until 2006) (in thousand) and percentage changes as compared to the previous year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2002 (May) – Census</th>
<th>2004(^a)</th>
<th>2005(^a)</th>
<th>2006(^a)</th>
<th>2007(^a)</th>
<th>2008(^a)</th>
<th>2009(^a)</th>
<th>2010(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>786</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 450</td>
<td>1 950</td>
<td>2 270</td>
<td>2 210</td>
<td>2 100</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1 170</td>
<td>1 550</td>
<td>1 860</td>
<td>1 820</td>
<td>1 690</td>
<td>1 607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>294</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>465</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>595</td>
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**Percentage change as compared with previous year\(^b\)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>EU27</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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<th>Italy</th>
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<td>16.4</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>32.5</td>
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<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>36.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>.</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>-8.5</td>
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<td>-42.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(.) No data available.

\(^a\) As for the end of a given year.

\(^b\) 2002-2004 changes not reported due to lack of full data comparability.

Source: CSO (2011b).
The above-presented data documents a spectacular development of migration process in the early post-accession period: between 2004 and the end of 2007 the number of temporary Polish migrants increased by almost 1.5 million and reached 2.3 million (6.6 per cent of the total population). Since then a gradual decline in number of Poles staying temporarily abroad has been noted. The most recent estimate (accounting for the stock in 2010) was based already on the first outcomes of 2011 National Census, which makes this particular information relatively reliable. According to the presented data since 2008 a gradual decrease in scale of migration was noted, which can be attributed do the economic downturn in majority of migrants’ destinations. A slight decline in number of persons staying abroad was observed already in 2008 (2.6 per cent), in next year it amounted to 5 per cent and the stock of temporary migrants was estimated at 2.1 million. The largest scale of decline was noted in case of Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands (in 2009) and Spain (in 2010), i.e. particularly in those countries which were most seriously hit by the economic crisis. In 2010 the number of temporary migrants staying abroad remains relatively high (2 million). Most of those persons reside in the EU-27 countries (80 per cent). Notwithstanding recent changes in the stock of persons staying abroad, structure of destination countries in the post-accession period has been relatively stable (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Stock of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad by destination country*, in thousand – upper panel and as % of the total – lower panel

*As for the end of a given year.
Source: own elaboration based on the CSO data (2011b).
After the Polish accession into the European Union in 2004 the most important destination country became the United Kingdom hosting over 29 per cent of all temporary migrants. Before the accession Germany used to be the most important destination, hosting almost 40 per cent of all Polish migrants in 2004. After 2004 this country became the second most important destination (22 per cent). Interestingly, situation did not change significantly even in 2011 when transitory arrangements with respect to German (and Austrian) labour market were abolished: according to available data the number of Polish migrants staying in Germany increased by roughly 40 thousand. United Kingdom and Germany are followed by Ireland (7 per cent of all migrants), the Netherlands (5 per cent) and Italy (5 per cent). Recent data indicate significant decreases in case of countries suffering severe economic crisis, i.e. Ireland and Spain.

5.3. Migration from Poland according to LFS

As noted already even if the LFS data is not fully representative with regard to the scale of migration, it may serve as reliable and useful tool to follow dynamics and structural features of temporary migration from Poland. Figure 5 presents the estimates of number of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad for longer than three months.

![Figure 5. Stock of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad according to Labour Force Survey, 1994-2011 (2nd quarter) – absolute numbers (in thousand) and year-to-year change](image)

Source: own elaboration based on the LFS data.

On the basis of the LFS data we can conclude the following:
- since 2007 serious decline in number of persons indicated in the LFS as temporary migrants was noted; in fact, in the third quarter of 2010 the number of migrants was about the same as in 2004 (the same quarter) and increased only slightly since then; first two quarters of 2011 witnessed an increase in scale of migration but it is too early to describe it in terms of a new trend in migratory behavior;
• notwithstanding changes in global economic climate, most of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad take up employment at destinations (since 2006 more than 90 per cent of all migrants, around 91 per cent in the most recent quarters) and thus can be described as ‘typical’ labour migrants;

• temporary migrants from Poland are mostly men who constituted around 55 per cent of all migrants in the 1990s and over 60 per cent in last few years – in 2010-2011 the share of male migrants was as high as 62-64 per cent; this indicates different pattern of migration than shown by the register data on permanent migration from Poland;

• temporary character of the recent migration from Poland is its interesting feature: a spectacular increase in number of migrants noted in the early post-accession phase was mostly due to increase in number of short-term migrants, i.e. migrants staying abroad for longer than 3 but shorter than 12 months. The share of those migrants in the total number was as high as 60 per cent between mid-2004 and mid-2006. In 2007 a steady decline in number of short-term migrants was noted, to around 70-80 thousand persons (22-25 per cent of all migrants) in 2011 (second quarter). Also, long-term migration figures increased from 100 thousand in late 2003 to 230 thousand in 2011 (Figure 6);

Figure 6. Stock of Polish migrants staying temporarily abroad according to Labour Force Survey, 1994-2011 (2nd quarter)

Source: own elaboration based on the LFS data.

• the data for 2009 and 2010 have shown that number of long-term migrants stabilized while sharp decline in number of short-term migrants was noted; this suggested that Poland was already in ‘late’ or ‘mature’ phase of post-accession migration. At this stage the stock of Polish emigrants could split into a group of temporary migrants who started to meet their decisions on return and to the other group which
might decide to settle abroad; recent changes however may indicate that due to economic downturn one may expect further changes in migratory behavior of Poles.

6. Immigrants in Poland

6.1. Flows of foreigners according to the Central Population Register

It should be recalled from the Section 3 that the Central Population Register provides the information on persons (both Polish nationals and foreign nationals) who came from abroad and registered for a permanent stay in Poland. Thus, this data source concerns not only immigrants, but also Polish nationals.

In general, in the period 2001-2010 112.8 thousand persons registered in Poland for a permanent stay (Table 2). In 2010 the number of permanent immigrants was 15 246 persons, which was by 12 per cent less than in the previous year. The majority arrived from the countries of European Union (11 115 persons, 73 per cent), mostly the ‘old-15’ member states (10 928 persons, 72 per cent). Just like in the previous year, the most important source countries were United Kingdom (4 409), Germany (2 677), the United States (1 601 persons) and Ireland (1 200). Since these are main destinations for Polish emigrants, this data seems to include information rather on the return migration or migration of persons with the Polish descent than on inflow of foreigners. Unfortunately, the PESEL register does not distinguish nationals of Poland from foreigners and further conclusion can be only a speculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of previous residence</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10 802</td>
<td>14 995</td>
<td>15 275</td>
<td>17 424</td>
<td>15 246</td>
<td>4 864</td>
<td>6 492</td>
<td>6 235</td>
<td>6 235</td>
<td>6 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>6 792</td>
<td>10 463</td>
<td>10 692</td>
<td>12 751</td>
<td>10 928</td>
<td>2 811</td>
<td>4 185</td>
<td>4 049</td>
<td>4 129</td>
<td>4 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>6 908</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>10 817</td>
<td>12 918</td>
<td>11 091</td>
<td>2 863</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>4 107</td>
<td>4 221</td>
<td>4 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>10 840</td>
<td>12 934</td>
<td>11 115</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>4 122</td>
<td>4 226</td>
<td>4 280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(. ) No data available.


The proportion of women in the inflow remains in the recent years stable; in 2010 it was 41 per cent. Persons registering in Poland for a permanent stay are relatively young, with a significant share of persons aged less than 30 years (61 per cent). Interestingly, in 2010 there was a large proportion of small children, aged under 4 (29 per cent, in 2009 22 per cent), which indicates, again, a return migration of Polish nationals for family reasons. The structure of provinces of destination in Poland has remained relatively stable in last few years: the most important were Śląskie (14 per cent of immigrants in 2010), Małopolskie (13 per cent), Dolnośląskie (12 per cent), Mazowieckie and Pomorskie (8 per cent each).

6.2. Stocks of foreigners and of temporary migrants

The Central Statistical Office estimates, on the basis of the Labour Force Survey, the stock of foreigners (aged 15 and over) residing in Poland. This data source should be treated with caution (see Section 3). The
Labour Force Survey revealed a very low scale of immigration to Poland. The number of foreign citizens aged 15 and over oscillated between 50 thousand in the 1\textsuperscript{st} quarter of 2010, 39 thousand in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} quarter and 42 thousand in the 4\textsuperscript{th} quarter (Table 3). In 2011 this number was estimated at 44 thousand in the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 41 thousand in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} quarter, which is rather a marginal number as for a country inhabited by 38 million persons. The figure referring to foreign born persons turned out to be much higher, 271 thousand at the beginning of 2011, because of the relocation of borders of Poland after the Second World War. For many citizens of Poland born in the pre-war period the place of birth ceased to be in 1945 within the Polish territory.

**Table 3. Estimates on the number of foreigners based on the Labour Force Survey\(^a\), 2010-2011 (in thousand)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of LFS</th>
<th>Non-Polish citizens</th>
<th>Foreign born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st quarter</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd quarter</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd quarter</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th quarter</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st quarter</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd quarter</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Data refers to foreigners living in individual dwellings.


The information on stock of temporary migrants was derived from the Central Population Register that concerns persons (both foreigners and Polish nationals) who arrived from abroad and registered for a temporary stay of above three months in Poland. In 2009 this number was as high as 59 thousand, that is by 3 per cent more as compared to 2008 and by almost 27 per cent more than in 2007 (Table 4). This increase was both due to change in number of arriving foreigners as well as Polish nationals, but the percentage of the former in all temporary immigrants exceeded 90 per cent. In 2006-2009 Polish nationals constituted approximately 8-10 per cent of all temporary migrants. The main countries, from which temporary immigrants recruited, was Ukraine (14.2 thousand in 2009), followed by Belarus (4.1 thousand), Germany (3.2 thousand), Russian Federation (2.6 thousand), Vietnam (2.5 thousand) and Armenia (1.5 thousand). The Central Statistical Office intended to estimate the stock of temporary migrants in 2010 considering preliminary results of the 2011 Population Census; however, nothing was published at least until 2013.

Additionally, it is worth noting that in 2010 43 375 residence permits were issued, which was by 1 per cent more than in the previous year. Just like in previous period, they were mostly permits for a fixed period (30 451, 70 per cent) and registrations of stay of EU citizens (6 863, that is 16 per cent). The number of permits to settle was over 3 thousand. As of 31st December 2010 over 97 thousand foreigners from non-EU countries held valid permits for stay in Poland (Table 5).
### Table 4. Polish and foreign nationals who arrived from abroad and who registered for temporary stay above three months (above two months until 2006), 1997-2009 (as of December 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17 976</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27 542</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>39 303</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>43 623</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>43 501</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>47 255</td>
<td>24 218</td>
<td>23 037</td>
<td>35 446</td>
<td>11 809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>42 356</td>
<td>21 123</td>
<td>21 224</td>
<td>33 307</td>
<td>9 049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>44 733</td>
<td>22 776</td>
<td>21 957</td>
<td>34 823</td>
<td>9 910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42 417</td>
<td>21 618</td>
<td>20 799</td>
<td>33 274</td>
<td>9 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40 695</td>
<td>22 019</td>
<td>18 676</td>
<td>31 934</td>
<td>8 761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>46 778</td>
<td>26 521</td>
<td>20 257</td>
<td>37 019</td>
<td>9 759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>57 560</td>
<td>33 575</td>
<td>23 985</td>
<td>45 022</td>
<td>12 538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>59 233</td>
<td>33 992</td>
<td>25 241</td>
<td>45 953</td>
<td>13 280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Of which:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39 673</td>
<td>20 223</td>
<td>19 450</td>
<td>31 099</td>
<td>8 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37 585</td>
<td>20 396</td>
<td>17 189</td>
<td>29 510</td>
<td>8 075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42 824</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>52 804</td>
<td>31 117</td>
<td>21 687</td>
<td>41 576</td>
<td>11 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>53 552</td>
<td>31 012</td>
<td>22 540</td>
<td>41 812</td>
<td>11 740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( . ) No data available.

Source: Kępińska (2007), Central Statistical Office based on Central Population Register PESEL.

### Table 5. Number of valid residence permits held by non-EU citizens, as of 31st December 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of permit</th>
<th>Number of valid permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permit to settle</td>
<td>47 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit for a fixed period</td>
<td>37 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term resident’s EC residence permit</td>
<td>5 747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary protection</td>
<td>4 832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit for tolerated stay</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97 080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office for Foreigners.
6.3. Foreign labour

The information on labour performed in Poland by foreigners, provided by the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, refers to work permits granted individually to foreigners or to sub-contracting foreign companies operating in Poland.

The number of work permits granted in Poland has been increasing constantly since 2007 (Figure 7). As for work permits granted individually, in 2010 35 365 documents were issued, that is by 20 per cent more than in the previous year. It is expected that this rising trend will be maintained in 2011, since the number of work permits issued in the first half of 2011 exceeded the respective number for 2010 (18 396 to 15 628). In the first half of 2011 extensions constituted only 19 per cent of all work permits – the rest was constituted by documents issued for the first time. As for work permits granted to foreign sub-contracting companies, in 2010 1 756 documents were issued, which was by 43 per cent less than in the previous year. In the first half of 2011 already 2 230 work permits to foreign sub-contracting companies were granted.

*Figure 7. Work permits granted to foreigners by type, 1995-2011*\(^a\)

\(^a\) Data for 2011 from January to June only.

Source: own elaboration based on the National Labour Office and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy data.

In 2010 the main economic sectors of foreign employment were retail and wholesale trade (16 per cent of work permits), construction sector (16 per cent), manufacturing (11 per cent), professional, scientific and technical activities (9 per cent). As for the country of origin of foreign employees, in 2010 the largest groups were constituted by citizens of Ukraine (35 per cent), China (17 per cent), Vietnam (6 per cent), Nepal (6 per cent), Belarus (5 per cent), Turkey (4 per cent) and India (3 per cent). All the above-mentioned groups of foreign employees were dominated by qualified workers and workers performing simple jobs, employed...
mostly in retail and wholesale trade (the case of citizens of China, Ukraine, Vietnam), manufacturing (the domain of citizens of Ukraine), construction sector (Ukraine and China). An interesting new phenomenon concerned a large number of the citizens of Nepal, mostly employed in professional, scientific and technical activities. Such an abrupt inflow from this country and the peculiarity of sector of employment indicate that specific migration networks linking Poland and Nepal (and involving recruitment agencies) have been established. Apart from that, distributions of occupations, economic sectors and nationalities remain similar over the last years and the preliminary data for the first half of 2011 do not show any change. Over half of work permits granted individually in 2010 was issued in Mazowieckie, other regions attracting foreign workers were Śląskie, Pomorskie, Lubuskie.

In 2009 a simplified procedure of employment gave a way to increased inflow of foreign labour. According to the procedure, the citizens of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia do not need to receive a work permit in order to work up to six months during twelve consecutive months, on the basis of Polish employer’s declaration of intent to employ a foreigner. On the basis of such a declaration Polish consulates issue visas which enable citizens of those countries to enter Poland and undertake employment.

The number of employers’ declarations of intent to employ a foreigner on the basis of simplified procedure increased from almost 22 thousand in 2007 to 180 thousand in 2010 (by 4 per cent less than in 2009) and 164 thousand in the first half of 2011 (Table 6, Figure 8). As in the previous years, in 2010 Ukrainians constituted the vast majority of foreigners for whom the declaration was made on the basis of this procedure (169 thousand, that is 94 per cent). Further nationalities were the citizens of Moldova (5.9 thousand), Belarus (3.6 thousand), Russia (0.6 thousand) and Georgia (0.5 thousand). In 2010 and the first half of 2011 the main economic sectors represented by the employers were agriculture and the construction sector (Table 6), which explains seasonality of the demand (Figure 8). Further economic sectors of employment were household services and manufacturing, hotels and restaurants. Agencies of temporary work, for which the economic sector remains unspecified, reported intent to employ for a considerable group of foreigners.

Table 6. Number of employers’ declarations of intent to employ a foreigner, by sector of employment, 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic sector</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21 797</td>
<td>156 713</td>
<td>188 414</td>
<td>180 073</td>
<td>163 984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6 431</td>
<td>77 187</td>
<td>122 352</td>
<td>109 603</td>
<td>97 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>5 629</td>
<td>23 949</td>
<td>19 095</td>
<td>20 049</td>
<td>28 789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household services</td>
<td>1 242</td>
<td>8 270</td>
<td>8 791</td>
<td>6 619</td>
<td>5 958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>5 031</td>
<td>3 815</td>
<td>2 585</td>
<td>2 494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2 940</td>
<td>10 071</td>
<td>6 600</td>
<td>6 249</td>
<td>7 542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>4 619</td>
<td>3 041</td>
<td>3 661</td>
<td>3 022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>3 724</td>
<td>3 474</td>
<td>4 091</td>
<td>2 489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary work agencies</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>10 312</td>
<td>11 341</td>
<td>10 999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 229</td>
<td>13 138</td>
<td>11 385</td>
<td>16 217</td>
<td>16 319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(,) No data available.

aData for 2011 from January to June only.

Source: own elaboration based on the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy data.
6.4. Mixed marriages

This section is based on the data derived from the Central Population Register on marriages contracted in Poland between a permanent resident of Poland and a person residing permanently abroad before marriage (of foreign or of Polish nationality).

In general, the number of mixed marriages registered in Poland has been increasing since 2006. In 2010 3,732 marriages were contracted between a resident of Poland and a foreign resident and 86 marriages between both foreign spouses. Those numbers constitute, altogether, only 1.7 per cent of all marriages contracted in Poland, which – again – points to still very low level of immigration to the country. Similarly to previous years, mixed marriages in Poland are contracted more often between a husband residing abroad and a wife residing in Poland (75 per cent). As for a husband from abroad, in 2010 the main sending countries were the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Ireland and France. Interestingly, those countries constitute destinations for Polish emigrants rather than typical origin countries for immigrants trying to settle down in Poland. Therefore, it is highly probable that mixed marriages contracted with a man residing in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Ireland or France concerned mostly Polish emigrants. The opposite situation can be observed in the case of wives from abroad, for whom the main sending countries were Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation. Since those are typical origin countries of immigrants, the mixed marriages contracted with a women residing in Ukraine, Belarus or the Russian Federation concerned mostly immigrants.
6.5. Naturalization and repatriation

The Polish citizenship is based on the *ius sanguinis* rule. Persons who do not have Polish parent(s) dispose of four procedures of acquiring Polish citizenship, open to different categories of foreigners: conferment procedure (with President as a competent authority), acknowledgment procedure (with governor of the region as a competent authority), declaration procedure (with governor of the region as a competent authority) and repatriation procedure. A foreigner willing to obtain the Polish citizenship is obliged to reside incessantly in Poland usually for at least ten years, which is a strict condition and results in a relatively low number of the Polish citizenship acquisitions. The following numbers refer to three procedures of acquiring Polish citizenship: by conferment, acknowledgement and declaration. On the basis of these procedures 1528 persons acquired Polish citizenship in 2007, 1054 in 2008, 2503 in 2009 and 2926 in 2010. The main recipients were citizens of the former USSR: Ukrainians (992 persons in 2010), Belarusians (418), Russians (215), Armenians (101). The Vietnamese and German citizens constituted further major groups (97 and 92, respectively).

The resettlement law constitutes a legislative basis for settling down in Poland and this procedure is open to persons of Polish descent or origin. Officially, there are two possibilities to resettle in Poland: on the basis of the repatriation procedure and on the basis of the Article 52(5) of the Constitution. In practice, there are also numerous cases of persons who have finished studies, begun the economic activity, and use the resettlement procedure to stay in Poland. Just like in the case of naturalization procedure, there are relatively few persons benefiting from the resettlement. The main reason for that are financial constraints related to repatriation to be borne by the Polish local authorities (accommodation and vacant job offers). Thus, after a certain peak in the period 2000-2001 when approximately 1 thousand repatriation visas were issued annually, their number dropped to 204 in 2008, 164 in 2009 and 139 in 2010. Simultaneously, applications for repatriation visas decreased to 178, 240 and 125 (in the years 2008, 2009, 2010). In 2010 the largest group of incoming repatriates originated from Kazakhstan (84), Russian Federation (23), and Ukraine (15).

Due to problems with financing of repatriation other procedures are being more and more often used by persons of Polish descendent willing to live in Poland. The Card of the Pole (according to the Act on the Card of the Pole passed in September 2007) is a document proving the adherence to the Polish nation and it facilitates obtaining further permits for coming and – possibly – settling down in Poland. The following numbers reflect only applications for the Card of the Pole, and not real flows of migrants. Until the end of 2010 approximately 55 thousand applications were submitted (19 046 in 2010). The vast majority of applications has been approved and approximately 40 thousand Cards were granted (18 333 in 2010). Around 90 per cent applications were submitted in Ukraine (app. 29 thousand) and Belarus (app. 20 thousand), followed by Lithuania (3 thousand) and Russia (1.7 thousand). According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the realization of the Polish Act on the Card of the Pole in Belarus is impeded by the local administration.

6.6. Inflow of refugees / asylum seekers

The number of applications for the refugee status has not been stable in recent years: 8.5 thousand in 2008, 10.5 thousand in 2009 and 6.5 thousand in 2010. Also, the number of first applications varied, from 7.2 thousand in 2008 to 9.7 thousand in 2009 and 4.3 thousand in 2010. Similarly to previous year, in 2010 the Russian Federation constituted the main sending country of asylum seekers (73 per cent of all applications). It is presumed that the majority of applicants with the Russian citizenship was constituted by persons declaring Chechen nationality. Another sending country was Georgia (17 per cent), but the number of Georgian applicants was on decrease since 2009 as most of applications were denied as manifestly unfounded.
In 2010 82 persons were granted the refugee status in Poland according to the Geneva Convention, which shows a relevant decrease as compared to the previous years (186 in 2008 and 131 in 2009). There were mostly citizens of Russia (42 persons) and Belarus (19). In the same year only 195 persons got supplementary protection (1 074 in 2008 and 2 316 in 2009), whereas 196 persons were allowed to stay in Poland on the basis of tolerated status (1 507 in 2008 and 65 in 2009). Again, the vast majority of those persons were the citizens of Russia.

Notes

1 Amnesty for foreigners of 2012 is a third regularization action in Poland. The first two took place in 2003 and 2007. Requirements for taking advantage of previous abolitions were much more restrictive.

2 The stock of temporary Polish migrants (defined as explained above) is being estimated on the basis of: the 2002 National census data (basis for the estimation), data on officially registered flows (referring to permanent migrants), data of quarterly Labour Force Survey, and statistics on Polish migrants in destination countries, including administrative data on the number of work registrations, insurance registrations, residence permits, work permits as well as LFS data.

3 The former is open to persons from the Asian part of ex-USRR, the latter to persons from all over the world. The Card of Pole can be available to persons from the all ex-Soviet republics.

References


Przyglądając się półce z książkami każdego badacza migracji, bez względu na to, czy jest on ekonomistą, demografiem, politologiem, antropologiem czy przedstawicielem innych nauk, można na niej znaleźć parę stałych pozycji. Jedną z nich jest The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world, napisana w 1993 roku przez profesorów Stephena Castlesa z University of Sydney i Marka J. Millera z University of Delaware. W tym klasycznym już, obszernym, bo liczącym około 400 stron (w zależności od wydania), dziele można znaleźć charakterystykę współczesnej mobilności ludzi.

Baz danych statystycznych). W czasach powszechnego dostępu do internetu, który aż za często bywa pierwszym miejscem poszukiwań informacji, na pewno istotne jest, żeby nakierować żądanego dalszej wiedzy czytelnika na przydatne strony. I aż się prosi, żeby dopisać w tym miejscu, że polskiemu czytelnikowi na pewno będzie brakować linków do ośrodków badawczych z naszego regionu.

Interesujące są analizy przypadków (case studies) umieszczone na stronie internetowej wydawnictwa, które stanowią znakomitą ilustrację do teorii i analiz zawartych w książce. W papierowym wydaniu wiele podobnych opisów można znaleźć w sarych ramkach, a te na stronie stanowią świetne rozszerzenie materiału. Równie interesującym, choćby jeśli chodzi o kwestie merytoryczne nie tak istotnym, dodatkiem na stronie są zdjęcia pochodzące z granicy meksykańskiej oraz galeria przedstawiająca projekty realizowane w Maroku, w który zaangażowani są migranci powrotni, a także projekt prowadzone przez autorów jako badacza migracji, poprzez udowodnienie, że on „tam był”, że widział na własne oczy elementy procesów, o których pisze.

Strona internetowa książki jest nie tylko zabiegem marketingowym, ale też służy podkreśleniu, że pozycja ta jest prawdziwym podręcznikiem „nowej generacji”, skierowanym do współczesnego studenta, który nie umie się obyć bez komputera i sieci. Na wielu stronach papierowego wydania można znaleźć odnośniki do stron internetowych, sugerowane są miejsca, gdzie można szukać dalszych lektur i danych do analiz. Momentami trudno jest czytać tę książkę nie mając dostępu do internetu, bo lektura kusi i podpowiada, gdzie i jak pogłębiać dalsze studia.

Biorąc do ręki tę, bardzo skąpaną w sztuce wydania książkę, polski czytelnik zastanawia się jednak, czy na pewno się nie pomylił. Polski tytuł Migracje we współczesnym świecie może wzbudzić chwilowy niepokój, czy to na pewno ta książka. Zabrakło pierwszej części tytułu, którą z anglojęzycznego oryginału można by przetłumaczyć jako „era” bądź „wiek migracji”, zwłaszcza, że w tekście znajdują się potem odwołania do tego terminu wprowadzonego przez autorów. Choćby na samym początku rzuca się w oczy zdanie: „Istnieje wiele powodów, by twierdzić, że wiek migracji będzie trwał” (s. 21), które jest oczywistym nawiązaniem do tytułu… którego nie ma. Być może przyjmując taką, a nie inną polską wersję wydawnictwa, choć też tłumaczy, postawiło jednak na podkreślenie przekrojowości pozycji i jej podręcznikowego charakteru. Innym mankamentem polskiego wydania jest nieumiejętność informacji, że znajdujące się na stronie internetowej teksty są dostępne tylko w języku angielskim, zwłaszcza, że odnośniki do tejstrony znajdują się w wielu miejscach książki, a sama strona jest nieodłącznym elementem wydania papierowego. Brak tych tekstów po polsku sprawia, że czytelnik dostaje do pewnego stopnia „wybrakowane” dzieło. Polskiemu wydawcy można by jeszcze wytnąć, że zapomniał o indeksie rzeczowym, elemencie, od którego (oprócz przejrzenia bibliografii) często zaczyna się „przygodę” z książką.

Polskiego odbiorca zapewne szczególnie zainteresują procesy zachodzące w naszym regionie. Tej tematyce poświęcony jest niezbyt obszerny rozdział (s. 147-151), który skróciło, ale rzetelnie opisuje sytuację w latach 1990. i po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej. Czytając jednak książkę od deski do deski można natknąć się na zdania takie jak: „W UE swoboda przemieszczania się nie pociągnęła za sobą masowych przepływów ludności na stałe” (s. 96), które stoi w sprzeczności z tym, co można przeczytać dalej w rozdziale poświęconym Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Wydaje się, że to pozostalość po wcześniejszych – przed rozszerzenia UE – wydaniach książki, kiedy rzeczywiście to zdanie było prawdziwe. Brakować też może bardziej konkretnej informacji o migracji sezonowej z naszego regionu do krajów Europy Zachodniej i Południowej. Zjawisko to zauważa się jest raptem kilkoma zdaniami w różnych częściach książki. W dodatku po przeczytaniu fragmentu, że m.in. Niemcy są
Tematem książki są kariery zawodowe współczesnych migrantów z Polski, ujmowane poprzez analizę mobilności na rynku pracy i przebiegu ich ścieżek zawodowych. Badając te zagadnienia Autorka nadaje szczególne znaczenie czynnikom kształtującym zarówno kariery zawodowe, jak i migracje, dzieląc je dychotomicznie na wynikające ze struktury społecznej oraz z podmiotowego sprawstwa (agency). Wskazanie tych grup czynników, ich opis oraz ukazanie powiązań pomiędzy nimi niewątpliwie jest oryginalnym wkładem I. Grabowskiej-Lusińskiej w teorię i metodologię badań migracyjnych. Walorem pracy jest również próba skonfrontowania wskaźników mobilności zawodowej charakteryzujących migrantów oraz „nie-migrantów”, wywodzących się z tych samych społeczności lokalnych, co migrujący za granicę. Przyjęcie takiej perspektywy komparatystycznej wydaje się koniecznością wynikającą z charakteru istniejących badań (przede wszystkich zrealizowanych przez Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), z których Autorka zaczerpnęła dane do swojej książki. Niezależnie od tego, perspektywa społeczności lokalnych może być również uznana za szczególnie przydatną w badaniach migracyjnych.

Celem badań było jednak przede wszystkim ustalenie znaczenia migracji w życiu zawodowym osób podejmujących wyjazdy do pracy za granicą. Ten zamysł badawczy należy uznać za kolejny oryginalny wkład Autorki w problematykę badań migracyjnych, włącznie z zaproponowaną klasyfikacją kontekstu migracyjnego mobilności zawodowej, wyróżniającą jego cztery znaczenia: utrwalacza, przypadku, eksploracji i projektu. Przyjęte metafory ukazują bardzo zróżnicowane oddziaływanie migracji na przebieg karier zawodowych migrantów – mało znaczącego epizodu do elementu spójnie z planowanej drogi zawodowej.

Oprócz wskazanych osiągnięć badawczych za równie wartościową w monografii należy uznać imponującą inwentaryzację badań oraz literatury naukowej poświęconych ważnym i powiązanym ze sobą zagadnieniom okołomigracyjnym, przede wszystkim strukturze społecznej i agency (według

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W polskiej literaturze socjologicznej niewątpliwie mamy do czynienia z niedostatkami refleksji teoretycznej dotyczącej szeroko rozumianych zjawisk migracji, która od początku transformacji systemowej w Polsce jest ważnym strukturalnym zjawiskiem społecznym. Ten niedostatek dotyka szczególnie problemu migracji w kontekście podejmowania i przebiegu kariery zawodowych. Pomysł wypełnienia tej luki należy przyjąć z uznaniem, wskazując również na sprawność jego realizacji przez Izabelę Grabowską-Lusińską w wydanej przez Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar książce Migrantów ścieżki zawodowe „bez granic”, odnoszącej się do wspomnianego zjawiska ze styku uczestnictwa w rynku pracy i migracji zagranicznych. Warto powtórzyć za Autorką, że zawartą w tytule książki metaforę należy odnosić do przekraczania nie tylko granic terytorialnych, lecz także życiowych (mentalnych).
Autorka „potencjalnie” alternatywnym modelom wyznaczającym aktywność zawodową i migracyjną, a także mobilności i karier zawodowej. Opis zróżnicowanych perspektyw teoretycznych tych terminów oraz ich zastosowania w podejmowanych na świecie badaniach jest najpełniejszy w polskim piśmiennictwie naukowym. Wiele z tych konceptów oraz wyników badań zostało po raz pierwszy zaprezentowanych polskiemu czytelnikowi.


Na uznanie zasługuje jasna i spójna koncepcja monografii. Autorka konsekwentnie rozwija narrację naukową w pięciu logicznie skonstruowanych rozdziałach (z których każdy kończy się zwięźłym podsumowaniem), omawiając kolejno: powiązania pomiędzy koncepcjami wpływu struktury społecznej i podmiotowego sprawstwa na kariery zawodowe migrantów (rozdział I), metodologię badań karier zawodowych migrantów (rozdział II), mobilność przestrzenną i zawodową migrantów z Polski na tle profili zawodowych „nie-migrantów” (dokonując przy tym krytycznej prezentacji istniejących na ten temat danych oraz uwzględniając w porównaniach wszystko dostępne zmienne społeczno-demograficzne, m.in. związane z plecią, wiekiem, kwalifikacjami, pochodzeniem z określonego typu miejscowości, czasem i rodzajem migracji – rozdział III), typy karier zawodowych migrantów według dostępnych danych ilościowych (rozdział IV) oraz – na koniec – znaczenie migracji zagranicznych w życiu zawodowym migrantów w oparciu o wyniki badań zastanych i własnych badań jakościowych, ukazujących rolę agency w zjawiskach migracyjnych (rozdział V). Dobrym, i jak się wydaje, metodologicznie niekontrowersyjnym pomysłem, jest zastosowanie przy tym podejścia APF (Applied Theory Formation - czyli kształtowania koncepcji teoretycznych przez adaptację już istniejących) w porównywaniu roli czynników wynikających ze struktury społecznej oraz podmiotowego sprawstwa w dociekania na temat relacji pomiędzy mobilnością zawodową i migracjami.

Recenzencka dyskusja z Autorką może odnosić się do kilku spraw o charakterze metodologicznym. Najważniejszą z nich jest chyba nadmierne wyostrzenie dychotomii pomiędzy przedstawianymi w rozdziale I teoretycznymi modelami: strukturą społeczną oraz podmiotową, jako agregatami czynników określających przebieg karier zawodowych i mobilność przestrzenną migrantów. W świetle zaprezentowanego przeglądu autorskich koncepcji przypisanych do jednego lub drugiego modelu, tego rodzaju rozróżnienie nie jest całkowite. Nie jest takie w tym znaczeniu, że nie występują poglądy na temat całkowitego zdeterminowania omawianych zjawisk przez czynniki strukturalne ani też – z drugiej strony – dowodzące całkowitego woluntaryzmu decyzji jednostek, w odwrocie od struktury społecznej, w którą są one uwikłane. Nawet we wzmiankowanym podejściu marksistowskim (a zatem mocno deterministycznym) oddziaływanie struktury społecznej nie jest czymś zasadniczo odseparowanym od wpływu jednostki. Tym niemniej Autorka formułuje zarzut (m.in. pod adresem D. Masseya), że w badaniach niewystarczająco akcentowana jest autonomia mechanizmów związanych z podmiotową sprawstwem bądź strukturą. Na pewnym poziomie refleksji teoretycznej można się z tym zgodzić, można jednak również pozostać przy poglądzie, że zaproponowany przez Autorkę kompromis pomiędzy paradygmatami podmiotowego i przedmiotowego sprawstwa, w postaci „podmiotowego sprawstwa w ramach struktury społecznej”, w rzeczywistości nie modyfikuje zasadniczo teoretycznych stanowisk większości cytowanych autorów,
niekiedy – jak się wydaje – tylko umownie przypisanych modelowi struktury. W tych koncepcjach (np. A. Giddensa) rola agency jest zasadniczo „wtopiona” w oddziaływanie struktury.

Kolejnym zagadnieniem, które wydaje się istotne, jest chyba nadmierne uproszczenie podziału podziału na „migrantów” i „nie-migrantów” w badanych społecznościach lokalnych. Owi „nie-migranci” są traktowani jako względnie jednolita kategoria przeciwstawiana migrującym za granicę w celach zarobkowo-zawodowych, podczas gdy w badanych społecznościach z pewnością są również osoby migrujące w tych samych celach, tyle że w obrębie kraju. Włączanie ich do grupy „nie-migrantów” wydaje się niesłuszne, ponieważ można im, przynajmniej częściowo, przypisać podobne cechy i postawy jak migrantom zewnętrznym.

Szczególnie po akcesji Polski do Unii Europejskiej i stopniowym otwieraniu jej rynków pracy dla obywateli polskich, czasowe wyjazdy zagraniczne stały się łatwiejsze i jednocześnie dla wielu planujących migrację mieszkańców wsi i niewielkich miast (z tzw. trudnych rynków pracy) konkurencyjne w obszarze poszukiwania miejsca pracy i zamieszkania w dużych miastach w Polsce. W kontekście warunków stwarzanych przez późną nowoczesność i globalizację, do których Autorka często się odwołuje, warto zauważyć, że w wypadku obywateli polskich po 2004 roku, podobnie jak i obywateli innych państw członkowskich UE, migracje ekonomiczne w obrębie Wspólnoty stają się coraz mniej specyficznych rodzajem ekonomicznie motywowanej ruchliwości społecznej, a przede wszystkim językowych, kulturowych, a także klasowych i generacyjnych, co stwarza warunki dla konieczności zmiany modelu struktury.

Zgadzając się z Autorką, że na współczesnym, dużo bardziej niż wcześniej zglobalizowanym, rynku pracy tradycyjne koncepcje pracy trudniej jest odróżnić, należy jednak mieć wątpliwości, czy należy całkowicie rezygnować z branża pod uwagę tego wymiaru ruchliwości społecznej – także w wypadku migrantów. Nielatwo jest bez zastrzeżeń podzielić pogląd, że w związku z otwartością współczesnych struktur społecznych trudno obiektywnie ocenić, czy dana osoba doświadczyła awansu, czy degradacji zawodowej. Występują wprawdzie przypadki, gdy o taką ocenę jest istotnie trudno, wydaje się jednak, że w większości sytuacji można takie wartościowanie przeprowadzić w sposób obiektywny i względnie łatwy. Pomijanie wskaźników mobilności zawodowej „w górę” i „w dół” może być usprawiedliwiane głównie brakiem odpowiednich danych. Odwoływanie się przy tym do subiektywnych ocen respondentów nie jest w stanie zrekompensować rezynacji z obiektywnych kryteriów awansu zawodowego, a jedynie może uzupełnić wyniki badań o sferę życiową wartości respondentów oraz poziom ich samopoczucia w związku z podejmowaniem (lub nie) migracji związanych z pracą. Natomiast ze względu metodologicznych należy to traktować jako zbyt daleko idące uproszczenie, mające wpływ na wyniki badań i formułowane wnioski. Wyłączenie ruchliwości wertykalnej z mobilności zawodowej przy jednoczesnym nadawaniu relatywnie dużego znaczenia przesunięciom między krajowym i zagranicznym rynek pracy (opóźnienia oraz segmentami gospodarki oraz między sferą bierności i aktywności zawodowej – co nie budzi wątpliwości) może – w niewielkiej części przypadków karier zawodowych – prowadzić do mylnych wniosków o większej adaptacyjności do wymagań rynku pracy, podczas gdy w rzeczywistości mamy do czynienia z ponawianymi z różnym skutkiem próbami jakiegokolwiek zaistnienia na tym rynku.
zawodowego (a także degradacji) jako pionowego kierunku ruchliwości zawodowej. Ogólny wniosek na temat pozytywnej roli nowych karier zawodowych (w których Autorka szczegółowe znaczenie przyznaje migracjom, ale tylko zagranicznym) występuje się chyba nadmiernie prosty – że populacja „nie-migrantów” jest w miejscu wysyłającym bardziej stabilna pod względem zawodowym niż populacja osób migrujących za granicę. Można się zastanawiać, jaka jest wartość eksplanacyjna takiego stwierdzenia, skoro przy przyjętych wskaźnikach mobilności zawodowej migracje zagraniczne z definicji godzą w tak ujmowaną „stabilność” karier zawodowych. Kolejna uwaga, że sama migracja może, choćby na chwilę, wyrwać ludzi z lokalnej, często pozornej, stabilności wymaga – moim zdaniem – uzupełnienia o stwierdzenie, że nie chodzi o wszelkie migracje zagraniczne „jako takie”, tzn. bez brania pod uwagę ich celu, przebiegu i skutków, a także konsekwencji dla dotychczasowej sytuacji zawodowej. Warto wrócić do poruszanego już wcześniej wątku, że nie tylko migracje zagraniczne „wyrwają” ludzi z takiej „pozornej stabilności”, a co więcej, nadmiernie mechaniczne traktowanie „zmienności karier” nie zawsze wiąże się z korzyściami w wymiarze jednostkowym. Przyjmując kryterium intensywności migracji mamy w Polsce do czynienia ze społecznościami lokalnymi, w tym także z większymi regionami, w których zagraniczne migracje zarobkowe od pokoleń są niemalże aktywnością nawykową (np. Opolszczyzna, Podhale). Sądzę, że przynajmniej tam, i przynajmniej w odniesieniu do części migrantów, rezygnacja ze strategii życiowych opartych na migracjach sezonowych czy cyrkulacyjnych oraz podjęcie „stabilnej” kariery np. przedsiębiorcy w lokalnym układzie gospodarczym byłaby odpowiednikiem zalecanych wzorców nowej kariery zawodowej.

Zasygnalizowane problemy nie wyczerpują zagadnień, dla których warto jest podjąć dyskusję z Autorką, a tym samym sięgnąć po Jej książkę. Sądzę, że powinna ona stać się lekturą dla wszystkich zainteresowanych zjawiskami migracji z Polski, nie tylko socjologów. Efekt pracy I. Grabowskiej-Lusińskiej należy bowiem ocenić bardzo pozytywnie, biorąc pod uwagę zakres i spójność przeprowadzonych analiz oraz zasadność prezentowanych wniosków. Oprócz wskazanych uzasadnień naukowych, walorem ocenianej monografii jest również to, że jest ona napisana ze swadą, bardzo dobrym językiem polskim, co powoduje, że czyta się ją nie tylko z pożytkiem, ale i przyjemnością.